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This present collection of essays and research reports by 14 academic 
commentators and senior practitioners brings together a diverse set of 
contributors unified in the belief that reform initiatives are imperative for better 
government and public policy. All these contributions have connections with 
ANZSOG — the Australia and New Zealand School of Government, established 
in 2002–03 as an innovative collaboration between the Australian and New 
Zealand governments and a range of prestigious universities across both 
countries. Some of the essays were commissioned research papers by experts 
in the field on topics of multi-jurisdictional concern, others were research 
papers in which ANZSOG played a role and that were subsequently presented 
to ANZSOG for publication, and others were first given as keynote speeches 
at public events hosted by ANZSOG or involving ANZSOG staff members. Of 
the 14 contributors, eight are academics by profession (at various stages, five 
have been members of ANZSOG faculty), and six are senior executives with 
wide-ranging government experience. They each approach their topic with 
critical engagement, providing constructive suggestions and recommendations 
for future reform. 
This title, New Accountabilities, New Challenges, is the latest in the ANU Press/
ANZSOG series which now runs to over 40 titles covering diverse areas of public 
policy and administration. (ANZSOG also publishes web-based occasional 
papers, often with jurisdictional partners.) It is the fourth collection of essays 
ANU Press and ANZSOG have published since the series began in 2006. The 
first was A Passion of Policy: Essays in public sector reform (2007), the second 
Improving Implementation: Organisational change and project management 
(2007), and the third was Critical Reflections on Australian Public Policy: Selected 
essays (2009). Each of these previous collections has been well received and 
consistently attracted high downloads. I am sure that this collection will not 
disappoint readers, and feel confident that it will surpass the take-up and 
dissemination accorded to the earlier collections. I commend the volume of 
essays to our stakeholders and readers and look forward to the debates it will 
undoubtedly stimulate.
Professor John Wanna
Sir John Bunting Chair in Public Administration, RSSS, ANU, and National 
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1. Introduction — Embracing New 
Accountabilities, Confronting New 
Challenges: Canvassing options for 
next generation improvements
John Wanna
For several decades now Australian governments have been increasingly active in 
policy-making across traditional as well as new policy sectors, yet often remain 
ineffective in dealing with some of the more intransigent social and economic 
problems our nation faces. Governments seem unable to solve or mitigate the 
inherent problems in many specific areas of policy responsibility, such as child 
welfare and protection; dignified aged care (especially for the frail and aged); 
dealing with Indigenous well-being and closing the gap between Indigenous 
health indicators and those of the wider community; the management of mental 
health problems and care of those afflicted; dealing with chronic substance abuse 
across generations; the provision of effective education and health services; 
delivering sustainable energy and reducing carbon emissions; and improving 
environmental management and mitigating climate change and preparing for 
adaptation. This is just to name a few of these intractable policy problems of 
limited effectiveness. 
However, despite recent rhetoric about the end of the age of entitlement, there is 
no evidence of a lack of appetite among either politicians or government officials 
in addressing areas they feel need attention — including behavioural change 
and forms of social engineering. Although politicians and media commentators 
like to think that the real motivation for this activity is entirely down to rising 
electoral expectations (see Tingle 2012), politicians and senior officials are also to 
blame for fanning such demands. Arguably there is more supply-side willingness 
to increase state responsibilities than demand-side expectations. Even in fiscally 
stringent times, governments have continued to demonstrate a real propensity 
to commit to long-term unfunded liabilities (their so-called ‘signature projects’), 
locking in future governments and parliaments to generous funding plans 
conceived in today’s opportunistic politics. There is still a mentality of ‘let’s 
try to fix everything’ among the political elite, arguably guided today less by 
ideology and more by a desire to be seen to be doing something and to spawn 
legacy initiatives. There is also an attitude within government that substantial 
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funding cannot be withdrawn from existing programs, even from those that 
may be of dubious worth, and that we will continue pouring good money after 
bad, even into programs that are not working well. 
In making this critique of public policy, we need not go so far as to agree with 
the former US President Ronald Reagan when he asserted in his presidential 
campaign of 1980 that governments are the problem, not the solution. But we 
should recognise that governments often contribute towards the dimensions 
of the problem, and can make problems worse by their actions or inaction. 
Governments have their own serious limitations which often prevent them from 
optimising outcomes, and many analysts from within and without government 
have limited confidence that governments will get it right or do what is best. 
Governments can do great good, but they can also do great harm and damage the 
sectors they think they are assisting.
Dealing with policy issues: Pros and cons
In terms of policy effectiveness, governments are best equipped to deal with issues 
when they can be standardised or lend themselves to routine administration 
(such as taxation, entitlement provision, customs and quarantine, licences, 
passport control, etc.); they perform worst when they are faced with great 
complexity and uncertainty, non-routine problems, and unexpected events. 
Many important areas of public policy are more associated with the latter cluster 
of highly complex issues than the former routinised ones.
In addition to the limitations on government per se, we should also remember 
that we have multiple and competing governments in Australia, further 
complicating the picture. There are nine separate ‘sovereign’ governments 
in Australia, each with their own spheres of jurisdiction, constituencies and 
interests (and each with their own political oppositions). There are also 560 
local jurisdictions with the closest relationships to the community at the ground 
level. These myriad jurisdictions continually interfere and encroach upon the 
policy responsibilities of the others in a fluid interface of ‘contested federalism’, 
sometimes labelled ‘pragmatic federalism’ (see Hollander and Patapan 2007). 
This makes any semblance of overall national coordination of a policy area 
difficult and protracted, and consistency is seen as a holy grail.
Australia is not alone in wrestling with these strategic, structural and 
implementation issues of governance. Globally, many other jurisdictions suffer 
from this same malaise. Europe is constantly wrestling with the competing 
demands of consistency versus diversity. America and Canada are similarly 
afflicted — with near-autonomous sub-national jurisdictions much more 
locally powerful than Australian states. New Zealand, with a unitary system of 
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government, still has considerable local autonomy and discretion at the municipal 
level, especially in its provincial cities. Latin America has a long tradition of 
municipal and provincial government where regions can actively engage in 
public policy agendas relatively unconstrained by equity considerations.
To put it in a nutshell, public policy frameworks established by government 
can serve as initiators of change but also as impediments to change, with 
governments reacting, following, over-regulating, and seeking to control, but 
prevented from acting decisively. The relationship between policy settings and 
social change is a complex and often contradictory one, where governments 
can, at best, seek to facilitate change rather than lead and drive it. In many 
important ways, governments and their policies or laws provide the background 
context in which other drivers of change can take the initiative. Governments 
can provide some stability and continuities, offer certainties, guarantees, 
incentives, and impose penalties, which are important bedrocks to a modern 
functioning economy and society. They can mitigate sovereign risk by abiding 
by the rule of law, preserving institutional integrity, treating cases fairly and 
equally, providing some assurances of respect that are fundamental to social 
and economic planning, personal and group commitments, honouring ongoing 
agreements, purchases and investments, and so on. There is a fundamental role 
for government in regulating markets, especially in ‘thin’ markets and social 
areas (moving into the future, this may be more inter-jurisdictional and involve 
hybrid/voluntary forms, with government providing regulatory frameworks 
supplemented by self-regulation and conduct monitoring — health, professions, 
media, education, sport, advertising, consumer issues). 
Yet we frequently overestimate the capacity of governments to plan strategically 
and achieve their intended objectives. As a comparatively ‘statist’ society, 
many Australians generally prefer to view governments as contributing to the 
‘solution’ benignly and constructively — it is our domestic Weltanschauung. But 
governments often disappoint, perhaps because they cannot find or settle upon 
a given solution, (or, if one is found, because they cannot impose that solution 
on its constituents), and sometimes they cannot even win agreement about what 
the nature of the problem is. Governments have a great theoretical or normative 
potentiality for doing good and assisting good governance. Yet they often shirk 
their responsibilities to drive appropriate policy responses, offering second- or 
third-best compromises with predictable flaws. There are many possible reasons 
for this. They may not know what to do in a given circumstance, or find it hard 
to work out a practical solution amid all the competing pressures, or maybe they 
announce a solution but then find it impossible to agree on a course of action 
and stick with it. They may be too timid or reticent, too swayed by expedient 
politics, or too torn between competing alternatives. Sometimes governments 
may ‘think’ they know what they want to change in policy terms but be unable 
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to carry it off and impose or facilitate their solution. Or they may be blocked by 
other powerful socio-economic forces and prevented from acting. The famous 
US policy analyst Peter Hall (1993) offers some persuasive scenarios explaining 
the various configurations governments find themselves in when confronted 
with dimensions of policy change. He argued that first order, second order and 
third order changes arise in ascending order from routine adjustments (first 
order) to changes in policy instruments (second order), to changing goals (third 
order), with each magnitude of change attracting different intensities of political 
contestation.
So, what’s wrong with existing government 
and the public provision they provide?
In order to consider future reforms and improvements in the quality of 
governance and public policy outcomes, we need to examine more carefully 
the core attributes and capacities of existing government provision and the 
respective policy frames on which they rely. Governments have considerable 
baggage and bring past path dependencies to bear on current and future 
problems. Internally, governments have gradually changed from being 
traditional command hierarchies with limited responsibilities to broader 
institutional actors negotiating with policy networks, navigating complex 
relations with stakeholders, breeding interdependencies and engaging in shared 
responsibilities, but they still seek to operate in traditional command ways as if 
the landscape has not altered substantially (whether intentionally or by default). 
It is a modern conundrum that is sometimes difficult to fathom. In many social 
and economic sectors, as will be discussed below, governments feel that they 
have to collaborate in order to provide services (co-produce, co-design, co-
deliver, etc.), but have not acquired the necessary skills and capabilities to be 
able to do so successfully and effectively, and their bureaucratic and traditional 
accountabilities may act as a gravitational pull against such endeavours.
Critiques of government as an institutional entity, and especially of its capacities 
to deliver effective policy, tend to commence with the observation that it is 
shaped by democratically elected governments (party regimes), but then focus 
on the limiting cultures and perverse incentives it operates with, in addition to 
the traditional ways in which public provision and public policies are structured 
and managed. A brief critique of the present state of Australian government is 
likely to include the following elements.
First, our governments are subservient to the political cycle. They are dominated 
by short-term calculations and are reactive and responsive to immediate 
electoral pressures. Governments tend to regard citizens as ‘immediate bounded 
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rationalists’, interested primarily in instant gratification rather than long-term 
planning and preparation for future contingencies. Voters are thought to have a 
short attention span and politicians continually pander to it. At the same time, 
governments find it hard to interest the electorate in long-term issues and do 
not tend to invest much time or leadership acumen in educating or strategically 
directing policy issues of greater scope.
Second, governments are motivated and incentivised by popularity in ways that 
erode resilience and sustainability. Their concern with popularity limits their 
horizons and attention spans and reinforces the imperatives to surrender to the 
24/7 media cycle. They rarely act deliberately in ways that threaten to erode 
populism or will make them deeply unpopular. This proclivity to seek popularity 
and be well-liked places a straitjacket around the kinds of issues governments 
are willing to address or engage with, including any possible solutions than can 
be considered and implemented. For example, constantly increasing the aged 
pension according to movements in average male earnings from generic taxation 
(consolidated revenue) is very popular among this older, welfare-dependent 
constituency, but does not particularly help provide sustainable incomes for 
growing numbers of older Australians into the future.
Third, majoritarian political systems are usually adversarial in political and policy 
terms. Successive governments can unpick the reforms of their predecessors. 
The ‘winner takes all’ philosophy is problematic for good policy development, 
and there is little effort invested in building consensus with opponents or rival 
political entities. There are many areas of wasted policy legacies — policies 
discontinued, dismantled, aborted, undermined, or entirely reconfigured. 
Adversarial systems tend to build distrust and scepticism of government and 
temporary policy solutions.
Fourth, in considering policy options, governments generally tend to be 
overly cautious and risk-averse. They are expedient and prone to back-sliding, 
especially if they meet resistance and the going gets tough (recent examples 
include the much mooted emissions trading scheme, the mining super profits 
tax, and the issue of substantial tax reform).
Fifth, many parts of the public sector have insufficient or inadequate capacities 
to perform the things asked of them. Jurisdictions are inward-looking, self-
regarding and self-referential. Departments and agencies remain too insular, 
risk-averse, complacent, hide-bound and unwilling to embrace transformational 
change. Enduring bureaucratic norms and hierarchical authorities prevail in 
administrative systems, often working to narrow ministerial agendas, nervous 
of offending the political echelons, and staffed by those interested in time-
serving rather than entrepreneurial activity. Agencies still tend to comply in 
perfunctory ways when reporting their activities or performances. Recruitment 
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patterns have made public services more diverse and representative of the 
community, but because they still operate on conventions of a career service, 
flexibility and responsiveness have arguably been reduced in some sectors.
Sixth, governments have gradually denuded most of their internal organic 
research capacities and much of their policy capacities (collective memory, 
operational knowledge, technical capacities). They are left to search various 
external sources of research for policy-relevant works (for example, universities, 
think tanks, consultants, other jurisdictions, and even consulting Google). But 
these administrators may not have the analytical capacities to make the best 
choices when confronted with raw data, predigested options, or a range of 
alternatives. 
Seventh, governments suffer from declining trust in public institutions and 
community disaffection. Despite appealing to populism, there are mounting 
arguments worldwide that many advanced democracies suffer from the malaise 
of ‘democratic deficits’ — which can exacerbate disaffection, alienation, social 
exclusion, de-legitimacy, political protests and social unrest — and a widespread 
perception that the political system increasingly represents and serves a narrow 
set of interests. If this leads to people disengaging from society and public 
life, then governments face greater problems trying to re-engage with these 
disaffected or marginalised cohorts. Cleavages marked by welfare dependency, 
regionalism, race or ethnicity may further exacerbate these issues.
Is cultural transformation necessary for the 
public sector?
Many of the impediments that afflict our current public bureaucracies and 
public providers are not insurmountable or unsolvable. But they will require 
governments to undertake various systemic transformations of structure, 
substance and process. Systemic changes will need to be made to the political 
regime, a movement away from command-driven cultures based on ministerial 
responsibility to empowering cultures based on learning and improvement. 
Public sector cultures of risk avoidance and blame-shifting are likely to be 
superseded with cultures of capacity-building and achievement-orientation, 
with policy workers more willing to explore other approaches to getting 
results, such as experimental policy-making. Traditional, narrow notions 
of public accountability (based on punitive rule-subservience and negative 
sanctions based on ‘gotcha’ logics) will need to be replaced by performance 
answerabilities and more generous reward and incentive structures for success. 
Within the administrative systems of policy-making, this will require something 
of a revolution in managerial thinking, capacity-calibration and organisational 
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learning. This, in turn, will impact on many of the standard operating procedures 
and administrative routines of the entire public sector, such as organisational 
design incorporating networks; more externally focused management practices; 
more scope for outsourcing, working with partnerships and developing hybrid 
delivery systems; greater emphasis on stakeholders, recipients and clients, and 
the management of relationships with civil society; wider recruitment processes 
and lateral hiring of staff; more diverse career development trajectories; more 
outward-bound staff training and executive development; and performance 
review and management conceived of as outcome and impact assessments. 
The Public Sector Research Centre, a private sector think-tank sponsored by 
the accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, has recently identified a future 
set of different cultural and operational norms for government and our patterns 
of governance (Public Sector Research Centre 2013). It sees a broad set of 
transformations with the old statist/public administrative modes of government 
giving way and being superseded by new roles and relationships, new 
organisational norms and characteristics, new ways of organising and reviewing 
services, and new ways of incorporating the community as co-designers and co-
producers of services. While improving policy and implementation effectiveness, 
some of these transformations may be undoubtedly more costly in the short-
term (and run counter to current fiscal pressures), although in the longer-term 
greater benefits may eventually flow to the community. Its projections can be 
summarised as follows: 
Old governments 
moving from:
New governance moving to: Explanatory comment
Citizens under control Citizens in control Decentred, empowering citizens 
and community with meaningful 
control 
Governing for citizens Governing with citizens Two-way interdependency and 
multiple initiations of policy and 
delivery systems
Organisational 
silos with discrete 
responsibilities
Organisation networks 
with multiple shared 
responsibilities
Porous agencies, working through/
with others, shared responsibilities 
Public sector 
organisations as big, 
all-in-one behemoths
Public sector organisations 
as small, flexible purpose-
driven entities
Breakdown of autarky and 
monopoly, and replacement 




Governments as service 
facilitator/broker/
commissioning agent
Different role for governments and 




Governments and citizens 
owning outcomes
Greater community discretion 
and outcome setting, replacing 
governments calling all the shots









and intended impacts 
qualitatively
Substantive quantitative and 




Mutual collaboration based 
on trust
Self-organising relationships for 
mutual benefit
Trust in the ‘strong, 
decisive leader’
Trust in each other and 
co-producers, the ‘servant 
leader’
Governments performing 
coordinating role rather than 
directing role 
This chart can be interpreted in at least two ways. It can be understood as 
suggesting that older styles of organisational management will be replaced by 
newer styles and cultures, or it can be interpreted as anticipating that newer 
styles of management will co-exist with older styles, supplementing each other 
and producing new synergies. Many will argue that there will always be some 
role for traditional hierarchic forms of administration and standardised delivery 
chains. But inevitably the newer cultures of governance and administration will 
challenge and erode the principles of traditional administration in the search for 
different outcomes. 
Speaking from today’s vantage point, despite these predictions of major 
transformational change (the supposed future ‘nirvana’), governments are 
clearly a long way off such root-and-branch recalibrations. There is much talk 
of new governance models, but less actual progress on the ground. Somewhat 
contradictorily, there may be ample evidence to suggest that there has been 
some clawing back of more flexible and experimental managing styles in order 
to restore traditional accountabilities. Complacency still has its adherents, and 
some traditional public administrators (especially ministers) would still consider 
these transformational imperatives and opportunities as subversive cultures 
threatening old style administration. Hence, when looking across the entire 
public sector — from schools to hospitals, from central to line agencies, and 
from regulatory to delivery agencies — large parts of the existing public sector 
are not ‘transformation ready’ in the terms outlined above. 
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Government still retains resilience and some 
comparative advantages, but recalibration is 
necessary to progress in the future
Governments remain resourceful actors with a plethora of potentially 
powerful policy instruments and command powers at their disposal (including 
expenditures and program funding, taxation and fines, authorisations 
and enforcement powers, tax expenditures or concessions, legislation and 
regulations, direct provision and ownership, indirect provision and contractual 
engagement, and educational, promotional and marketing campaigns). These 
instruments are mostly deployed in immediate policy delivery rather than in 
anticipating future long-term needs, although there are successful examples 
of longer-term planning (such as superannuation, and educational completion 
targets at Year 12 and tertiary levels). Australian governments tend to use and 
deploy an ad hoc mix of instruments and powers, not necessarily optimising 
their effectiveness or impact. For instance, governments across the federal‒
state divide are not generally good at identifying key intervention points — 
identifying which instruments at their disposal will be most effective to use and 
which can make the greatest desired impact. 
Governments can create the conditions upon which we are able to plan and 
anticipate future needs and constraints. This is a facilitating role, bringing 
expertise and needs together. To date, governments have not necessarily been 
good at this role and many of their formal attempts have become politicised, 
ineffective or were soon overtaken by events (for example, the Commission for 
the Future in 1980s, EPAC in the 1980s, the 2020 Summit of 2008, many state 
government future planning scenarios, the ‘Big Australia’ debates, and future 
workforce projection exercises variously produced by Commonwealth agencies). 
Long-term planning may be one area where governments can fulfil an essential 
role in bringing various players and voices together while mediating the longer-
term public interest. 
As the initiators of major strategic planning exercises, governments need 
to build in more adaptability and agility to future policy stances. There are 
good techniques for environmental scanning and scenario building/projection 
testing. Governments should produce projections and intended plans (budgets, 
employment estimates and housing forecasts, etc.) as a range of most likely 
forecasts (based on variable assumptions and calculations), not as artificially 
definitive numbers producing linear trends. At present, many of these 
documents are produced to make governments look good rather than to provide 
realistic assessments of projected circumstances.
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Governments accordingly have a responsibility in agenda-setting, defining the 
issues we ought to be talking about and wrestling with solutions and options (a 
form of social ‘mind-setting’). Traditional institutions that could play this role 
(for example, various parliaments and parliamentary committees, government 
departments, university research centres, and think tanks) have often been 
disappointing or episodic in their attention, so we tend to rely on specialised 
bodies with defined mandates (for example, Productivity Commission, Climate 
Commission/Council, the Inter-Generational Report exercise, the former 
Indicative Council, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare), but most 
of these relate solely to economic, fiscal or population issues. There is scope to 
broaden these commission-type bodies to provide greater strategic direction, 
but the problem will always be the question over their substantive connection 
to existing policy-making processes and the priorities of the government of 
the day. On future agendas, governments need to relax their ‘control’ urges 
and allow different players to make different cases — encouraging radically 
different scenarios to be thought through and evaluated (through peer review 
processes directed at learning, not necessarily formal performance reporting). 
For example, in Australia with its vast land mass, we might like to encourage 
our states and regions to go in different directions and adopt different scenarios 
in order to evaluate their respective effectiveness in anticipating future needs.
Governments are becoming far more technologically sophisticated. The 
‘technology can transform government’ movement is very strong in countries 
such as the US, Canada, Europe, and Singapore. The same is true in the areas 
of e-health, educational access and online delivery, one-entry portals, social 
media, and ‘open government’, where the bounds of public authority are 
porous and deliberations take place through joint collaborations. Having said 
that, while the promise of tech-enabled governance is clearly conceivable, the 
actual achievements to date have been generally disappointing.
Governments need to invest in consensual approaches where decisions are 
enriched by different voices and perspectives, and can stand the test of time. 
They need to promote community-wide dialogues over problems, issues and 
directions, bringing the various political parties to the table and moving 
towards shared objectives and outcomes. We need to develop notions of shared 
ownership of problems and their proposed solutions, while allowing scope for 
some diversity of options. 
Governments need to facilitate change by welcoming greater experimental 
governance (see Charles Sabel’s works on this — Sabel and Zeitlin 2010; see also 
Albury 2011), learning by doing, and greater autonomy for frontline deliverers/
providers/teachers/trainers in many policy areas: social disadvantage, schooling, 
technical education, higher education, and job-readiness. Experiments with 
behavioural economics (as is occurring in NSW at present in relation to job-
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readiness and employability) are worth monitoring and developing where they 
are effective. Experimentation and innovation are likely to require a greater role 
for professionally trained people with relevant technical and specialist skills 
(in delivering services in areas of health, education, social policy and welfare). 
In operational terms, governments will face many workforce challenges in 
their own sphere of employment and engagement of myriad human resources 
(including contractual provision, greater reliance on part-time and casual 
workers, and volunteers). They will need to be ‘faster’ in responding to 
changing needs and developments, and as a result they will require flatter 
organisational structures, more streamlined capacities, more agile abilities, and 
more technological capabilities. There is much scope for closer engagement with 
the community and non-government actors through co-design procedures, co-
delivery, co-production and the techniques of behavioural economics — if only 
governments were prepared to accept that they will inevitably have to share the 
risks and rewards and open up policy processes to a wider range of inputs.
On the one hand, governments can potentially do many things well and achieve 
intended outcomes for the economy and society, on the other hand, they can also 
do great damage through neglect, unwise decisions, or relying on inappropriate 
policy settings. They are less sensitive to the perverse consequences of their 
actions and inactions and rarely anticipate the unintended consequences of 
their policy frameworks or adjustments. In such circumstances, governments 
should be more prepared to experiment and explore alternative options in policy 
planning (for example, through random trials, customised experimentation, 
and alternative scenarios), realising that they are unlikely ever to know all 
the answers into the future, but still have some real capacities and technical 
abilities to assist social and economic development through better analysis and 
coordination. 
The present volume of essays in reform options
The present volume of essays brings together a number of reflections and reform 
options from practitioners, researchers and analysts interested in improved 
governance. Some essays canvass particular ideas, such as Chris Eccles’s focus 
on reforming trust in government, or Daniel Stewart’s examination of the value 
of freedom of information laws to improve scrutiny of government performance. 
Other essays highlight continual areas of concern in underperformance and 
suggest better ways forward, such as Ian Marsh’s analysis of the dysfunctionality 
of new public management when confronted with complex social problems and 
multiple disadvantage in regional Indigenous communities, Patricia Gerald’s 
assessment of how ‘follow the money’ audit reforms should be conducted to 
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produce the best results, and John Wanna’s critical review of the history of 
euphemistic budget reforms while governments have largely shunned much-
needed remedies to resource management. Other essays explore the analytical 
findings from previous episodes of successful reform, trying to generalise the 
lessons from success while at the same time pondering the question of why 
reform trajectories tend to stagnate unless they receive continual prodding 
and encouragement. In this latter category is the essay by Wendy Jarvie and 
Trish Mercer on educational reform in literacy at the turn of the last century, 
and Jeffrey Harwood’s and John Phillimore’s analysis of the achievements of 
cooperative federalism as evidenced by the national competition reforms. These 
essays point to areas for further development and improvement. None will 
contribute the last word on the topic, but all make considered contributions to 
meeting the reform challenges.
Part one of this book clusters together essays directed to examining systemic 
accountabilities, including central oversight and management of the core public 
service; parliamentary oversight of the public service; the benefit of transparency 
in improving government performance; the imperatives of further reform to 
our budgetary systems; and the effects of the limitations on parliamentarism 
on the prospects for good governance. In the last essay in this section, Harshan 
Kumarasingham and John Power appraise ‘constrained parliamentarism’ 
across the New Zealand and Australian contexts, concluding that historical, 
institutional, and electoral differences have resulted in far stronger constraints 
on executive power in Australia than its neighbour. The main message in 
each of these contributions is that we ought to be able to undertake periodic 
systemic reviews of the effectiveness of the system and its inherent limitations 
or institutional design problems. 
In part two, the focus shifts to addressing the question of how policy processes 
can be improved to improve actual results and social impacts. Evert Lindquist 
and John Wanna re-emphasise the importance of implementation processes and 
their contributions to quality governance, as well as offering applied advice to 
policymakers in reviewing implementation. Jeffrey Harwood, John Phillimore 
and Patricia Gerald reflect on substantive improvements to policy outcomes 
driven through intergovernmental relations. Ian Marsh surveys a litany of 
poorly designed Indigenous programs that failed to deliver intended outcomes, 
and suggests better policy processes to improve Indigenous well-being. John 
Butcher explores the increasingly protracted relations between governments 
and the organisations representing the ‘not-for-profit’ sector, and considers the 
origins and value of formal ‘compacts’ that guide the quality and effectiveness 
of their policy relationships. Finally, Wendy Jarvie and Trish Mercer dissect 
the difficulties in prosecuting policy change in a highly contested policy sector 
with powerful stakeholders and interest groups. They centre their account on 
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the importance of finding a champion of policy change with sufficient policy 
vision and political fortitude to overcome resistance and see reform through to 
fruition.
Each of the succeeding 11 chapters in this volume has some connection with 
the Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG). Some were 
specifically commissioned research exercises, some were written for other 
purposes by ANZSOG-associated staff and have been included in this collection, 
others were presented at ANZSOG events and later polished for publication 
here. The collection bears close inspection from practitioners and researchers 
alike, and should make a valuable and long-lasting contribution to the ongoing 
reform of government in Australia. 
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2. Restoring Trust in Government1
Chris Eccles
The topic of my chapter, restoring trust in government, has universal application 
to public administration and is central to many of the fundamental challenges 
facing government and its institutions. Accordingly, I want to address a number 
of key areas where we, as public servants, have the ability to both influence and 
initiate the process of restoring trust in government, more particularly, through 
the way we work with the citizens of New South Wales, a trust in and of the 
public sector.
We have all heard phrases such as ‘I’m from the government and I’m here to 
help’, and ‘the cheque is in the mail’. These phrases have entered the lexicon 
as classic statements of counter-intuition, with the implication of cynicism and 
mistrust. But has it always been thus with trust?
To begin, let me provide some context. Various surveys and studies have 
found that, since the mid-1960s, public trust in government and political 
institutions has been decreasing in virtually all of the advanced industrialised 
democracies (Dalton and Wattenburg 2000). Research conducted using both 
series of the World Values Survey conducted in the early 1980s (1981–84) and 
the early 1990s (1990–93) provides substantial support for theories that focus 
on the performance of governments and political institutions to explain citizens’ 
declining confidence in them (see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org).
A 2005 survey of Canadian citizens found that the degree to which citizens trust 
government is dependent upon a number of factors (ICCS 2005). The survey 
found that citizen trust and confidence is promoted when public organisations 
provide:
• good leadership and management (50–65 per cent impact);
• equal and ethical treatment (10–15 per cent impact);
• quality services (10–20 per cent impact); and
• services that meet citizens’ and community needs (10–25 per cent impact).
These measures do not, however, account for declining confidence related to how 
well a government is able to manage the economy. Many studies have found that 
citizens have less trust in governments that cannot generate economic growth, 
create jobs, and competently deliver social services (Nye 1997). Conversely, 
1 This paper was written in 2011 when Chris Eccles was Director General of the NSW Department of Premier 
and Cabinet.
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governments that can bring about economic growth, create jobs, provide access 
to education, and deliver services in an easy and transparent manner are more 
trusted (Fiorina 1978; Mackuen et al. 1992). 
The most extensive evidence on public trust in government comes from the 
United States and its American National Election Studies data series (see http://
www.electionstudies.org/). Early readings from the late 1950s revealed a largely 
supportive public with most people believing that:
• one could trust government to do the right thing;
• there were few dishonest people in government;
• most officials knew what they were doing; and,
• government was run for the benefit of all.
These positive feelings were relatively unchanged until the mid-1960s, and then 
declined sharply. For example, in 1964, 75 per cent of the American public 
believed they could trust their government to do the right thing most of the 
time, by 1995 only 15 per cent did so. Closer to home, New Zealand studies 
reflect a similar trend. In 1985, 8.5 per cent of New Zealanders had a great deal 
of confidence in their government, but by 1998 this had fallen to 2.5 per cent 
(State Services Commission 2002).
A study conducted in the United States using empirical evidence contends that 
the pervasiveness of the trend across advanced industrial democracies cannot 
be explained simply on the basis of government performance. This is especially 
so as the latter half of the twentieth century was a time of generally improving 
standards of living, characterised by rising affluence, expanding education, and 
improved social opportunities for most citizens.
Whilst there are national explanations for the drop in trust in government (in 
the case of the US, for example, the Vietnam War, Watergate, and the Lewinsky 
scandal), it is unreasonable to assume that a simultaneous decline of trust over 
the past 40 or more years throughout the advanced industrial democracies 
is purely coincidental. This prompts one to look beyond specific national 
conditions and take account of factors that are broadly affecting the advanced 
industrial democracies as a group. This then leads us to conclude that general 
forces of social change are affecting these nations, including Australia for which 
there is no nation-specific empirical, longitudinal data.
The changes, described as a ‘social modernisation’, are transforming the 
relationship between the citizen and the state. Scepticism of the political 
process has also grown more rapidly among the young and better-educated, 
with the new style of politics represented by less deference to authority, more 
assertive styles of action, and higher expectations for the democratic process 
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(Inglehart 1990; Dalton 2004). It is suggested that changing citizen values and 
expectations have created a new political Zeitgeist, which stimulates greater 
scepticism of government (Dalton 2005).
Globalisation, a greater interconnectedness through information and 
communications technology, and increased advocacy of non-government 
organisations have also contributed to making citizens more aware of their 
rights and therefore more demanding of their governments. Recent events in 
North Africa and the Middle East have made this dramatically apparent.
A literature review produced for the ‘Seventh Global Forum on Reinventing 
Government’ explored the theme of building trust in government and 
concluded that expectations of citizens vis-à-vis their governments and political 
representatives in the era of globalisation had changed with the possible 
emergence of a new civic culture:
The new civic culture cherishes trust for itself … demands sincerity and 
truthfulness in the words and deeds of representatives … It wants to be 
able to monitor government performance much more closely than before 
… [and suggests that] governments today would be better off applying 
programs and policies that enhance trust in government directly … 
rendering politics more transparent and dispersing the power of political 
decision-making to foster accountability (Blind 2006). 
Partially prompted by popular dissatisfaction with the governing process, 
contemporary democracies have implemented reforms to expand access, increase 
transparency, and improve accountability of government.
Political and social parameters are also at play, with political scandals, seemingly 
frequent findings of corruption, and the sometimes disproportionate focus of the 
media on these issues contributing to the decline of trust in government institutions 
and political leaders. However, these events tend only to reinforce the (generally 
poor) impressions of government already held by an increasingly cynical public.
Governments here have clearly recognised the importance of addressing the 
issue of trust. As opposition leader, former NSW Premier Barry O’Farrell made it 
clear in a speech to the Institute of Chartered Secretaries Australia that the NSW 
Liberals and Nationals were resolved to restoring trust in public institutions, 
and to ‘unite the public sector, individuals and communities, and elected 
representatives in a network of trust’ (O’Farrell 2010a). A number of initiatives 
that are currently being pursued in NSW are testimony to this commitment: the 
establishment of a Public Service Commission; legislation embedding new public 
sector values and an ethical framework; the strengthening of whistleblower 
protections; the imminent appointment of a Customer Service Commissioner; 
and the creation of Infrastructure NSW. I will return to these initiatives later.
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How can the public sector meet the challenge of restoring trust and better meeting 
citizens’ needs? As the literature reveals, there are various dimensions to the 
construct of trust and numerous factors that serve as a basis for understanding 
citizens’ declining trust in government. In recognition of this, the OECD refers 
to the implementation of the so-called ‘ITARI principle’ as the basis for trust-
building and performance improvements in the public sector (OECD 2009). 
The five components that comprise the ITARI principle will not be unfamiliar: 
integrity, transparency, accountability, responsiveness, and inclusiveness.
In order to ensure that we are able to act in an inclusive manner when dealing with 
citizens, community, and stakeholders, the public sector needs to address the critical 
challenge of increasing transparency in how decisions are made and implemented. 
This can be achieved by paving new ways to increase citizen and stakeholder 
participation and engagement in formulating public services and products. 
Facilitating a greater involvement and engagement with and amongst stakeholders 
is critical to assisting government delivers on the expectations of citizens.
A ‘network of trust’: Interventions designed to 
connect government and stakeholders
Critical to the way government interacts with key stakeholders — public 
servants, citizens and communities — is the creation of the ‘network of trust’ 
referred to by the NSW Premier in his speech to the Institute of Chartered 
Secretaries Australia. The vision is fourfold: for citizens to be able to trust public 
institutions and to defend their interests; for politicians and ministers to be 
able to trust that the public service will give them objective, high quality and 
fearless advice; for public servants to trust government to do what it says; and 
for public servants to be valued by government and citizens for their integrity, 
impartiality and expertise.
Key to facilitating a new vision of government–stakeholder interactions based 
on a mutual trust are a number of initiatives currently being pursued by the 
NSW government.
The new Public Service Commission will work with public servants and public 
sector workers as stakeholders, to restore and maintain the highest levels of 
integrity, impartiality, ability, accountability and leadership. It will also explore 
ways in which the public sector can develop its people through enhanced 
mobility, whether via exchanges between departments, agencies and other 
jurisdictions or secondments with the private and community sectors. A key 
challenge will be to ensure that the public sector workforce has the capabilities 
and technical skills to deliver efficient and effective services into the future.
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A Customer Service Commissioner will work to ensure that government 
interactions with the citizens of NSW meet the needs of citizens. The then 
Premier Barry O’Farrell (2010b), in a pre-election address to the Committee 
for Economic Development Australia on 12 November 2010, indicated that the 
purpose of the commissioner is to:
• bring the interest of public service customers and the defence of public 
value and public interest right to the heart of decision-making;
• develop practical and sustainable ways to give government’s customers the 
value and results they deserve; and,
• ensure customer-centred services are a strategic priority for government, 
with ministers to be the champions of the ‘customer’ within their portfolios.
The Premier further identified five customer service principles that provide a 
framework for implementing this new direction:
• making customer focus a leadership issue;
• simplifying government;
• redesigning public service delivery to suit people, not bureaucracies;
• devolving authority to people, communities and frontline staff; and
• measuring results and ensuring accountability.
A third body, Infrastructure NSW, has been established in legislation to work 
with the private sector to deliver coordinated infrastructure planning across the 
whole of government using the most efficient and effective funding mechanisms 
available, to deliver the best results possible. It will be responsible for preparing 
a 20-year ‘State Infrastructure Strategy’ for NSW, along with detailed five-year 
infrastructure plans that will set out the details of projects, sequencing and 
funding arrangements in the forward estimates of the NSW budget. The intention 
of the government in establishing this body is to ensure independent — non-
political — infrastructure decision-making. The impact of Infrastructure NSW 
will be to bring private sector expertise to bear in this decision-making.
The need for a more outward-looking public 
sector
Giving more than lip service to the notion of putting citizens first means, in one 
sense, that the public sector must look beyond itself for developing solutions to 
public problems. We need to both understand and acknowledge that the public 
sector does not hold all the answers and, by extension, does not necessarily 
have the expertise, capacity and resources to meet the ever-evolving needs 
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and expectations of citizens. The custom and practice — dare I say, ‘culture’ 
— of introspection is, I believe, the single greatest risk to the relevance and 
effectiveness of the public sector.
We must also ensure that we engage with communities and stakeholders so 
as to achieve sustainable, citizen-focused outcomes when developing and 
implementing policies or service delivery solutions. Furthermore, blindly 
following rules and processes risks creating ‘solutions’ that simply address 
internal control parameters and/or that align with ‘conventional wisdoms’.
An outward-looking public sector will establish a dialogue with communities 
of interest to ensure priorities are appropriate and approaches sound. It will 
also encourage members of the wider community to more actively contribute 
to service delivery improvements, policy and program development, and to 
make progress in areas that rely more on public choices than on government 
interventions (such as saving water and lowering obesity levels).
Government will need to be open to feedback and actively engage with 
communities about decisions that concern the services to be provided and how 
they are funded, and remain open to new ways of providing services.
Embracing new approaches to improving the 
quality of policy advice and service delivery 
outcomes
Participatory approaches and requirements
If the trust of citizens is a prerequisite for the efficient functioning of government, 
we need to address the critical challenge of increasing transparency in how 
decisions are made and implemented by paving new ways to increase citizen 
and stakeholder participation and engagement.
Stakeholder engagement, a common activity across government, is a key 
component in effective service delivery. I need to emphasise that it is not an 
exercise in managing stakeholder expectations. Governments have become 
experts in stakeholder management. I am as guilty as the next senior public 
service manager of past laziness in the identification of stakeholders around 
a given issue (often falling back to the litany of usual suspects: the Business 
Council of Australia, Australian Industry Group, Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, and Australian Council of Trade Unions), and then 
attentiveness to the cosmetics of engagement while seeking to control, manage 
and/or minimise their actual impact.
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A more productive way to conceptualise stakeholder engagement is to break 
it down into five broad categories of participatory approaches viewed along 
a continuum, starting with low-level engagement and leading to high-level 
partnering characterised by shared ownership and accountability. The 
participatory approaches on this ‘engagement continuum’ are defined as follows:
• Networking: a low level of engagement characterised by information 
exchange about strategies and activities;
• Coordination: structured consultation on strategies or activities to influence 
outcomes;
• Cooperation: formal involvement in the development of outcomes;
• Collaboration: similar to cooperation, except that this phase signals changes 
in the way stakeholders behave when working together; and
• Partnering: shared accountability for the product and in the achievement of 
the goals set.
Importantly, the model of the engagement continuum I have described imposes a 
discipline by requiring a forensic assessment of the exact relationship proposed 
for each stakeholder group and the level of reciprocity that can be expected 
from government in the relationship.
Too often, government defaults to the language of partnership — and thereby 
sets expectations around that promised engagement — when something different 
is intended. A more diligent and honest approach avoids pain on both sides 
by recognising that different levels of participation are acceptable and more 
or less desirable depending upon the characteristics of the policy process and 
the goals being pursued. In addition, each participatory approach will require 
a different design, using a new combination of tools and methodologies, much 
like the way that each participatory initiative contains a unique mix of people 
and institutions.
To return to rules and process fixation, misguided attempts to strictly standardise 
and replicate protocols, in line with conventional scientific practice, can also 
undermine the participatory process. To illustrate, there is a view that some 
of the frameworks that were successfully applied to the management of the 
multitude of projects that were undertaken in the lead up to the Sydney Olympic 
Games, and which were then retained post-Olympics, have had some longer-term 
unintended consequences.The nature of the Sydney Olympic Games projects 
(particularly in terms of arrangements like public–private partnerships), their 
scale (in terms of the magnitude of the work required), size (in terms of budget 
and other necessary resourcing), and the tight delivery time frames, together 
with the public scrutiny they received, demanded a specific and necessarily 
rigorous response in terms of the probity frameworks that were applied.
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However, these highly engineered probity frameworks continue to be used 
today as a one-size-fits-all approach to risk management. Rather than pursue 
good outcomes, is it possible that the application of the pre-existing probity 
frameworks, through no better reason than a preoccupation with process, has 
created barriers to the fomenting of new ideas, stifled opportunity for innovation 
and resulted in reluctance on the part of the business community to effectively 
engage with the public sector and vice versa? Those from outside government 
who have confronted our approaches to unsolicited infrastructure proposals 
and tendering generally might be forgiven for thinking so.
I hasten to add that I am not advocating the dismantling of probity frameworks 
or the casting aside of risk management methodologies, but rather that they be 
fit for purpose, taking account of the value, complexity and sensitivity of the 
initiative or project being pursued. We should be reminded that the goal of 
risk management is not the total elimination of risk, but an approach aimed at 
effectively identifying and assessing risk with a view to mitigating its potential 
impact. Risk management frameworks, much like engagement strategies, need 
to be developed so that they are fit for purpose.
Sir David Normington, appointed to oversee public appointments and the 
civil service code and recruitment in the UK, criticised the recruitment code 
of practice as too ‘process-driven … too complex, over-regulated’, and ‘too 
prescribed and specific’. He said that ‘it is time for people to stop leaning on the 
rules’, because ‘if you are concentrating on stopping things you tend to forget 
that you are also there to enable’. He also made the point in this context that 
people need to start engaging their brains. I would like to think that this means 
looking for ‘new ideas that work’. If this also means providing the public service 
with the authority, competence and tools to align probity and risk requirements 
with legitimate public service innovation and experimentation, then so be it.
Participation, as I have outlined, allows the community opportunity to 
contribute ideas and expertise to the solving of problems. Participation, in all of 
its forms, improves the effectiveness of government by encouraging partnerships 
and cooperation within and across levels of government, and between the 
government and private institutions.
Co-production and market design: Working towards 
citizen-centric solutions
The concepts of co-production, co-creation and market design have evolved from 
a similar footing; they each involve taking a citizen-centric approach to policy 
development and program delivery. It is no longer adequate for government to 
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be just the rule-setter and service-provider. Government needs a restless value-
seeking imagination that constantly searches out ways to create public value 
(Benington and Moore 2011). 
Co-production is an active but voluntary behaviour by a citizen which is conjoint 
with government activity and which creates value in the form of outputs or 
outcomes. Support for co-production processes is central to the design policies 
that encourage, enable or educate citizens to make choices that contribute to 
wider public goals.
Co-production is not about offloading the delivery of services to the community 
to reduce spending; rather, it is defined by:
• Joint development of policy and service delivery to realise shared strategic 
outcomes;
• The community as co-architects in the design of policies and programs that 
concern them and their resources;
• Citizen participation and involvement in government activities; and
• Collaboration between the state and the citizen in the production of socially 
desired outcomes.
The aim is to mobilise the additional productive capabilities of citizens to 
complement service delivery in areas of public concern — volunteers of the 
rural fire service, for example, ‘produce’ emergency responses, but also assist, 
or ‘co-produce’, with respect to educating property owners of the need to 
undertake fire prevention or mitigation work. Citizens sorting their household 
waste to facilitate recycling are also engaged in co-production.
Market design builds further on the principles of co-production in that it 
adds elements of devolved government — where funding is provided to non-
government entities for goods/services — and co-regulation — where the 
regulatory role is shared between government and industry.
Concluding observations
Introducing new participatory approaches where we must engage with citizens, 
and apply citizen-centric research and design thinking, can be challenging. 
According to Christian Bason of Denmark’s MindLab, three myths in particular 
characterise the involvement of citizens in these types of processes (see 
Bason 2013).
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First, there is the fear of ‘citizen dictators’: by involving citizens or business 
representatives explicitly, as public servants we might be devolving our 
decision-making authority. The purpose of involvement is not to ask citizens 
which ideas they prefer, but to explore which ideas are likely to work.
Second, citizen involvement requires too many resources: it will take too long 
and it will be too expensive. Energy and resources are necessary for citizen 
involvement, but consider the alternative: what does it cost to develop 
supposedly ‘expert’ solutions behind a desk, ‘roll them out’, and then realise, 
based on citizens’ complaints, rising service costs and political fall-out, that the 
solution doesn’t work? Citizen involvement is a cost-effective means of ensuring 
that new solutions really do meet users’ needs, and that they hit the target in 
terms of service improvements and better outcomes.
Third, citizen involvement creates unrealistic expectations: now that we have 
generated these new ideas together, don’t citizens expect something to happen? 
Most citizens and business owners understand that in a political system, 
especially in a democracy, there is no guarantee that just because a group of 
public servants think that an idea is a good one it will be judged so by top 
management or by politicians. It is therefore necessary to clarify expectations 
— that we would take the process and their input seriously — and report to 
them what, if any, ideas we would continue to work on.
We should nevertheless be encouraged in this endeavour, as it is evident 
that there is an enormous appetite for engagement in the business and non-
government sectors, and, critically, a real and genuine willingness to make 
a contribution to NSW’s enhanced performance. This was made clear to 
me soon after commencing my role here in NSW, when, at the invitation of 
former premier Nick Greiner, I was invited to an informal gathering of 20 or so 
influential people drawn from the business world, university, community and 
cultural sectors, and past mandarins from the bureaucracy. They shared their 
aspirations for NSW, their frustration at the generally closed and introverted 
nature of the public sector, and their enthusiasm to be involved in what they 
characterised as the rejuvenation of the state.
In considering how the NSW public service can push through this open door 
and take systematic advantage of the knowledge and experience held by people 
similar to those I met from outside government, I am working with Dr Michael 
Spence, Vice Chancellor at the University of Sydney, to convene forums that 
bring together senior public servants, academic, business and community leaders 
to talk about opening lines of engagement and explore ideas for unleashing the 
potential of our external partners (using the term in its true sense). From this 
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will emerge a specific course of action for how the public service will move 
from introversion to extroversion. We have permission from this government to 
engage. It is now for us to make it happen. 
To conclude, I am not so naive as to believe that the phrase, ‘I am from the 
government and I am here to help’, will ever again be accepted at face value. 
But I am confident that initiatives such as the NSW Public Service Commission, 
Infrastructure NSW, the Customer Service Commission, and the external leaders 
engagement exercise will go some considerable way to creating the foundations 
on which that trust can be built. To underscore these initiatives, I suggest we 
reword the phrase to say: ‘I am from the government and I need — and want 
— your help’.
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After a century of industrialisation and urbanisation, and a commensurate rise 
in state power, Australia is experiencing ‘a major reconceptualisation of the role 
of government’ (Nethercote 2003, p. 12). The need for Parliament to address 
such change had arisen as early as 1950, when Professor Wolfgang Friedmann 
called for ‘a re-consideration of the problem of parliamentary control’ over the 
increasingly pervasive activity and influence of governments (Friedmann 1950, p. 
27). Ambitious initiatives to this end were introduced in the 1960s, with the past 
three decades witnessing the growth of a complex ‘web of parliamentary scrutiny’ 
of all aspects of governance, especially public administration (Cole 1980, p. 174). 
Today, Parliament’s capacity to scrutinise the performance of ministers and public 
servants outside the chamber is of a similar order to its legislative power. This is 
a welcome development, which provides opportunities for identifying ministerial 
neglect and bureaucratic maladministration. It is also important in reducing their 
incidence. As Walter Bagehot put it: ‘All checks are valuable, not in proportion to 
the vices which they discover, but in proportion to the vices which they prevent’ 
(Bagehot 1974, p. 42). The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether this 
web has been as effective as its designers intended in ensuring the accountability 
to Parliament of Australia’s main non-political institution of government, the 
Australian public service (APS) (the Commonwealth public service (CPS) 1901–73 
when it received its present name). 
The vehicles for enhanced scrutiny introduced from the early 1970s — 
expanded parliamentary committee arrangements, improved financial and 
auditing practices, more rigorous budget reporting procedures — transformed 
the means of evaluating public administration at the federal level. The earliest 
manifestation of parliamentary scrutiny of public service operations occurred 
in the Senate and the House of Representatives after federation in 1901. With 
some exceptions — chiefly, the activities of two parliamentary joint statutory 
committees — the Joint Committee on Public Accounts and Audit (1913–32, 
1952–2011) and Public Works (1913–2011), only a modest degree of committee 
scrutiny took place during Parliament’s first six decades. Wide-ranging scrutiny 
by committees across the whole spectrum of government activity did not become 
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commonplace until the creation of a formidable Senate committee system in 
1970. This event ‘revolutionised the Parliament as a whole’ (Reid and Forrest 
1989, p. 375).
The importance accorded to the work of the Auditor-General, and to the 
requirement that departments and other Commonwealth agencies report 
annually on their activities to Parliament, fluctuated last century. It was only 
during the 1980s that these became major elements in parliamentary scrutiny. 
Government’s growing complexity from the late 1960s also spawned new 
administrative machinery and relationships whose implications for governance 
are only now seriously emerging (and demanding to be addressed). Some of these 
raise questions central to scrutiny. They include the position of ministerial staff 
in Australian government–APS interchange; the obligations and responsibilities 
of public servants and ministerial advisers, especially in relation to parliamentary 
committees; and the increased exposure of APS employees to scrutiny in an 
atmosphere in which they, even more than ministerial staff and politicians, are 
called upon increasingly to shoulder accountability responsibilities that would 
previously have been borne by their ministerial chiefs.
Parliamentary scrutiny is more than ‘the assertion of the supremacy of 
Parliament over the Executive Government in money matters’ (Odgers 1979, 
p. 23). Ideally, its remit extends to monitoring administrative efficiency and 
influencing spending priorities and policies (HRSCE 1979, p. 11). As Stanley 
Bach has argued, ‘if the process of scrutiny of legislation or administration 
did not change policy outcomes from time to time, it would serve no serious 
governmental function’ (Bach 2003, p. 154). There are now ‘numerous structures, 
processes and systems’ which facilitate financial and administrative scrutiny 
(Baxter 2003, p. 65). Parliamentary scrutiny, like accountability, has become 
multidimensional, ‘not a “thing” in itself, but a set of relationships through 
which political and bureaucratic actors must account for their integrity and 
their performance’ (Stewart 2002, p. 69).
The advent of a Senate committee system and the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Expenditure (1976) strengthened scrutiny but did not 
displace the traditional apparatus of oversight and control. The problem remained 
of how best to bring information before Parliament in ways that would assist 
Senators and MPs to exercise their investigatory authority over standards of 
administrative performance and government financial management. In the mid-
1970s this prompted the authors of one major review of public administration 
to call for improvements and refinements to Parliament’s scrutiny function in 
several areas. This chapter examines these in turn: the chamber vehicles of 
Question Time (or Questions without Notice), Questions on Notice, and Matters 
of Public Importance (these counting as one category); committee activity; the 
work of the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO); budget evaluation and 
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appropriation processes; and the accountability of ministerial advisers and 
public servants within the framework of parliamentary privilege (RCAGA 1976, 
pp. 108–113). 
However, throughout the 1970s and 1980s it became clear that, although 
Parliament was no ‘cipher in the sphere of public accountability’, it still 
faced many obstacles in achieving ‘the smallest kinetic effect upon the Public 
Service’ (Reid 1981, p. 133). One commentator, in proffering reasons for this, 
complained that ‘parliament’s scrutiny of government administration has been 
hindered by secrecy, public service anonymity, limited resources and the 
burgeoning of inscrutable statutory bodies’ (Indyk 1980, p. 93). Two decades 
on, it remained generally accepted that the Senate’s ‘key role’ of scrutiny 
continued to be essential to a healthy Australian democracy (Faulkner 2003, 
p. 4). Much the same can be said of the House of Representatives, although 
its contribution to this process is often underestimated. Simplistic diagnoses 
based on portrayals of the Senate as Saint George and the executive (buttressed 
by the House of Representatives) as the dragon to be slain do little to improve 
public and specialist understanding of the situation. More detailed examination 
of the parliamentary record would assist in addressing such misconceptions. 
Initial research of this kind suggests that, today’s high volume of parliamentary 
business notwithstanding, Australians could be better served by their elected 
representatives, whose primary tasks include ensuring more effective scrutiny 
of the APS.
In Australia (as in a number of other parliamentary democracies) such trends 
are adversely affecting the main institutions of governance, namely, the 
Parliament and the APS (Mulgan 2003, p. 57). The solution to this problem 
lies in understanding its deep-seated origins, rather than in resorting to the 
well-rehearsed mantra of the executive as the chief impediment to a degree 
of parliamentary scrutiny worthy of the name. It is also to be found in better 
methods of evaluating and assessing public administration in the federal sphere. 
An important basis for such innovation would be more trenchant research into 
the parliamentary sources themselves in understanding past developments, 
testing widely held hypotheses, and developing new approaches. While such 
calls are made periodically (usually in relation to estimates activity) (Uhr 1990, 
p. 83), the paucity of detailed studies of parliamentary history renders this a 
recurring problem. However, recognition of the need for intensive and sustained 
inquiry into parliamentary scrutiny is growing. A persuasive call to this effect 
was made by Colleen Lewis and Ken Coghill in their article, ‘Surveying Research 
on Parliament and Parliamentary Oversight of the Public Sector’ (Lewis and 
Coghill 2005).
Since the then Howard government achieved an (admittedly narrow) Senate 
majority following the 9 October 2004 general election, there has been an increase 
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in discussions about parliamentary oversight procedures. The implications of 
this for parliamentary scrutiny of the APS have been the subject of considerable 
debate. Some Senators and MPs have maintained that the machinery of scrutiny 
in both houses remains as effective as ever. Others are much less sanguine, 
pointing to a notable decline in the number of sitting days (the Senate during 
the 41st Parliament had the then lowest number of sitting days for 50 years, 
the starting point of a trend of significantly lower allocated sitting days for 
the Senate); the deleterious effects of departmental restructuring on the 
Senate estimates process (for instance, difficulties in adequately examining the 
activities of the Department of Human Services which, for estimates purposes, 
for some time were spread across the Department of Finance and Administration 
and other agencies); an increasing tendency for the government to resort to 
classifying material as ‘commercial-in-confidence’ in order to avoid or delay 
providing information on APS administration; fewer so-called ‘spillover’ days 
for debate; and growing, deliberately imposed time and resources constraints on 
the consideration of legislation (National Institute for Governance 2005a). 
The Rudd-led Australian Labor Party (ALP) government elected in 2007 was 
slow to act on parliamentary reform. However, in 2010, the first hung Parliament 
since 1941 forced the ALP and Coalition parties to implement meaningful 
parliamentary reform, most notably to Question Time due to the pressure of 
independent MPs. The independent MPs insisted on securing an agreement 
on parliamentary reform before any agreement on forming a government. As a 
result, changes to the standing orders, Question Time, House of Representatives 
committees and Private Members’ Bills were negotiated and agreed to by both 
the ALP and Coalition parties. While the changes to parliamentary scrutiny 
procedures in the standing orders have been implemented, the spirit of the 
reforms were almost immediately abandoned as the Coalition reneged on much 
of the ‘in principle’ reforms outlined in ‘Agreement for a Better Parliament: 
Parliamentary reform’ (House of Representatives 2010). This fact is reflected in 
the continuing poor behaviour of MPs during Question Time and the institution’s 
enduring low standing in the community. In this context it is difficult to assess 
the reform’s long-term impact on the Parliament. 
The role of Question Time, Questions on 
Notice, and Matters of Public Importance in 
legislative scrutiny
Question Time and committee activity are the best known features of the 
parliamentary machinery. According to received specialist and public opinion, 
Question Time is the one most abused by Senators and MPs. This is a longstanding 
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concern. Even parliamentarians have variously described Question Time 
(the period set down for Questions without Notice) as a ‘propaganda forum’, 
a ‘blood sport’ and ‘an absolute farce’ (CPD (Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates) Senate, 9 September 1971, p. 583; 25 October 1973, p. 1451; 21 May 
1990, p. 608). The most frequently aired complaint concerns the ‘Dorothy Dixer’ 
— a prearranged question addressed to the Prime Minister or a Minister by a 
government MP in order to show the administration in a favourable light (CPD, 
House of Representatives, 22 April 1971, pp. 1864−1865; 14 March 1973, pp. 
538, 546; 13 October 1983, pp. 1702−1703). 
Question Time has long been a point of debate and anxiety for parliamentarians, 
academics and citizens. Previously, the customary length of Question Time 
(approximately 45 minutes) was often criticised as being too short; yet 
parliamentarians repeatedly resisted proposals to extend its length beyond 
45 minutes (CPD, Senate, 25 October 1972, pp. 1883−1889). Criticism of 
governments who curtail Question Time for perceived political purposes is 
invariably severe. In October 1993, for example, one Senator protested against 
the Prime Minister’s decision the day before to terminate Question Time (in the 
House of Representatives) after only 25 minutes, allegedly to save the Minister 
for Finance further political embarrassment (CPD, 6 October 1993, p. 1727). 
More infamous still was the conclusion of Question Time after a single question 
by Prime Minster Julia Gillard following a failed attempt to censure the Prime 
Minister and the government by the leader of the opposition (CPD, House of 
Representatives, 24 August 2011, p. 9216). The practice of ministers reading 
prepared (and lengthy) answers to questions, which absorbs valuable time and 
reduces opportunities for participation by non-ministers, has regularly been 
deplored (CPD, House of Representatives, 1 May 1963, p. 926; 18 October 1983, 
pp. 1811−1812; 17 October 1991, p. 2174). Another common objection relates 
to the absence or inadequacy of procedures designed to prevent evasive replies 
to questions (CPD, Senate, 24 May 1972, p. 2025). 
The degeneration of Question Time into a set-piece opportunity for tactical 
stroke and counter-stroke, in which replies to questions are constantly 
turned into matters for debate, has frequently drawn comment (CPD, Senate, 
11 October 1973, p. 1155; 13 November 1990, pp. 3970−3971). In 1990, one 
opposition Senator insisted that, although some latitude for delay in protecting 
the government by such means was acceptable, when this became regular and 
systematic the situation was untenable (CPD, Senate, 21 May 1990, p. 608). 
Nevertheless, little improvement in Senators’ or MPs’ behaviour followed 
during the 1990s, or in the wake of the 2010 reforms. 
Some prime ministers (and a long-serving party leader, W. G. Hayden) have 
put forward ambitious reform proposals for Question Time. Prime Minister 
E. G. Whitlam advocated changes to the Standing Orders whereby Senate 
New Accountabilities, New Challenges
34
ministers could be rostered to answer Questions without Notice in the House 
of Representatives (and vice versa) (CPD, House of Representatives, 30 August 
1973, p. 632). On 25 February 1982, his successor as party leader, Bill Hayden, 
proposed that the following six-part motion be referred to the Standing Orders 
Committee (it was so referred, though the matters were never implemented):
The standing orders and practices which govern the conduct of Question 
Time, taking particular account of:
1. The definition of relevancy in answers to questions and the setting out of 
criteria to define relevancy in accordance with legal definition.
2. Length of answers to be subject to a time limit.
3. The need for clearer definition in the standing orders about the practice in 
relation to supplementary questions.
4. Senators who are ministers to attend the house to answer questions.
5. The appropriateness of setting down specified sitting days as days on which 
questions will be directed to ministers about particular departments.
6. Question Time to be a minimum of 45 minutes (CPD, House of Representatives, 
25 February 1982, pp. 595−598).
Other suggested changes have included the proposal that Question Time 
continue each day until 28 questions are asked and answered (CPD, House of 
Representatives, 27 September 1993, p. 1158).
A survey of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates for both houses between 
1964 and 2010 reveals Senators and MPs to have had a recurring interest in 
certain aspects of APS operations. All were frequently the subject of Questions 
without Notice. They included (principally) the size and costs of running the 
organisation; the recruitment and training of staff (from in-service training to 
cadetships to graduate programs); the employment of people with disability; the 
recruitment and development of Indigenous Australians; the role, numbers and 
level of seniority of women and the elimination of discrimination against them 
(from the abolition of the ‘marriage bar’ to the implementation of the ‘equal 
pay for equal work’ principle to affirmative action initiatives); public sector 
leave provisions and superannuation arrangements; the health of employees (for 
example, the high incidence of tenosynovitis and repetitive strain injury during 
the mid-1980s); public servants’ membership of and/or dealings with trade 
unions; the freedom of expression allowed to public sector staff; the part played 
by ministerial advisers in APS‒executive interaction (an issue first raised seriously 
in 1973); the activities and influence of the Public Service Board (abolished in 
1987) and, later, those of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet; 
the annual reports of departments and other government agencies; financial 
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management reforms (notably, the changes introduced from the early 1980s); 
the new structures and practices consequent upon public service devolution in 
the late 1990s; and the steady growth in office automation culminating in the 
dominance of the internet and IT technologies over administrative processes 
and research methodologies.
Judgements regarding the role of Question Time in legislative scrutiny have been 
remarkably similar over the years. While Ken Baxter over-optimistically calls it 
‘a lethal weapon in the armoury of good governance’ (Baxter 2003, p. 65), G. S. 
Reid and Martyn Forrest’s description of it as ‘a device for executive advantage 
in both houses’ (Reid and Forrest 1989, p. 367) better reflects majority opinion 
on the subject. Hansard transcripts, committee report recommendations, and 
political party platforms of the 1990s and early 2000s, point to continuing 
concerns.
This has been the case in each house. Between 1989 and 1992, for example, 
6,814 Questions without Notice were asked in the Senate and 2,595 in the House 
of Representatives. The latter’s Standing Committee on Procedure, in its report 
‘About Time’ (HRSCP 1993), sought to counter the decline in the number of 
questions being asked during Question Time. The Committee observed that the 
average number of questions put on each occasion had almost halved between 
1976 and 1992 (from 19.3 to 10.8), despite the longer Question Time (a maximum 
of 62.8 minutes compared with a minimum of 48.5 minutes). By 1993, both 
figures had fallen further — 10.6 questions during a period of 48.2 minutes. The 
committee’s suggested solution was a longer Question Time and the requirement 
that a minimum number of questions be asked. However, it concluded that 
procedural reform alone would not be enough; a different approach was needed 
by the government and the opposition to the issue of Questions without Notice 
(HRSCP 1993, pp. xi, 2, 21). In April 2007, the ALP promised that, if successful 
at the forthcoming election, it would require the attendance of all ministers 
during Question Time and ensure that all questions were properly answered 
(ALP 2007, p. 180). However, the commitment the party made in 2004 (in its 
‘Machinery of Government’ policy) to work for a better Parliament–executive 
balance through Question Time reform was not part of its 2007 policy agenda 
(Latham and Faulkner 2004, p. 9).
Not surprisingly, the Liberal–National Party Coalition government argued that 
there was no need for reform, the Prime Minister, John Howard, defending his 
administration’s approach to Question Time in comparison with that of his two 
ALP predecessors, R. J. L. (‘Bob’) Hawke and Paul Keating. He described the 
institution of Question Time, not as a courtesy extended to the House by the 
executive, but as an essential element of executive accountability to Parliament. 
‘In the end’, Howard emphasised, ‘the real determinant of the accountability of 
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a government and of a prime minister is their willingness to front up here day 
after day to answer questions’ (CPD, House of Representatives, 27 June 2002, 
p. 4602).
During the 13 years of the Hawke and Keating administrations (between 
March 1983 and March 1996), 9,248 questions (an average of 711 questions 
annually) were asked during Question Time in the House of Representatives, 
and 19,646 questions in the Senate (an annual average of 1,511 questions). 
Between the Howard government’s election in March 1996 and November 2007 
— a parliamentary period of 12 years — 14,150 Questions without Notice were 
asked in the House of Representatives (an average of 1,179 annually), and a 
total of 15,211 in the Senate (a yearly average of 1,170 questions). Since 1983, 
on the basis of the average number of questions asked each year, scrutiny 
during Question Time has clearly been more vigorous in the Senate under 
ALP governments and more marked in the House of Representatives under 
Coalition governments.1 Although, in terms of the number of questions asked, 
Senate Question Time needs to become more robust in comparison with the 
years 1983−96, these findings provide a revealing contrast to the prevalent 
perception of a weak House of Representatives Question Time system under 
constant attack from the executive.
Changes since 2007
The election of the Rudd ALP government on 24 November 2007 resulted in 
modest reforms of Question Time in the Senate. In September 2008, the Senate 
Standing Committee on Procedure proposed changes to the nature of Question 
Time: 
1. All primary questions to be placed on a Question Time Notice Paper by 
11 am.
2. Up to 6 supplementary questions following each primary question.
3. Up to 2 minutes for an answer to each primary or supplementary question.
4. Answers to be directly relevant to each question.
The effect of these changes would have resulted in government agencies spending 
less time preparing briefs for questions that may arise during Questions without 
Notice. Moreover, these changes would have also facilitated greater engagement 
across the chamber and between multiple parties. However, these bold reforms 
1 In only nine years during 1964–2011 did the number of questions asked in the House of Representatives 
exceed the number asked in the Senate (1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1969, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008). 
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were not adopted by the Senate. Instead, as outlined by the Senate Standing 
Committee on Procedure in its third report, the upper chamber held a two-week 
trial of the following during the last two sitting weeks of 2008: 
1. no notice to be given of questions, as at present;
2. primary questions to be limited to one minute and the answers to them to 
two minutes;
3. two supplementary questions to be allowed to the questioner;
4. supplementary questions and the answers to them to be limited to one 
minute each;
5. answers to be required to be directly relevant to each question, as in the 
original proposal.
As Senator Faulkner outlined, the effect of these changes was ultimately rather 
cosmetic, increasing the total amount of time for the questioner by one minute and 
reducing the time for answers by one minute (CPD, Senate, 13 November 2008, 
pp. 26–27). These temporary procedures have not been adopted permanently, 
but were extended three times and are still in effect at the time of writing.
In the House of Representatives, the election of the first hung parliament since 
1941 forced the issue of parliamentary reform upon all major parties. The 
independent MPs, spearheaded by Rob Oakeshott, negotiated an overhaul of 
parliamentary standing orders and procedures before agreeing to support either 
party to form a government (House of Representatives 2010). The reforms were 
aimed at making changes to the standing orders of the House of Representatives; 
they also sought to change the culture of parliamentary procedure. Three of 
the reforms called for by Bill Hayden were addressed or implemented. On 29 
September 2010, amendments to the standing orders were introduced, placing 
formal time limits on questions of 45 seconds and four minutes for answers. On 8 
February 2012, the time limits were further reduced on questions to 30 seconds 
and on answers to three minutes (CPD, House of Representatives, 8 February 2012, 
pp. 10–11). While a definition of ‘relevancy’ was not included in the parliamentary 
reforms, the standing orders were amended such that answers ‘must be directly 
relevant to the question’, and that ‘a point of order regarding relevance may be 
taken only once in response to each answer’ (CPD, House of Representatives, 
29 September 2011, p. 123). 
Additionally, the agreement called for the opposition to be given the opportunity 
to ask one supplementary question during each Question Time. While the 
provision for supplementary questions already existed within the standing 
orders, the privilege had not been used since 1998. The reforms provided 
the opportunity for the reinterpretation of this privilege and this process has 
continued with the introduction of an opportunity for a second supplementary 
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question in 2012, on a trial basis. Finally, the agreement called for Question 
Time to end no later than 3.30 pm, thereby allowing time for 20 questions to be 
answered (House of Representatives 2010). The implementation of an outer time 
limit could be interpreted as a reaction against the former Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd’s regular practice of allowing Question Time to continue beyond 3.30 pm 
and even past 4 pm. On the other hand, Question Time has twice ended after 
only one question was asked (CPD, House of Representatives, 24 August 2011, 
p. 9216; 24 November 2011, p. 2011). While there has been criticism of these 
short Question Times, no minimum question threshold or time limit has been 
raised in the Parliament.
After more than a year in operation, the reforms to parliamentary procedures have 
produced modest improvements. The changes to time limits on Questions without 
Notice have modestly reduced the length of questions only by seconds. The changes 
have been made more successful by reducing the length of answers by ministers 
to government questions from an average of four minutes and 52 seconds to two 
minutes and 23 seconds. The opposition has made good use of the opportunity to 
ask supplementary questions, asking 64 supplementary questions in the period 
until October 2011 (Parliamentary Library 2011, p. 6). However, since these 
statistics were recorded in 2011, the opposition has on only five occasions not asked 
supplementary questions during Question Times (Parliamentary Library 2011, p. 9). 
Enforcing relevance remains a vexed problem, ultimately relying on the willingness 
of the Speaker to enforce a ruling. Yet, Speaker Peter Slipper took the unprecedented 
step of removing the call from Prime Minister Julia Gillard after several warnings 
of failing to be relevant (CPD, House of Representatives, 28 February 2012, pp. 
1–2). However, Speaker Slipper’s stance arose as a result of the finely balanced 
numbers of the minority Parliament and because it suited the political position of 
the government. It is unlikely that future speakers, conventionally supplied by the 
government, would have this capacity and security in their position to assert their 
will over ministers and prime ministers.
Nevertheless, commentators continue to lament the supposedly parlous state 
of Question Time. Coghill attributes this chiefly to the ‘ridiculous’ rules 
governing its operation and to ministers’ prolonged ‘preambles’ to answers. He 
stigmatises this development as a ‘peculiarly Australian problem’, and proposes 
amended procedures designed to ensure that questions are answered, except 
where the national interest may be adversely affected (such a determination to 
be made by the presiding officer of the house concerned, namely, the President 
of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, respectively). In 
addition, in instances where the Minister is genuinely unable to reply, the 
question could be placed on notice or answered by means of a ministerial 
statement (Coghill 2002).
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Initiatives aimed at improving Question Time by making it longer, by increasing 
the number of questions asked daily, or by enhancing the quality of replies, 
collectively or individually, promise useful reform — but only if the executive 
has the will to embrace them. Clearly, however, while finer points such as the 
duration of Question Time and the length of questions are important, the first 
challenge is to increase the number of genuine questions (and answers) in both 
houses and, by doing so, to improve their efficacy as legislative scrutiny tools. 
This could be achieved through more definitive presiding officer rulings over 
the nature and content of questions — such rulings to derive their very real 
authority from the standing orders.
The best way forward almost certainly lies in implementing the remainder of the 
1982 Hayden reform proposals and in ensuring that they are observed. Among 
the most effective means of achieving this would be to reshape the offices of 
President and Speaker so as to give them greater powers over the conduct of 
Question Time (as in Britain, in the case of the Speaker). Some of Hayden’s 
recommendations have been in place in the British House of Commons for many 
years. These include the assignment of certain days on which MPs can question 
the staff of specific departments of state about their activities; provision for 
‘Cross-Cutting Questions’ (a practice inaugurated in January 2003) whereby a 
number of ministers attend to answer questions on a topic encompassing the 
responsibilities of several government departments (a reform prompted by the 
‘cross-cutting’ focus of ‘joined-up government’, which has strong resonances in 
Australia as ‘whole of government’); and a separate Prime Minister’s Question 
Time, whose existence eases pressure on the main Question Time. 
The role of the presiding officers (notably, the independent Speaker of the 
House of Commons in the British context), in the Australian Parliament, if 
such reform were to be seriously contemplated here, cannot be overstated. 
In Britain, ‘[t]he Speaker controls the pace of Question Time’, and he (or she) 
has the power ‘to check a Member or Minister who is either too lengthy or 
is using Question Time as an opportunity for debate’ (HCIO 2005, p. 5). The 
outcome is a Question Time that, through its provision for ‘oral questions’, 
serves well the interests of parliamentary scrutiny of government and public 
administration. Another significant factor in the effective functioning of the 
British Question Time machinery is the regular scrutiny of the parliamentary 
questions apparatus by Parliament itself. Since the Second World War — in 
contrast to Australian practice (though this is changing) — the subject has 
been investigated by British parliamentary select committees on 13 occasions 
(in 1946, 1958, 1965, 1970, 1972, 1976, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2002 
and 2005). Since the election of the hung Parliament, the then speaker 
Harry Jenkins initiated some informal changes to increase the institution’s 
independence, such as promising not to interact with his ALP colleagues 
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until after the house had risen on Thursday evenings. However, these changes 
were self-imposed and, as a result of their uncodified nature, were able to be 
abandoned by any future speaker. 
Table 1: Questions without Notice 1964–2011 (number asked annually)
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Source: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates.
Questions on Notice 
Parliamentarians’ areas of interest in APS administration from 1964 to 2011 as 
reflected in Questions on Notice were similar to those for Questions without 
Notice. In the 1960s, rarely did a Minister decline to provide an answer to a 
Question on Notice on the ground that the time and work involved in preparing a 
response would unwarrantably burden departmental staff. However, such a reply 
became more and more common during the 1970s and 1980s. Prime Minister 
William McMahon reminded MPs in August 1971 that ‘the resources of Ministers 
and departments are not unlimited and, notwithstanding the importance of 
providing the Parliament with the information it seeks, there are competing 
demands’ (CPD, House of Representatives, 26 August 1971, p. 798). 
The leader of the government in the Senate, Sir John Carrick, was similarly 
direct in October 1982: ‘I am not prepared to authorise the large diversion of 
resources in Departments which would be needed to answer [the Senator’s] 
question in the terms asked.’ 
Nevertheless, as was common practice in such instances, he offered a compromise 
in the interests of scrutiny: ‘If the honourable senator would like to rephrase his 
question so as to refer to a shorter period of time and to focus more precisely on 
his area of interest, Ministers will consider what assistance can be given’ (CPD, 
Senate, 27 October 1982, p. 1927).
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With the expansion of the APS and the wider public sector throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s, Questions on Notice underwent a number of changes. 
Increasingly, many such questions took on an ‘analytical’ rather than a merely 
‘informational’ character. The following inquiry (from 1991) is a good example:
Australian Public Service
(Question No. 740)
Are members of the Australian Public Service (APS) who are seconded 
to the staff of Ministers and Members of Parliament not denied the right 
to pursue their careers when they return to the APS?
Does existing legislation protect the rights of public servants who have 
worked on the personal staff of Members from all parties and whose 
characters have been impugned? (CPD, House of Representatives, 13 
May 1991, p. 3616).
Putting aside the fact that departmental–ministerial/parliamentary staff 
interchange was largely an uncontroversial issue in earlier times (as distinct 
from the role of ministerial advisers) it is unlikely that such a question would 
previously have been coined in such subjective terms. Formerly, even questions 
seeking information to be used for a ‘political’ purpose, were couched more in 
terms of an information-seeking request.
Many have also become complex, focusing on the minutiae of governance in 
a few key areas such as staff numbers, program implementation and audit, 
the composition and make-up of ministerial adviser teams, outsourcing, and 
performance management (of both APS employees and organisations). Whereas 
previously, ministers and/or leaders of the government in each house had 
almost invariably refused to provide replies that would unjustifiably strain 
departmental resources, they were now promising to do so in respect of the 
most detailed questions, whether informational or analytical (see, for example, 
‘Australian Taxation Office: Staff’ (No. 991), CPD, 17 February 2000, pp. 13860–
13864). By 2005, the provision of replies on this scale had become a growing 
burden on employees, one which was hampering their capacity as policymakers 
and service providers to the extent that it was identified publicly as a serious 
issue by the then secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
Dr Peter Shergold (2005).
Paradoxically, while the average number of questions placed on notice between 
2000 and 2004 in each house did not rise significantly compared with that 
for the years 1970 to 2000, the delays in providing answers to questions (4, 
6, 12 and even 18 months) is further evidence of this problem (CPD, House 
of Representatives, 13 March 2000, pp. 14, 437; 6 September 2000, pp. 20, 
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272–274). Such delays or ‘slippage’ had occurred occasionally in the past, with 
one MP recommending the adoption of the then House of Commons procedure 
requiring that all Questions on Notice (‘written questions’) be answered within 
one week of their being put on the Notice Paper (CPD, House of Representatives, 
16 March 1971, p. 890). However, the situation did not improve, prompting Dr 
Shergold (as we have seen) to call for some relief for the beleaguered APS in 
August 2005. 
Table 2: Questions on Notice 1964–2011 
Senate House of Representatives
Total questions Annual average Total questions Annual average
1964–69 - - 4,907 818 
1970–79 9,002 900 22,025 2,202
1980–89 8,780 878 16,992 1,699
1990–99 8,266 826 9,271 927
2000–11 13,197 1,199 6,017 1,203
Total/average 39,245 957 67,350 1,432
Source: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates.
Following their peak in 2005, Questions on Notice were sustained at high levels 
in both the House of Representatives and the Senate until the demise of the 
Howard government in 2007. And, while the number of Questions on Notice 
in the Senate has remained fairly stable since the change of government, in 
the House of Representatives the number of Questions on Notice has collapsed 
dramatically. In the House of Representatives, the average time in which to 
obtain an answer to a Question on Notice in 2007–08 was 207 days before the 
change of government; after this it was only 26 days. The results were similar in 
the Senate: previously it had taken 115 days to provide an answer to Questions 
on Notice, and this improved to 55 days after the change in government (CPD, 
Senate, 13 November 2008, p. 26). There is little doubt that the Question on 
Notice, as it is presently perceived and framed, will remain a valuable tool of 
legislative scrutiny. Yet, it is clear that some refinement of the scope and degree 
of detail of many questions is urgently needed (the number does not present a 
problem — it is excessive in neither house). This could be arrived at through 
executive–opposition front bench agreement on the need for such reform 
and/or (as with Questions without Notice) the provision of greater powers to 
the presiding officers to assess the content and purpose of questions and to 
ensure that they are answered by a certain date (the British no longer have a 
parliamentary rule requiring this: HCIO 2005, p. 11). Only then, perhaps, will 
this growing problem be satisfactorily addressed. 
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Table 3: Questions on Notice 1964–2011 (number asked daily)
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Source: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates.
The Matter of Public Importance
The Matter of Public Importance (MPI) continues to be underrated as a tool 
of scrutiny by students of politics and public administration alike. As one 
academic commentator expresses the traditional view of MPIs: ‘An MPI debate 
is really only an invitation to comment on a “matter for discussion”, with no 
vote taken, as would be the case in a censure motion.’ He concludes that, ‘The 
parliamentary discussion is simply timed out. But it is a useful opposition tactic 
for getting arguments and evidence on the public record’ (Uhr 2005, p. 11). 
However, an analysis of the parliamentary record between 1964 and 2011 
indicates the picture to be less clear-cut. The MPI, under this or earlier names,2 
has been employed to highlight significant gaps in public policy or issues in need 
of sustained attention. Prominent, early examples of this include those dealing 
with ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work’ (CPD, House of Representatives, 1 May 1962, 
pp. 1741−1753), ‘Public Service’, (CPD, House of Representatives, 14 May 1963, 
pp. 1288−1300); ‘Commonwealth Public Service Annual Leave and Employment 
Conditions’ (CPD, House of Representatives, 4 March 1970, pp. 54−60, 13 May 
1970, pp. 2049−2063); ‘Government Contracts’ (CPD, House of Representatives, 
8 March 1973, pp. 362−376); and, in the Senate (where it is employed far less 
than in the lower house), ‘Review of Commonwealth Functions’ (the alleged 
inadequacy and deleterious community effects of this review) (CPD, Senate, 
11 November 1981, pp. 2018−2021). In contrast to earlier decades, several 
MPIs (in 1993 and 2003–04 in particular, relating to one minister’s financial 
2 Throughout this period, the term MPI was generally employed in the House of Representatives. In the 
Senate, the term Matter of Urgency (MoU) was used instead of MPI between 1963 and 1977, both MPI and 
MoU being employed interchangeably in 1978 and 1979. Since 1980, an MPI has been identified in the Senate 
independently of an MoU and a Matter of Public Interest (MoPI).
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practices and the issue of APS politicisation, respectively) have raised awareness 
(among Senators and MPs, at least) of the MPI as a scrutiny vehicle (they will be 
examined in greater detail later).
Since 1990, the MPI has become a more common feature of parliamentary business 
in both houses. As well as the predictable interest in policy matters (mainly 
economic and foreign), ministerial decisions and public sector performance, 
there is a strong concern with the health of the institutions of governance 
and public administration. Major examples include ‘Government Financial 
Management’ (especially ‘the process of government’: CPD, Senate, 24 August 
1990, pp. 2184–2204); ‘Department of Social Security: Administration’ (‘The 
continuing failure of the Minister for Social Security to address the multitude of 
administrative problems currently besetting his Department’: CPD, Senate, 11 
October 1990, pp. 2921−2945); ‘APS Politicisation’ (‘The growing politicisation 
of the public service, and attempts by the Government to withhold important 
information from parliament through doctoring and withholding reports’: 
CPD, Senate, 12 August 2003, pp. 13343−13357); and ‘APS Politicisation’ (‘That 
the Senate expresses its deep concern at the continuing politicisation of the 
public sector by the Howard Government’: CPD, Senate, 25 March 2004, pp. 
21986–22006). The MPI is now an established tool for such scrutiny in Senate 
deliberations.
Among notable House of Representatives examples are those dealing with damage 
to public confidence in the government’s stewardship of public administration: 
‘The Operation of the Australian Loan Council’ (CPD, House of Representatives, 
3 November 1992, p. 2394; 4 November 1992, p. 2574; 5 November 1992, pp. 
2748−2758); ‘Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service’ (‘The government’s 
failure to reform both the efficiency and culture of the Australian Quarantine 
and Inspection Service which is hampering Australia’s competitiveness in 
world markets’: CPD, House of Representatives, 16 December 1993, p. 4240); 
‘Commonwealth Financial Management’ (‘The government’s failure to prudently 
manage the Commonwealth’s finances’: CPD, House of Representatives, 8 
November 2000, pp. 22442–22453)3; and, ‘Howard Government: Denigration 
of Government Institutions’ (‘The persistent failure of the Government to 
be accountable and to tell the truth, denigrating in the process institutions 
fundamental to Australian democracy, including the public service, the defence 
forces, the Parliament and the courts’: CPD, House of Representatives, 21 March 
2002, pp. 1921–1922).
3 One of the issues emphasised here was the ‘radical decentralisation’ of responsibility under the provisions 
of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997, which had — it was argued — contributed to a 
significant decline in Department of Finance and Administration supervision of departments engaging in 
foreign exchange related transactions.
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The insistence of Senators and MPs that the MPI process be properly observed 
and the procedure’s forensic nature, breadth, depth and coverage (especially 
since 1990) attest to the status they accord it (and to its effectiveness) as a 
vehicle of scrutiny. The opposition leader, E. G. Whitlam, in March 1970 was 
at pains to stress that, so far that year, the opposition had raised five MPIs, and 
each time the debate was gagged after one speaker from each side had spoken. 
He pointed out that in 1969 the average number of speakers had been four and, 
between 1960 and 1970, no fewer than three speakers on each side spoke on 
MPIs (CPD, House of Representatives, 18 March 1970, p. 561). Thirty years later, 
Dr Andrew Theophanous referred to this continuing problem as constituting, 
if not an abuse of procedure, then certainly a regrettable practice, when he 
argued that time be allocated to enable independent MPs to speak on MPIs 
and the Business of the House not be brought on precipitately, thus precluding 
them from speaking (CPD, House of Representatives, 6 September 2000, p. 
20272). No doubt this premature curtailing of the MPI process in order to stifle 
or smother debate (amounting to attempted strangulation at birth in the cases 
of the Australian Loan Council and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection 
Service) and marked ‘Denigration of Government Inspections’ in other cases 
restricts scrutiny.
As a result of the reforms to parliamentary standing orders in September 2010, 
three substantive changes were made to MPIs. First, they increased the amount 
of time allowed for discussion to one hour and 30 minutes. This would permit 
the proposer and the next speaker to speak for 15 minutes and any following 
speakers for 10 minutes (CPD, House of Representatives, 29 September 
2011, p. 117). Second, MPIs are now discussed directly after Question Time, 
thereby raising their prominence. Third, the agreement also outlined the 
principle that there should be a proportionate share of time for MPIs in order 
that all non-government members would have adequate time allotted (House 
of Representatives 2010, p. 4). However, additional changes would further 
improve the situation. For example, standing orders could be altered to make 
it mandatory for a minimum of four Senators and MPs to speak for a specified 
minimum length of time on each MPI. Notwithstanding this problem, the MPI 
remains a more estimable tool for scrutiny by the non-government parties (its 
main purpose anyway) than is often supposed. Few better examples of this can 
be found than the ‘Community Grants’ or so-called ‘Sports Rorts Affair’ of late 
1993, which was pursued vigorously via the MPI process (the result being a 
ministerial resignation and the implementation of improved accountability 
processes earlier recommended by the Auditor-General). Two influential MPIs 
were involved here: ‘Community Grants’ (‘The failure of administration in the 
Department of the Arts, Sport, the Environment and Territories as exemplified 
by the blatant misuse of taxpayers’ money for political purposes’: CPD, House 
of Representatives, 17 November 1993, pp. 3018−3027), and ‘Community 
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Grants’ (‘The failure of the Minister for the Environment, Sport and Territories 
to adequately respond to the efficiency audit of the Auditor-General on the 
community cultural, recreational and sporting facilities program’: CPD, House 
of Representatives, 22 November 1993, p. 3288).
The number of MPIs being raised in each house is another issue requiring 
attention. Since 1964, in every year except four (1983, 1984, 1989, 2011) the 
number of MPIs raised in the House of Representatives has been almost, and 
often more than, double that in the Senate (a total of 1,841 in the lower house as 
against 626 in the Senate). Clearly, further procedural reform (again, by means 
of standing orders) is needed to resuscitate the MPI as a vehicle for scrutiny 
in the upper house. The figures underline the need starkly: Senate MPIs 
1997–2011, 152; House of Representatives MPIs 1997–2011, 664. The MPI has 
certainly proved itself a useful tool of scrutiny, and it is true that, as one former 
Senate Deputy President and MP put it, the MPI process offers the opposition 
and smaller parties ‘very fair opportunities to put their point of view’ (Hamer 
2004, p. 294). Nevertheless, the MPI (particularly in the Senate) could clearly be 
rendered a sharper tool by addressing the issues of MPI debate gagging and the 
small numbers of Senate MPIs. 
Table 4: Matters of Public Importance 1964–2011 (number raised annually)
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Source: Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates.
Committees of the Parliament
Committees are the best known features of the parliamentary scrutiny machinery. 
The Sydney Morning Herald of 20 June 2005 contained the findings of a survey of 46 
Senate inquiries undertaken since 1996, most of whose major recommendations, 
according to survey authors Gerard Ryle and Lisa Pryor, have been largely 
ignored (Ryle and Pryor 2005). At first sight, figures for inquiry duration, 
number of report recommendations and estimated cost of these investigations 
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make the Senate committee system appear to some degree to be a luxury of 
governance. While a relatively easy picture to create, this is in many respects 
misleading. The wide-ranging nature of Senate (and House of Representatives) 
committee inquiries, even if the majority of their findings are not implemented, 
still makes committees an influential tool of scrutiny. Although many committee 
recommendations are integrated into legislation and APS practice, it should 
be recognised that few governments have the capacity to reshape what are 
frequently complex spheres of governance by enshrining into public policy 
the numerous recommendations made by committees (some reports contain 
almost 100 recommendations). Politics and public administration essentially are 
exercises in reconciling resources with the most suitable avenue of policy; in 
this instance, to criticise governments for not implementing recommendations 
on such a scale never (or highly unlikely ever to have been) realisable anyway, is 
a superficial criticism that takes little account of the political or administrative 
challenges of governance. 
It is perhaps also necessary to arrive at a more balanced view than that usually 
advanced in relation to recent committee work. As one Senator put it in December 
2005 on the subject of committee activity since the government began to exercise 
its Senate majority (from 1 July of that year): ‘we have seen the number of 
committee references that have been agreed to halved and, correspondingly, the 
number of committee references opposed doubled. That shows another example 
of the significant amount of scrutiny that has been prevented’ (CPD, 8 December 
2005, pp. 133–134). 
He went on to protest against the government’s refusal ‘to allow scrutiny of 
basic broad policy matters’, notably, by means of frequent use of the ‘gag’ or 
‘guillotine’ in order to prevent or limit debate on proposed committee references. 
Yet, he called for a sense of perspective in discussions of this and related matters: 
I think it is important that we try to put a bit of a brake on this continual 
‘tit-for-tat’ and dragging back through Hansards of the last 20 years, 
because none of us have totally clean hands here. We all know that 
guillotine motions can be justified. Every party in this place … voted 
for guillotines at various times.
This seems a useful plea for more measured commentary on developments in 
both houses.
Since the reforms to parliamentary procedure in 2010, the House of 
Representatives committees have undergone somewhat of a revival. The changes 
to the committee system outlined in clause 10 of the agreement (House of 
Representatives 2010, p. 6) and implemented through the standing orders (20 
October 2010) were:
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1. Reducing the number of committees from 12 to nine;
2. Reducing the number of committee members to seven;
3. Increasing the number of supplementary members from two to four thereby 
allowing greater participation of parliamentary members in committee 
business; 
4. Stipulating that the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit be chaired 
by non-government members;
5. Allowing the selection committee to refer controversial bills for further 
scrutiny by the relevant standing or joint committee; 
6. Encouraging faster response times by government by requiring a ministerial 
explanation to the house if government responses are not received within 
six months; and 
7. Enabling committee chairs and deputy chairs to make statements in the 
house about new inquiries during private members’ business time. 
The reduction in the number of standing committees was effectively cancelled 
out by the increase in the number of joint standing and select committees, having 
a negligible effect on the workload of Senators and MPs. As yet it is difficult 
to determine the effectiveness of the six-month time frame for government 
responses to reports. The time limit has elapsed for 14 reports, of which nine 
have since received a government response. As a result of the reforms, 67 out 
of 300 bills considered were referred by the Selection Committee for further 
scrutiny, comprising about one-fifth of government business. This compares 
favourably with the period 1994–2010 when only 16 bills underwent further 
investigation by house committees. In addition, the number of amendments 
made to bills based on committee recommendations has lead the House Standing 
Committee on Procedure to consider this reform a success.
Australian National Audit Office (Auditor-General)
The Audit Act 1901 regulated the Auditor-General’s first period of activity (1901–
97), during which (in accordance with the legislation) he concentrated almost 
entirely on financial audit processes and financial accountability in a narrowly 
prescribed sense. Since 1998, under the terms of the Auditor-General Act 1997, 
audit goals and a greater emphasis on enhancing public sector efficiency have 
been the chief focus of the ANAO. An independent auditor, responsible for 
scrutiny of the Auditor-General’s office itself, was appointed in May 1979. 
During the years under review here (1964–2011), with the exception of the 
first ‘efficiency audit’, this situation endured until 1983–84 when efficiency 
audits of APS operations and performance became an established part of ANAO 
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activity (they remained so, along with the project audit — instituted in 1991 
— until 1995). Since then the dominant form of audit has been the performance 
audit (formerly known as an audit report). Since 1998, the ANAO has devised a 
number of other types of audit: the assurance and control assessment audit; the 
business support process audit; the compliance assessment audit; the financial 
control and administration audit; and, the financial statement(s) audit. The 
ANAO’s internet pages, which are among the most accessible and detailed of any 
Australian government (or associated) body, and the Indexes to Papers Presented 
to Parliament, contain an informative (and definitive) listing of all of its reports. 
Its numerous important publications (many of which produce findings with 
implications for the whole field of public administration rather than for just 
the issue or agency under investigation) include ‘Survey of Internal Audit in 
the Commonwealth Public Sector’ (ANAO 1990); ‘Accountability off the Rails — 
National Rail Corporation Limited: Erosion of Accountability to the Parliament’ 
(ANAO 1991a); ‘Implementation of Purchasing Reforms in the Australian Public 
Service’ (ANAO 1991b); ‘Financial Management: Department of Veterans’ 
Affairs’ (ANAO 1995); ‘The Administration of the Australian National Training 
Authority’ (ANAO 1996); ‘Survey of Fraud Control Arrangements in APS 
Agencies’ (ANAO 2000); ‘Recordkeeping’ (ANAO 2002); ‘Absence Management 
in the Australian Public Service’ (ANAO 2003a); ‘Administration of Staff 
Employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984: Department of 
Finance and Administration’ (ANAO 2003b); ‘Annual Performance Reporting’ 
(ANAO 2003c); and ‘Performance Management in the Australian Public Service’ 
(ANAO 2004b). 
The 1997 legislation and consequential amendments to the Public Accounts 
Committee Act 1951, which also involved a change of name for the committee to 
Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA), marked a transfer from 
the executive to the Parliament of independent audit scrutiny (by the JCPAA) 
of government and the APS. The act also ensured that, henceforth, the Auditor-
General would be more independent of both the executive and the Parliament 
by virtue of the considerable powers given to the JCPAA. Two parliamentary 
officers summed up the new arrangements in May 2001 as follows:
The Auditor-General, by conducting financial and performance audits 
of Commonwealth agencies provides the technical expertise and 
detailed scrutiny necessary for the effective evaluation of public service 
performance. Parliament depends on the Auditor-General’s reports as a 
basis for further public inquiries.
By strengthening the independence of the Auditor-General and his office 
from the Executive and enhancing the role of Parliament in relation to 
the Auditor-General as both guardian and client, Parliament has gained 
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some crucial extra weighting in the ever changing dynamic of checks 
and balances that pervade Australian democracy (Kerley and Harris 
2001, pp. 11−12).
The year 1997 ushered in ‘a new legislative era’ for the Auditor-General’s 
activities, which saw routine financial auditing eclipsed (or at least matched) by 
auditing intended to ‘add value and improve public administration’ (Wanna, Ryan 
and Ng 2001, pp. 288, 295). The Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration’s 1976 call for ‘a renewed vitality’ for the audit function (in the 
form of a wider and sharper reporting brief and a parliamentary committee with 
greater powers) had clearly been answered (RCAGA 1976, p. 375). Yet the ANAO 
further sought to improve APS accountability, not only through ‘an integrated 
audit approach’ (Barrett 2004, p. 8), but also by advancing public sector practice 
via initiatives such as ‘Better Practice Guides’. These are designed to translate 
ideas and procedures of proven success in some organisations to other parts 
of the public sector. Thirty-three such guides were produced between June 
1996 and December 2011 covering areas like ‘Audit Committees’ (July 1997) and 
‘Managing Parliamentary Workflow’ (April 2003). They play ‘a desirable and 
valuable role in supporting improved public administration’ (Coghill 2004, p. 6). 
A retired Auditor-General has referred to a number of challenges facing the 
ANAO. Towards the end of his tenure, the question of lower funding resulting 
from projected budget cuts and the potential threat this constituted to the 
ANAO’s capacity to discharge its duties prompted him to express his concerns in 
a letter to the Prime Minister in early 2005 (Lewis 2005, pp. 1–2). This could be 
addressed by achieving a better balance between what appears to be a possible 
overemphasis on detailed reporting, and examinations of general trends, namely, 
less micro and more macro evaluation (the APS Senior Executive Service, for 
example, has been the subject of several micro but few — and then not at 
all recent — macro reviews). Another issue he identified related to how the 
organisation could ‘strike the right balance of audit activity across the public 
service to fulfil [its] statutory obligations, while meeting the particular demands 
of Parliament and individual agencies. The key to this outcome is understanding 
the Parliament’s priorities and the business/functional imperatives of agencies 
that are creating a need for audit examination’ (Barrett 2004, pp. 2−3, 8).
The authors of the ANAO history may have had something like this in mind 
when they wrote, three years earlier, that ‘the tyranny of Parliament over the 
auditor-general could be equally as threatening to the independence of the office 
as the tyranny of the executive’ (Wanna, Ryan and Ng 2001, p. 289). Fortunately, 
there are no signs of this happening and the 1997 reforms must be judged a 
success. The Auditor-General’s role in Australian governance continues to be 
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‘a moderating one’, with the ANAO acting as ‘a unifying influence, improving 
interconnectedness by strengthening the influence of values of openness and 
transparency’ (Coghill 2004, p. 7).
The ANAO could partly address its limited funding by redirecting existing 
funding to more broad-ranging audits and through a reduced emphasis on 
what might be termed micro auditing. This would entail a smaller focus on 
the minutiae of administration in the case of the APS. A combination of these 
approaches may well provide a workable and successful future model for the 
ANAO. It could, for example, undertake fewer micro audits (ANAO 2005b) 
and more macro audits (ANAO 2005a). The former could profitably be less 
detailed and time- and resource-consuming, and the latter focused more on the 
enunciation for the whole APS of general principles and guidance tools absorbed 
from ANAO experience.
























Source: Australian National Audit Office.
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Budget evaluation and appropriation processes
The Commonwealth financial scrutiny framework, specifically the budget and 
appropriation machinery, was transformed between 1964 and the early 2000s. 
Although public accountability now emanates (as it did a generation ago) 
from a single ‘source of initiative’ — the Parliament (Reid 1981, p. 133) — the 
financial scrutiny apparatus has become more complex and been reshaped by 
greater community pressure for better services, as well as the accountability 
requirements generated by expanded and more intricate government outsourcing 
and procurement arrangements. Both the formal political expression of this 
change (for example, administrative law) and its informal manifestations (for 
instance, adroit and systematic use of the media by individuals, organisations 
and interest groups) have produced greater accountability demands on ministers 
and the APS, and increased the need for improved financial structures and 
practices to underpin their activities (O’Faircheallaigh, Wanna and Weller 1999, 
pp. 296−297).
Given its importance to sound governance, the issue of the effectiveness of 
the financial accountability structures and processes remains a central one. 
L. J. Hume, writing in June 1963, warned of the danger that‘ in the Commonwealth 
Parliament the work of scrutiny will become wholly ineffective, and that the 
annual financial routine will degenerate into a ritual’ (Hume 1963, p. 165). 
The financial documents debated by Parliament, he stressed, focused too much 
on ‘certain technical details of the government’s book-keeping’ instead of on 
‘the broad economic impact and implications of programmes’ (Hume 1963, pp. 
165, 166). Despite such well-argued calls (which were prescient about what 
would come to pass 20 years on), reform in this area was minor during the 1960s 
and 1970s — with the notable exception of the appointment of Senate Estimates 
Committees (1970), which were given the power to examine government 
expenditure via systematic questioning of departmental staff.
After conducting a wide-ranging analysis of how things stood in the early and 
mid-1960s, one student of the subject concluded:
Efficiency of the Commonwealth public service occupies only a 
minor place in the considerations of the Commonwealth Parliament. 
Parliament’s interest in public service efficiency is determined partly 
by concern with its own prestige; partly by political considerations 
derived from party or public or electoral attitudes. Only in the former 
does Parliament tend to act as a unit with party differences submerged; 
here there is evidence of a ‘parliamentary’ attitude. In the latter the 
main concern is with political issues, with questions on administration 
subordinate (Holzheimer 1973, p. 249).
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By 1976, the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration had 
become convinced that the establishment of a forward estimates process was 
essential to sound Commonwealth financial management. Such reform would 
be ‘central to the task of rational coordination of policies as well as the efficient 
use of resources’ (RCAGA 1976, p. 357). The 1980s were to witness far-reaching 
changes which reshaped parliamentary financial scrutiny of APS operations; 
indeed, they altered the whole landscape of government financial management. 
The main initiatives were:
• Review of Commonwealth Administration: J. Reid, January 1983 — emphasis 
on the importance of APS and governmental financial accountability and 
management;
• Financial Management Improvement Program — Diagnostic Study: Public 
Service Board and Department of Finance, February 1984 — promotes the 
practice of ‘program budgeting’ which is introduced later that decade;
• Budget Reform — A Statement of the Government’s Achievements and Intentions 
in Reforming Australian Government Financial Administration: Department 
of Finance, April 1984 — recommends that better methods of identifying 
and establishing budget priorities be devised; and
• Efficiency Audit created to enhance APS financial functions: September 1986 
(Verspaandonk and Holland 2003). 
The 1990s saw an even more significant series of reforms:
• Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act) — introduced 
responsibilities for agency heads in areas such as fraud (s. 45), the 
establishment of an audit committee (s. 46), debt recovery (s. 47), record-
keeping (s. 48) and providing the Auditor-General with financial statements 
in the required form (s. 49); and
• Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act) — introduced 
a single set of core reporting and auditing requirements for the directors 
of Commonwealth authorities and companies that are separate legal entities 
established for a public purpose (and which are entitled to hold money in 
their own right).
The remaining key budget and appropriation accountability mechanisms 
under the FMA Act are FMA regulations, FMA delegations, chief executive’s 
instructions, FMA orders, financial statement orders, and the ‘Commonwealth 
Procurement Guidelines’ (of which more later).
The need to ensure greater scrutiny of government contracting resulted in the 
Senate Order of 20 June 2001, which required ministers to table, twice yearly, 
letters of advice that agencies they administered under the FMA Act had placed 
on the internet lists of current contracts (to the value of $100,000 or more) into 
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which these agencies had entered. The Auditor-General provides regular reports 
on this process (twice annually until December 2003 and once a year since then: 
ANAO 2004c, p. 21; Holland 2003). Documentation relating to maintaining 
the confidentiality of commercial information in connection with contracting 
and procurement activities is contained in the Department of Finance and 
Administration’s publications, the ‘Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines’ 
(Finance and Administration 2004) and ‘Confidentiality of Contractors’ 
Commercial Information’ (Finance and Administration 2003).
The wider budget framework comprises a number of elements. They are 
annual appropriations, special appropriations, special accounts, the Australian 
government budget, a charter of budget honesty (introduced in 1998), the pre-
election economic and fiscal outlook, an annual final budget outcome report, 
and monthly consolidated financial statements for the Government (APSC 
2005a, pp. 61−73).
Australia’s federal budget and appropriation arrangements are generally 
performing well. The reforms introduced in the 1980s and 1990s, which sought 
to reduce the emphasis on compliance and increase that on performance, have 
been successful. These include:
• The publication of the forward estimates in the interests of greater 
transparency;
• The introduction of program budgeting, which requires the outlining of 
program budgets and targets, and also that all appropriations related to that 
objective be certified;
• The establishment of aggregate controls, such as efficiency dividends, and 
identification and reporting against efficiency and effectiveness indicators; 
and
• The implementation (for the first time in the 1999–2000 budget) of an 
integrated framework of accrual budgeting, accounting and reporting, one 
that specifies outcomes and outputs.
Accrual accounting, which requires items to be brought to account and included 
in the financial statements as they are earned or incurred, rather than as they are 
received or paid, made it necessary for agencies to redevelop what had formerly 
been cash-based financial management and reporting systems (APSC 2003, pp. 
93−95, 98−99).
What, then, can be said in conclusion about the present system, and how it 
might be refined or improved? There has been a marked change for the better 
in procurement and contract management activity following the introduction 
of the ‘Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines’, the Department of Finance 
and Administration’s financial guidance document on contractors’ commercial 
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information, and the Senate Contracts Order, and a significant decline in the 
incidence of confidentiality provisions in contracts. Nevertheless, the ALP 
insisted in 2004 on the need for independent, credible and public benchmarks 
against which outsourcing and contracting proposals could more profitably be 
assessed (Latham and Emerson 2004, p. 4). While the ANAO found in 2004, after 
an audit of five medium-sized FMA Act agencies (including the Department 
of the Treasury), that ‘generally, agencies had developed adequate control 
structures for the application of financial delegations for the expenditure 
of public monies’, it was clear that ‘such delegations were not always being 
managed in accordance with relevant legislation’ (ANAO 2004a).
Interestingly, in an echo of L. J. Hume’s 1963 concern with the format and 
contents of the financial documentation, one of the pillars of the new financial 
framework has been the subject of considerable debate — the Portfolio 
Budget Statements (PBS) themselves. In its third report on the structure and 
contents of the PBS (in 2000), the Senate Finance and Public Administration 
Legislation Committee concluded that, in view of the divergence of opinion 
about the proper purpose of the estimates process, ‘the PBS are inevitably 
compromise documents’. Their make-up was not always proving helpful in ‘the 
formulating of questions on input and process’ and they were certainly not for 
the ‘uninitiated’. But the committee could find nothing wrong in principle with 
the PBS layout, advising (especially senior) APS staff to familiarise themselves 
more with PBS introductory material and the whole subject of public sector 
budgeting in an attempt to enhance their understanding of the PBS process. The 
committee also recommended that Senate legislation committees report on the 
adequacy of the PBS provided to them for each set of hearings (SFPALC 2000, 
pp. 3−4, 39, 42).
One Senator, however (speaking in the same year), was less indulgent towards 
the PBS. He described it (and the Portfolio Additional Estimates Statement) as 
being replete with jargon, often difficult to read (indeed, sometimes unreadable), 
hard to follow from one year to the next because of radical format changes, and 
much in need of an ‘English translation’ or the assistance offered by a ‘Guide to 
the Galaxy’, as it appeared to him that the document could not have been put 
together by someone on this planet (Hogg 2001, p. 169).
Another major criticism of today’s financial accountability arrangements was 
voiced in November 2004 by D. W. Challen:
Since the introduction of accrual budgeting in 1999, the Commonwealth 
government has presented two sets of budget to Parliament, and 
they report substantially different figures for almost every item. As 
a consequence, Parliament is hopelessly confused. One set of budget 
is based on Australian Accounting Standards formulated for [private 
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sector] business applications while the other is prepared according 
to the Government Capital Finance Statistics standards of [the] IMF 
[International Monetary Fund] (Challen 2004).
Challen went on to argue that weaknesses exist in the present public sector 
reporting framework, particularly in relation to meeting the information needs 
of users; urged that the objectives and associated qualitative characteristics of 
public sector financial reporting should be more carefully articulated; referred 
to the problems which have arisen from applying the for-profit concept of 
financial control to the public sector; and recommended that a more appropriate 
definition of a government reporting entity be arrived at (Challen 2004, p. 2 and 
passim). 
Since 1964, Australian governments of all political hues have gone to considerable 
trouble (especially from the early 1980s onwards) to ensure greater financial 
accountability for their activities. In this they have been ably assisted by the 
APS and the wider public sector. At present, it cannot be said that the demands 
of the financial framework are an impediment to sound government and efficient 
public administration. However, it is probably salutary to remember that 
‘accountability is not an unqualified good to be maximised at all costs. It must 
always be subject to reasonable limits in the light of other conflicting values, 
including practicality and cost’ (Mulgan 2003, p. 236). 
The institutions and requirements of financial management scrutiny as they 
relate to APS operations are, as argued earlier, basically sound. However, 
another aspect of financial accountability, which affects but is not germane 
to public sector activities, continues to raise concerns. It relates to ‘special 
appropriations’ (more accurately, ‘standing appropriations’). These provisions 
permit governments to appropriate money from the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund; such amounts are often unspecified and for no fixed duration. In the 
words of one Senator: ‘The significance of standing appropriations from an 
accountability perspective is that, once they have been enacted, the expenditure 
they involve does not require regular parliamentary approval and therefore 
escapes parliamentary control’ (Murray 2005, p. 2). 
The number of these (and the amounts involved) has risen markedly since 
federation: from 10 per cent in 1910 to 56 per cent in 1970, to over 80 per cent 
of all present Commonwealth government expenditure (the UK figure is 25 per 
cent). While the Australian Parliament undertakes no specific scrutiny of the 
many bills containing special appropriations, the Senate nevertheless possesses 
the power to remove or restrict the provisions in legislation for standing 
appropriations if it deems them inappropriate for the purposes of their proposed 
enactment (Murray 2005, p. 3). The Senate Standing Committee on the Scrutiny 
of Bills would be well-placed to undertake the task of examining all existing 
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legislation and identifying where such provisions exist. The Senate could then 
determine which to retain and which to abolish (a course of action that would, 
of course, require the government’s imprimatur). Thereafter, the Scrutiny of 
Bills Committee might assume this as one of its regular responsibilities.
Accountability to parliamentary inquiry: 
Ministerial advisers and public servants
The role of ‘special’ or ‘ministerial’ advisers in Australian governance, in 
particular their accountability to Parliament, emerged as a major issue during 
the early 1970s when the number of such appointments rose markedly in 
comparison with those of former decades. The implications of this trend and 
the main concerns to which it still gives rise were expressed by Senator John 
Carrick (then an opposition frontbencher) in May 1973:
People have been insinuated between the Minister and his departmental 
head as buffers, as indeed protectors, to prevent the department from 
giving its authentic and responsible view to the Minister. The special 
advisers are apparently immune. The advice that they give does not have 
to be recorded; it does not have to be documented; it is not capable 
in general terms of being examined by the public. I ask that in future 
the special advisers be present, along with the departmental officers 
at Estimates Committee hearings and that they be made available for 
examination through the Minister just as are departmental officers.
The test of the system is simple. If it is true … that the idea of the Senate 
Estimates Committee is, through the Ministers, to be able to draw out of 
the departmental officers the facts, the thinking of the departments, to 
get a participatory democracy between members of the Public Service 
and this Parliament, then the Government of the day cannot have any 
alibi for preventing the special advisers being brought into the open and 
being subject to scrutiny (CPD, Senate, 31 May 1973, pp. 2147–2148).
None of these questions has been seriously addressed, especially concerns about 
the accountability of ministerial staff, by any government since then, despite a 
regular stream of Questions on Notice requesting details of the growing numbers, 
conditions of employment, salaries and other entitlements of such staff. Since the 
passing of the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984, the total number of those 
employed under this legislation has risen from some 700 to 1,200, with ministerial 
staff numbers themselves standing in mid-2004 at approximately 400 (Latham 
and Faulkner 2004, p. 7). The Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration, as early as the mid-1970s, found there to be ‘a lack of clarity in 
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the division of responsibility between ministers and officials’ (RCAGA 1976, p. 
54). The debate has widened much since then with the longstanding focus on 
accountability recently being matched by a recognition of the need to set out 
clearly the respective roles of advisers and public servants. One MP identified 
this issue in 1981, arguing that the accountability dilemma for ministers, the 
APS and its staff centred on the complexity of its functions. This often resulted 
in ministers being placed in a position of ‘ministerial answerability’ rather than 
‘ministerial accountability’. The solution to this problem, he concluded, was 
a better definition of accountability requirements for department heads and 
senior APS employees which would assist ministers to be truly ‘accountable’ and 
not just ‘answerable’ (Aldred 1981, pp. 76−77). Yet, in the words of one Public 
Service Board chairman, as the 1980s advanced, public servants (even with their 
minister present) were finding themselves increasingly in the spotlight (Cole 
1981, p. 123). As early as 1982, one commentator was speculating that public 
examination of APS staff at estimates and other committee hearings could allow 
poorly performing ministers to escape appropriate scrutiny (Uhr 1982, p. 37). 
A set of guidelines aimed at clarifying the position of public servants in such 
proceedings was tabled in Parliament in August 1984. It was later revised to 
take account of the Senate Parliamentary Privilege Resolutions of 25 February 
1988 (Senate, Table Office 1988, p. 3; Prime Minister and Cabinet 1989).
By 1996, some observers were complaining of ‘the increasing “direct” 
accountability of public servants to Parliament’ — that, more and more, senior 
public servants at the table, rather than ministers, were being required to answer 
questions and explain decisions, and to do so to an unprecedented degree 
(Halligan, Mackintosh and Watson 1996, pp. 62–63). Some senior parliamentary 
officers, however, regarded this very differently, seeing it as merely another 
evolutionary step in scrutiny to which the APS leaders would need to become 
accustomed. In 2001, reflecting that ‘[t]he advent of broad-based committee 
systems in both the Senate and House of Representatives, has led to scrutiny 
being extended generally from Ministers to public servants’, they emphasised 
that ‘[s]crutiny can be better exercised by committee members directing 
questions requiring in depth or detailed answers to public servants who may be 
more familiar with such details than Ministers’ (Kerley and Harris 2001, p. 9).
Similarly, Max Trenorden stressed at this time that the traditional doctrine of 
accountability (the Westminster conception of a single chain of accountability 
via a minister) was essentially no longer valid, and that there now existed 
different levels and degrees of accountability following the landmark public 
service devolution and decentralisation of the late 1990s. However, as an MP 
himself, he acknowledged the difficulty confronting politicians in drawing 
the line when questioning public servants before committees, as they are 
increasingly involved in policy development and its review. Finding a balance 
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between the accountability of public servants for administration and the political 
responsibility of ministers in the greatly altered public policy arena of the early 
2000s will not be easy. An initiative that could assist in this is a revised set of 
guidelines governing public sector employees’ appearance before committees in 
an attempt to better define their roles and responsibilities while at the same time 
(by means of reform of the standing orders) placing the main burden to respond 
to committee scrutiny on the shoulders of the minister (Trenorden 2001, p. 98; 
Holland 2002).
Despite the direction offered to advisers in the Prime Minister’s Guide on Key 
Elements of Ministerial Responsibility and the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 
1984, the issue of the conduct of ministerial advisers continues to raise questions. 
The Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, which reported 
in August 2002 (see especially the section on ‘Accountability and Ministerial 
Advisers’, SSCCMI 2002, pp. 173−187) identified ‘a serious accountability 
vacuum at the level of ministers’ offices’. The fact that it had been denied 
access to the relevant key ministerial staff during its inquiry caused the select 
committee serious concern and led it to recommend a number of reforms to 
existing arrangements. These included the formulation of a code of conduct to 
better regulate the activities and ensure the greater accountability of such staff.
The inquiry prompted considerable debate about the ministerial staff system 
during 2003. Anne Tiernan and Patrick Weller, while acknowledging that the 
edifice had developed into ‘an important political institution’, nevertheless 
identified five important deficiencies in it: the system had outgrown the 
arrangements designed originally to support and control it; the framework 
was based on an outdated set of myths and assumptions; the absence of a clear 
and shared understanding of the respective roles of ministerial staff and public 
servants was undermining the quality of APS advice and support to ministers; 
a number of partisan practices had developed around the system which was 
reducing general and specialist knowledge of its structure and operations; 
and the critical weakness of present practices centred on the issue of the 
accountability of ministers for the conduct and performance of ministerial staff, 
and the overall lack of accountability of staff themselves. ‘Ministerial staff’, 
they concluded, ‘are the black hole of the executive — unaccountable in theory 
as well as practice’ (Tiernan and Weller 2003, pp. 3, 9, and passim).
Dr Michael Keating has suggested that a new stage in accountability has been 
reached; just as public servants are now accountable for their advice and actions 
more broadly than to their minister alone, ministerial advisers must also be 
subject to a formal accountability regime which fully reflects their new roles and 
responsibilities in government, and particularly in executive–APS interaction 
(Keating 2003, pp. 92–93). Ambitious prescriptions to this end have been put 
forward by both academic authorities and a parliamentary committee. Anne 
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Tiernan and Patrick Weller advocate greater transparency through mandatory 
reporting about central elements of the system, improved monitoring of its 
performance, and devising clearer lines of responsibility for such staff (Tiernan 
and Weller 2003, p. 10). Megan Kimber, speaking in late 2004, called for a fresh 
setting out of the functions of and relationships between ministers, their staff 
and public servants (Kimber 2004). A welcome publication in this area is the 
Australian Public Service Commission’s Supporting Ministers, Upholding the 
Values (APSC 2006). 
The most ambitious recommended reforms, however, remain those put forward 
by the Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee report 
on ‘Staff employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984’ (SFPARC 
2003b). The Committee called, inter alia, for the government to make ministerial 
staff available to appear before parliamentary committees in certain (specified) 
circumstances; recommended that the government, in consultation with the 
Parliament, provide a framework for the appearance of such staff; argued that the 
Act be restructured so as to better define the different categories of ministerial 
office employment; called for improved record-keeping practices within ministers’ 
offices; recommended that a code of conduct for ministerial staff be devised and 
implemented, with such a code for non-ministerial staff employed under the act 
to follow; and insisted on the need for better training of staff (SFPARC 2003b, 
pp. xix−xxiv). Similar calls appeared in the ALP’s August 2004 machinery of 
government statement (Latham and Faulkner 2004, p. 7). In government, Senator 
John Faulkner tabled ‘Code of Conduct for Ministerial Staff’ on 26 June 2008. 
The code contained 21 clauses. Some of the obligations outlined included that 
all ministerial staff should declare any gifts or hospitality; have no other outside 
employment; be aware of the APS code of conduct; acknowledge that they do 
not have the power to direct APS staff or make decisions; and not knowingly 
provide false information (Special Minister of State 2008). Yet, the code did not 
require ministerial staff to be directly accountable or answer questions before 
Parliament. Indeed the subject continues to provoke contrasting interpretation. 
In 2002, the Clerk of the Senate, for example, rejected the claim that either in 
practice or in law, ministerial staff cannot be summoned to appear as witnesses 
before parliamentary committees because they have immunity from such calls 
arising from the immunity of their ministers (Evans 2002, p. 137). Yet, the Clerk 
of the House of Representatives asserts that ministers and/or their staff should 
not be called upon to appear before a house (or one of its committees) of which 
the Minister is not a member because this would constitute an infringement of 
privilege (Harris 2002, pp. 105−106).
It is still largely the case (as it was in 1989) that ‘[t]he duty of the public servant 
is to assist ministers to fulfil their accountability obligations by providing full 
and accurate information to the Parliament about the factual and technical 
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background to policies and their administration’ (Prime Minister and Cabinet 
1989, p. 1). However, it cannot be denied that in doing so, and in their dealings 
with ministers, ministerial staff and parliamentary committees, public sector 
employees are now confronted with a more complex and demanding set of 
challenges than in the late 1980s. That having been said, the APS of today is 
much more aware of the need to reflect on questions of accountability and, as 
it has shown, to work with the government of the day (as well as academic 
and non-academic commentators) in developing processes designed to better 
address scrutiny demands.
The role of ministerial advisers and other such staff in APS–executive interaction 
has for some years received systematic attention in the Australian Public Service 
Commission’s annual ‘State of the Service’ report. The detailed synopsis it 
contains of APS staff relationships with ministerial offices suggests a generally 
harmonious set of relationships (APSC 2005b, pp. 34−43). The main foundations 
of this seem to be trust and clarity about what is required of public servants 
in such interchange. The APS values and code of conduct have provided (and 
continue to provide) a solid basis for the former. In March 2006, in order to 
strengthen the latter, the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) released 
Supporting Ministers, Upholding the Values.
Conclusion
Almost certainly the best way forward for parliamentary scrutiny inside the 
two houses lies in implementing the remainder of the 1982 Hayden reform 
proposals and in ensuring that they are observed. Among the most effective 
means of achieving this would be to reshape the offices of President and Speaker 
so as to give them greater powers over the conduct of Question Time (as in 
Britain, in the case of the Speaker). The three legislative (or chamber) scrutiny 
vehicles examined in this chapter (Questions without Notice, Questions on 
Notice and Matters of Public Importance) are clearly in need of some further 
reform. The administration of the current wave of reforms since September 2010 
demonstrates that the extent and success of such change will depend largely on 
the preparedness of the executive and the opposition front bench to collaborate 
in devising and abiding by in good faith initiatives aimed at providing the 
presiding officers with greater real authority over parliamentary proceedings. 
Overseas experience shows that these vehicles would then function more 
effectively, resulting in improved parliamentary oversight of the public sector. 
Parliament’s committees must also display a greater willingness to investigate 
all aspects of APS operations. Some improvement has occurred with the 
revitalisation of the House of Representatives committee system. 
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However, further gains could be made as trends in this area indicate that such 
scrutiny is neither broad-ranging enough nor based on the recognition that 
investigations of key features of public administration should be conducted 
regularly so as to better discern trends and devise improvements in processes 
and practices. Even in instances where encouraging work of this kind is begun, 
it is often not carried through. The Senate Finance and Public Administration 
References Committee reference, ‘Australian Public Service Employment 
Matters’ (28 June 1999), for example, was not readopted on 21 March 2002, 
despite the production of one valuable report on the subject entitled ‘Australian 
Workplace Agreements’ (SFPARC 2000). The question of the degree to which 
committee report recommendations and findings are being noted by public 
servants is also relevant. While the practice whereby the government of the 
day provides formal and detailed responses to report recommendations remains 
central to effective public administration, another opportunity exists in this 
context for APS employees to enhance their policy and administrative skills, 
one suggested recently by the British House of Commons Public Administration 
Select Committee. In its report, ‘Government by Inquiry’ (UKPSCPA 2005), it 
extended the conception and well-established practice of government response 
regarding implementation or non-implementation of recommendations to one 
concerned with public sector learning, namely, measures designed to ensure 
that the lessons of committee inquiries are better absorbed by public servants 
in order to improve their capability.
Scope exists, too, for the ANAO to undertake more review and follow-up 
inquiries and to revisit areas of APS administration, such as the structure, role 
and functioning of the Senior Executive Service. The proliferating number of 
separate bodies in the Australian government (which ebbs and flows around 
the 1,000 mark) reinforces the need to build on the reforms emanating from the 
Uhrig Report (2004) on Australian Government statutory authority governance, 
and to preserve and strengthen the present budget accountability and financial 
management arrangements governing APS operations. Despite the undoubted 
challenges they pose for the long-dominant, traditional Westminster model of 
governance, which has had considerable difficulty absorbing them, Australia (like 
Britain) appears to have accepted that ‘[g]overnment cannot be fully explained 
without reference to special advisers’ (Blick 2004, p. 314). More importantly, 
perhaps, politicians, public servants and commentators (academic and non-
academic) seem to have acknowledged that, the need for a finer definition of 
the special adviser system’s principles and practice notwithstanding, the APS 
and the ministerial adviser have separate (albeit important and complementary) 
contributions to make to sound governance — contributions which need not 
conflict or adversely affect public sector efficiency or good government.
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The shortcomings of Australia’s parliamentary scrutiny arrangements as they 
relate to APS administration, which have been explored in this chapter, should not 
obscure the real possibilities that exist for change; nor should they overshadow 
the strengths of the present system and the impressive repository of existing 
Australian practice and ideas that is available to be drawn on in pursuing fruitful 
reform. Much can also be learned from the political and public administration 
experience and scholarship of other parliamentary democracies. Successful 
constitutional change depends greatly on a historical perspective (University of 
London, School of Advanced Study/History of Parliament Trust 2005).The same 
can be said of attempts to reform the government sector. The ‘Effective Scrutiny’ 
project at the School of Public Policy’s Constitution Unit at University College, 
London, for example, has produced valuable research and political blueprints 
for improving scrutiny based on both historical research and analyses of present 
administrative practice. Some of its findings would undoubtedly be applicable 
in Australia. The British diplomat and writer on international affairs, Sir Harold 
Nicolson, a civil servant of 20 years’ standing, regarded the civil service as a 
stable and essential anchor of governance. It was, he proclaimed, nothing less 
than ‘the flywheel of the state’, a body whose continuity and flexibility as an 
‘organism’ rather than a ‘machine’ made it an immensely useful instrument of 
governance (Nicolson 1940, p. 4; 1950, p. 787). The Australian public service, 
like its British counterpart, faces constant challenges. Nevertheless, there is no 
reason to doubt its capacity to respond positively to and to benefit from the 
essentially sound apparatus of parliamentary scrutiny to which it is now and 
will continue to be subject. 
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4. Assessing Access to Information 
in Australia: The impact of freedom 
of information laws on the scrutiny 
and operation of the  
Commonwealth government
Daniel Stewart
When the first freedom of information (FOI) legislation was introduced in 
Australia, its basic objectives were said to be ‘simple’ (The Freedom of Information 
Bill 1978, second reading speech, Senator P. D. Durack, 9 June 1978):1 to make 
public the structure, functions and rules applied by government, and entitle 
members of the public to access government documents unless there are special 
reasons not to. Over 30 years later, the introduction of the ‘most significant 
overhaul of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (the FOI Act) since its 
commencement’ referred to the same basic objectives, attempting to ‘deliver 
more effective and efficient access to government information and promote a 
culture of disclosure across government’ (Freedom of Information Amendment 
(Reform) Bill 2009, second reading speech, Anthony Byrne MP, Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Prime Minister, Parliamentary Debates, 26 November 2009). 
This chapter explores the development, interpretation and operation of the FOI 
Act over the intervening 30 years. It examines the role of the FOI Act within the 
broader legal framework regulating access to government information to assess 
its impact on government policy at the Commonwealth level. It suggests that 
achieving the objectives of the FOI Act has proven anything but simple.
The Australian Freedom of Information Bill 1978 was the first of its sort 
introduced in a Westminster-style democracy.2 By the time it was enacted, 
Australia’s contemporaries in Canada and New Zealand had also passed similar 
legislation. Other countries, including the UK, have since passed legislation 
emboldened by these early examples, and there has been a recent explosion of 
laws intended to provide access to government information in over 76 countries 
around the world (Ackerman and Sanoval-Ballesteros 2006, p. 86; Worthy 2010, 
1 Unusually the second reading speech was not read out in Parliament but merely incorporated into Hansard 
prior to the parliamentary recess. The rush to have it introduced in this way in an attempt to quicken its 
passage proved pointless, however. See the discussion of the history of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 
(Cth) below.
2 Note that the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act 1766 is usually referred to as the first FOI legislation that 
inspired the United States 1966 legislation: see Lamble 2002.
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pp. 561–582). However, despite this proliferation of access to information laws, 
our understanding of their impact is still developing (Worthy and Hazell 2010, 
p. 352). 
Much of the assessment of the impact of government disclosure laws attempts 
a comparative evaluation of various elements or decisions made under FOI 
legislation. These comparisons are often based on high level indicators or aggregated 
data, often supplied by government agencies charged with administering or 
championing the Act, and suffer from ensuring the collection and aggregation 
of data are sufficiently rigorous and coordinated.3 Descriptive summaries of the 
presence of various exogenously valued features within legislation are contrasted 
with other studies attempting to compare the practical operation of access laws 
through lodgement of standardised requests. Some groups have also focused on 
the utility of access laws to their specific interests, particularly journalists (Worthy 
2010, p. 562). Questions arise as to the objective value of the criteria used as the 
basis of the comparison (see Hazell, Worthy and Glover 2010, pp. 51–52). 
The operation of access laws also presents other important impediments to 
evaluation. Access to information laws, perhaps more than comparable forms 
of regulation, ‘do not operate in a vacuum’ (Julnes and Holzer 2001, p. 696). 
The political context in which the access laws operate can have significant 
effects on the operation of reform initiatives. The attitude or culture of 
government agencies can make a significant difference. The goals of access 
laws are often vague, generalised or uncertain, making assessment inherently 
subjective or incommensurate. Perhaps most importantly, where those goals 
relate to democratic ideals or enhancing societal governance generally, they 
are profoundly impacted by the operation of institutions at the legislative, 
government, judicial or electoral level (Julnes and Holzer 2001, p. 696; see also 
Moynihan and Pandey 2004, p. 431). 
Any assessment of the impact of access laws involves reference to the objects 
or justifications for such laws. Justifications for greater access to government 
information include both consequentialist and deontological approaches. 
Exposure of government information is claimed to provide greater accountability 
and encourages better decision-making. Greater transparency in the decision-
making process establishes responsibility for the decision, requires disclosure of 
the considerations involved in the decision and increases the range of interests 
consulted. Requiring access encourages efficiencies in record-keeping and 
information gathering processes, improving the responsiveness of consultation 
and enabling correction of incorrect or incomplete information. Transparency can 
also encourage greater institutional legitimacy or trust, preventing corruption and 
3 See, for example, the admission that the list of bodies subject to the FOI Act collected in the 2010 Annual 
Report is contributed by individual departments and is not authoritative: O’Connor 2010, p. 132.
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reducing rent-seeking, reducing costs associated with establishing or enforcing 
agreements or encouraging compliance and generally allowing for more effective 
implementation of public policies (Ackerman and Sanoval-Ballesteros 2006, p. 92). 
Access to government information can also facilitate effective business practices. 
It has been suggested that
[c]ommercial users are, in many countries, one of the most significant user 
groups. Public bodies hold a vast amount of information of all kinds, much 
of which relates to economic matters and which can be very useful for 
business. A right to information helps promote a fluid information flow 
between government and the business sector, maximising the potential 
for synergies. This is an important benefit of the right to information 
legislation, and helps answer the concerns of some governments about the 
cost of implementing such legislation (Mendel 2008, pp. 4–5). 
Many of the consequentialist arguments above can relate generally to 
transparency in its various manifestations, in both the public and private 
sectors. However, justifications for transparency of government information 
in particular often relate to the contribution to participatory democracy. 
Participation at any level of the democratic process requires access to and an 
understanding of information about the activities of government. Engagement 
with the political process beyond exercising voting rights requires an awareness 
of the impact of government decisions and the interests they reflect. The ability 
to access, respond to and augment information utilised in the decision-making 
process in turn raises the level of political debate and more informed decision-
making (Hazell, Worthy and Glover 2010, p. 87). 
The rise of access to information laws has also been linked with its acceptance 
as an integral element of freedom of speech and as part of a general right to 
information. Such rights are based on realising our potential as citizens in a 
democratic society. For example, Mark Bovens suggests that information rights 
such as access to information
concern first and foremost the social functioning of citizens, not only in 
relation to the public authorities, but also in their mutual relations and 
their relations with private legal entities. Information rights should be 
part of the civil rights chapter of constitutions, together with the other 
individual rights (Bovens 2002, p. 327). 
With the right to information comes the correlative responsibility to participate 
in holding government to account (Roberts 2001, p. 243). Thus access to 
information is justified not just through the instrumental effects on the various 
participants in government, but in defining and enhancing the relationship 
between government and citizen (see also Rosanvallon 2008, p. 1). 
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The objects of the FOI Act were based on recommendations of the Senate 
Standing Committee for Legal and Constitutional Affairs into the first FOI Bill 
in 1979. They identified three specific justifications for freedom of information 
laws:
With certain national security exemptions … we believe that every 
individual has a right to know what information is held in government 
records about him [sic] personally … Second, we believe that when 
government is more open to public scrutiny, it in fact becomes more 
accountable … The accountability of the government to the electorate, 
and indeed to each individual elector, is the corner-stone of democracy, 
and unless people are provided with sufficient information accountability 
disappears … Thirdly, we believe that if people are adequately informed, 
and have access to information, this in turn will lead to an increasing 
level of public participation in the processes of policy making and 
government itself … Unless information is available to people other 
than those professionally in the service of government, then the idea of 
citizens participating in a significant and effective way in the process of 
policy making is set at nought (SSCLCA 1979). 
Thus even though these justifications focus on the instrumental effects of FOI 
laws they recognise the reciprocal nature of the obligations imposed, focusing 
not just on the accountability of government but also the importance of greater 
participation of individuals in the policy process.
The objects clause originally inserted as s.3 of the FOI Act only partially 
addressed these justifications. The object of the FOI Act was ‘to extend as far as 
possible the right of the Australian community to access to information in the 
possession of the [Commonwealth] Government’. It then referred to three ways 
this was to be achieved: by ‘making available to the public information about 
the operations of departments and public authorities’; ‘creating a general right 
of access to information in documentary form in the possession of Ministers, 
departments and public authorities, limited only by exceptions and exemptions 
necessary for the protection of essential public interests and the private and 
business affairs of persons’; and ‘creating a right to bring about the amendment 
of records containing personal information that is incomplete, incorrect, out of 
date or misleading’. Subsection 3(2) then suggested:
It is the intention of the Parliament that the provisions of this Act shall 
be interpreted so as to further the object set out in subsection (1) and 
that any discretions conferred by this Act shall be exercised as far as 
possible so as to facilitate and promote, promptly and at the lowest 
reasonable cost, the disclosure of information.
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The objects clause therefore recognised the general rights of access and 
amendment but without reference to the accountability and participation these 
rights are expected to achieve. It wasn’t until the recent 2010 amendments 
(Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010 (Cth)) that the reciprocal 
operation of the FOI Act is recognised in its objects with an explicit statement:
s.3(2) The Parliament intends, by these objects, to promote Australia’s 
representative democracy by contributing towards the following:
(a) increasing public participation in Government processes, with a view 
to promoting better-informed decision-making; 
(b) increasing scrutiny, discussion, comment and review of the 
Government’s activities.
The recent amendments also include ‘recognition that information held by the 
Government is to be managed for public purposes, and is a national resource’.4 
Thus the objects of the amended FOI Act recognise the value that access to 
government information has in improving the relationship between government 
and individual and making greater utilisation of government information 
possible.
This chapter considers how effective the FOI Act has been in attaining these 
stated and unstated objectives. It attempts to describe the development and 
operation of the FOI Act, outlining the application of the major provisions of 
the legislation and the basis for calls for their reform. It explores the various 
tensions within the legislation, including the need to encouraging disclosure 
generally without entrenching the means for restriction of access; recognising 
the role of the public service as agents both of the government and the public 
generally; protecting the interest of the individual in the context of the collective 
benefits of disclosure; and balancing the long- and short-term costs and benefits 
of any access regime. Beyond these inherent tensions, however, this chapter 
also considers whether there might indeed be a more fundamental concern over 
the introduction and operation of the FOI Act: the focus in the FOI Act on 
providing a right to access to government information reinforces the separation 
between government and individual rather than enhancing the engagement of 
both in the process of policy-making. 
Part I of this chapter reviews the development of the legal and political context in 
which the FOI was conceived and enacted, and how that context has continued 
to develop. Examining the legal framework of access to government information 
more broadly allows a consideration of the role of the FOI Act, both in the gaps it 
attempts to fill and the influence on the operation of that framework as a whole. 
4 Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010 (Cth) introduced what is now s.3(3) of the FOI Act.
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Part I seeks to establish three propositions: existing legal restrictions motivated or 
encouraged resistance to the introduction of the FOI Act; introduction of the FOI 
Act did not have a significant effect on the development of other elements of the 
legal regulation of disclosure and may arguably have hindered further development; 
and any discussion of the impact of the FOI Act on government policy-making has 
to consider the legal and political context in which that reform took place. 
Part II examines the history and operation of the FOI Act, in particular the 
impact that the utilisation of the exemptions to disclosure have had on achieving 
the objects of the FOI Act. It examines the way in which concerns over the 
impact of the FOI Act on conventions of responsible government manifested 
in a continuing reluctance to embrace the pro-disclosure culture that the FOI 
Act was seeking to achieve, and in particular the extent to which questions 
of deference to the judgement of the executive on the impact on the effective 
working of government undermined the potential contribution of the FOI Act.
Part III examines the role of the FOI Act in protecting the interests of individuals 
and organisations. It considers the operation of the FOI Act in facilitating access to 
personal information and the interaction with privacy concerns. It also considers 
the protection of confidential and business information. The role the FOI Act played 
in enhancing the trust in government commercial dealings and the impact that had 
on the scrutiny and enhancement of broader policy objectives is also discussed.
The final part of this chapter looks at other elements of the recent reforms to the 
FOI Act to consider their antecedents and possible effect on the ongoing impact 
of the FOI Act. In particular, it looks at the imposition of charges for access 
to government information and the inherent evaluation of costs and benefits 
such charges represent. It is suggested that some elements of that reform have 
the potential to substantially renew the relationship between government and 
citizen in the policy-making process, but concerns continue over the ability to 
carry out such a renewal given the history and operation of the FOI Act. 
Part I: The legal context of access to 
government information
Breaking down government secrecy?
In the final months of 2010, Wikileaks, ‘a non-profit media organization dedicated 
to bringing important news and information to the public’,5 released over 
250,000 US diplomatic cables to five respected international news organisations 
5 As described on the Wikileaks website, which is located on varying servers, including http://213.251.145.96/.
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— New York Times, The Guardian, Der Spiegel, Le Monde and El Pais (see 
Benkler 2011, pp. 1–2). Those news organisations then helped sift through and 
publish a selection of cables, often in redacted form, with simultaneous release 
on the Wikileaks website. They continued to be released in stages. The release 
drew immediate calls for action to be taken to seek to prevent or discourage 
the release of what was claimed to be classified, highly sensitive or damaging 
material (BBC News 2010; Shane 2010; see also Benkler 2011). However, the 
consequences from the release have so far been less dramatic. As US Secretary 
of Defense Gates predicted at a Pentagon press briefing on the day of the release:
Now, I’ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy 
described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think — I 
think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, 
governments deal with the United States because it’s in their interest … 
They will continue to work with us. We will continue to share sensitive 
information with one another. Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? 
Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest (US 
Department of Defence 2010). 
A similar scenario, although on a smaller scale, had played out in Australia 
some 30 years earlier. An initial distribution of some 662 copies of a 437-page 
book reproducing diplomatic memoranda, assessments, briefings and cables had 
resulted in the purchase of less than 100 copies before an injunction was obtained 
to prevent further sales. Copies had been sold to the Commonwealth government 
as well as the Indonesian and US embassies. Copies of some of the cables were 
to be serialised in The Age newspaper. Again, the main concern was perhaps 
what the fact of release — rather than the actual content of the documents — 
might mean for the relationship between Australia and the relevant countries 
concerned. As the secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs suggested: ‘It 
is much more likely to facilitate our future relations if the government has been 
seen to try its utmost to prevent that [disclosure] happening’ (Commonwealth v 
John Fairfax & Sons (1980) 147 CLR 39 at 46). 
An ex parte interim injunction was granted by Mason J in the High Court at 
12.45 am on Saturday 8 November 1980, after the Commonwealth had become 
aware of the intended publication of the book and partial serialisation in The 
Age later that morning. It was too late to prevent distribution of an early edition 
of some 60,000 copies of the newspaper, or to prevent early sales of the book. 
In Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons, the Commonwealth government was 
successful in continuing the interim injunctions. However, the impact of the 
judgement was to significantly alter the ability of the government to keep secrets.
Mason J confirmed that protection of government material as confidential 
in Australia involved three elements: that the material to be protected was 
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confidential in quality rather than public knowledge; that it was imparted 
in circumstances that imported an obligation of confidence; and that there 
will be unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party 
communicating it (Commonwealth v Fairfax (1980) 147 CLR 39 at 51 citing Coco 
v A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] R.P.C. 41 at 47). However, the detriment 
to be shown before the government could claim protection was significantly 
different to that of a private citizen:
The equitable principle [of breach of confidence] has been fashioned to 
protect the personal, private and proprietary interests of the citizen, 
not to protect the very different interests of the executive government. 
It acts, or is supposed to act, not according to standards of private 
interest, but in the public interest. This is not to say that equity will not 
protect information in the hands of the government, but it is to say that 
when equity protects government information it will look at the matter 
through different spectacles.
It may be a sufficient detriment to the citizen that disclosure of information 
relating to his affairs will expose his actions to public discussion and 
criticism. But it can scarcely be a relevant detriment to the government 
that publication of material concerning its actions will merely expose it 
to public discussion and criticism. It is unacceptable in our democratic 
society that there should be a restraint on the publication of information 
relating to government when the only vice of that information is that it 
enables the public to discuss, review and criticise government action.
Accordingly, the court will determine the government's claim to 
confidentiality by reference to the public interest. Unless disclosure is 
likely to injure the public interest, it will not be protected.
The court will not prevent the publication of information which merely 
throws light on the past workings of government, even if it be not 
public property, so long as it does not prejudice the community in other 
respects. Then disclosure will itself serve the public interest in keeping 
the community informed and in promoting discussion of public affairs. 
If, however, it appears that disclosure will be inimical to the public 
interest because national security, relations with foreign countries, or 
the ordinary business of government will be prejudiced, disclosure will 
be restrained. There will be cases in which the conflicting considerations 
will be finely balanced, where it is difficult to decide whether the 
public's interest in knowing and in expressing its opinion, outweighs 
the need to protect confidentiality.
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In relation to the documents in question in that case, Mason J was not willing to 
accept that publication would prejudice national security, except perhaps in the 
limited sense that other countries might be less willing to provide information 
on a confidential basis (Commonwealth v Fairfax (1980) 147 CLR 39 at 51 citing 
Coco v A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] R.P.C. 41 at 53). Security classification, 
particularly in the absence of evidence as to the basis and currency of the 
classification, was not sufficient to demonstrate the requisite detriment. In any 
event, any impact on Australia’s foreign relations had already substantially 
occurred due to the early sale of copies of the book to foreign governments. 
Mason J therefore established that there must be an identified impact on the 
public interest before government secrecy would be protected.6 
Recognition of the public interest in disclosure of government information had 
been recognised two years earlier in the case of Sankey v Whitlam ((1978) 142 CLR 
1). Former Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and members of his cabinet had been 
accused of a criminal conspiracy relating to their conduct in office, namely the 
borrowing of $4 billion without approval by the states, allegedly on the premise 
that they misrepresented the loans as being for temporary purposes where that 
was known not to be the case. As part of committal proceedings, cabinet papers 
and other official documents were subpoenaed and objections were raised over 
whether they were protected from disclosure in evidence by ‘Crown’, or ‘public 
interest’, privilege. It had been more or less accepted before this case that ‘a 
certified claim by a minister to a court that the disclosure of documents would 
be injurious to the public interest would ordinarily be accepted by the court’ 
(McMillan 2000, pp. 26–27). However, in Sankey v Whitlam the various judges 
of the High Court held that it was for the court to weigh up the competing 
public interests for and against disclosure in each case, irrespective of whether 
the claim for privilege was due to the contents of the documents in question or 
the claim they belonged to a class which in the public interest ought not to be 
disclosed. As Acting Chief Justice Gibbs suggested:
The fundamental and governing principle is that documents in the class 
may be withheld from production only when this is necessary in the 
public interest. In a particular case the court must balance the general 
desirability that documents of that kind should not be disclosed against 
the need to produce them in the interests of justice. The court will of 
course examine the question with especial care, giving full weight to 
the reasons for preserving the secrecy of documents of this class, but 
it will not treat all such documents as entitled to the same measure of 
6 The role of the court in assessing whether the Australian public interest in publication overrides the 
interest in preserving government confidentiality was endorsed by the majority of the High Court in Attorney-
General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (‘Spycatcher case’) [1988] HCA 25; (1988) 165 CLR 30 
at [32]; see also Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86. 
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protection — the extent of protection required will depend to some 
extent on the general subject matter with which the documents are 
concerned. If a strong case has been made out for the production of 
the documents, and the court concludes that their disclosure would not 
really be detrimental to the public interest, an order for production will 
be made (Sankey v Williams (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 43).7
The various members of the court recognised that the public interest in 
withholding documents may have various elements, including protection of 
national security or relations with foreign governments. Many were sceptical 
of broad claims that release of documents of a particular class would impede 
the candour of advice given to ministers or in the formulation of policy (see 
Sankey v Williams, Gibbs ACJ at 40, Stephen J at 62–3, Mason J at 97). Instead, 
importance was placed on preserving the basis on which information is 
provided to government where disclosure to others would impair confidence in 
the government and its effective working. 
Disclosure of Cabinet papers would therefore generally depend on the content 
and context, recognising the currency of the information and the broader 
impacts disclosure may have. But the inner deliberations of Cabinet and who-
argued-what may be protected where disclosure would undermine the doctrine 
of joint responsibility essential to Cabinet’s institutional integrity (Sankey v 
Williams Gibbs ACJ at 41-2, Mason J at 97-98). Importantly, anticipating the 
arguments accepted in Commonwealth v Fairfax, confidentiality of Cabinet 
meetings was not of itself sufficient to prevent disclosure. Later cases have drawn 
on this aspect of the case to emphasise that reference to the public interest in 
disclosure applied even to government holding of private information when 
that was provided to the government in supposed confidence (McMillan 2000, 
pp. 27–30). Thus in Jacobsen v Rogers ((1995) 182 CLR 572 at 590) it was stated:
Confidential information of a business character required to be given by 
a statute which prohibits the disclosure of the information and protects 
it from production to a court would appear to present a particularly 
strong case for immunity. Nevertheless, even where the private right 
to confidentiality is of some magnitude and its preservation is in itself 
in the public interest, it must be weighed against the public interest in 
disclosure for the purposes of the investigation and prosecution of the 
offences in question (Jacobsen v Rogers (1995) 182 CLR 572 at 592 citing 
Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 60–62). 
7 See also Mason J at 96: ‘In determining this question the court, though it will give weight to the Minister’s 
opinion that the documents should not be produced, is entitled to inspect the documents and form its own 
conclusion upon the question whether the public interest will be better served by production or non-
production.’
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Together, Sankey v Whitlam and Commonwealth v Fairfax represent a crucial 
turning point in the legal protection of government secrecy.8 However, they 
represented cases lost by prime ministers and governments who had themselves 
played instrumental roles in advocating for and introducing FOI legislation. 
In some ways, Sankey and Fairfax also represented high points in the case 
against secrecy, with subsequent developments in public interest privilege and 
government confidentiality continuing to apply the principles and qualifications 
set out in those cases without apparent attempts to further expand openness in 
government.
Lack of authority to disclose government information
While the publishers were successful in restricting claims of government 
confidentiality in Commonwealth v Fairfax, this was not enough to lift the 
injunction and allow publication of the book. The case also considered two 
other claims for protecting government information: breach of the Crimes Act 
1914 (Cth) and breach of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). The government was 
successful in continuing the injunction to restrain breach of copyright. Neither 
the concerns over the public interest that limited breach of confidentiality in 
government information in openness of government nor acknowledgement 
that publication, albeit limited, had already taken place, was sufficient to 
bring the impending publication within the fair dealing defences to copyright 
infringement. Fair dealing encompasses criticism or review, but that was unlikely 
to be successfully argued at any subsequent final hearing of the claim due to 
the lack of consent to the publication of previously unpublished (in the sense 
of publicly available) documents, and the lack of significant commentary on 
the government material. Similarly, the fair dealing exception of reporting the 
news was unlikely to apply to the subject matter of many of the papers; it would 
be the publishing of the papers that would create, rather than report on, the 
news in question. Mason J was prepared to speculate whether the publishing 
of unpublished works might be considered fair ‘as against a government 
merely because that dealing promotes public knowledge and public discussion 
of government action’ (Commonwealth v Fairfax (1980) 147 CLR 39 at 55). 
Similarly, Mason J acknowledged that a defence against copyright infringement 
might exist where publication would protect the community from destruction, 
damage or harm, but extending this to publication of material which discloses 
no clear illegality would ‘break new ground’ (Commonwealth v Fairfax (1980) 
147 CLR 39 at 57). An injunction was therefore granted to prevent publication 
in breach of copyright until the final hearing of the matter.
8 For example, SSCCLA 1979, p. 59 suggested that the judgements in Sankey ‘have challenged, or even 
undermined, many ideas that were previously held (and are reflected in the [Freedom of Information Bill 
1978]) about the relationship between government and the courts’.
New Accountabilities, New Challenges
90
Mason J’s speculations about extending the exceptions or defences to copyright 
infringement were not tested in a final hearing. There has been no significant 
clarification of the position since then, with doubts still remaining over whether 
the government occupies any special position in relation to unpublished works or 
public interest defences to infringement (see Collier Constructions Pty Ltd v Foskett 
Pty Ltd (1990) 19 IPR 44; Stewart, Grifffith and Bannister 2010, [8.51]–[8.520]). 
Reviews of government ownership and use of copyright have made a number 
of recommendations calling for limits on that use (see, for example, CLRC 2005), 
but it remains a matter for individual departments or the approach taken with 
individual documents (see, for example, Attorney-General’s Department 2010).9 
The other element of the Commonwealth v Fairfax decision was the claims 
relating to potential breach of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Section 79 of the Crimes 
Act creates, among other things, offences for communicating, retaining or 
receiving information with the intention of prejudicing the security or defence 
of the Commonwealth. Mason J held that this provision was not enforceable 
through an injunction to supplement the rights of the Commonwealth to enforce 
copyright or confidentiality (see Commonwealth v Fairfax (1980) 147 CLR 39 at 
50). He did not speculate whether the requisite elements of the offence might be 
made out in the circumstances of that case.10
It is also an offence under s.70 of the Crimes Act, then as now, for Commonwealth 
officers to publish or communicate any information or documents that come 
into their knowledge or possession by virtue of being a Commonwealth officer 
unless they have lawful authority. This is subject to imprisonment for up to two 
years. Section 70 has been the basis of a number of convictions for disclosure of 
government information, the most recent that of Allan Kessing for the disclosure 
to The Australian newspaper of security risks at Sydney airport which had 
come into his possession as a Commonwealth customs officer (Kessing v R [2008] 
NSWCCA 310). Reforms to whistleblowing protection at the Commonwealth 
level have been proposed but, at the time of writing, legislation is yet to be 
introduced (Brown 2011).11
9 That statement expresses support for use of a creative commons licence permitting reproduction provided 
attribution of government ownership is made, but this is not compulsory and is in many cases merely treated 
as a default position subject to variation as warranted in the circumstances of the individual agreement or 
document.
10 Section 79 has since been augmented by s.91.1 of the Criminal Code which makes it an offence for a 
person to communicate information concerning the security or defence of the Commonwealth or another 
country to a foreign country or organisation with the intention of prejudicing the security or defence of 
the Commonwealth, or of giving an advantage to another country’s security or defence. An article, record 
or document which is made, obtained, recorded, retained, forged, possessed or otherwise dealt with 
in contravention of this Part of the Criminal Code is forfeited to the Commonwealth. It is a defence if the 
information is lawfully publicly available.
11 For a general discussion of the state of whistleblowing in Australia see Brown and Latimer 2011, pp. 
137–157. Note that s.16 of the Public Service Act1999 (Cth) now states:
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The offence under s.70 of the Crimes Act is complemented by regulations 
under the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1902 (Cth). Up until 1974, there 
were strict limitations on the authority of public servants to engage in public 
comment on matters of administration or information of which they had 
official knowledge. At the time of Commonwealth v Fairfax the regulations still 
required that information concerning public business, the contents of official 
papers or any matter of which an officer has knowledge officially could only 
be disclosed in the course of a public servants official duties or with express 
approval. That general restriction continued until 2006 when it was replaced 
with regulations prohibiting disclosure of information connected with public 
service employment where it is confidential or ‘it is reasonably foreseeable that 
that disclosure could be prejudicial to the effective working of government, 
including the formulation of implementation of policies or programs’ (Reg 2.1 
Public Service Regulations 1999 (Cth)). 
Changes to the regulations relating to disclosure of information followed 
the declaration in Bennett v President, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission ([2003] FCA 1433) that the previous version was unconstitutional. 
Bennett was dismissed from his job at the Customs Department on grounds 
relating to his public comment as a union representative on general staffing 
issues. Finn J drew on the constitutionally enshrined freedom of political 
communication that had been developed by the High Court in the early 1990s 
(see Nationwide News v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television v 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106). Under that freedom, any law that burdens 
the freedom of public servants to disseminate information or communicate 
government and political matters was subject to the test of validity formulated 
in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation ((1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567): 
When a law of a State or federal Parliament or a Territory legislature 
is alleged to infringe the requirement of freedom of communication 
imposed by ss 7, 24, 64 or 128 of the Constitution, two questions must 
be answered before the validity of the law can be determined. First, does 
the law effectively burden freedom of communication about government 
or political matters either in its terms, operation or effect. Second, if the 
law effectively burdens that freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate 
and adapted to serve a legitimate end the fulfilment of which is 
compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed 
A person performing functions in or for an Agency must not victimise, or discriminate against, an APS 
employee because the APS employee has reported breaches (or alleged breaches) of the Code of Conduct to:
(a) the Commissioner or a person authorised for the purposes of this section by the Commissioner; (b) the 
Merit Protection Commissioner or a person authorised for the purposes of this section by the Merit Protection 
Commissioner; or (c) an Agency Head or a person authorised for the purposes of this section by an Agency 
Head.
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system of representative and responsible government and the procedure 
prescribed by s 128 for submitting a proposed amendment of the 
Constitution to the informed decision of the people …
The first part of this test was described by McHugh J in Levy v Victoria ((1997) 
189 CLR 579 at 622; see also John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Attorney-General 
(NSW) (2000) 181 ALR 694 per Spigelman CJ): 
The freedom protected by the Constitution is not, however, a freedom 
to communicate. It is a freedom from laws that effectively prevent 
the members of the Australian community from communicating with 
each other about political and government matters relevant to the 
system of representative and responsible government provided for 
by the Constitution. Unlike the Constitution of the United States, 
our Constitution does not create rights of communication. It gives 
immunity from the operation of laws that inhibit a right or privilege 
to communicate political and government matters. But, as Lange shows, 
that right or privilege must exist under the general law.
The application of that freedom in the context of disclosure of government 
information requires recognition of the legitimate interests of the government. 
Finn J recognised that the complexity, and need, of maintaining public 
confidence, and the diversity of circumstances in which public officials may 
disclose information, suggested a variety of legitimate interests may need to 
be accommodated in any regulation of disclosure. Those legitimate interests 
included possible restrictions on partisan political activity to preserve the 
impartiality, neutrality and loyalty of its public service, or restrictions to 
maintain the effective working or efficient operation of government. In the case 
of regulations preventing disclosure of ‘information about public business or 
anything of which the employee has official knowledge’, Finn J stated:
The dimensions of the control it imposes impedes quite unreasonably the 
possible flow of information to the community — information which, 
without possibly prejudicing the interests of the Commonwealth, could 
only serve to enlarge the public’s knowledge and understanding of the 
operation, practices and policies of executive government (Bennett v 
President, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2003] FCA 
1433 at [99]). 
In invalidating the regulations, Finn J rejected an argument that the regulations 
relied on the exercise of discretion in granting authority which would be 
exercised in the same way as determinations to release information under the FOI 
Act. Finn J considered the reliance on discretion unreasonably compromises the 
implied freedom of political communication by turning it into a dispensation and 
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possibly resulting in at least the appearance of censorship (Bennett v President, 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission [2003] FCA 1433 at [103]). 
Therefore regulations restricting the authority of public servants to disclose 
information had to reflect a more considered balance between the competing 
interests at stake.
Administrative law developments
The case of Commonwealth v Fairfax indicates that although there was growing 
judicial recognition of the public interest in disclosure of government information 
there remained considerable legislative restrictions on that disclosure. The 
operation of the Copyright Act and Crimes Act provided considerable scope 
to discourage the disclosure of government information by providing ministers 
and departments with considerable discretion over what information may be 
publicly released. These restrictions continued to operate after the introduction 
of the FOI Act, with substantial reform only now being considered (see ALRC 
2010). 
There were, however, a number of other legislative reforms that preceded 
the introduction of the FOI that had important implications for openness of 
government. In 1971, the report of the Commonwealth Administrative Review 
Committee, or Kerr Committee (CARC 1971), tabled its findings. Appointed 
under limited terms of reference to update some of the technical or anachronistic 
elements of review of administrative decisions, the report presented a plan for 
a ‘new administrative law’. Two subsequent committees (Bland Committee 
1973; Ellicott Committee 1973) further developed that plan and led to the 
introduction of three important elements of the current administrative law 
system. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) established the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to undertake merits review of a wide 
range of government decision and the Administrative Review Council to perform 
an advisory role. The Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) established the Ombudsman’s 
Office to handle complaints and investigate concerns over maladministration. 
The Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act) was 
introduced to simplify and extend the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to review 
the lawfulness of Commonwealth administrative decision. Importantly, however, 
‘[e]ach of those Acts also affirmed the existence of a new legal right, that a 
person aggrieved by a decision should be entitled upon request to be given a 
written statement of the reasons for the decision’ (McMillan 2000, p. 3, citing 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s. 28; Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) 
s. 15(2)(e); and Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s. 13). 
The new administrative law package, particularly the ADJR Act, has had a 
substantial impact in providing an alternative to the common law system of 
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judicial review described by the Kerr Report as ‘technical and complex and 
in need of reform, simplification and legislative statement’ (CARC 1971, [21]). 
However, the common law system remains an essential element of Australia’s 
administrative law system. Its constitutional entrenchment has led to increasing 
recourse to common law judicial review as the limitations of legislative provision 
of review rights have been exposed (see, for example, Spigelman 2010). Some 
commentary has suggested that the ADJR Act may even have had a stultifying 
effect on the continued development of that common law system (Aronson 2005). 
An essential element of that common law review — procedural fairness — 
requires that an individual be informed of the basis for any decision which 
affects them in a direct and immediate way. After the decision in Kioa v 
West ((1985) 159 CLR 550), any administrative decision which singled out an 
individual in a way distinct from the community at large had to be accompanied 
by notice of the case to be met, including any credible, relevant and significant 
information that may be adverse to the interests of the individual, or be invalid 
and of no legal effect. The range of interests protected by procedural fairness 
expanded considerably after Kioa, with commercial and personal interests and 
even procedural expectations requiring disclosure prior to being affected (see Re 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 
1).12 It meant that even material submitted to the government in confidence may 
have to be submitted, in substance at least, in the course of making decisions 
to which it might relate (VEAL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88). Procedural fairness has not, however, 
extended to an obligation to provide reasons in making a decision (Public Service 
Board (NSW) v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656), something that remains subject only 
to legislative prescription despite the clear benefit in understanding the elements 
of the decisions made against them (see Cane and McDonald 2008, p. 145, fn 129). 
Parliamentary access
The final frontier of access to government information, however, has been, 
surprisingly, the ability of Parliament to require the provision of information. 
Since Sankey v Whitlam it has been maintained that the rights of Parliament 
to require disclosure is at least as great as the judicial arm of government. 
In Egan v Willis ((1998) 195 CLR 424) the High Court held that the NSW 
Legislative Council could hold a Council member in contempt for failing to 
produce documents as directed. The Court relied on the principle of responsible 
government, including the responsibility of the government to the upper house 
of Parliament. The Court stated that:
12 For a general discussion of the expansion of Natural Justice see Cane and McDonald 2008. 
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In Australia, s. 75(v) of the Constitution and judicial review of 
administrative action under federal and State law, together with freedom 
of information legislation, supplement the operation of responsible 
government in this respect (Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424 per 
Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ; see McMillan 2000). 
In a continuation of the dispute, the NSW Court of Appeal held in Egan v 
Chadwick ((1999) 46 NSWLR 563) that, like the Court in Sankey v Whitlam, the 
Council could determine claims of legal professional or public interest privilege, 
subject only to constitutional principles such as the maintenance of Cabinet 
confidentiality.
Numerous questions remain about the role of Parliament and the courts in 
enforcing parliamentary access to government information. Despite continued 
criticism by Senate and parliamentary committees over refusals by ministers 
and their staff to provide information, recourse continues to be political rather 
than punitive or judicial in nature (McMillan 2000, p. 30). 
Conclusions
This part has attempted to outline the general legal framework affecting 
access to government information. It has suggested that the legal context in 
which the FOI Act was introduced was one of increasing judicial recognition 
of the public interest in disclosure of government information. Limitations 
on public interest privilege and government confidentiality, together with 
enhanced procedural fairness rights to participation, significantly limited the 
ability of government to restrict information from individuals singled out by 
administrative action. Legislation introduced in the new administrative law 
reforms of the 1970s also gave individuals considerable scope to have decisions 
that affected them as individuals reviewed and amended. The introduction of 
the FOI Act was not the only legal development that contributed to increased 
access to government information, and any assessment of its impact should be 
considered in this light.
However, the capacity of the courts to affect change in the conventions of 
government control of information utilised in the working of government 
was limited. There was little scope to encourage the capacity of government 
disclosure to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of government regulation, 
or to enhance the relationship between government and the public generally. 
That recognition had to come from within government itself. 
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Part II: Operation of the Act: In whose  
public interest?
In the second Garran Oration — the first having been given by Sir Robert Garran 
the year earlier — the Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, spoke on the theme 
of responsible government: ‘Those who make government policy and control 
its implementation should be responsible and accountable for the performance 
of their trust’ (Fraser 1978, p. 22). Beyond effective and democratic electoral 
and parliamentary machinery, responsible government for Fraser had two 
fundamental requirements:
First, people and Parliament must have the knowledge required to pass 
judgment on the government. Secondly, the ministers and government 
must themselves be in control of public policy so that those who the 
Parliament and people can call to account are indeed those responsible. 
To the extent that responsibility is diffused beyond that elected 
government — other than by legislative intent — to that extent is 
effective, popular control diminished. These two conditions for effective 
responsibility in government are complementary, but there are also areas 
where they compete. 
The clearest area of competition is the appropriate extent of confidentiality 
in government. Too much secrecy inhibits people's capacity to judge 
the government's performance. A complete absence of privacy in our 
system, where advisers must be capable of advising governments of 
different political complexions, inhibits the frank and open discussion 
between ministers and between ministers and officials which is critical 
to effective government and ministerial control (Fraser 1978, p. 2). 
Three years later, these words would be repeated (Hansard, Senator Puplick, 
Wednesday 8 April 1981, p. 1257) during the second reading speeches for the 
Freedom of Information Bill 1981 (Cth), an amended version of which would 
finally become law a year later. The tension between too much and too little 
secrecy has dogged the FOI Act since before its introduction. Concerns about 
the effect access will have on the working of government have continued to 
shape the boundaries of access to information ever since.
Under Fraser’s prescription of responsible government, the role of the public 
servant was to act as the agent of the elected government. This requires a 
relationship of confidence and impartiality between senior administrators and 
government, and between public officials and the public. The role of the public 
service was not just to administer the executive function of government, but 
also to contribute to the formulation of new policy, and to facilitate public 
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consultation both to encourage new ideas and to test the understanding and 
reaction to proposals developed by government. The recognition of the political 
nature of some senior public service positions led the Fraser government to 
reduce the security of tenure of such appointments (Public Service Amendment 
(First Division Officers) Act 1981 (Cth)), a trend that continued with new 
managerialism and corporatisation of the government services as the FOI Act 
matured (see, for example, Kettl 2000, p. 7). It perhaps merely reinforced the 
perception that the relationship of trust and confidence extended from the 
public service to the government of the day rather than the public generally.
This part looks at how the structure and interpretation of the FOI Act arguably 
helped promote a culture of secrecy within government at a time when other legal 
and social developments were shifting towards greater openness. It examines 
the role that notions of ministerial responsibility and the relationship between 
Parliament, ministers and their departments has had on the development and 
operation of the FOI Act. It begins by setting out the basic elements of FOI 
legislation and the objections that were raised against its introduction. It then 
considers the interpretation of various elements of the legislation, in particular 
the objects clause, the public interest test in the exemption of documents 
relating to internal deliberations and the impact of conclusive certificates on the 
role of external review. It concludes that concerns over responsible government, 
and the role of the public service within that construction, has restricted the 
development of the FOI Act and its ability to meet its objectives of enhancing 
the relationship between the government and the public at large. 
The Introduction of the Freedom of Information Bill 
1978
Despite its promises on the eve of election (Australian Labor Party 1972; see 
Terrill 1998, p. 94), the Whitlam government was unable to pass freedom of 
information legislation. Efforts to release departmental reports met with 
considerable resistance within the bureaucracy, advice to ministers more so. 
Whitlam wrote of his government that it had ‘devoted many hours of discussion 
to freedom of information legislation but not sufficient to overcome the resistance 
of its most senior and respected public service advisors’ (Whitlam 1985, p. 621; 
see Terrill 2000, p. 99). An interdepartmental committee established to draft 
FOI legislation reported that FOI was ‘extremely complex with far reaching 
implications’ (Terrill 2000, p. 106). They offered no justifications in favour of the 
introduction of FOI legislation and expressed an intention that such legislation 
merely codifies rather than expands access. The change in government led to 
the establishment of a second interdepartmental committee. Prior to its report, 
however, the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration had 
included a highly detailed draft bill and explanatory memorandum among its 
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appendices and helped spur increased public pressure for reform (RCAGA 1976, 
10.7.20). In June 1978, the Freedom of Information Bill 1978 was introduced into 
Parliament largely based on the second interdepartmental committee report. 
The FOI Bill 1978 established many of the most important elements that continue 
to characterise the FOI Act. The most important of these features relating to 
access to government documents is set out below.13
Right of access
Under the FOI Act, every person has a legally enforceable right to obtain access 
to Commonwealth agency documents and official documents of a Minister, other 
than exempt documents. This was amended in 1991 to make it clear that this 
right of access was not affected by the reasons for seeking access.14 Importantly, 
access was not dependant on demonstrating any special interest in or need for 
the document in question.
Application process
The basic procedure for accessing documents involved requests in writing to the 
agency or Minister. Agencies were obliged to assist in framing a suitable request 
and to direct the request to the appropriate agency or minister. There were time 
limits (originally 60 days but soon reduced to 30 days) on the agency or Minister to 
make a decision about the request. Access can be either to a copy of the document 
or being allowed to inspect it. Reasons have to be given if the request for access 
is refused wholly or in part. Fees for the application, search and retrieval of 
documents and deciding whether to grant access were set out in regulations.
Exemptions
Access to a document could only be denied on a ground set out in the legislation. 
Grounds for denying access included where providing access would ‘interfere 
unreasonably with the operations of the agency or performance by the Minister 
of [their] functions’ (s.13(3) FOI Bill 1978).15 However the main grounds for 
refusing access related to classification as an exempt document. These fell into 
three main groups (see Creyke and McMillan 2009, p. 1198): 
13 For a discussion of the elements of the Act relating to access and correction of personal information and 
proactive disclosure of information see Parts III and IV of this chapter. 
14 Though note that the applicant’s reasons may be relevant to being declared vexatious and prevented from 
making further requests: see John Ford and Child Support Registrar [2007] AATA 1242; 45 AAR 166 affirmed 
by the Federal Court in Ford v Child Support Registrar [2009] FCA 328.
15 Note that these provisions have undergone numerous revisions. See below under the discussion about 
document handling processes in Part IV.
4 . Assessing Access to Information in Australia
99
• Exemptions to protect the workings of government — these included 
interests such as national security, defence, and international relations; 
Commonwealth–state relations; the national economy; law enforcement 
and the protection of public safety; and the financial, property and staff 
management interests of government. It also covered the processes of 
government including Cabinet deliberations and the internal deliberative 
processes involved with the functions of an agency or Minister.16 
• Exemptions to protect third party interests — these included confidential 
informants; personal affairs of any person; material obtained in confidence; 
or trade secrets, business, commercial or financial information.
• Exemptions to uphold other recognised legal interests — these included 
information which other legislation required be kept secret; and documents 
subject to legal professional privilege. Enactment and subsequent amendment 
removed exemptions based on ‘public interest’ privilege and added 
documents whose disclosure would constitute a contempt of Parliament of 
a court; certain documents relating to companies and securities legislation; 
and electoral rolls and related documents.
These exemptions were often subject to further qualification. For example, 
refusing to disclose Commonwealth financial, property or staff management 
information required a ‘substantial adverse effect’ (ss. 39 and 40 FOI Bill 1978).17 
Importantly, internal working documents were only exempt if the disclosure 
would be ‘contrary to the public interest’ and the AAT was restricted under the 
bill from reviewing that conclusion (see s.37(4) FOI Bill 1978). Some exemptions, 
such as Cabinet documents, internal working documents or documents relating 
to security, defence, and foreign affairs, were also further protected by the issue 
of ‘conclusive certificates’, which restricted the capacity of the other bodies 
to call into question the basis of the exemption. The 1978 Bill, for example, 
prevented the AAT from reviewing the decision to give the certificate or the 
existence of proper grounds for the giving of the certificate. These provisions 
were generally amended in the 1982 legislation to restrict the AAT to whether 
there existed reasonable grounds for the respective claims. Amendments in 1983 
gave the Minister, after the tribunal had found that there were no reasonable 
grounds for the certificate, the option to revoke the certificate or to give notice 
that the certificate will not be revoked to both the applicant and each house 
of Parliament (see Freedom of Information Amendment Act 1983 (Cth) which 
inserted s.58A). 
16 Note that subsequent amendments separated out the exemption relating to Commonwealth–State 
relations (s.33A) and added exemption for documents that might affect the conduct of tests, examinations 
or audits (s.40) or discloses unfinished research (s.43A). Recent amendments have further consolidated the 
exemptions. For a recent discussion of how exemptions relating to Commonwealth–state relations, foreign 
governments and law enforcement might be interpreted by the AAT: see Maksimovic and Commonwealth 
Director of Public Prosecutions and Anor [2009] AATA 700 (11 September 2009).
17 See further the discussion in Part III below.
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Agencies and the Minister retained discretion to provide access to documents 
even though they may be exempt. The Act was not ‘intended to prevent or 
discourage Ministers and agencies from publishing or giving access to documents 
(including exempt documents) otherwise than as required by this Act, where 
they can properly do so or are required by law to do so’ (s.12 FOI Bill 1978; s.14 
FOI Act 1982). There was also provision to redact documents, i.e. to delete parts 
of the documents that fall within an exemption.
Access to external review
One of the key elements of the FOI Bill was the provision for external review 
by the then newly formed Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The tribunal is 
generally able to engage in merits review of the decision to refuse or defer 
access, exercising the powers of the decision-maker within the agency or the 
minister to consider the nature of the documents sought,18 the elements of 
proposed exemptions and the reasons for and against disclosure. The tribunal, 
unless restricted by a conclusive certificate, is able to exercise all the powers 
and discretions conferred on the original decision maker, and may affirm, vary 
or substitute a new decision for that under review or refer the matter back for 
reconsideration. There is an onus on the agency or Minister to justify their 
decision to refuse a request for access. Unlike agencies or ministers however, the 
tribunal cannot grant access to exempt documents. The conclusive certificate 
described above ultimately restricts the scope of the tribunal’s review. Other 
decisions under the FOI Act, such as imposing or declining to waive charges or 
correct personal records, are also generally subject to review by the tribunal.
The FOI Bill also made provision for decisions by agencies, but not ministers, 
to be reviewed internally (s.54 FOI Act 1982). Seeking internal review was 
necessary before going to the tribunal. There was also recognition of the role the 
Ombudsman might play in investigating complaints, particularly about delay, 
and the relationship with tribunal review. The FOI Act 1982 clarified the scope 
for the Ombudsman to investigate complaints about actions taken by agencies 
relating to an access request prior to any tribunal hearing being sought (s.57 
FOI Act 1982).19 
Enactment of the Freedom of Information Act 1982: 
Objections
It took almost four years after the introduction of the Freedom of Information 
Bill 1978 (the FOI Bill) before legislative expression of the so-called simple 
18 Note that there are restrictions on the capacity of the AAT to access the documents in some circumstances.
19 For further discussion of the proposed role of the Ombudsman see the discussion in Part IV below.
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principles of open government were accepted in the Freedom of Information Act 
1982 (Cth). Upon its introduction, the FOI Bill was criticised for its apparent 
restrictive approach to access to government information. The ability of 
ministers to issue certificates establishing conclusively the grounds on which 
access to documents could be denied, the lack of retrospective effect of the 
act, the breadth of the exemptions and the delays it permitted all seemed to 
provide the public servants with the ability to control the release of information 
(Terrill 1998, p. 91). The Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal 
Affairs, after an extensive inquiry with over 168 submissions and 129 witnesses, 
recommended that the legislation be substantially amended in an attempt to 
provide greater external scrutiny of any denial of access under the Bill. The 
government substantially rejected these recommendations in making only 
limited amendments to the Bill. Criticisms of the Bill largely continued. Further 
amendments to the cct the following year by the then new Australian Labor 
Party government did little to alleviate the concerns (Freedom of Information 
Amendment Act 1983 (Cth)). 
Opposition to the Bill highlighted several areas of concern, including the resource 
and administrative burdens of complying with access requests, the protection 
it affords to suppliers of information to government and how compliance would 
be monitored or enforced (see SSCLCA 1979, p. 21).20 Concern from within the 
public service, however, focused on the compatibility of FOI legislation with 
the Westminster system of government in Australia. The Senate Standing 
Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs reported concerns from the 
highest levels of the public service about the fundamental attack the legislation 
represented (SSCLCA 1979, p. 34). Access to government information could 
erode both the collective responsibility of Cabinet and individual responsibility 
of ministers for the actions of their department. It would distort the political 
neutrality and hence loyalty and efficiency of the public service, and remove 
their anonymity. It would, in other words, present scrutiny of the deliberations 
and discord within government or the executive at the expense of scrutiny of 
the outcomes achieved.
The Senate Standing Committee presented the impact of freedom of information 
on responsible government in a different light. Exceptions to the legislation 
would preserve the confidentiality of Cabinet deliberations, individual views of 
ministers and the secrecy of advice tendered to Cabinet (SSCLCA 1979, p. 39). 
The practice of ministerial responsibility for the actions of their department 
bore little relationship with the theory — indeed, ministerial responsibility may 
be revitalised as ministers were required to answer for more of the activities and 
administrative decisions of their departments (SSCLCA 1979, p. 43). No longer 
would a minister access details going to the proper and efficient working of the 
20 For further discussion of these issues see Part III.
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departments under their responsibility at a time of their choosing. While the 
loyalty of public servants to government, of whatever persuasion, was important, 
the increasing influence and delegation of authority to the executive means that 
the public service should be more open to scrutiny and more accountable for 
its actions, both to Parliament and the public at large (SSCLCA 1979, p. 47–48). 
The exposure of the views of public servants may well change the nature of the 
advice provided, but for the better, particularly if it encourages public servants 
to join in public debate. As the Senate Standing Committee stated:
It is in the interests of ministers themselves to expose the advice of their 
officials to public scrutiny so as to improve the quality of that advice 
and ensure that all possible options have been canvassed. Freedom of 
information legislation can be in the interest of the public servants and 
government agencies whose processes are opened up to public gaze too, 
for it will lead to more adequate public recognition of the effectiveness of 
the public service. Greater exposure of government agencies to scrutiny 
can be expected in the longer term to result in a reduction in the level of 
suspicion and distrust surrounding relations between some government 
and non-government agencies …
What has happened, in short, is that critics have got things the wrong 
way around. It is not that freedom of information will change our 
governmental system; it is rather that our changing governmental system 
is contributing to pressures for freedom of information legislation. A 
Freedom of Information Act is indeed one way to make government 
adaptable, flexible and effective (SSCLCA 1979, p. 26–27). 
Of particular concern to the Senate Standing Committee was the ability to seek 
external review of decisions under the proposed FOI Act. The ‘unnecessarily 
restricted jurisdiction of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’ was seen as a 
‘major inadequacy’ (SSCLCA 1979, p. 286). Any special relationship between 
Parliament, ministers and public servants would ‘only require that some, not 
all, documents of political significance … be protected, and it would not follow 
that ministers, or senior public servants, alone should decide conclusively 
what documents bear upon that relationship’ (SSCLCA 1979, p. 286) The Senate 
Committee acknowledged the AAT may properly be restricted by conclusive 
certificates from determining the public interest in disclosing documents 
relating to defence, national security, international relations and Cabinet and 
Executive Council documents. However, review of other exemptions should 
not be limited by the issue of conclusive certificates. As the Senate Committee 
suggested:
There is no justification for such a system tailored to the convenience 
of ministers and senior officials in a Freedom of Information Bill that 
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purports to be enacted for the benefit of, and to confer rights of access 
upon, members of the public. This can only confirm the opinion of some 
critics that the bill is dedicated to preserving the doctrine of executive 
autocracy (SSCLCA 1979, p. 180). 
As mentioned above, the FOI Bill excluded the AAT from reviewing whether 
disclosure of an internal working document would be contrary to the public 
interest. The Senate committee had accepted the exemption relating to internal 
working documents ‘reluctantly’ (SSCLCA 1979, p. 218) and mainly due to the 
public interest criterion allowing all relevant interests to be considered and 
weighed. It was considered ‘naïve to expect that a phrase such as “public 
interest” can be administered properly by public servants, who clearly have 
an interest in non-disclosure’ (SSCLCA 1979, p. 221). The court in Sankey 
v Whitlam ((1978) 142 CLR 1) had demonstrated its capacity to balance the 
competing public interests involved, and the courts would be involved with 
decisions to refuse access through judicial review of the grounds of refusal 
anyway. Importantly, a neutral tribunal standing outside the system would best 
allow for the development and change in emphasis that must necessarily occur 
in such a broad exemption (SSCLCA 1979, p. 223).21 It would permit ‘a natural 
growth in the ideas about the way in which government should relate to the 
community. The public interest in any situation will not require a fixed result. 
The result would vary from time to time, depending on many factors’ (SSCLCA 
1979, p. 222). 
The Senate committee recommended that the AAT have the power to review 
whether disclosure of an internal working document would be contrary to the 
public interest. The government rejected this recommendation, responding 
that the ‘proper place to challenge a decision not to release a document which 
is judged would substantially impair the proper and effective working of 
government was parliament’ (see Government Response to the recommendations 
of the Report by the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal 
Affairs on the Freedom of Information Bill, Hansard, 11 September 1980, p. 803). 
However, there were changes to the FOI Bill that partially met the committee’s 
concerns. The AAT was given the power to review decisions relating to internal 
working documents, but conclusive certificates could still be issued in relation 
to such documents that limited review of the public interest to whether there 
existed reasonable grounds for such a claim. As we shall see below, this has had 
a considerable impact on limiting the scope for development of public interest 
grounds for disclosure.
Few of the other substantive recommendations of the Senate Standing Committee 
were adopted in the revised Freedom of Information Bill 1981 that, after minor 
21 This sentiment was repeated in (SSCLCA 1987, [11.17]).
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amendment, was enacted and came into operation in 1982.22 There were only a 
limited number of substantive amendments of the legislation leading up to the 
most recent amendments. The change in government in 1983 brought with it 
changes to the FOI Act to provide a greater right to documents created before 
the enactment of the FOI Act, shift the ability to review decisions back to the 
AAT as originally intended, particularly in relation to conclusive certificates, 
and gradually reduce the time limits for compliance from 60 to 30 days (Freedom 
of Information Amendment Act 1983 (Cth)). In 1986, application and decision-
making fees were introduced and search and retrieval fees were increased in a 
move towards greater cost recovery (Freedom of Information Laws Amendment 
Act 1986 (Cth)). Agency reporting obligations were also increased. In 1988, 
amendments were made reflecting the introduction of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), 
and in 1991 there was some clarification and simplification of the procedures and 
operation of the act as well as a widening of the ability to refuse access due to 
the diversion of agency resources involved (Freedom of Information Amendment 
Act 1991 (Cth)). Each of these amendments did little to alter the basic structure 
and operation of the act and if anything they reflect increased resistance to the 
disclosure of government information.23
The importance of the Senate Standing Committee conclusions goes well beyond 
the amendments to the original bill or legislation. As this chapter will discuss, 
they have provided the basis for many of the subsequent reviews and calls 
for substantive reform of the FOI Act. However, with the benefit of hindsight 
there are perhaps two main concerns that might be suggested. The first is that 
the Senate Standing Committee made various observations about the changing 
governmental system but only considered the value or implications of those 
changes to the extent they suggested a basis for greater openness in government. 
They fail to engage with the extent passage of the FOI Act might itself encourage 
further change and the implications that may have. Secondly, they are based 
on the assumption that the implementation of the FOI Act will accord with 
the committee’s expectations, which in turn relies on the acceptance by those 
implementing the act of the value of greater openness in government that 
underpin those expectations. In other words, the positive impacts of the FOI Act 
which underpinned the committee’s conclusions depend on how the FOI Act is 
interpreted and implemented. As we shall see in the following discussion, the 
practical operation of the FOI Act suggests that the concerns of public servants 
about the effects of the FOI Act may not have been so easily displaced.
22 Perhaps the most important not already discussed was the inclusion of the ability to amend personal 
records which is discussed below in Part III. 
23 For a general discussion of the various amendments to the FOI Act see Paterson 2005.
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Interpretation and operation of the FOI Act: The 
public interest in disclosure
One recommendation of the Senate Standing Committee was the inclusion of 
an objects clause in the FOI Act. As discussed above, the object of the FOI 
Act was described as extending as far as possible the right of the Australian 
community to access information in the possession of the government (FOI Act 
s.3(1)).24 It also attempted to encourage a pro-disclosure ‘leaning’ of the act, so 
that interpretation of its provisions or exercise of the discretions it conferred 
was further that object and encourage disclosure (FOI Act s.3(2)). However, 
despite that explicit intention, any ‘leaning’ had limited effect (see Bayne and 
Robinson 1995, p. 114). Early decisions interpreting the provisions of the act 
cautioned against constructing provisions providing access generously while 
taking a narrow construction of exemptions which permitted information to 
be withheld: ‘The rights of access and the exemptions are designed to give a 
correct balance of the competing public interests involved’ (News Corporation 
Ltd v National Companies and Securities Commission (1984) 1 FCR 64 at 66 per 
Bowen CJ and Fisher J). By 1987 Burchett J stated:
… it is too late to regard [the objects clause] as introducing any bias 
into construction of the exemptions in the Freedom of Information Act. 
They are as much part of the Act as s11, which confers a right to access 
expressly subject to them and as a right relating to documents other 
than those which are exempt (Arnold v Queensland (1987) 73 ALR 607 at 
626 per Burchett J; see generally Creyke and McMillan 2009, p. 1212). 
It is this literal approach to the balance set out in the FOI Act that is reflected 
in the reasoning adopted in the influential AAT decision of Re Howard and the 
Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia ((1985) 7 ALD 626; [1985] AATA 100). 
John Howard, the then deputy leader of the opposition, lodged an FOI request 
in July 1984 for documents provided by the Treasury to the Australian Council 
of Trade Unions (ACTU) Task Force during the bargaining over the 1984–85 
Budget as part of the accord agreement reached between the Australian Labor 
Party and ACTU with respect to matters of economic policy. The Treasurer, Paul 
Keating, issued a conclusive certificate certifying that there were documents 
that met that request that were exempt as internal working documents, i.e. they 
‘would disclose matter … relating to … the deliberative processes involved in 
the functions of an agency or Minister or the Government of the Commonwealth’ 
(s.36(1)(a) FOI Act). The issue of the certificate meant that the AAT was restricted 
to whether there ‘exist reasonable grounds for the claim that the disclosure of 
the document would be contrary to the public interest’ (s.58(5) FOI Act ). 
24 FOI Act s.3(1).
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President Davies of the AAT referred to various decisions restricting the ambit 
of internal working documents. The ordinary meaning of deliberation involved 
the weighing up or evaluation of the competing arguments or considerations 
that may have a bearing upon the exercise of the agency’s functions. The 
exemption does not include purely factual material (s.36(5) FOI Act), reports of 
scientific or technical experts (s.36(6)(a)), statements of reasons for adjudicative 
decisions (s.36(6)(c)) or documents that have to be disclosed before a decision 
is made prejudicial to an individual’s interest (s.36(2)), but might include the 
collection and exchange of facts involved in providing advice, opinion or 
recommendation. There was also no need for the material to relate to policy 
formation or be considered as part of the ultimate policy decisions of government 
(see Re Howard, [8]–[15]). 
In considering when the public interest would prevent disclosure, previous 
tribunal decisions had relied on ‘public interest’ privilege case including Sankey 
v Whitlam in concluding that the exemptions for internal working documents 
protected the integrity and viability of the decision-making process within 
government. They are designed to encourage debate within government, protect 
the public from confusion, maintain the integrity of the decision-making process 
itself by confirming that officials are judged by what they decide rather than 
what they considered before making up their minds (Re Howard at [18] citing 
Re Murtagh and Commissioner of Taxation (1984) 6 ALD 112 at 121–122), and 
prevent ‘ill-informed or captious public or political criticism’ by those ‘ready 
to criticise without adequate knowledge of the background and perhaps with 
some axe to grind’ (Re Howard at [19] quoting from Lord Reid in Conway v 
Rimmer (1968) AC 910 at 952, as approved in Sankey v Whitlam). Therefore, 
while ‘the whole of the circumstances must be examined including any public 
benefit perceived in the disclosure of the documents sought’ (Re Howard, [20]), 
Davies J was able to suggest general guides relating to disclosure of internal 
working documents:
(a) the higher the office of the persons between whom the communications pass 
and the more sensitive the issues involved in the communication, the more 
likely it will be that the communication should not be disclosed; 
(b) disclosure of communications made in the course of the development and 
subsequent promulgation of policy tends not to be in the public interest; 
(c) disclosure which will inhibit frankness and candour in future pre-decisional 
communications is likely to be contrary to the public interest; 
(d) disclosure, which will lead to confusion and unnecessary debate resulting 
from disclosure of possibilities considered, tends not to be in the public 
interest; 
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(e) disclosure of documents which do not fairly disclose the reasons for a decision 
subsequently taken may be unfair to a decision-maker and may prejudice the 
integrity of the decision-making process (Re Howard, [20]). 
The documents sought in Re Howard fell within these guides. Although they 
related to an agreement which placed the ACTU in a privileged position, 
Davies J did not accept that the government in forming a budget could not 
consult on a confidential basis with individual organisations. There were 
therefore no particular circumstances that favour disclosure (Re Howard, [24]–
[27]). Falling within the guides set out by Davies J was therefore sufficient to 
shift the persuasive burden to establishing a separate reason for disclosure that 
offset the impact of disclosing internal working documents of this nature.
The guides set out by Davies J have been subject to considerable criticism, both 
academic and in decisions of the AAT (for example, Re Rae and Minister for 
State for Aboriginal Affairs (1988) 16 ALD 709; SSCLCA 1987, 11.7–13). They 
were not intended to be definitive — as Davies J suggested after setting out the 
guides:
The FOI Act has been in operation since 1 December 1982. As was said 
in [previous AAT decisions] the Tribunal has not yet received evidence 
that disclosure under the FOI Act has in fact led to a diminishment in 
appropriate candour and frankness between officers. As time goes by, 
experience will be gained of the operation of the Act. The extent to 
which disclosure of internal working documents is in the public interest 
will more clearly emerge. Presently, there must often be an element of 
conjecture in a decision as to the public interest. Weight must be given 
to the object of the FOI Act (Re Howard, [21]). 
However, the emphasis on the public interest in non-disclosure, expressed in 
general and non-tangible terms, has arguably enabled reliance on the guides to 
excuse non-disclosure at the expense of demonstrating actual harm. The criteria 
suggest the possibility of class exemptions without regard to the content of the 
documents subject to the disclosure request and the injury to the public interest 
likely to result from their release. Protection of policy documents would seem 
contrary to the objects of the Act, protecting the public from confusion and 
unnecessary debate seems ‘elitist and paternalistic’ (Eccleston and Department of 
Family Services and Aboriginal and Islander Affairs (1993) 1 QAR 60 at 137 per F N 
Albeitz (Information Commissioner); see Creyke and McMillan 2009, pp. 1221–
1224). The impact on candour and frankness in particular has been rejected by 
more recent AAT decisions that have emphasised the need for concrete evidence 
of how the release of the documents would impair the efficient and effective 
performance of government functions (for example, Re Cleary and Dept of the 
Treasury (1993) 31 ALD 214; McKinnon and Secretary, Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet [2007] AATA 1969). 
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However, the Re Howard criteria continued to be adopted and adapted by 
decision-makers in refusing access. In 2002, Mr McKinnon, the FOI Editor of 
The Australian Newspaper, made two FOI requests: for ‘[r]eports, reviews or 
evaluations completed in [2002] detailing the extent and impact of bracket creep 
and its impact on revenue collection of income tax’, and ‘[d]ocuments relating to 
any review/report or evaluation completed on the First Home [Owners] Scheme25 
in the last two years’ (see McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury (2006) 
228 CLR 423 at [30]–[31] per Hayne J). Access to most of the documents that 
fell within these requests was denied on grounds that clearly echoed many of 
the criteria adopted in Re Howard. They included: ‘Officers of the Government 
should be able to communicate directly, freely and confidentially’, and ‘in 
written form what they would otherwise do orally, in circumstances where any 
oral communications would remain confidential’; ‘[t]he release of material would 
tend to be misleading or confusing in view of its provisional nature’; ‘cannot be 
put into context because of the absence of any explanation of the variables used 
or assumptions relied on’; not ‘fairly disclose the final position reached’; and use 
‘technical terms and jargon’ without ‘sufficient information for an uninformed 
audience to interpret them correctly and reasonably’ (quoted in McKinnon v 
Secretary, Department of Treasury (2006) 228 CLR 423 at [34] per Hayne J). 
Each of these public interest grounds was accepted as reasonably open by the 
original AAT decision in McKinnon of President Downes J. The High Court 
did not have to explicitly consider the public interest grounds relied on by 
the government, but all the judgements emphasised the contestable normative 
assessment involved in determining where the public interest might lie in 
relation to any particular document. The joint judgement of Callinan and Heydon 
JJ suggested that ongoing sensitivity, the difficulty of placing information into 
context, and lack of trust in the public to understand the technicalities and 
jargon used, or concern over a lack of balance in the way the documents would 
be reported were not in themselves likely to be reasonable grounds on which 
the public interest of non-disclosure would be justified. However, jeopardy 
to candour and desirability of written communications, the tentativeness of 
matters and recommendations yet to be settled which might mislead the public,26 
25 A scheme subsidising the purchase of a first home regardless of income.
26 See also:
The release of the material would tend to be misleading or confusing in view of its provisional 
nature, as it may be taken wrongly to represent a final position (which it was not intended to do) and 
ultimately may not have been used or have been overtaken by subsequent events or further drafts 
(McKinnon at 228 CLR 423 at 450 [80] per Callinan and Heydon JJ)
Hayne J also suggests:
In the case of those particular documents, the relevant grounds for the claim were grounds asserting 
that release of the material shown in the documents had ‘the potential to lead to confusion and to 
mislead the public’. The appellant did not assert that this could not constitute a reasonable ground 
for the claim that had been made (McKinnon at 228 CLR 423 at 448 [70]).
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and the threat to responsible government of revealing documents prepared for 
responding to questions in Parliament were all considered possibly reasonable 
justifications for non-disclosure (McKinnon 228 CLR 423 at 446–447). 
Conclusive certificates
The issue to be decided in McKinnon involved the role of the AAT in reviewing 
non-disclosure decisions where a conclusive certificate has been issued. In such a 
case the AAT is not tasked with determining whether disclosure of the documents 
in question would be contrary to the public interest, but only with whether 
the documents come within the description of the exemption (for example, are 
indeed ‘internal working documents’) and, if so, ‘whether there exist reasonable 
grounds for the claim that the disclosure of the document would be contrary 
to the public interest’ (s.58(5) FOI Act). In the decision of the Full Court of the 
Federal Court leading to the High Court Appeal, the majority had rejected an 
argument about whether assessing reasonableness required considering factors 
both in favour of and against disclosure. For example, Tamberlin J had suggested 
that ‘if there is a ground that is not irrational, absurd or ridiculous for a claim 
that the [desirability of preserving intra-government communications prior to 
making a decision] … would not be served by disclosure, then that alone is 
sufficient’ (see the description of the Full Federal Court decision in McKinnon 
(2006) 228 CLR 423; at 432 [14] per Gleeson and Kirby J; 443 [54] per Hayne J; 
and 468 [131] per Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
The minority of Gleeson CJ and Kirby J held that the approach of the Full Federal 
Court was wrong in law. The reasonableness of any ground can’t be based only 
on the existence of a relevant consideration in favour of non-disclosure. It must 
be based on all relevant considerations that have a rational bearing on the claim 
(McKinnon (2006) 228 CLR 423 at 430–431 [12]). Callinan and Heydon JJ, by 
contrast, focused on the wording of the FOI Act rather than the correctness of 
the Full Federal Court’s approach. They held that the AAT’s role did not involve 
any balancing exercise between competing reasons. One reasonable ground for 
the claim disclosure, they continued, is if it is contrary to the public interest, 
even if there are other grounds going the other way (McKinnon (2006) 228 CLR 
423 at 468 [131]). Hayne J agreed with the orders of Callinan and Heydon JJ, 
but he took a slightly different approach. He stated that ‘the tribunal’s task is 
to decide whether the conclusion expressed in the certificate (that disclosure 
of particular documents would be contrary to the public interest) can be 
supported by logical arguments which, taken together, are reasonably open to 
be adopted and which, if adopted, would support the conclusion expressed in 
the certificate’ (McKinnon (2006) 228 CLR 423 at 444 [56]–[57]). 
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The difficulty confronted by the court and by the AAT in determining its role 
in the presence of conclusive certificates comes arguably from the conflation 
of possibly distinct tasks. A claim that disclosure of a document would harm 
the public interest in the candour of policy advice, for example, requires an 
assessment of whether that is a reasonable claim in relation to the particular 
document in question which requires considering the probative evidence on 
whether release of that document would have the harm identified; whether the 
harm identified does indeed go to the broader public interest recognised by the 
FOI Act rather than the interests of any other individuals or institutions; and 
how the effect on the public interest of denying release of the document compares 
to the impacts on the public interest if the document was released. It is arguable 
that all judges in McKinnon recognised the need to evaluate evidence both in 
favour and against the impact on the public interest identified by the Minister; 
it is not enough for the AAT to merely consider whether there are arguments 
in favour of withholding disclosure being in the public interest. However, the 
role of the AAT is not asked its view on where the public interest might lie but 
merely whether there are reasonable grounds to accept the judgement of the 
minister in relation to each of the distinct elements of that question.
This commonality between the various judgements in McKinnon was accepted 
in the AAT decision of McKinnon and Secretary, Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet ([2007] AATA 1969). Once again the FOI Editor from The Australian 
newspaper faced a conclusive certificate refusing access to internal working 
documents, this time in relation to documents held by the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet relating to options that had been considered for industrial 
reform in the previous 12 months or that related to particular consequences of 
industrial relations reform. Deputy President Forgie rejected various grounds 
for the conclusive certificate because either the documents in question did not 
relate to what might be a reasonable ground or that there was a lack of evidence 
that the particular documents would contribute to the harm identified.27 There 
wasn’t a sufficient link made between the need for an apolitical public service 
and the confidentiality of high level policy advice. As Forgie D.P. suggested, 
‘[w]hy is it that the APS can only behave as a professional and apolitical body if 
its work in giving high level advice is kept out of the public arena?’ (McKinnon 
(2007) AATA 1969 at [160]) . There was no reasonable basis for concluding that 
the advice of senior officials would be confused for final decisions taken by the 
27 Various documents were also identified as Cabinet in confidence and claimed as exempt under s.34 as 
documents submitted to or part of the deliberative processes of Cabinet. Forgie D.P. held that while there 
are ‘reasonable grounds for concluding that disclosure of documents in the nature of Cabinet documents … 
protected from disclosure under the FOI Act by s.34 would be contrary to the public interest [the documents 
in question] are not of that nature. The evidence does not support a finding that their disclosure would 
compromise the confidentiality of Cabinet deliberations and so the notion of collective responsibility of 
Cabinet’ (McKinnon (2007) AATA 1969 at [152]).
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government, or that the public would conclude that decisions were taken on the 
basis of the incomplete information set out in individual documents (McKinnon 
(2007) AATA 1969 at [157]–[158]). 
Forgie D.P. also rejected as unreasonable the claims that disclosure would impair 
the frankness of advice, encourage oral rather than written advice which would 
impair understanding and assimilation of relevant material, and restrict accurate 
written records of decision-making processes. She pointed to the provisions 
of the Public Service Act 1999, written directions by the AAPS commissioner 
provided under that Act and various other materials that set out requirements 
for written records to be kept. As she suggested:
The APS must ensure that it has reporting arrangements in place to 
give account of each agency’s performance and its effective, efficient 
and ethical use of resources. That must be underpinned by existence 
and maintenance of good recordkeeping systems. These are not simply 
standards to aspire but statutory requirements framed in terms of the 
APS Values and the Directions made under them (McKinnon (2007) 
AATA 1969 at [162]). 
However, Forgie D.P. accepted that the disclosure of tentative options put 
forward during the development of policy options might reasonably not be in 
the public interest. As he put it, various grounds in the conclusive certificates 
were based on the claims that ‘the government of the day is accountable to 
the Australian community for what its policy is in a particular area and for 
what it has included in a particular Bill submitted to Parliament. It is not in the 
public interest to require it to explain what it considered and what it rejected’ 
(McKinnon (2007) AATA 1969 at [153]). 
There may be various arguments about why disclosure of the options considered 
and rejected, whether the views of interest groups or ministerial advisors 
or APS officers were preferred and the quality of the advice given might all 
appropriately be the subject of public scrutiny. However, the limited role of 
the AAT was to consider the reasonableness of the ground in the then current 
circumstances.
Those circumstances are that matters relating to workplace relations law are 
very topical and the subject of much debate. It is not, however, in the interests 
of the efficient use of resources that a government should be required to disclose 
options and opinions to which it had, or might have had, regard in formulating 
its final position. The public’s scrutiny of a government policy or of a particular 
piece of legislation is not advanced by the government’s explanation of why it 
did or did not adopt a particular option:
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The government is currently accountable in the context of the workplace 
relations for its acts and omissions regarding the workplace relations law 
that has been enacted and not for amendments to that law that it may 
enact in the future (McKinnon (2007) AATA 1969 at [155]–[156]).
The two McKinnon decisions made clear that the role of the AAT in reviewing 
the issue of conclusive certificates did not extend to substituting its view of 
the impact of the public interest of withholding disclosure. It was a reasonable 
argument that withholding direct access to the deliberative process could be 
justified due to the accountability provided by public exposure of the results 
of that deliberative process and the possible detriment to its candour and 
efficiency. Thus the public interest protected under the FOI Act was able to 
be restricted by a view that the benefits of direct access to the deliberative 
process were outweighed by its costs. It was subject to the view of the Minister 
as to impact of disclosure on the particular policy in question, rather than the 
broader impact on policy-making, or government, in general.
Reform
In its 1987 report on the ‘Operation and Administration of the Freedom 
of Information Legislation’, the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs concluded that many of the concerns that had been raised 
about the protection and promotion of frank policy advice and criticism had 
been unfounded. They did, however, express concern at the guides set out in 
Re Howard and their adoption in subsequent cases. In particular, they stated:
The Committee acknowledges that documents relating to policy proposals 
considered but not adopted can be used to attempt to confuse and 
mislead the public. But the Committee considers that such attempts, if 
made, will be exposed. The process of doing so will lead to a better public 
understanding of the policy formation process (SSCLCA 1987, p. 168). 
The ‘Open Government’ review by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) 
and Administrative Review Council (ARC) also emphasised the changing nature 
of the public interest and how it depended upon the application of amorphous, 
subjective criteria to the circumstances of each situation (ALRC, ARC 1995, pp. 
95–96 at [8.13]). They recommended that the public interest not be defined, but 
that it should be made clear that factors such as embarrassment to government 
should be irrelevant (ALRC, ARC 1995, Recommendation 37 at 96). However, it 
has only been in the recent amendments to the act that these recommendations 
have been accepted. The most recent reforms to the FOI Act have picked up on 
this in leaving the public interest undefined, but setting out irrelevant factors 
as well as factors favouring access. Whether access to the document could result 
in embarrassment to the Commonwealth government or cause loss of confidence 
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in the Commonwealth government; access to the document could result in a 
person misinterpreting or misunderstanding the document; the author of the 
document is of high seniority in the agency to which the request for access to 
the document was made; or access to the document could result in confusion 
or unnecessary debate can no longer be used as in determining the public 
interest in withholding a document from release (s.11B FOI Act).28 The result of 
these amendments is that many of the Re Howard factors are no longer relevant 
when considering the public interest served by withholding a document from 
release.29 
The concerns over conclusive certificates have also been the subject of various 
calls for reform. The 1987 Senate Standing Committee report recommended 
retaining conclusive certificates. This was based on what they considered 
the restrained use of such certificates and the accountability of ministers to 
Parliament if they decline to abide by a decision of the AAT. The Senate Standing 
Committee, referring only to the use of certificates to that point, suggested that 
placing greater review powers with the AAT risked undermining ministerial 
responsibility (SSCLCA 1987, p. 147). 
The Senate Standing Committee did recommend, however, the addition of 
requirements to inform Parliament of the issue of conclusive certificates. There 
has never been any requirement under the FOI Act to disclose publicly the 
numbers of conclusive certificates issued. Despite this, the Senate Standing 
Committee was able to report that there had been ‘only’ 55 conclusive certificates 
issued between 1 December 1982 and 30 June 1986, 21 of which were issued 
by Treasury prior to a change in internal procedures (SSCLCA 1987, p. 145). 
The only other figures available seem to be estimates of between 12 and 14 
conclusive certificates issued between 1996 and 2006 (see Costello, Treasurer 
2007; Parliamentary Library 2008). The ALRC agreed that the use of conclusive 
certificates should be disclosed, but went further in recommending that they be 
only for a limited duration and calling for the abolition of conclusive certificates 
in relation to Commonwealth–state relations and internal working documents 
(ALRC, ARC 1995, p. 117). Other commentators also called for their abolition. 
As Rick Snell suggested:
The existence of such certificates leaves the Act exposed to changes 
in political will and bureaucratic commitment to the principles and 
28 The ‘factors favouring access’ are if disclosure of the document would promote the objects of the Act; 
inform debate on a matter of public importance; promote effective oversight of public expenditure; or allow a 
person to access his or her own personal information. 
29 The recent amendments also make the public interest test more significant by applying it to all of what are 
termed conditionally exempt documents. The public interest test is therefore applicable to all the categories 
of exemption except those relating to national security, defence or international relations, Cabinet documents, 
prejudicing law enforcement or public safety, or to which secrecy provisions apply.
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objectives of the legislation … The current restraint in the use of 
these certificates is not cause to allow the damaging potential of this 
mechanism to go unchecked (Snell 2004, p. 9). 
The decision of the High Court in McKinnon also highlighted, however, the 
restricted role of the tribunal and the potential manipulation of the certificate 
process. The Freedom of Information (Removal of Conclusive Certificates and 
Other Measures) Act 2009 (Cth) abolished conclusive certificates and replaced 
them with some procedural protections for what may be considered sensitive 
material relating to national security, defence or international relations and 
denying access to documents from seven listed security agencies.30 
Conclusions
Recent reforms have continued the gradual development of our understanding 
of the ‘public interest’ for the purposes of the FOI Act. Of the five guides set out 
in Re Howard relating to access to the deliberative process, recent reform has 
left only two: concern over impeding frankness and candour, and disclosure of 
documents which do not reveal the reasons for a decision subsequently taken, 
and even these are judged by reference to the particular documents in question 
rather than available as a general claim. In many ways this reflects the discussion 
played out in the courts in decisions like Sankey v Whitlam and Commonwealth v 
Fairfax in the cases of public interest privilege and government confidentiality. 
However, the role of responsible government continues to be referenced. 
Recognition that government accountability is aimed at those responsible for 
the decisions of government has led to importance being given to the collective 
responsibility of Cabinet and the ability to protect the role of the public service 
in the provision of advice. This has allowed concerns over the importance 
of the role of the public service in influencing policy decisions to encourage 
restrictions on public disclosure of that role.
As the Senate Standing Committee suggested, there is a need to allow for the 
continuing development of our understanding of the public interest and the 
balance to be struck between disclosure and withholding access. However, 
that development has come slowly, and the concerns over use of conclusive 
certificates has demonstrated continuing resistance within the public service, 
at least within some departments at senior levels, over promoting disclosure at 
the possible expense of the involvement of the department in policy setting. 
Recent amendments to the FOI Act reflect long-held concerns over the ability of 
the government to interpret the public interest in disclosure unduly narrowly, 
30 These include the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Office of National Assessments, Defence Imagery and Geospatial 
Organisation, Defence Intelligence Organisation, and the Defence Signals Directorate.
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restricting access to politically sensitive documents and eroding insight into the 
policy development process. However, the amendments still reflect a view that 
access to government information — particularly relating to the deliberative 
process — may impede rather than enhance the government policy-making 
process. The role of the FOI Act in encouraging accountability of that process 
rather than just its product is still to develop.
Part III: FOI and non-government interests
On 7 September 2010, Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced that an 
agreement had been reached with two independents returning the Labor party 
to government. The process of agreement, she stated, had resulted in ‘more 
openness, transparency and reform in how we conduct our Parliament and the 
business of government than at any other time in modern Australian politics … 
let's draw back the curtains and let the sun shine in’ (The Age 2010). 
Crucial to that agreement was the Labor Party’s commitment to the National 
Broadband Network (NBN). The NBN, built in partnership with the private 
sector, will reportedly be the single largest nation-building infrastructure 
project in Australian history (Prime Minister, Treasurer, Minister for Finance 
and Minister for Broadband 2009). In April 2009, it was announced that it 
would be built and operated by NBN Co, a company incorporated under the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Initially this company would be a wholly owned 
Government Business Enterprise (GBE), but it has been established with 
eventual private ownership in mind. As a GBE it will be subject to various forms 
of accountability and governance requirements in addition to those applicable 
to incorporated bodies: it has to release annual statements of intent, keep its 
shareholder ministers informed of financially significant events, and is subject 
to review by the Auditor-General for example. But as an incorporated body it 
would not be subject to many other forms of accountability that apply to the 
public sector, including the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).31
Two months after the Prime Minister’s statements about openness, the Senate was 
demanding access to various documents relating to NBN Co, including release 
of its business plan, which had been provided to the government in line with 
commitments under the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cth) 
(Riley 2010). Under that Act and associated guidelines (Department of Finance 
and Deregulation 1997), GBEs like NBN Co are generally subject to governance 
and accountability requirements that echo those in the private sector, except 
that their reporting and other obligations are generally to the government. In 
31 See Crowe and NBN Co Ltd [2011] AICmr 1 (25 January 2011), the first decision of the newly created office 
of FOI Commissioner, affirming that NBN Co is not an entity that is subject to the FOI Act.
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the case of NBN Co, for example, it is the ministerial shareholders who receive 
reports and hold management to account. While there is an obligation to 
publicly release a GBE’s statements of intent (see Department of Finance and 
Deregulation 1997, [2.5]–[2.7]), other important reporting requirements may not 
be available to public scrutiny. Only documents that relate to the affairs of an 
agency or department of state are accessible under the FOI Act. Where a GBE is 
not covered by the FOI Act, not even the actions of government in holding the 
GBE to account are subject to scrutiny under the FOI Act. 
A summary business plan was eventually released as part of a compromise deal 
with independents to get crucial legislation considered by the Senate, but not 
until various claims had been made about the importance of maintaining the 
confidentiality of documents going before Cabinet, and the potential confusion 
arising from the various options outlined in the plan depending on pending 
determinations by other government agencies.32 However, only a summary 
rather than full plan was released to address concerns over the commercial 
sensitivity of information in the complete plan, including commercial-in-
confidence material gained from third parties and details about current and 
upcoming tender processes (Wilson 2010). The complete business plan was 
released a month later (itnews 2010). 
In January the following year, realisation that NBN Co was not subject to the 
FOI Act was acknowledged by the Prime Minister as ‘the ordinary operation 
of the Freedom of Information Act’ (Massola 2011). However, enactment of 
legislation relating to access arrangements for the NBN33 included amendments 
to the FOI Act to explicitly bring NBN Co under its scope, but also exempted 
NBN Co in relation to documents in respect of its commercial activities.34 In 
putting forward the amendments, Greens MP Adam Bandt suggested that the 
public had a ‘legitimate interest’ in ‘one of the largest sums of public money 
invested in one of the largest infrastructure projects in our history’:
The Greens are not prepared to see the continuation of a long-term 
trend of gradually corporatising government services and then claiming 
information is commercial-in-confidence. That trend has to be rolled 
32 In this case the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission on competition concerns with the 
plan: see Grattan and Yeates 2010.
33 See Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (National Broadband Network Measures—Access 
Arrangements) Bill 2011 (Cth), which passed both houses on 28 March 2011, but as of 12 April 2011 had not 
yet received royal assent.
34 Which is further defined as (a) activities carried on by NBN Co on a commercial basis; or (b) activities, 
carried on by NBN Co, that may reasonably be expected in the foreseeable future to be carried on by NBN Co 
on a commercial basis (see clauses 121 and 122 of the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (National 
Broadband Network Measures—Access Arrangements) Bill 2011 (Cth)). 
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back and [NBN Co] is the place to start. We also believe that maximum 
transparency is in fact the best way to build public confidence in the 
NBN (OpenAustralia 2011). 
The opposition, however, did not support the amendment, suggesting that, as 
a business, all of the activities of NBN Co would be conducted on a commercial 
basis (OpenAustralia 2011). 
As part of the amendment, there was to be a review of the operation of the FOI Act 
relating to documents of NBN Co within 12 months (National Broadband Network 
Companies Bill 2011 (Cth) s.100A and s.3).35 Assurances were given that the 
review would consider issues raised in the case of Commonwealth v Fairfax, and 
whether to ‘tighten FOI rules to prevent documents being withheld on the basis 
of “confidentiality” unless it was proven their release would be a “real detriment” 
to the Government or to NBN Co’s commercial operations’ (Crozier 2011).36
The issues surrounding the application of the FOI Act to companies like NBN 
Co highlights the role the FOI Act plays in the relationship between government 
and other organisations and individuals. This section will describe the range of 
agencies and other entities subject to the FOI Act. It will consider how individual 
interests, of both a commercial and private nature, are protected under the FOI 
Act and how the FOI Act continues to rely on the distinction between public 
and private interests despite their interdependence in the development and 
implementation of public policy. 
Subject to the FOI Act
One of the basic functions of the FOI Act is to provide a right of access to non-
exempt documents in the possession of an agency or, in some circumstances, 
ministers. ‘Documents’ in turn is very broadly defined to include any method 
of recording information, including electronically (s.4(1) and s.17 FOI Act). 
There is only limited scope to require the production of information not already 
recorded and available to the agency.37 
An ‘agency’ is defined in the Act as:
• a department of the Australian public service; or 
35 The review was announced on 16 April 2012, to be completed by 30 June 2012 (Roxon 2012).
36 Note however that the terms of reference for the review do not include any such reference. See Attorney-
General’s Department 2012. 
37 Note that s.17 of the FOI Act refers to producing documents of discrete records held on computers. This 
might include running a search term through a database and providing access to the result. The Act deems 
access to information in this way as a separate document, but it does perhaps involve reducing information 
not otherwise distinctly available into documentary form.
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• a ‘prescribed authority’, which includes unincorporated bodies established 
under legislation for a public purpose and, where declared in the regulation, 
other bodies established by the government or over which the government is 
in a position to exercise control.
Incorporated bodies such as NBN Co are therefore not generally subject to the 
FOI Act unless prescribed in regulations. Official documents of ministers are 
documents that are or used to be in the Minister’s possession, that can be accessed 
by the Minister, and which relates to the affairs of an agency (s.4(1) FOI Act). 
Not all documents in the possession of ministers in their official capacity are 
subject to the FOI Act; documents relating to the activities of non-agencies such 
as incorporated bodies are not subject to the right of access under the FOI Act.
Agencies may also be excluded from the operation of the FOI Act in respect of 
some or all of their activities (s.7 and Schedule 2 FOI Act). Thus bodies set out 
in Part I of Schedule 2 are exempt entirely,38 in Part II in relation to specified 
documents39 and in Part III in respect of their commercial activities.40 References 
to commercial activities in Schedule 2 means activities carried on by an agency 
on a commercial basis, or foreseeably might be carried on in the future on a 
commercial basis, in competition with private bodies (s.7(3) FOI Act). Broad 
interpretations by the AAT have meant that a wide range of activities are 
potentially captured by this exemption.41 An agency and Minister is also exempt 
in relation to documents, or summaries or extracts of such documents, which 
originated or are received from various named security agencies, or relate to 
defence intelligence or restricted technology (see ss.7(2A), 7(2B) and 7(2C)). 
There is no clear principled basis that has been used in exempting a body or 
certain of its documents from the operation of the FOI Act. The ALRC and ARC, 
in its ‘Open Government Report’, initially proposed repealing the exclusion of 
bodies entirely on the basis that the exemptions provide sufficient protection 
(ALRC, ARC 1995, p. 215). They were convinced, however, that alternative 
38 This currently includes agencies such as Aboriginal Land Councils and Land Trusts, Auditor-General, 
Australian Government Solicitor and various security and defence agencies. Previously, GBEs such as the 
Commonwealth Bank (prior to its privatisation) were also listed.
39 This currently includes Australian Broadcasting Corporation, in relation to its program material and 
its datacasting content; Australian Postal Corporation, in relation to documents in respect of its commercial 
activities; Medicare Australia, in relation to documents in respect of its commercial activities; Reserve Bank 
of Australia, in relation to documents in respect of its banking operations (including individual open market 
operations and foreign exchange dealings) and in respect of exchange control matters; Australian Statistician, 
in relation to documents containing information collected under the Census and Statistics Act 1905; and 
Qantas and Telstra were also listed prior to privatisation.
40 This includes body corporates established under the Dairy Produce Act 1986 (Cth), or Primary Industries 
and Energy Research and Development Act 1989 (Cth).
41 See, for example, Australian Postal Corporation v Johnston [2007] FCA 386, where listings of licensed post 
offices maintained by Australia Post were held to be exempt from disclosure as included under Schedule 2. See 
also Bell and Commonwealth Scientific and Research Organisation (CSIRO) [2007] AATA 1569; (2007) 96 ALD 
450 for a discussion of the relevant case law.
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forms of accountability and the probable exemption of vast majority of their 
documents justified the exclusion of the security agencies. GBEs, similarly, 
should not be prescribed authorities and hence excluded from the act if they 
are ‘engaged predominantly in commercial activities in a competitive market’ 
(ALRC, ARC 1995, p. 216). Those not so engaged in a competitive market should 
be subject to the FOI Act and the general operation of its exemptions without 
being listed in Schedule 2. The exemption relating to business and commercial 
affairs should clearly apply to documents that contain information about the 
competitive commercial activities of agencies (ALRC, ARC 1995, p. 141).42 These 
recommendations were not, however, adopted in the most recent reforms to the 
FOI Act, and the controversy over the treatment of NBN Co perhaps highlights 
the continuing need for this issue to be addressed.
The commercialised state
Concern over the FOI Act’s coverage of the commercial activities of government 
agencies is just one concern over a trend towards greater commercialisation 
of government activities in general since its introduction in 1982. Renewed 
emphasis on the efficiency and effectiveness of government was accompanied by 
a shift to a ‘managerialism’ or ‘new public management’ philosophy, emphasising 
cost-effectiveness, service quality and organisational performance.43 Attempts 
to expose public services to competition, contestability and market-based 
mechanisms led to increased use of a range of tools including ‘deregulation, 
commercialisation, corporatisation, public sector down sizing, outsourcing of 
services and privatisation’ (Taggart 1997, pp. 1–2). Accompanying this shift 
has been concern over the applicability and persistence of public sector forms 
of accountability (Mulgan 2003). Exclusions of public bodies from the ambit of 
accountability mechanisms like the FOI Act, or limitations on their exposure, 
have been questioned given the seemingly increasing reliance on private sector 
forms of governance and contracting as a means of regulation (Parker and 
Braithwaite 2003, pp. 119–145). As Finn suggests:
The always fuzzy line between public and private has been reconstructed 
since freedom of information (FoI) legislation first appeared in Australia … 
the commercial relations between government, business and the broader 
community have been fundamentally reshaped (Finn 2003, p. 60). 
At a broader level, the emphasis on market mechanisms and privatisation 
of government services has brought with it recognition of a broad range of 
42 This has since been accepted by the Courts. See, for example, Secretary, Dept of Workplace Relations & 
Small Business v The Staff Development & Training Centre Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1375.
43 On the changing philosophies of the Australian public sector see Wilenski 1988. On new public 
management generally see Hood 1991.
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regulatory mechanisms that can help enhance the achievement of public policy 
goals. A range of methods was available to the government, often in conjunction 
with the private sector, to help achieve its public policy — or at least political 
— aims. Creating and influencing markets, transactional regulation through 
contract or grant, regulation of structural elements like underlying standards, 
codes or architecture, and a range of informational regulation ranging from 
requiring disclosure to performance indicators, ratings or education were added 
to more traditional command and control mechanisms like requiring licences 
or approval (Freiburg 2010, p. 85). Most provided for an increased role for 
government in gathering and processing information.
This has meant that a significant proportion of the information generated and 
held by the reconfigured government is commercial in nature (see Paterson 2004, 
p. 321). That information can relate to the commercial activities of government 
itself, to contractual arrangements entered into with private bodies for the 
delivery of government services, to the activities and governance arrangements 
of organisations that government has some interest it, or have been provided in 
the course of some regulatory scheme in which government plays a supervisory 
or enforcement role. Finally, that information can be provided during the policy-
making process, with the submission of commercial information used to influence 
the policy setting process or to contribute to a finding and recommendation of 
a government body.44 Each of these avenues for the generation and collection of 
commercial information encompasses an incredibly broad range of circumstances 
and regulatory or public policy objectives.
Excluding access to commercial information may therefore have a significant 
impact on the achievement of those objectives. To the extent to which FOI 
obligations modify market mechanisms they may reduce the competitive 
benefits to be gained or have other unintended effects. Potential release of 
commercial information may increase the risks and hence costs associated with 
doing business with government, or reduce the incentives to be forthcoming in 
providing information. However, excluding such information from disclosure 
where it plays an increasingly important role in the way government is 
conducted may significantly undermine achieving the objectives of the FOI Act. 
Adequately scrutinising the conditions in and performance under government 
contracts, the effectiveness of the market design in achieving its regulatory 
aims, and the influence of regulatory capture or interest group pressures may all 
depend on access to documents that necessarily include commercial information 
of a public or private nature.
44 John McMillan has argued that in some ways the availability of access to information has led to non-
government organisations asserting a right to set the agenda, propose options or veto proposals: McMillan 
2002, p. 30.
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The FOI Act attempts to balance these considerations in a number of ways. 
As discussed above, the FOI Act is focused on agency documents and there 
are general exclusions available for some bodies because of their commercial 
nature or documents relating to their commercial activities. There are also a 
number of specific exemptions relating to commercial affairs available both to 
government and non-government bodies to prevent release of documents. Under 
the ‘reverse FOI’ procedure (see ss.27 and 27A FOI Act), before release of a 
document containing information concerning a person’s or organisation’s private 
or commercial affairs, they must be given an opportunity to make submissions 
in support of it coming within the personal or business affair exemptions. These 
submissions must then be considered in deciding whether to grant access to the 
document, and if access is to be provided, an opportunity must then be given for 
proceedings to be brought in the AAT arguing that the exemption should apply. 
Up until the recent amendments a document could be withheld as exempt in a 
commercial context if:
• its disclosure was prohibited under other legislation;45
• it disclosed trade secrets or information having commercial value that could 
be diminished if revealed (s.43(1)(a) and (b)); 
• its disclosure would found an action for breach of confidence (s.45); or
• it disclosed other information about a person’s business or professional affairs 
or an organisation’s46 commercial or financial affairs which, if disclosed, could 
unreasonably adversely affect them or ‘could reasonably be expected to 
prejudice the future supply of information to the Commonwealth’ (s.43(1)(c)). 
These provisions therefore recognise that commercial interests can be implicated 
in a request for disclosure of information in a number of ways. Disclosure can 
affect the intrinsic value of the information itself, the commercial activities of the 
party providing the information, or the relationship between the government 
and providers of information. The document being requested can also have 
originated in three arguably distinct situations: disclosure of information to 
government, either under compulsion or voluntarily; generated by government 
itself as part of its commercial affairs; or it relates to government contracts and 
other commercial affairs (see Paterson 2004, pp. 325–329). 
The exemptions to disclosure for commercial information involve the same 
concern with balancing the effect of disclosure on the commercial interests 
of businesses and organisations (including the government itself) against the 
public interest in that information being known. Disclosure may undermine the 
public policy objective sought through the creation or collection of commercial 
45 Either legislation specified in Schedule 3 or which expressly applied the FOI Act exemption: s.38.
46 Including government authorities.
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information, including greater efficiency or effectiveness through use of a market 
mechanism or correction of a market failure. Alternatively, the information 
disclosed may be sufficiently distinct from the activities of government, placing 
the party disclosing the information at a competitive disadvantage, or devalue 
intellectual property rights. As Gurry has suggested, in discussing both 
commercial and private information provided to government:
By limiting the use which the State may make of this information to the 
discharge of the function for which it is received, the law assures citizens 
that their confidences will not be abused for reasons of extraneous 
political expedience and provides a framework of trust conducive to the 
candid disclosure necessitated by the relation of the modern State and 
its citizens (Gurry 1984, p. 18).
However, the protection against disclosure of commercial information is 
not absolute. Where disclosure would defeat the regulatory objective of a 
legislative scheme, there can be explicit provision for non-disclosure of the 
relevant information. Otherwise, information about business or commercial 
affairs supplied to the government is protected only to the extent disclosure 
would reasonably affect them or unreasonably jeopardise trust, for example. 
The reference to reasonableness has allowed incorporation of elements of the 
public interest, including other factors for and against disclosure, in recognition 
that merely relating to the commercial affairs of a body is not sufficient in itself 
to justify withholding the information (ALRC, ARC 1995, [10.31]). 
Information of intrinsic value independent of its use by government is separately 
protected but only if it can be shown that value would be diminished or it 
otherwise can be considered a trade secret. The AAT has confirmed that the 
value of information to a private body is treated differently to that held by the 
government. For example, in Secretary, Dept of Workplace Relations & Small 
Business v The Staff Development & Training Centre Pty Ltd ([2001] FCA 1375) the 
tribunal emphasised that ‘information must have value to the [agency] in respect 
of those of its activities which can be said to bear a commercial, as opposed 
to an administrative or governmental character’ (Secretary, Dept of Workplace 
Relations & Small Business v The Staff Development & Training Centre Pty Ltd 
[2001] FCA 1375, [28]), and stated that 
there is a distinction between government functions and trading or 
commercial functions and that that distinction holds true even though 
government may deliver its governmental functions to interested 
members of the public in a commercial format, for example, by ‘out-
sourcing’ them to private service providers (Secretary, Dept of Workplace 
Relations & Small Business v The Staff Development & Training Centre 
Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1375, [26]). 
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Information disclosed in confidence to the government is also protected from 
disclosure under the FOI Act, but only if it would found an action in breach 
of confidence (s.45 FOI Act). The courts, drawing on Commonwealth v Fairfax, 
have confirmed that where information is supplied to, as well as generated by 
government, determining whether there has been a breach of confidence involves 
a consideration of the public interest in disclosure (see Smith Kline & French 
Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Sec, Dept of Community Services and Health (1991) 
28 FCR 291; 20 IPR 643). But the question of whether information provided to 
government is confidential doesn’t just depend on the intention of the private or 
government party. It will also be affected by how subsequent use or disclosure of 
the information serves the legitimate interests of the public purpose that underlies 
the agency’s authority (Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Sec, 
Dept of Community Services and Health (1991) 28 FCR 291; 20 IPR 643). 
Reform of the protection of commercial information
Despite the various limitations on the exemptions of commercial information 
from disclosure, the exemptions have been subject to considerable criticism 
over the extent they may operate to limit scrutiny of the commercial activities 
of government. Unlike the exemptions dealing with the internal workings of 
government, these exemptions affect not only the process and deliberations 
underlining particular public policy choices but also the evaluation of the 
outcomes of those choices. Protecting the commercial interests of parties dealing 
with government may prevent scrutiny of the extent to which the public policy 
objectives have been achieved. The mere fact that information is commercial 
in nature, or discloses information about the identity or participation of 
organisations in commercial dealings with the government, should not, in itself, 
be protected. Similarly, the mere fact that contracts include confidentiality 
clauses may merely indicate an intention to prevent public scrutiny of the terms 
of the contract. The exemptions from disclosure may provide the incentive for 
agencies to use provisions designed to protect third parties to instead protect 
the terms of the agreement, or government interpretation and enforcement of 
them, from scrutiny (see Paterson 2004, p. 328). As Frieberg has suggested,
public costs are often unknown or uncalculated, while private costs tend 
to be regarded as commercially confidential. For a proper evaluation 
and comparison of costs to take place, both the public and private 
sectors will need to make their bottom lines, if not their calculations, 
more transparent. In the absence of valid comparisons, the process of 
contractualisation will continue to be based on ideology rather than 
economics (Frieberg 2010). 
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Continuing concern over the expenditure of public funds through contractual 
arrangements involving confidentiality provisions led the Senate to adopt 
a continuing order requiring government agencies47 to list on their websites 
various details of all contracts with a value over $100,000, including whether 
there are any confidentiality requirements. Agencies have to also provide 
reasons for the confidentiality. The Commonwealth Auditor-General reports 
to the Senate each year on the possible inappropriate use of confidentiality 
provisions in government contracts (Senate Order for Departmental and Agency 
Contracts; see also Department of Finance and Deregulation n.d.). There has 
been a significant decline in the reported use of confidentiality provisions, from 
around 24 per cent to 10 per cent, since the introduction of the order (see ANAO 
2003, p. 13).48 The Auditor-General recently concluded there remained ‘scope 
for improvement’ in agencies understanding and application of the guidelines 
in order to assess whether particular contract provisions should be confidential 
(ANAO 2003, p. 13). 
The recent amendments to the FOI Act have, however, sought to extend access 
to documents relating to the performance of government contracts. In so doing, 
the amendments have largely adopted recommendations in the 1995 ‘Open 
Government Report’ (ALRC, ARC 1995, [15.8]–[15.15])49 and the ARC report on 
‘The Contracting Out of Government Services’ (Administrative Review Council 
1998). The amendments allow requests for access to documents held by non-
government parties who provide services under a contract. The services have 
to be in connection with that agency’s functions or powers, and not merely 
provide services to the agency in question. Agencies are required to include 
provisions in the contracts to ensure they will be provided with documents 
held by the contracted service providers upon request from the agency after 
the agency receives an FOI request (s.6C FOI Act). An agency may not disclose 
the document under the FOI request if an exemption applies, or if all reasonable 
steps have been taken to obtain the document under the contractual provisions 
but the document has not been provided to the agency (s.24A FOI Act). This 
new amendment reflects what might be considered good practice in respect 
of monitoring the performance of contracted obligations. It emphasises that 
the agency retains responsibility for supervision of the contract, and that any 
47 Defined as an agency within the meaning of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 
(Cth) — generally bodies that owe direct financial reporting and accountability requirements as part of the 
Commonwealth government. 
48 In 2009 there were 41,937 contracts for goods and services totalling $165 billion. Of these, 4,084 contracts 
were reported as containing confidentiality provisions. Of the 150 contracts examined, 14 per cent incorrectly 
included confidentiality provisions and 51 per cent were incorrectly listed as containing confidentiality 
provisions, thus restricting their access by the Senate and public. 
49 The proposal is tied to recommendation 99 of the ‘Open Government Report’, which was concerned with 
‘the trend towards government contracting with private sector bodies to provide services to the community’ 
on the basis that it ‘poses a potential threat to the government accountability and openness’.
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request for documents is done within the contractual framework. It means, 
however, that documents cannot be obtained from non-government parties 
outside of the contractual context. 
The recent amendments also clarified how the public interest test applied 
to those exemptions dealing with commercial concerns. Trade secrets and 
other valuable information and information provided in confidence remain 
unconditionally exempt, but documents disclosing business or commercial 
affairs that might reasonably adversely affect those affairs or prejudice the 
future supply of information to the government must be disclosed unless their 
disclosure is contrary to the public interest (ss.47G and 11A FOI Act). While 
the impact of these clarifications is still uncertain, it may be relevant that some 
of the cases referred to in Part II, concerning exemptions relating to internal 
working documents, placed less importance on the public interest in accessing 
submissions and other documents relating to consultation with non-government 
organisations. For example, in McKinnon and Secretary, Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet ([2007] AATA 1969) it was suggested by Forgie D.P.:
Those consulting with government are not subject to the same statutory 
standards as those working within the [Australian Public Service 
relating to record keeping]. It may be that, in particular circumstances, 
their candour and frankness would be inhibited. Deliberations and 
consultations that occur as part of the decision-making process are a 
different matter and are, in my view, more properly considered in the 
context of separating the pre-decisional deliberations from the post-
decision deliberations and the principle that government is accountable 
for what is has done, or has omitted to do, in implementing a particular 
policy but is not accountable for what was put to it or considered by it 
and rejected (McKinnon and Secretary, Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet [2007] AATA 1969, [174]). 
It may be that the courts will continue to allow withholding of documentation 
involving commercial information received from non-government parties. 
Therefore the recent amendments enhance the focus of the FOI Act on subjecting 
the performance of government to scrutiny but they also retain considerable 
scope for the government to enter into and maintain contractual and other 
commercial operations largely exempt from such scrutiny.
Private information
In 1991, the objects clause in the FOI Act was amended to include ‘creating a 
right to bring about the amendment of records containing personal information 
that is incomplete, incorrect, out of date or misleading’ (s.3(1)(c) FOI Act). It was 
inserted on the recommendation of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
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Constitutional Affairs 1987 report on the Freedom of Information Act (SSCLCA 
1987, pp. 35–36). Its inclusion is a compromise to address the perceived divergence 
between the general objects of the FOI Act and the provisions of Part V of the Act, 
which provided for a general right to amend records relating to an individual’s 
personal affairs. The Senate Standing Committee actually recommended that Part 
V be removed from the FOI Act and placed in legislation dealing directly with 
privacy concerns. The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) was enacted in the year following 
the Senate Standing Committee’s report, regulating the collection, storage, 
security, access, correction, use and disclosure of personal information. It required 
government agencies take reasonable steps to ensure that personal information 
records are correct, relevant, up to date, complete and not misleading. Access and 
amendment of personal information remains a part of the FOI Act, however.50
Amendment of personal records in Part V was originally included in the FOI 
Act 1982 only after a Senate amendment was accepted (Hansard (Senate) 8 
April 1981, p. 1239; 29 May 1981, p. 2364; see ALRC, ARC 1995, p. 56). The 
Senate Standing Committee 1979 report (SSCLCA 1979) had anticipated that 
access to personal records was likely to be a significant proportion of access 
requests. In the absence of any legislative protection of privacy the Committee 
recommended that there should also be an ability to correct personal records 
where they are inaccurate, out of date, contain irrelevant information or are 
otherwise misleading (SSCLCA 1979, pp. 264–265). Calls to repeal the provisions 
after the enactment of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) have not been accepted. For 
example, the ALRC and ARC, in the 1995 ‘Open Government Report’, initially 
proposed removing the correction provisions from the FOI Act (ALRC, ARC 
1995, [5.17]). This would have the advantages of removing the overlap and 
possible inconsistency between the Privacy and FOI Acts and only having one 
process for amendment of personal records. However, it was concluded that 
these did not clearly outweigh the disadvantages of the complexity of dealing 
with ‘mixed’ requests for both personal and non-personal information, the 
replication of procedures and exemptions in the Privacy Act and diversion of 
the privacy commissioner’s resources. Importantly, the ALRC and ARC report 
accepted that access and amendment of personal information ‘are as much 
matters of government accountability and openness as privacy and should, 
therefore, remain within the FOI Act’ (ALRC, ARC 1995, p. 56). 
By providing access and amendment of personal records the FOI Act provides 
a mechanism to scrutinise not only the accuracy of those records, but also the 
process and systems developed to collect and use the information in question. 
It helps to ensure that the design of those systems accord with the intended 
public policy objectives, and that the benefits outweigh the impact on personal 
50 Note, however, that the recent reforms included altering the objects clause to once again remove explicit 
reference to access and amendment of personal records: see s.3 FOI Act 1982 as amended Act no.139, 2010.
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privacy concerns. It therefore potentially goes beyond the privacy requirements 
of making only authorised and consented use of personal information, as well 
as providing a means to scrutinise compliance with other administrative law 
and FOI Act requirements to disclose the basis on which decisions are made to 
the detriment of a person’s interests, especially when those decisions are made 
on the basis of considerations personal to an individual. Access to personal 
records also ensures that record-keeping practices are subject to scrutiny of sort, 
allowing the FOI Act to augment good record-keeping requirements in other 
legislation and as implicitly encouraged through FOI access requirements.51
Under the FOI Act, a person can request either an amendment or an annotation 
of records they have lawfully obtained containing their personal information 
(s.48 FOI Act). The agency has discretion to amend or annotate the record; 
though to the extent practicable they should not obliterate the previous text of 
the record (s.50 FOI Act). If the agency declines to amend the record then they 
must annotate the record with any statement provided by the person who is the 
subject of the record (s.51A FOI Act). Refusals to amend or annotate, or delays in 
responding to requests, are generally reviewable by internal and merits review, 
and now through the Information Commissioner. The amendment provisions 
have caused some concerns over the ability of applicants to essentially rewrite 
findings of fact or conclusions as to matters that are subject to disputes in other 
forums or under other regulatory schemes (see generally Creyke and McMillan 
2009, pp. 1200–1201). 
The relationship between the FOI Act and privacy concerns are also reflected in 
the exemptions for disclosure of personal information. Apart from the protection 
of information disclosed in confidence discussed above, the FOI Act also exempts 
unreasonable disclosure of personal information about any person (s.47F FOI Act 
1982 (as amended Act no.139, 2010), previously s.41).52 Again, the reference to 
reasonableness has been held to incorporate a public interest test (for example, 
Colakovski v AOTC (1991) 100 ALR 111). The Privacy Act 1988 also provides 
limitations on the release of personal information to another person, but this is 
not generally subject to public interest considerations. The recent reform of the 
FOI Act has made it clear that unreasonable disclosure of personal information 
involves consideration of the extent the information is publicly known, the 
person was known to be associated with matters dealt with in the document, 
and whether there are other public sources of the information. It is also now 
clear that documents containing personal information are to be released unless 
that would be contrary to the public interest, so that factors favouring release of 
51 See further the discussion in Part IV below.
52 Note there is provision to release information provided by a qualified person (medical practitioner, 
psychologist, counsellor, etc.) to another qualified person if it appears to the agency or Minister that disclosure 
might otherwise be detrimental to the applicant’s physical or mental health or well-being.
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the documents are also to be considered as well as those favouring withholding 
access (s.47F, s.11A and s.11B). Like the commercial information exceptions listed 
above, the ‘reverse FOI’ provisions apply to provide a person whose personal 
information is contained in requested documents and who might reasonably 
wish to contend that the document is therefore exempt, an opportunity to make 
submissions or to seek review of any decision to grant access before access is in 
fact provided (s.27A FOI Act 1982 as amended). 
Personal information can include the names and other information of public 
servants whose duties were associated with requested documents. It was 
acknowledged in the ‘Open Government’ review that ‘[t]he disclosure of 
personal information of public servants as it relates to the performance of their 
duties for the government does not unduly threaten personal privacy and 
reflects the democratic objectives of FOI’ (ALRC, ARC 1995, p. 131, quoting 
the Privacy Commissioner DP Submission 81). This was, however, subject to 
situations where harassment or personal security could be threatened or where 
information related to investigations into conduct affecting fellow public 
servants. The public interest test has to incorporate these considerations so as 
to ensure that the traditional anonymity of public servants is removed in favour 
of subjecting the bureaucracy to scrutiny (ALRC, ARC 1995, p. 131). 
Similarly, the identity of persons who have made allegations that another person 
is involved in some form of wrongdoing may be withheld on a number of 
grounds, such as law enforcement, adversely affecting the operations of agencies, 
or breach of confidence as well as personal information. Other administrative 
law obligations may require the identity or substantial content of the allegations 
to be disclosed53 and the FOI Act doesn’t prevent a breach of those obligations 
resulting in the invalidity of the administrative decision in question.
Conclusions
The FOI Act attempts to balance the interests of both government and non-
government organisations, recognising that these are interrelated in the 
development and institution of policy. However, there has been a concern that 
the interests of non-government parties are unduly elevated, particularly in 
the application of exemptions to disclosure. There is too much discretion given 
to government agencies to either claim confidentiality or seek exemptions to 
preserve their own interests rather than those of the non-government organisation 
involved. Dealing with disclosure of non-government information involves 
balancing difficult and potentially incommensurate factors when identifying 
53 For example, obligations of natural justice require disclosure of information which may be credible, 
relevant and significant to an adverse effect on a person’s interests: see VEAL v Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88.
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where the public interest may lie. Separation of the elements of the public 
interest favouring disclosure from general concerns over the accountability 
of non-government organisations and their role in public activities remains 
difficult but crucial to the effective operation of the FOI Act. 
Part IV: Developing a culture of disclosure
Two days before the release of the 1980 federal budget, Journalist Laurie Oakes 
disclosed details of a draft (see Blenkin 2011) of the budget speech on national 
television. The source of the ‘leaked’ draft has never been revealed. It proved 
highly embarrassing to the then Treasurer, John Howard, and led to the Prime 
Minister, Malcolm Fraser, declaring that at least his office ‘was not going to 
play that game [of leaking to advance a person or policy], ever’ (see Skeketee 
2011). So-called ‘authorised leaking’, however, has become a matter of course, 
particularly in relation to budget material, with speculation about impending 
budget measures being selectively released on a confidential basis to journalists 
in the hope of gauging and affecting public reaction to the official policy. As 
Laurie Oaks himself, perhaps not surprisingly, suggested many years later, 
‘leaks, and whistleblowers, are essential to a proper democratic system’ (Oakes 
2005; see Brown 2007, pp. 19–28). As Sir Humphrey in Yes Minister suggests, 
‘[t]he ship of state … is the only ship that leaks from the top’ (Wikipedia n.d.). 
Leaking, or whistleblowing, to an external agency, and particularly to the media, 
is a relatively extreme demonstration of the independence of the public service 
or individual members of government.54 The extent of that independence — 
to whom the duties of the public service are owed — lies at the heart of the 
role of FOI in enhancing government policy development. Peter Shergold, then 
Secretary to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, expressed it in this 
way:
Of course the Australian Public Service needs to be accountable for the 
way it plays its role. It is — more than ever before. The Westminster 
tradition has evolved considerably in the last thirty years: there is 
now much greater scrutiny of public service decision-making than in 
the past through Parliamentary committees, the Audit Office, and the 
Ombudsman; through legislation which, within limits set by Parliament, 
provides freedom of information to the public; and the opportunity, 
through an extended panoply of administrative law, for citizens to have 
decisions reviewed. There is now a network of integrity which did not 
exist 30 years ago.
54 For a discussion of whistleblowing in the Australian context see Brown 2008. 
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Yet confidentiality remains a fundamental requisite of democratic 
decision-making. A public service that cannot provide its frank advice 
in confidence will rapidly lose its ability to influence. No government 
will willingly involve officials in decision-making if they fear that the 
written advice, or an account of its oral discussion, will end up in the 
newspapers if the government’s judgment is not accepted. Those who leak 
the deliberations of government (as opposed to those who whistleblow 
on corruption), undermine democratic process. They erode the trust 
between government and public administration that lies at the heart of 
good governance. They diminish the opportunity for public servants 
to inform and influence policy and, conversely, reduce the willingness 
of government to seek the broadest range of advice from across the 
administration. They undermine whole of government approaches. It is 
for that reason that I protect the confidentiality of ministerial decision-
making just as zealously as journalists protect the confidentiality of 
their informants (Shergold 2006). 
But there are concerns over the public service acting merely as agents for the 
government. In 2006, Andrew Podger, reflecting on his 37 years in the public 
service, including his roles as Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Ageing, and Public Service Commissioner, criticised what he termed the overly 
responsive nature of some elements of the public service. As he suggested 
then, greater emphasis should be given to the public services ‘obligations of 
professionalism, impartiality, being apolitical and complying at all times with 
the law: the obligations that imply a degree of independence notwithstanding 
our need to be responsive’ (see Grattan 2005). 
Podger was particularly concerned at the public service’s role in an incident 
in the lead up to the 2001 general election where it was alleged that children 
of asylum seekers were being deliberately thrown into the water to enhance 
their chances of being allowed to enter Australia. The subsequent ‘Senate 
Select Committee for an Inquiry into a Certain Maritime Incident’ reported that 
the minister involved, Peter Reith, made ‘a number of misleading statements, 
implying that the published photographs and a video supported the original 
report that children had been thrown overboard well after he had received 
definitive advice to the contrary’ (SSCICMI 2002, p. xxiv). 
The Senate Select Committee summarised their conclusions by pointing to a 
number of factors that contributed to the false reports, including ‘genuine 
miscommunication or misunderstanding, inattention … and deliberate deception 
motivated by political expedience’ (SSCICMI 2002, p. xxii). But also important 
‘was avoidance of responsibility, a public service culture of responsiveness 
and perhaps over-responsiveness to the political needs of ministers’ (SSCICMI 
2002, p. xxii). This and other instances of over-responsiveness suggested that 
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‘some senior public servants are too concerned to please and serve partisan 
government interests by failing to keep proper notes, destroying diaries and 
ratcheting up security classification of documents’ (Public Service Informant, 
July 2005, as quoted by Timmins 2006). 
The different views about the role of the public service reflect continuing 
appreciation of the importance of the relationships between government and 
the public in the development and implementation of public policy. So-called 
‘authorised leaking of proposals’ to assist with formal delivery recognises 
that engaging with media, stakeholders and the broader community can play 
an important role in both policy development and delivery. A public service 
that acts to support the government of the day can play an important role in 
both reducing political risks but also, ultimately, enhancing the effectiveness of 
government by greater engagement with the public at large. 
In the latest review of Commonwealth administration, ‘Ahead of the Game: 
Blueprint for the reform of Australian government administration’, the 
relationship between ministers and the public service is described as a 
‘partnership to develop policy and implement government programs and 
services’ (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet n.d.). The report sets 
out a ‘vision for the future’ including:
An APS that captures ideas and expertise through the transformative 
effect of technology by:
• Citizens directly communicating their views and expertise to 
government through multiple channels, including Web 2.0 
approaches (for example, online policy forums and blogs);
• Greater disclosure of public sector data and mechanisms to access the 
data so that citizens can use the data to create helpful information for 
all, in line with privacy and secrecy principles; and
• Citizens become active participants involved in government, rather 
than being passive recipients of services and policies (Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet n.d., p. 38). 
This recommendation was complemented by the release of a separate report 
from a taskforce established to examine the role of technology in facilitating 
interaction with government. In ‘Engaged: Getting on with government 2.0’, 
the taskforce suggested that new collaborative technologies associated with 
the internet promised ‘new tools for public servants to engage and respond 
to the community' (Government 2.0 Taskforce 2009, p. x). Embracing these 
possibilities, however, required
[l]eadership, and policy and governance changes … to shift public sector 
culture and practice to make government information more accessible 
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and usable, make government more consultative, participatory and 
transparent, build a culture of online innovation within Government, 
and to promote collaboration across agencies (Government 2.0 Taskforce 
2009, p. x). 
It requires changing the approach to government information, from a resource 
for government to ‘a national resource that should be managed for public 
purposes’ (Government 2.0 Taskforce 2009, p. x). 
Together, these recommendations have been supported by the government 
through a ‘Declaration of Open Government’ based on principles of informing, 
engaging with and participation of the public (Department of Finance and 
Deregulation 2008). Mirroring developments in the US (http://www.data.gov/) 
and the UK (http://data.gov.uk/), the government has established a website 
gateway to accessing government datasets (http://data.gov.au/), and released 
guides as to the ways in which information is released to encourage access and 
reuse by the public (Australian Government n.d.). The recommendations are also 
reflected in recent reform of the FOI Act that now includes among its objects to 
provide the community with access to information held by the Commonwealth 
government, an intention ‘by these objects, to increase recognition that 
information held by the Government is to be managed for public purposes, and 
is a national resource’ (s.3(3) FOI Act 1982). 
As the other parts of this chapter have suggested, these sentiments are not new. 
The original principles of the FOI Bill 1978 reflected the same objectives to 
both provide a right of access but also to encourage the proactive disclosure of 
government information. But there has been a shift in the nature and function 
of that information. As the first annual report on the operation of the FOI 
Act 1982 suggests, the FOI Act ‘requires information about the operations of 
Commonwealth agencies to be made publicly available, particularly rules and 
practices affecting members of the public in their dealings with those agencies’ 
(Attorney-General’s Department 1983). Proactive disclosure of information held 
and generated by government may extend beyond informing the individual 
about how decisions about their interests are going to be made to informing the 
public more broadly.
This section examines the obligations of proactive disclosure in the FOI Act 
1982. It looks at the limited nature of that disclosure when compared to 
developments in administrative law more generally. It then considers the extent 
to which proactive disclosure has been affected by considerations of resource 
constraint, including the impact on document handling and retrieval and the 
ability to recoup costs of FOI obligations, as well as the role of the Ombudsman 
or other government agencies in encouraging a pro-disclosure culture. It then 
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considers the recent introduction of the Office of the Information Commissioner 
and the important role it will play in both encouraging proactive disclosure and 
enhancing government information processes more generally.
Publication of certain documents and information
Part II of the FOI Act, headed ‘Publication of certain documents and information’, 
was described by the 1979 Senate Standing Committee as ‘one of the least 
known and publicised parts of the [FOI Bill 1978], but in our view one of the 
most important’ (SSCLCA 1979, p. 87). It provides for:
• the publication of an annual statement of the general organisation and 
functions of an agency, particularly decision-making powers affecting 
members of the public; how the public can participate in policy development 
or administration, what documents are already or customarily made available 
to the public, how physical access to documents can be obtained and the 
procedures and contacts for making an FOI application (s.8 FOI Act 1982); 
• making available to the public documents which are used by the agency 
in making decisions that affect rights, privileges or benefits, obligations, 
penalties or other detriments; including rules, guidelines or practices relating 
to the administration or enforcement of legislative or executive schemes; and 
at least once a year compiling a list of such documents (s.9 FOI Act 1982); 
and states that 
• a person can’t be prejudiced where a rule, guideline or practice is not made 
available or listed; provided the person was not otherwise aware of the rule, 
guideline or practice that should have been available or listed, and they 
could have avoided being prejudicially affected if they had known about it 
(s.10 FOI Act 1982). 
These sections were the subject of considerable scrutiny during the enactment of 
the FOI Act. Amendments to the original Bill went beyond the recommendations 
by the 1979 Senate Standing Committee in some respects, particularly the 
provision for a lack of prejudice if the required ‘hidden law’ of the agency was 
not made publicly available. However, the provisions have never perhaps taken 
on the importance envisaged by the Senate Standing Committee.
The ALRC and ARC ‘Open Government Report’ suggested that the main aim of 
the provisions was to provide the public with guidance about the information 
held by the government, primarily to assist the formulation of access requests. 
However, the information disclosed under the provisions ‘was not easily 
accessible and is rarely used’ (ALRC, ARC 1995, p. 81). The internet being very 
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much in its infancy,55 the report recommended access be expanded beyond the 
regional offices of the Australian Archives to Australian Government Publishing 
Service shops, public libraries and branches of the relevant agency. Availability 
of the information needed to be better publicised. Compliance with the 
provisions was patchy and there was a need to monitor and enforce compliance 
through establishment of an FOI Commissioner.
Subsequent reviews of the operation of the provisions have confirmed their 
limited effect. The report by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) 
on ‘Administration of Freedom of Information Requests’ (ANAO 2003) found 
that only half of the agencies required to provide details of documents used 
to make decisions that affect the public in 2002–03 had done so, and only 
31 per cent of the lists of such documents was current. There were no processes 
to actively follow up on lapsed statements (ANAO 2003, p. 40). However, the 
ANAO recommended that the amendment of the provisions be considered to 
provide for disclosure through an agency’s website. In the 2006 ‘Scrutinising 
Government’ report, the Ombudsman reached a similar, if not quite as extensive, 
conclusion about lack of compliance with Part II requirements (Commonwealth 
Ombudsman 2006, p. 15). 
There has also been almost no case law on the interpretation and operation of the 
provision (see, for example, Duncan v Chief Executive Officer, Centrelink [2008] 
FCA 56). The few places where access was available, the uncertain definition of 
the information to be published, and a focus on rules and practices that might 
have an effect on individual interests all limited awareness of the availability 
and usefulness of the FOI requirements. Importantly developments in other 
areas of administrative law, in particular natural justice requirements, generally 
placed more extensive obligations for disclosure of how decisions affecting 
individual interests would be made. For example, natural justice obligations 
do not generally depend upon showing how any prejudice arising from the 
non-publication of the information may have been avoided. There was also 
considerable disparity between agencies as to how willing they were to adapt 
to the publication and information facilities of the internet. Agencies involved 
with high volume decision-making on an individual level were responding to 
a number of factors other than FOI requirements to embrace the information 
provision facilities the internet provides, including the need to reduce costs, 
remove duplication of services, improve ‘client’ satisfaction and reduce 
complaints (ALRC, ARC 1995, [7.7]–[7.8]). 
55 The ‘Open Government Report’ mentions the recent establishment of a server at the National Library that 
could be used to provide access to government files.
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Recent amendments
The recent amendments to the FOI Act include extensive reform of Part II. The 
new Information Publication Scheme (IPS) is intended to transform the FOI 
framework ‘from one that is reactive to individual requests for documents, to 
one that also relies more heavily on agency driven publication of information’ 
(OAIC n.d.). The IPS requires agencies56 to disclose a broader range of 
information and encourages further proactive, and more accessible, disclosure of 
government information. An agency must have a plan stating what information 
it will proactively disclose, and how and to whom it will disclose it. Agencies 
continue to have an obligation to disclose their structural and organisational 
details, including decision-making powers affecting members of the public, 
how the public can comment on policy proposals, and other relevant contact 
information. Information in documents to which the agency routinely gives 
access in response to FOI requests or in response to requests from Parliament 
are also required to be disclosed in the IPS, although not if it is subject to 
exceptions (s.8C FOI Act) including personal and business information personal 
to those making an FOI request (see s.8(2)(g)(i), (ii) FOI Act). Information about 
how decisions affecting individuals are made is now included in a broader 
‘operational information’ category, including all information which assists the 
agency perform its functions affecting members of the public.57 Each agency IPS 
entry is required to be ‘accurate, up-to-date and complete’ (s.8B FOI Act). 
Agencies are also required to consider the objects of the FOI Act and guidelines 
issued by the Information Commissioner when complying with IPS requirements 
(s.9A FOI Act). The Information Commissioner reviews the operation of the IPS, 
including investigating compliance, either after receiving a complaint or on 
its own motion (s.8F FOI Act). Results of that review will be provided in the 
Information Commissioner’s annual reports. There are no direct enforcement 
measures provided, however, with the commissioner having limited compulsory 
powers in relation to the conduct of the investigation (see sections 79ff). Similar 
to prior to the amendments, a failure to list ‘operational information’ on the IPS 
can’t prejudice an individual whose interests are affected by a decision assisted 
by that information, but only where the prejudicial affect could have been 
avoided if the information was known (s.10 FOI Act). 
56 Note the IPS does not apply to ministers and their offices.
57 Section 8A(1) FOI Act includes ‘[t]he agency’s rules, guidelines, practices and precedents relating to … 
decisions and recommendations’. The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner Guidelines state that 
operational information does not encompass information including policy analysis; hypothetical discussion; 
case study and culpability reports; audit and evaluation reports on the operation of a government program; 
and case management recording procedures (see OAIC n.d., [13.97]). However, such information may be 
published proactively or when subject to a FOI request. 
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Agencies are also able to publish other information as part of the IPS (s.8(4) FOI 
Act) and are of course not precluded by the FOI Act from publishing information 
generally, including information that could be withheld as exempted from 
disclosure if the subject of an FOI request (s.3A FOI Act).58 The Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) guidelines point out that agencies 
are required to explain in their agency plan ‘the steps they will take to review 
their information holdings and identify information that may be suitable for 
publication’ (OAIC n.d., [913.107]). They suggest that agencies should have 
regard to the interests of clients and stakeholders, general community interest, 
public demand, assistance in dealing with the agency, promotion of agency 
accountability or public understanding, whether the information is in an 
appropriate format to be accessible and reusable,59 whether it needs revising 
or updating and whether there are privacy or security concerns (OAIC n.d., 
[13.109]). The discretion as to what additional information to release and where 
to release it remains with the agency however.
Disclosure logs
The recent amendments to the FOI Act also require both agencies and ministers 
to publicly release information in a disclosure log that has been released in 
response to an FOI request. Prior to this amendment, the FOI Act did not make 
explicit provision for the general release of information. Such forms of disclosure 
have, however, always been available. The exemptions to disclosure in the 
FOI Act provide a basis to withhold publication, but don’t generally prevent 
disclosure where not otherwise prevented by other legislation or obligations of 
confidentiality. Release of documents in response to an FOI request has been, in 
effect, to the world at large, although in practice it was often up to the recipient 
of the information to release the information more broadly. The new disclosure 
log requirements formalise this aspect and provide for increased access to the 
information that has become publicly available.
Agencies and ministers must now publish, on their websites, lists of information 
released in response to an FOI request for documents held by the agency or 
Minister and either provide access, direct links or other details on how the 
information may be obtained (s.11C FOI Act). The information must be published 
within 10 working days of the grant of access to the FOI applicant.60 There have 
been concerns raised by media organisations that this reduces their incentive 
58 Note the discussion relating to general secrecy provisions under other legislation and the Public Service 
Act in Part 1 above. 
59 Further reference is given to the publication on www.data.gov.au and the checklist available at www.
finance.gov.au/e-government/better-practice-and-collaboration/better-practice-checklists/index.html.
60 There are no specific requirements as to how long the information must remain accessible, but archiving 
the information or making it available on request would meet the requirements under the FOI Act for access. 
See (OAIC n.d., [14.42]).
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to make requests and pay the resultant fees if the information is going to be 
released publicly (see, for example, Australia’s Right to Know Coalition 2011; 
Sear 2011). The Information Commissioner has recommended that maintaining 
trust and cooperation between agencies and FOI applicants, both in respect of 
particular agencies and the climate of efficient processing of FOI in the future, be 
considered in deciding how soon to publish released information on disclosure 
logs. Fees or charges might be waived, particularly where the information 
is released and published at the same time. The format to be adopted by the 
disclosure logs are not set out in the legislation, but OAIC guidelines refer to 
various government policies and standards to help ensure the documents are 
easy to locate and access (OAIC n.d., [14.50]), including by all members of the 
public (see the discussion in the guidelines about accessibility standards, OAIC 
n.d., [14.59] –[14.61]). 
Personal, business, commercial, financial, professional affairs or other information 
of a kind determined by the Information Commissioner can be withheld from 
inclusion on the disclosure log where that would be ‘unreasonable’. Generally 
this means that the disclosure logs won’t include information about persons or 
businesses that also made the request. Releasing documents including the name 
of the agency official mentioned in connection with their duties would not be 
unreasonable. Note that these provisions mean that the decision to list a document 
on the disclosure log is separate and generally distinct from the decision to 
release the document. Procedures for informing a person or organisation whose 
information is included in released information do not apply to listing on 
disclosure logs, through the OAIC guidelines recommend including information 
about potential inclusion on disclosure logs in any ‘reverse FOI’ procedure (OAIC 
n.d., [14.19]). 
Role of the Information Commissioner
The 1979 Senate Standing Committee review of the FOI Bill 1978, after 
summarising its recommended changes to the Bill, pointed out that ‘[l]egislation 
of course is one thing; its effective operation can be entirely another’ (SSCLCA 
1979, p. 30). While the committee expressed its hope that agencies would 
cooperate in the spirit of the legislation, it was ‘essential that the operation 
of freedom of information legislation be kept under constant review’ (SSCLCA 
1979, p. 30). There was a need not only in monitoring and review of the operation 
of the Act and the balance of competing interests it represented, but also in 
mediating between agencies, individuals and the broader public interest. A 
body was needed to act as conciliator in disputes between agencies or ministers 
and individuals, counsel or assist individuals before the AAT in appropriate 
cases, and, going beyond enforcement of rights and obligations under the Act, 
to also provide advice and criticism to other departments. 
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The Senate Standing Committee recommended that these functions be split. A 
department directly headed by a Minister directly responsible, and answerable 
on a regular basis, to Parliament would have ‘administrative responsibility for 
monitoring compliance with [FOI requirements] and of systematically reporting 
as to the extent to which agencies had fulfilled their obligations’ (SSCLCA 1979, 
p. 305). The Attorney-General’s Department was selected for this purpose. 
The close comparability of the other required functions with the ‘general 
administrative role performed by the Ombudsman’, and the resource benefits of 
not having to establish a separate bureaucracy meant that the Ombudsman’s Office 
was preferred to the establishment of an at least formally separate Information 
Commissioner (SSCLCA 1979, p. 306). The Senate Committee felt that the powers 
of the Ombudsman’s Office would need to be expanded to ensure that it could 
adequately fulfil these additional functions under the FOI Act.61
Much of this role of the Ombudsman, along with the role of monitor and 
rapporteur, was realised by enactment of the FOI Act and its 1983 amendments. 
However, resource constraints in the mid-1980s led to the general monitoring 
and reporting roles being shifted to the Attorney-General’s Department (Freedom 
of Information Amendment Act 1991 (Cth), based on the recommendations of 
the Parliament of Australia; SSCLCA 1987).62 The Ombudsman’s Office was 
therefore left with its general powers under the Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) 
to investigate administrative actions of government agencies, including FOI 
matters, either upon compliant or on its own motion. Decisions of ministers 
and relating to public sector employment remained outside its jurisdiction. The 
FOI Act provided for some additional powers and limits in relation to matters 
appealed to the AAT or correction of records (see ss.56–57 FOI Act prior to 
1 November 2011). Thus the Ombudsman was able to ‘investigate complaints 
about agency decisions to deny or grant limited access to documents, the 
amount of fees and other charges … delays in responding to requests or 
other administrative processes, and the adequacy and clarity of reasons for 
decisions’ (Commonwealth Ombudsman 2006, pp. 3–4). This role reflected the 
more general role of the Ombudsman in ‘ensuring agencies implement sound 
document management procedures, provide clear and accessible information, 
and are open and responsive to complaints about issues to do with access to 
information’ (Commonwealth Ombudsman 2006, p. 4). 
Despite these synergies between the Ombudsman’s broader role and its role 
under the FOI Act, concerns remained (Commonwealth Ombudsman 2006, p. 
5). The ALRC and ARC ‘Open Government Report’ considered that ‘many of the 
61 For example, to allow it to review decisions by Ministers under the FOI Act and to investigate complaints 
while an appeal to the AAT was pending, as well as having a role in AAT proceedings.
62 Responsibility for administration of the FOI Act, and the general monitoring and reporting requirements, 
has at times resided with the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, but is now back with the Attorney-
General’s department. 
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shortcomings of the [then] current operation and effectiveness of the Act can be 
attributed to this lack of a constant, independent monitor of and advocate for 
FOI’ (ALRC, ARC 1995, pp. 61–62). They considered the most effective means of 
improving administration of the FOI Act would be the appointment of an FOI 
Commissioner. The commissioner would, on the basis of regular audits, monitor 
compliance with and administration of the act; promote the act; provide advice, 
assistance and facilitation to agencies and the public; provide legislative policy 
advice; and participate in broader information policy (ALRC, ARC 1995, pp. 
63–69). 
Importantly, however, the report recommended that the commissioner not 
be given investigatory powers to form a view as to the correctness of specific 
actions or decisions under the act, and no determinative powers to review an 
agencies FOI decision (ALRC, ARC 1995, pp. 69–70). The AAT would remain 
the sole reviewer of FOI decisions. The report considered that providing the 
commissioner with determinative powers would be incompatible with its role in 
developing guidelines, providing advice to agencies and, particularly, facilitating 
requests for disclosure. Conflicts of interest or erosion of the perception of 
independence could arise. Merits review was available by going to the AAT, 
and any criticisms of the practices of the AAT could be rectified without having 
to provide for another form of merits review (ALRC, ARC 1995, p. 70). 
Additional reviews of the FOI Act by the Commonwealth Ombudsman in 1999 
(Commonwealth Ombudsman 1999) and the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Legislation Committee 2001 (SLCLC 2001) also encouraged the establishment 
of an FOI Commissioner, either as an independent body or, given resourcing 
constraints, as a specialised unit within the Ombudsman’s Office. The 2004 
review by the ANAO emphasised the lack of any government agency with 
responsibility to ensure general compliance with the FOI Act or to identify 
improvements both to the operation of the act or information collected (ANAO 
2003, [2.30]). The ANAO recommended the Attorney-General’s Department take 
a more active role in monitoring agency compliance (ANAO 2003, [2.29]). The 
most recent review of the Commonwealth Ombudsman in 2006 reiterated the 
need to establish a statutory FOI commissioner ‘who would play an active role 
in publicising the legislation’s existence, monitor compliance with its provisions 
and promote its effective operation’ (Commonwealth Ombudsman 2006, p. 33). 
Election commitments by the Labor party to reform FOI legislation in the lead up 
to the 2007 election included the establishment of an Office of the Information 
Commissioner and establishment of various statutory office holders to act along 
with the Privacy Commissioner to provide a ‘clearing house for complaints, 
oversight, advice and reporting of freedom of information and privacy matters’ 
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(Rudd and Ludwig 2007, p. 6). These reforms were instituted by the Freedom of 
Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010 (Cth) and the Australian Information 
Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth). 
Delays
The most common complaint to the Ombudsman about the operation of the 
FOI Act related to delays in the processing of FOI requests (Commonwealth 
Ombudsman 2006). In general, an agency has 30 days to respond to an FOI 
request. If the request concerns a state government or another business or 
person requiring a ‘reverse FOI’ consultation the time limit can be extended 
to up to 60 days. The time limit can be extended for the time waiting for the 
applicant to respond to a notification about likely charges involved with the 
processing of their request. The Ombudsman’s own motion investigations into 
administration of the FOI Act in 1999 and 2006 both concluded that there was, 
in general, excessive delays in responding to FOI requests, though these varied 
considerably between agencies. Alarmingly, the Ombudsman suggested that 
this was not just the result of the nature of the FOI requests or the allocation 
and efficient use of resources within the agency. As the 1999 ‘Needs to Know’ 
report suggested,
the investigation also identified a more pervasive malaise in the 
administration of FOI: a growing culture of indifference or resentment 
towards the disclosure of information, ailing standards of training and 
development and a profound lack of understanding of or commitment 
to the ethos and purpose of the legislation. It appeared that, although 
the FOI Act had wrought some change in the culture of public 
administration, its goals had been imperfectly achieved. Many of the 
early FOI practitioners were advocates of open government, but had, 
over time, been replaced by staff who had grown up in a very different 
environment, with FOI just one of a number of competing demands on 
agency time and resources (Commonwealth Ombudsman 1999).
In the 2006 ‘Scrutinising Government’ report, the situation had perhaps improved, 
but the complaints received by the Ombudsman, albeit a relatively small 
proportion of the total number of FOI requests (Commonwealth Ombudsman 2006, 
p. 9),63 still indicated that agencies were failing to allocate adequate resources, 
had developed a culture of ‘compliant but protracted processing of FOI requests’ 
(Commonwealth Ombudsman 2006, p. 15), and that ‘good FOI administration is 
of dwindling importance, in some agencies at least’ (Commonwealth Ombudsman 
63 For example, in 2004 there were 275 complaints arising out of over 39,265 FOI requests.
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2006, p. 28). ‘Moreover, there are proportionally more “other-than-personal” FOI 
requests taking more than 60 days to process than is the case for personal FOI 
requests’ (Commonwealth Ombudsman 2006, p. 18).64 
The recent amendments to the FOI Act provide for complaints to be investigated 
by the new Information Commissioner, or the Ombudsman where that is 
considered appropriate (where the complaint is part of a wider grievance 
about the agency, for example). The commissioner has powers similar to the 
ombudsman to make inquiries, obtain information from any person or inspect 
relevant documents, including exempt documents (see ss.79–82 FOI Act as 
amended). There is no formal power to compel agencies to resolve the complaint, 
however the commissioner can require the agency to provide particulars of any 
action it will take in response to the investigation (s.89 FOI Act as amended) 
and can then report to the relevant minister’s and have the report tabled in 
Parliament. Like the Ombudsman, the Information Commissioner is only able 
to investigate complaints against agencies and not ministers (OAIC n.d.), [11.6]). 
Reviews
The recent reforms go beyond the many recommendations for the creation of 
an Information Commissioner by giving that office the function of reviewing 
FOI decisions along with the other functions envisaged by the various 
recommendations. Applicants unhappy with the response to their request for 
access to documents can seek review by the Information Commissioner. It is 
intended that this will provide ‘a simple, expedient and cost efficient system 
for external merits review’, based mainly on the submissions and papers 
provided by the parties, rather than through formal hearings (Explanatory 
Memorandum, Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Bill 2010, p. 32). 
The commissioner can affirm, vary or set aside the original decision relating to 
access and substitute a new decision (s.55K FOI Act). Applicants who disagree 
with the Information Commissioner’s decision can apply to the AAT for review 
(s.57A FOI Act). The commissioner can also refuse to review a matter and refer 
the review to the AAT where, for example, the commissioner has played a role in 
the dispute or it would more effectively resolve the dispute to do so (s.54W FOI 
Act). Importantly, in any review by the commissioner, the agency or Minister 
who made the initial decision relating to access to a document has to justify 
the position they took; there is no onus on the applicant to establish that the 
document should be released or the conditions of that release (s.55D FOI Act 
as amended). The commissioner is given various powers in relation to gaining 
access to documents and agencies have an obligation to assist the commissioner 
in carrying out the review (see generally Part VII FOI Act as amended). 
64 In 2003–04, the respective proportions were in the order of 17 per cent and 12 per cent respectively.
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There is no cost to the applicant for review by the commissioner,65 and the 
intended informality of proceedings may also help to keep costs low, but there 
will remain considerable time and resource costs involved. It is unclear whether 
interposing a hopefully more cost efficient review by the commissioner before 
an appeal to the AAT will reduce the total costs of reviews. The concerns of the 
ALRC and ARC about the conferral of a review function on the commissioner 
remain: potential confusion about sources of review; potential delays before 
a final decision can be obtained given right of the agency or minister to 
appeal to the AAT; and potential conflict between the objectives of facilitating 
reform within agencies and acting as arbiter of disputes between agencies and 
individuals disgruntled with agency decisions. The role of the commissioner 
in working with agencies in relation to record-keeping, developing processes 
and policies in relation to proactive release of documents, and dealing with 
complaints through a process of investigation and reconciliation all require a 
considerable degree of goodwill between agencies and the commission. It will be 
a difficult balance to maintain that goodwill, particularly given the resistance of 
some agencies and the considerable resource costs they may be faced with, while 
also sitting in judgement of the response of agencies to access requests.
As John McMillan, now the Information Commissioner, commented on the 
20-year anniversary of the enactment of the FOI Act, ‘[t]he cost to government 
of administering FOI requests poses an unresolvable dilemma’ (McMillan 2002, 
p. 23). Responding to access requests imposes administrative burdens that 
divert resources from other activities. ‘On the other hand, the success or failure 
of an FOI scheme can hinge on the issue of costs … A high-costs regime can be 
used by government to deter requests and to corrode the spirit of an FOI Act’ 
(McMillan 2002, p. 23). 
In the first annual report on the operation of the FOI Act, it was stated:
It is not intended that the costs incurred under the Act should be offset 
by any revenue generating mechanism to recover costs. The Act does 
not seek, by means of the scheme of charges for access, to recover the 
full costs of meeting [FOI] requests. Most significantly, the Act provides 
that charges cannot be made for time spent in examining a document 
with a view to deciding whether the document contains exempt matter 
(Attorney-General’s Department 1983, p. 143). 
This view reflected the concern of the Senate Standing Committee’s 1979 report 
that charges for decision-making time might be applied inconsistently or depend 
on the commitment to openness: ‘It hardly seems fair or just, in a Bill designed 
to confer rights of access, that an agency’s charges are inversely related to its 
commitment to the philosophy underlying the Bill’ (SSCLCA 1987, [11.22]). 
65 Appeals to the AAT will involve an application fee of $777 as at 1 March 2011.
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Within three years (see Freedom of Information Law Amendment Act 1986 (Cth)), 
however, there was an application fee of $30 and internal review charges, 
increases in the hourly charges for search and retrieval and, perhaps most 
significantly, a ‘decision-making fee’ of $20 per hour for time spent by public 
servants in deciding whether to release information (Ardagh 1987, p. 22). There 
were exemptions for persons seeking personal income maintenance information 
— for example, information about pensions, government allowances, etc. —
and the ability to waive most fees requiring the agency or Minister to take 
into account ‘whether the giving of access is in the general public interest or 
a substantial section of the public’.66 The introduction of these charges were 
widely criticised: they went against the stated intention of the government not to 
introduce such charges; they would be a deterrent against lodging applications, 
particularly by those seeking policy information in the broader public interest; 
and they encouraged inefficient document handling and decision-making 
processes under the act (see, for example, Ardagh 1987, p. 23). It has been 
observed that the 1986 charges marked a turning point in the operation of the 
FOI Act, encouraging usage of the act to be dominated by access to personal 
records (McMillan 2002, pp. 23–24). 
Even after the increase, the charges paid under the act were far exceeded by the 
estimated costs of complying with the FOI Act. For example, in 2009–10, $211.612 
was collected in fees for initial and internal review applications, amounting 
to 41 per cent of total FOI revenue. Agencies notified a total of $3,177,732 in 
charges to applications, but through the exercise of their discretion to reduce or 
waive fees collected only $305,178, or 10 per cent, of those charges. The total 
amount of fees and charges, however, only represented 1.9 per cent of the total 
costs reported in the annual report for the operation of the FOI Act (O’Connor, 
B., Minister for Privacy and Freedom of Information 2010). Over the 30 years of 
the FOI, reported fees and charges represent only 2.08 per cent of the estimated 
total costs of administering the FOI Act (OAIC 2012, p. 5). 
66 Section 30A FOI Act allowed the agency or Minister to remit the fee for any reason, including that payment 
of the fee would cause financial hardship or giving of access in the general public interest or in the interest of a 
substantial section of the public. This section was abolished in the recent amendments and replaced by s.29(5) which 
makes it clear that in deciding whether to reduce or not impose the charge the Minister must take into account the 
same two factors. The Information Commissioner is also now able to review decisions relating to reducing the charges 
imposed.
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Figure 1: Costs and charges in relation to FOI requests
Source: OAIC 2012, p. 20.67
The costs of administering the FOI Act are generally based on the percentages 
of staff time reportedly allocated to complying with the requirements under the 
Act. There is considerable variation in the costs per request between agencies68 
and, as Figure 1 suggests, an increase in the raw figures over time despite a 
general decrease in requests in recent years. The high number of requests 
for personal information received by some agencies, the resources otherwise 
available to some agencies, and the level of interest in particular developments 
in any year all play a role. As the 1987 Senate Committee report suggested: 
The introduction of the FOI Act formed part of a trend towards increasing 
openness in government. In turn, the Act has had an impact upon that 
trend. Some of the material released under the FOI Act would have 
been released even in the absence of the legislation. The Committee has 
no method of determining what proportion of FOI access requests are 
67 Note that there was a change ‘from using the average of the salary levels of the three agencies recording 
the highest total FOI costs in pre-2006–07 FOI annual reports to using Australian public service base salary 
median figures, and the inclusion of Senior Executive Service salary costs since 2006–07, means that tables, 
charts and appendices in FOI annual reports that contain pre-2006–07 salary cost components are not strictly 
comparable with their post-2005–06 equivalents’ (Annual Report p. 21).
68 For example, in 2009–10 there were 11 agencies with an average cost per request received greater than 
$10,000.
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for such material. But the proportion, at least in the area of applicants 
seeking access to personal or personnel files, would appear to be high 
(SSCLCA 1987, p. 15). 
The report points out that calculating total and average costs of compliance with 
the FOI Act depends on many agency-specific factors, including the approach 
taken to providing access outside of the FOI Act, allocation of resources to 
complying with the FOI Act rather than general document and information 
handling procedures, and approaches to initial and internal decision-making 
(SSCLCA 1987, p. 15). Some material released, such as the disclosure of internal 
manuals, may also have benefits to the agency beyond compliance with the FOI 
Act. The committee noted, however, that the costs of the FOI Act extended 
beyond that reported by agencies, to include costs to information providers, 
costs of the tribunal and court systems to resolve FOI disputes, opportunity costs 
of the resources allocated to FOI matters, and possible costs of ‘threatened or 
actual reduction in information flow to [the Commonwealth]’ due to the possible 
disincentives created through the FOI Act (SSCLCA 1987, p. 28). Though the 
published information about costs must be ‘treated with some caution’, the 
committee was prepared to assume that the omissions and deficiencies could 
‘cancel each other out’ (SSCLCA 1987, p. 33). 
Against those costs the committee attempted to compare the (admittedly 
unquantifiable) benefits of the legislation. They described how some agencies 
had reported greater awareness of the need for objectivity in dealing with the 
public, improved quality of decision-making, improved communications with 
and understanding of clients, improved efficiency of records management 
and greater public awareness of the role of the agency (SSCLCA 1987, p. 19). 
Disclosure under the FOI Act could lead to changing what would otherwise 
have been a ‘poor decision’, benefits to news reporting, assistance in claiming 
personal, business or professional benefits provided by the government, and 
increased certainty over how access was provided all potentially involved 
considerable benefits to the recipients of the information and the public at 
large. The committee concluded that the benefits of FOI were considerable, 
but that attention had to continue to be paid to the costs of the operation and 
administration of the FOI Act (SSCLCA 1987, p. 33). 
The 2010 amendments to the FOI Act altered the fee structure again. All 
application fees, including fees for internal review, have been abolished. There 
are no costs to access your personal information. In line with a greater emphasis 
on reducing delays in the processing of requests, all charges will be waived if a 
statutory timeframe is not met (Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 
2010 (Cth)). The introduction of the IPS and disclosure logs are also intended 
to reduce the number and nature of individual requests (OAIC n.d., [13.65] 
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and [14.4]). Finally, the role of the Information Commissioner in developing 
government information policy, including the role of government information as 
a national resource, will include information handling and processing reforms.
The fee structure was subject to review a little over a year after its amendment, 
with the OAIC recommending significant changes to the charges framework 
(OAIC 2012). The review is based on the role of government in meeting a 
substantial part of the costs of what it terms a democratic right, but seeks to use 
charges as an incentive to moderate unmanageable requests and simplify access 
processes even further. The review makes 10 recommendations, including 
various ways to simplify the types and calculation of charges and circumstances 
for waiver of charges, but there are perhaps two main aspects to the suggested 
changes.
The first suggested change comes from recognition that there are many, largely 
informal, ways in which information is provided on request. Agencies would 
be encouraged to more clearly identify these administrative access schemes on 
the agency’s website where information that is open to release under the FOI 
Act could be obtained largely free of charge. Anyone not satisfied with the 
response to a request under the administrative access scheme could then make 
a formal request under the FOI Act. Bypassing the administrative access scheme 
by making a request under the FOI Act for information that could have been 
obtained under the access scheme will lead to an application fee being imposed 
(OAIC 2012, pp. 59–60). 
The second suggested change stems from a concern that some agencies face 
a substantial administrative burden in handling large and complex requests, 
particularly where access under the FOI Act is being used as a substitute for 
other forms of access (such as the discovery process in litigation, see OAIC 2012, 
pp. 69–70). Under the FOI Act, agencies can refuse a request if satisfied that it 
would ‘substantially and unreasonably divert the resources of the agency from 
its other operations’ (ss.24 and 24AA FOI Act).69 Before refusing the request, 
the agency has to consult with the applicant about possibly revising the request 
(s.24B FOI Act). It has been emphasised that this discretion to refuse access 
on the basis of resource costs can only be used in strict circumstances, and 
not merely because of the costs of inefficient record-keeping or the number of 
documents potentially in issue (OAIC n.d., ‘FOI Guidelines’, [3.47]). However, 
agencies have regarded the discretion as imprecise or indeterminate and have 
preferred to rely on the setting of high fees to encourage further discussion 
about the scope of requests (OAIC 2012, p. 69). The review therefore suggests 
69 Note that agencies can treat multiple requests for the same documents or relating to the same subject 
matter as a single request (s.24(2) FOI Act).
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that greater certainty be introduced through the imposition of a cap of 40 hours 
on the processing time for a request before it can be refused (OAIC 2012, pp. 
68–70). 
Conclusions
As John McMillan has suggested, ‘the fee scale alone will not hold the balance 
between the democratic potential of FOI and the cost to government’ (McMillan 
2002, p. 24): much depends on the attitude of the agency to the request. Any 
objective to promote disclosure of information at the lowest reasonable cost
can only be realised fully if in the administration of the Act there is a 
recognition (and quantification, roughly speaking) of all the intangibles 
that bear upon the true ‘cost’ of an FOI request: the democratic principles 
that underpin the FOI Act, the public interest purpose (if any) to which 
the requested information may be put, the reasonableness (or otherwise) 
of the agency and an applicant consulting about or shaping the request, 
and whether the resource burden of a particular request is attributable 
more to the unsatisfactory nature of file management or FOI processing 
in an agency than to the nature of the request (McMillan 2002, p. 25). 
The recent amendments reflect this concern with information management. The 
expanded role of proactive disclosure under the IPS, and assisting access through 
disclosure logs both are instances of the increased emphasis on information 
management. As the amended objects clause now states, information held by 
the government is to be managed for public purposes, and is a national resource 
(s.3(3) FOI Act). The emphasis on ready release of information is further 
emphasised in the review of FOI charges suggestions to further encourage 
informal access regimes and place caps on processing time.
In many ways this emphasis on information management may facilitate the 
change of culture that is seen as essential to fulfilling the objectives of the FOI 
Act. Reducing the costs associated with fulfilling FOI requests while enhancing 
the means by which an agency can communicate with the public provides 
an added incentive to facilitate access generally. However, the emphasis on 
information management may serve to only highlight the distinctive treatment 
of personal or non-sensitive requests and those that have the potential to be 
embarrassing to the government.
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Conclusion: The impact of FOI?
In May 1980, federal Cabinet met to decide on the government’s response to the 
Senate Standing Committee’s report on the Freedom of Information Bill. It was 
a meeting which would shape FOI laws in Australia for the next three decades. 
Before Cabinet was a submission reporting on the views of the most influential 
government departments. They all opposed extending disclosure beyond the 
limited amount already provided for by the FOI Bill 1978.70 
The Finance Department, led by Ian Castles, was concerned about the significant 
cost implications of the Bill, and was opposed ‘as a matter of principle, to the 
proposal to appoint a “Referee”’ (the AAT). Treasury, through its Secretary 
John Stone, warned that ‘Ministers should be left in no doubt whatsoever as 
to the cost and resource implications’. With Finance, they suggested that ‘the 
final decision on whether to release confidential commercial information should 
rest with the suppliers’, who would ‘be the best judge of whether its release 
would be harmful to [their] own commercial interests’. For the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Bill as it stood already represented ‘a 
major innovation, with significant though unquantifiable costs and major 
administrative difficulties’. Appointing an external referee to review claims 
to exemption would ‘add an unnecessary new layer of review to the existing 
mechanisms’ and any appeal should rest with the Minister. The chairman of 
the Public Service Board commented that ‘Ministers might find this a suitable 
occasion to review the whole subject’.
They were right, and wrong, about the implications of the FOI Act. Costs and 
resource implications would indeed continue to influence the operation of the 
FOI Act. Commercial concerns under the act would continue and incorporate 
those of the private individual. However their concern that an external referee 
would threaten the role of government departments in our system of ministerial 
responsibility is less apparent. As the 1987 Senate Standing Committee report 
would suggest, any concern about loss of candour or the quality of advice had 
diminished with the realisation that, ‘as a result of the way courts and the 
tribunal have interpreted the FOI Act, public servants have become increasingly 
confident that the Act provides sufficient protection’ (SSCLCA 1987, [2.71]). 
The FOI Act has generally been credited with significantly enhancing the 
openness and transparency of government.
70 See Cabinet Submission No. 3938: Freedom of Information Bill 1978 — report of Senate Standing 
Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs — Related to Decision No. 11134, 11653, 12437, 11185(Ad 
Hoc), 11610(Ad Hoc), 11623, 11632(Ad Hoc) part of series A12909, 1980, pp. 77–80. Available at http://
recordsearch.naa.gov.au/scripts/Imagine.asp?B=30484359.
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There can be no doubt that Australian government today is considerably 
more open than it was when FOI laws were first considered during the 
later part of the 1970s. Freedom of information has both been part of, 
and underpinned, broader changes. These have included changes in 
doctrines of public law that have brought it more into line with the 
traditional openness of courts, changes in the framework and practices 
of government, and more complex philosophies of government. The 
fact that freedom of information makes disclosure possible and that 
disclosure may be politically embarrassing means that governments now 
need to think more carefully about the consequences of their actions. At 
the same time, it has increased community awareness about government 
actions and made the community more demanding of explanations about 
situations touching on probity and propriety in government (Paterson 
2005). 
The ALRC and ARC ‘Open Government Report’ states that the enactment of the 
FOI Act in 1982 brought about a ‘fundamental change in the law in Australia 
relating to access to government-held information and challenged the boundaries 
of government secrecy’ (ALRC, ARC 1995, p. 11). The FOI Act
has had a marked impact on the way agencies make decision and the way 
they record information. Along with other elements of the administrative 
law package, the FOI Act has focused decision-makers’ minds on the 
need to base information on relevant factors and to record the decision 
making process. The knowledge that decisions and processes are open 
to scrutiny, including under the FOI Act, imposes a constant discipline 
on the public sector (ALRC, ARC 1995, pp. 15–16). 
But the report then suggests that the ‘assessment is not entirely positive … 
There is a perception … that the Act is not achieving its objectives’ (ALRC, ARC 
1995, pp. 15–16). Subsequent reviews have confirmed the impression that the 
FOI may work well in facilitating access to personal information, but not so well 
in providing access to policy-related information (Commonwealth Ombudsman 
2006, p. 1). 
The Commonwealth government is clearly much more open than at the time 
FOI legislation was being considered. The role of the FOI Act, however, remains 
difficult to isolate. The trend towards openness was already evident as the FOI 
Act was being introduced — indeed it was an important part of the acceptance 
of the obligations the FOI Act imposed. Courts had already cast doubt on 
any presumption of the government-determined need for secrecy, and other 
administrative law amendments, both in legislation and by the courts, soon had 
a profound influence on decisions affecting individual interests. Recognition of 
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the constitutional protection of representative government followed, although 
it never reached the point of securing any right to government disclosure in the 
absence of statutory provision.
However, the application and interpretation of the FOI Act arguably did not 
follow that judicial trend. Emphasis on the need for balance reflected in the 
structure and drafting of the FOI Act conferred extensive discretion on agencies 
and ministers to withhold information from disclosure. Concerns over the impact 
of disclosure on the internal deliberations of government extended exceptions 
and justified certificates preventing disclosure. The uncertain and intangible 
public interest in disclosure was subjected to the concerns of those charged 
with administering the Act.
Government has continued to evolve. Emphasis on the commercial concerns both 
of and in relationship with government was reflected in the FOI Act’s protection 
of those interests. The inherent tension between privacy interests and open 
disclosure was increasingly tightened one way through the introduction of 
legislative protection and a statutory agency devoted to monitoring, enforcement 
and encouragement of privacy interests.
An officer to champion greater openness in government has come only with 
the most recent reforms to the FOI Act. Up until now, access to government 
information has largely come at the initiative of the individual, primarily 
through seeking information personal to them or the organisations they 
represent. Proactive disclosure has been limited along with systematic attempts 
to improve the document and information handling of government. Delays in 
responding to requests and providing information, attitudes to the application 
of exemptions, and the imposition of, albeit largely potential, charges and fees 
have all contributed to discourage the pursuit of information in the public 
interest. It remains to be seen whether the current emphasis on proactive 
disclosure and efficient access will bring with it a heightened willingness to 
disclose sensitive or embarrassing material.
The theme common to much of the discussion in this chapter has been the effect 
of the FOI Act on the relationship between government, the public service, and 
the public. The impact of government disclosure laws depend on the political 
and constitutional climate in which they operate. At the Commonwealth 
level, concerns over the impact of FOI legislation on our system of responsible 
government have continued to be raised by those subjected to FOI obligations. 
Subjecting agencies to individual scrutiny distinguishes their role in policy 
development and implementation, multiplying avenues and opportunities for 
allocating responsibility. Perhaps, in the process, this increased separation 
between agencies and their ministers serves to reduce the influence of those 
agencies and the public service in general, affecting their role in the policy-
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making process and the effectiveness in turn of the FOI Act in holding that 
process to account. The potential operation of the FOI Act has therefore been 
resisted as agencies side with ministers in the competition with the public over 
access to the inner workings of government. Information, instead of being a 
resource available to all in an effort to generate and improve policy, remains used 
as currency to gain or maintain political favour.
The recent amendments to the FOI Act in many ways reflect recommendations 
made before the FOI Act was first enacted. They reflect the view that greater 
disclosure of government information has the potential to enhance the 
discussion among all participants in the policy-making process, which in turn 
places responsibility on all of those participants to make use of that information 
appropriately. It remains to be seen whether the amendments go far enough for 
the FOI Act to realise this potential.
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5. Through a Glass Darkly: The 




The budgeting of public resources is supposedly one of the most crucial tools 
in public governance. Budgets and the associated allocation and management 
of financial resources are a fundamental source of power to governments — 
and money invariably lies at the heart of almost all public policy decisions and 
activities, as Peter Walsh (1995) once argued. It provides governments with 
their wherewithal, their real authority and the ability to achieve their aims. 
Ostensibly, budgets allow governments to plan and fund their priorities, to 
resource existing commitments, to reduce allocations to less preferred activities, 
or change the tax-benefit trade-off between citizens and government (Wildavsky 
and Caiden 2004). This is the theory, but practice is very different and much 
more complicated.
Budgets are multiple things to multiple constituencies; they serve many 
purposes and functions across government and between government and the 
community. Their functions include economic management and macroeconomic 
policy, sustaining public finances, fiscal policy, revenue functions, investment 
intentions, expenses, allocative functions, technical efficiency, performance 
evaluation and accountability review (see Wanna et al. 2003, pp. xxix–xxx). 
These functions are not necessarily complementary, consistent or cumulative. 
Hence, unlike private choice, public budgeting is a complex, repetitive set of 
collective choices about resources and provisions various governments consider 
society needs (some of which relate to given ‘mandates’ but other choices no one 
can remember making), and then accounting for these choices and decisions. 
Budgets have long been a traditional ritual of modern government. They are 
a major undertaking of government, performed annually. They are political 
exercises as much as administrative exercises. Our governments invest a great 
deal of time, resources and political capital in putting the annual budget together 
and selling it. They take great pride in their successful delivery and reception 
in Parliament, and with the media, interest groups and wider community. They 
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are frustrated and perplexed when budgets flop or receive a less than rapturous 
ovation from stakeholders and critics. Budgets are also a routine confidence issue 
and governments can themselves fall if their budgets are rejected or deferred.
But, for the purposes of this chapter, it should be recognised that budgets 
are also hard to put together and there may be little scope for flexibility in 
the overall budget. They are massive in scope; there are many competing 
demands; there are many stakeholders and recipients involved; they often defy 
orderliness or tidiness; they defy planning logics and mathematical rationalities. 
They are notoriously difficult to compile and keep together. There are masses 
of information to be assembled, weighed, evaluated and used as foundations 
for other calculations and projections. They are constantly buffeted by events, 
changing perceptions and shifting interpretations. They simultaneously look 
backwards and forwards — governing from behind to meet the challenges of 
the future.
Budgets and budget formation are also highly secretive and undertaken away 
from the glare of publicity (see Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; Wanna et al. 2003, 
p. xxxiii). They involve back room processes and decisions, internal rules and 
conventions, ways of doing things that are not disclosed. Rules are changed 
periodically often to disadvantage certain claimant groups or agencies. Ministers 
may ‘see’ only a thin veneer of the budget — generally those elements that concern 
them or for which they have personally lobbied. We, the public, generally see 
but the tip of the iceberg and have to guess what goes on under the surface. 
Furthermore, budgets are supposedly an accountability device, transparent and 
open to scrutiny and requiring legislative authorisation (as a form of control on 
executive government). Yet, budgets are presented in ways that differ markedly 
from the ways they were put together. It is as if we have two separate processes 
or logics of action that hardly interrelate with each other. As will be argued, 
despite claims of greater openness, this lack of clarity and transparency remains 
a major problem. The political executive likes to keep the legislature guessing, 
at arm’s length and one or two steps behind the action. There are problems with 
the alignment of data and activities, figures and results; it is hard to identify or 
distinguish ‘old money’ from ‘new money’, offsets from new programs, and how 
changed preferences for reporting activities vary from previous years. 
Once budgets are consolidated and formally presented they are judged by 
the community, the media, money markets, commentators, lobbyists, and the 
government’s political opponents. There is a tendency here to see success in the 
form of projected surpluses — the notion that government can pay for itself rather 
than that government is using its funds wisely. So surpluses (especially year-on-
year), as Australian treasurers are fond of saying, indicate we are managing well 
and practicing sound financial management. Like George Orwell’s farm animals, 
governments seem to bleat ‘one surplus good, two surpluses better’. 
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But are we managing well? Does the existence of a surplus necessarily mean that 
we are following best practice budgetary and financial management? The Howard 
government’s finance minister, Senator Nick Minchin, in his opening address to 
the senior budget officials (OECD) meeting in Sydney June 2006 (Minchin 2006), 
implied that this was the only measure for judging budgetary performance — 
as he unfavourably compared state budget deficits with federal surpluses. This 
may not be the most appropriate indicator of success (nor a fair comparison). 
Moreover, the budgetary system under the Howard government did not really 
experience adverse economic circumstances and so was not tested. After 1997, 
the Howard government enjoyed high economic growth and a mining boom; 
it did not face significant fiscal pressures and presided over massive year after 
year spending increases only surpassed by even more massive revenue receipts 
(see Wanna et al. 2000, p. 258–269; Laurie and McDonald 2008). Arguably, the 
reluctance to seriously reform the tax side of the budget equation means that 
taxation revenues give the appearance of good budgetary practice, without it 
necessarily being so.
In this chapter, I explore briefly the imperatives for budgetary reform and 
comment on where they came from. I then trace and explain the particular 
trajectory followed in Australia and note the vicissitudes of budget reform over 
time. I do not attempt a comprehensive detailed overview of budget reform, as I 
have undertaken that in other publications (Wanna et al. 2000; O’Faircheallaigh 
et al. 1999; and Wanna et al. 2003, and later in Wanna et al. 2010). Rather, I 
will pick out some of the key successes that have improved our management 
of public finance, after which I indicate a few weaknesses and deficiencies in 
our current system — highlighting the problems associated with the present 
outcomes framework. I explore some dead ends and dry gullies we once went up 
before deserting them. Then I raise some problems with our present practices of 
budgetary reporting and accountability. Finally, I offer a series of propositions 
from my research to perhaps challenge preconceptions about the overall nature 
of budgetary reform.
Background: Traditional budgets and the 
imperatives for budgetary reform
Conventional wisdom, and much of the relevant academic literature over the 
twentieth century asserted that traditional budgets and internal budgetary 
processes were conservative, incremental and risk-averse (Wildavsky 1964). 
They locked in governments and gave them limited scope for reallocation. They 
were often beyond political control or influence and, over the post-war era, 
expenditures grew less according to political preferences than to internal logics 
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of growth and augmentation. International comparative analyses of expenditure 
increases over this period highlight the consistency of growth patterns within 
distinct national clusters (Scandinavian, Anglo-American and Continental 
European: see Castles 1999). Ministers often played a relatively insignificant role 
in the process except for the presentational functions and events (for example, 
introducing the budget to the legislature, or selling it afterwards). Many cabinets 
were not involved in setting aggregate budgetary frameworks or informed about 
decisions in detail. Because most of the new policy decisions and commitments 
feeding into a collective budget were made on the basis of comparing the relative 
merits of rival bids, budgetary processes had to find ways to reduce or mitigate 
political conflict through the proliferation of rules, disciplines and timelines (see 
Wildavsky 1964). Budgeting became acknowledged as an annual repetitive cycle 
where adjustments were made at the margin.
So, as a means of rationing claims from ‘spender’ departments, budgeting 
was undertaken largely in secret using bilateral negotiations or side deals. 
A semblance of control over the process — often interpreted as exercising 
power over the public purse — gave budget guardians such as treasuries or 
finance departments the illusion of power. They performed the role of devil’s 
advocates, but were often outplayed or outmanoeuvred by spending agencies 
who regularly overspent their allocations. The command-post mentality of 
central budget agencies fitted only with a budgetary system based on input 
allocations within a punitive administrative culture, which was increasingly 
seen as dysfunctional to modern governance (Schick 2001; Wanna et al. 2003). 
Moreover, the role performed by central guardians was reactive rather than 
strategic, and generally prevented or restrained governments from doing the 
things their component parts had proposed.
Such input-driven systems remained largely unchallenged until the economic 
and fiscal crises of the 1970s and 1980s, when governments presided over large 
and repeated deficits, and debt levels rose because of structural budgetary 
imbalances. Compounding resource problems saw governments gradually take 
a closer interest in both their fiscal policy settings and internal budgetary 
processes (Keating 1990; Keating and Holmes 1990; Keating and Dixon 1989). 
New governments proposed various half-baked or speculative suggestions for 
budgetary reform, often not worked out in detail (see ALP 1983; Australian 
Government 1984), or issued persuasive arguments on the need for substantial 
reform (for example, New Zealand Treasury 1984). If politicians were to be 
held accountable for the consequences of poor budgeting outcomes, then they 
and their senior advisers felt they ought to exert greater influence over crucial 
aspects of government budgeting, including aggregate-setting and discretion 
over the allocation of the ‘base’ and new money/new policy proposals. 
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Governments began a process of containing expenditure growth, targeting 
spending, using co-payment and user-charging devices to ration and direct 
resource public provision. The early methods were fairly crude, blunt and 
limited in their effectiveness. The Fraser governments (1975–83) attempted 
budget control through arbitrary top-down ceiling controls, clawbacks and 
across-the-board cuts. The subsequent Hawke (1983–91) and Keating (1991–
96) governments forced managers to manage within prescribed resource 
limits set over the medium term, thereby bringing aggregate budgets under 
control (see Wanna et al. 2000). By the mid-to-late-1980s governments had 
made the difficult transition from consecutive high deficits in final budget 
outcomes to annual surpluses often exceeding budgetary forecasts. Budgets 
and financial management in the modern expansive state had been brought 
under administrative control possibly for the first time since the parsimonious 
nineteenth-century era of small government liberalism.
This is probably the most significant single achievement of modern budgetary 
reform and the associated adoption of sophisticated information technology 
systems. Governments, if they so desired, now had the capabilities to be able to 
bring their budgets under control and into balance. But as the years 1990–92 
showed, and then again in the global financial crisis after 2008, public budgets 
were not recession proof; a point that is still evident in many OECD nations such 
as the US, the UK, Ireland and most of southern Europe.
There were many budgetary and financial management adaptations that were 
regarded as successful and which have proved useful in improving resource 
utilisation. We should acknowledge these and give credit — as I will later turn 
to highlight some deficiencies in the present systems. Successful innovations 
have included:
• A consolidated budgetary process allowing the comparative merits of 
budgetary proposals to be judged and argued out with a consolidated 
reporting of budget measures;
• A strong Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) of Cabinet with senior 
guardian ministers able to impose discipline over the budget process;
• The ‘medium-term economic framework’ (MTEF) that sits on the formally 
documented ‘fiscal strategy statement’;
• One-line operating budgets providing greater flexibility with departmental 
expenditures and expenses;
• Full cost budgeting on an independent accrual accounting basis, providing 
systematic recognition for assets and liabilities as well as revenue and 
expenses;
• A tighter focus on core public sector activities (moving out of Government 
Business Enterprises, and other entities) through privatisation of functions 
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not fitting the current role of government and restructured corporate 
governance arrangements to improve accountability for the remaining 
government functions; 
• Greater attention to a results-based orientation in public finance in the 
formulation process, in-year operations and with budget reporting;
• Offsets and matching saving requirements from bidding departments 
have provided, on occasion, a test of priority and seriousness of budget 
submissions; 
• Asset recognition, asset management and property leasing across government.
Australia and New Zealand were soon regarded as leaders in the field. Many 
of the budgetary and IT reforms practiced here were taken up internationally 
as other countries adopted improved practices in their own jurisdictions. 
Considerable policy transfer occurred especially across the OECD (see Wanna et 
al. 2010); some simply through information exchange about local innovations; 
some through the direct importation, copying and adaptation of innovations 
developed elsewhere; some through the dissemination of endorsed practices 
(best practice principles) by the OECD and IMF (for example, OECD 2001; and 
by the Senior Budgetary Officials meetings, OECD 2004; IMF 1999); and some 
through the bullying of donor financial institutions anxious to proliferate their 
notions of good governance structures to local polities before releasing funds. 
In addition, legions of consultants, former budgetary officials and occasional 
academics cruised the world proselytising the merits of various reform initiatives 
(usually ones with which they had been personally associated, but thereafter 
presented as frozen snapshots in time rather than intermediate stages in a longer 
evolution of change). 
The transfer of budgetary rules and procedures has included legislative 
instruments (for example, the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 of New Zealand 
was later replicated in Australia in the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998, and 
adapted almost simultaneously by various state governments too: see Wanna 
2006). It has included the uptake of substantive innovations (for example, one-
line budgets, MTEF, centrally imposed aggregate spending limits, Cabinet 
budget review committees, and the consolidated running costs arrangements, 
many of which were exported from Australia and New Zealand to countries 
such as the Netherlands, Canada, Denmark and Ireland, as well as many smaller 
Asian and Pacific nations). In addition, improved accounting techniques have 
received international acceptance (such as internationally recognised standards, 
accrual budgeting systems). Not all countries achieved similar rates of progress. 
There was much cultural and institutional adaptation, and there still remains 
much diversity in country-specific arrangements. However, a significant group 
of OECD nations now operate much more sophisticated budgetary systems with 
far greater control over the total budget.
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Explaining Australia’s ad hoc trajectory of 
budgetary reform
Australia’s trajectory or path dependency in budget reform was far from linear 
and planned. It was not programmatic or designed according to an overall 
template or blueprint. There was no rational design, no calculated schedule 
or intended agenda of reform. Nevertheless, governments and their central 
budget agencies have generally insisted budget reform was rational, planned, 
linear, always anticipated, and a process of progressive consolidation — when 
often it was nothing of the sort. The Department of Finance was once renowned 
for saying there were never ‘problems’ overseeing the budget process, just 
‘challenges’.
The process of reform was piecemeal and staccato, where the consequences 
or change are often unintended and unforeseen. As such, various reforming 
governments from Fraser to Hawke and Keating to Howard embarked upon a 
meandering journey of budget reform. The journey was associated with changing 
circumstances and technical possibilities as well as by changing considerations 
— getting control of expenditures, consolidating operating budgets, identifying 
programs and sponsoring program management, separating ‘program’ costs 
from running costs, using various costing methodologies, and the use of market 
delivery mechanisms.
The process was ad hoc, but not totally random. Instead, some broad principles 
and directions can be traced that shaped the government’s thinking. These broad 
principles followed rather than led the unfolding path of experimentation. 
Over time, governments endorsed the principles of devolution and devolved 
responsibilities, of a results-based focus in spending allocations. There were 
disputes and disagreements along the way between advocates of rival directions 
— especially between ‘central controllers’ and ‘devolved managers’. In the 
process many players and agencies suffered identity crises — what were they 
doing, why, how, what value did they add to the process (this included agencies 
such as the Treasury, Finance, the Auditor-General, and even Parliament). As 
victors and survivors get to write history, the eventual winners were able to 
rationalise the sustainable components of the process much later (see Management 
Advisory Board 1997; Department of Finance and Administration 1998). They 
then insisted that the successful reforms had been intended from the outset, that 
they knew they would work, were augmented and extended when successful, and 
then documented and if necessary legitimised through changed legislation or 
budget rules. Myth was built on myth, and was disseminated internationally 
through the OECD and senior budget officials meetings (see Chan et al. 2002).
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Elsewhere I have clustered the surviving reforms under six headings to indicate 
the different trajectories and objectives of many of the reform experiments 
(O’Faircheallaigh et al. 1999). These headings are:
• Political and ministerial reforms — for example, ERC, approving fiscal targets, 
political discipline, spending rounds consolidated to specific windows;
• Budgetary and technical reforms — for example, consolidation of running 
costs, one-line budgets, outcome budgeting, various incentive arrangements 
with agencies;
• Managerial and systems reforms —  for example, program management, 
business plans, management information systems;
• Program evaluation reforms —  for example, evaluation processes, 
compulsory evaluations, performance audits, benchmarking, triple bottom 
line reporting; 
• Market-based and contract management — for example, competitive 
tendering, outsourcing; and 
• Accounting and reporting reforms — for example, accrual budgeting, 
improved integrated reporting, financials and non-financials.
In the struggle for the hearts and minds of the reform movement, the so-called 
‘managerialists’ won the day (those seeking not to reduce the state but to make 
it perform better and deliver more efficient and effective services). So, Australia 
took on a pragmatic, managerialist-inspired approach to budgetary reform, 
accompanying an expansionist Commonwealth government with galloping 
expenditures and expanding policy horizons (Laurie and McDonald 2008). The 
new legions of public managers became the specific focus and essence of the 
changes. Australia’s budget reform trajectory consciously and unconsciously 
privileged the managers. Managerial incentives became central to the character 
of reform and its momentum. It also became highly path-dependent. In many 
ways Australia’s ad hoc trajectory was a ‘provider-led’ reform strategy — 
driven by champions in central agencies (with a few supporters out in line 
agencies) who argued the case that program managers should be given more 
operational discretion. Put differently, the program managers captured the 
reform process, implying that the ‘providers’ rather than the ‘principals’ ran the 
show — distinctly unlike the New Zealand trajectory. Australia is an example of 
bureaucratic capture of budget reform.
The path of reform was clearly not neo-liberal in character (and it is a misdiagnosis 
to see it in such terms as some have) but dedicatedly managerialist — oriented 
around ‘doing more’, ‘making managers manage’, improving ‘value for money’ 
(Keating 1989). It gave executives resource latitude within a managerialist-
driven system. The presumption was that the spenders and program managers 
would manage their budgets better and more conservatively if allowed to do so 
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— and using the potentialities of devolved financial management most program 
managers were able to come in under budget so that agencies were able to carry 
forward funds year after year. Under new public management and then accrual 
budgeting in an ‘outcomes framework’, spenders needed to exercise their own 
guardian roles and ‘behave’ within the negotiated resource limits (see Kelly and 
Wanna 2001). While constraints were important, managers were given flexibility 
to manage within program structures, and told to identify outputs and results.
By omission or contrast, Australia’s reform path gave less emphasis to other 
factors such as accountability, performance, ‘policy integrity’ or policy 
effectiveness. We can contrast the Australian trajectory with those found in 
other nations that have undertaken budgetary reform. Canada placed more 
focus on policy integrity, policy priorities and policy rationing. New Zealand 
centred its approach on ministers purchasing outputs from managers. The UK 
placed emphasis on systematic administrative reviews of spending and later 
on combined outputs (joined up initiatives). The Netherlands emphasised the 
central withdrawal from social services and the devolution of service delivery 
to regional and municipal governments.
In Australia, management instruments and budgetary instruments were blended 
and overlaid upon each other. Resource allocation shifted from a historical 
fascination with ‘front-end’ analysis (preoccupied solely with input data and 
detailed spending amounts on itemised units), to an MTEF oriented towards 
results (outcomes and/or outputs) with considerable devolution of resource 
usage to operational management, and eventually the full costs of services 
acknowledged in budget allocations (a performance and activity focus).
Importantly, Australia’s promotion of budgetary reform was often the initial 
catalyst and main driver of wider public sector reform and improvements in 
public management. Indeed, some would argue that budgetary reform has 
significantly biased the nature of new public management especially in the 
Anglo-American nations, giving a strong resource-orientation to the reforms 
(Wanna et al. 2000, Chapter 12; Halligan 2004). Thus, management reforms, 
business plans, citizens charters, outsourcing, the streamlining of industrial 
relations, and human resource management reforms were often premised or 
built on the foundations of budgetary reform. Some would further argue that 
budgetary orientations and practices drove policy choices especially in the 
1980s and mid-1990s — when portfolios and agencies were allowed to reallocate 
internally and clawbacks such as the efficiency dividend encouraged agencies to 
invent new policy bids to replenish their operating budgets.
To some extent Australia’s managerialist trajectory hit a brick wall when a 
budgetary ‘outcomes/outputs framework’ was superimposed over the system. 
This was introduced in 1999–2000 as a blanket-like framework that supposed it 
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could be applied equally to all parts of the public sector. Initially, the outcomes 
framework was welcomed and received a positive reception (by Cabinet, 
many individual agencies, by parliamentary committees and the Auditor-
General). There was much hype about the integrated and interlocking nature 
of the ‘backward mapping’ decision process — going from desired outcomes to 
deliverable outputs to budget allocations — or at least in theory (see Chan et al. 
2002). But many of these promises led to disappointment (see Tanner 2006 for 
the ALP’s ‘Operation Sunlight’ proposals).
Problems with the outcomes framework and 
budget processes
To date, it is clear there are a number of fundamental problems that have arisen 
with our reforms. 
First, the reforms have been aimed at better internal resource utilisation by 
operational managers rather than at strategic allocations or allocative efficiency 
at the whole of government level. We can ask a series of questions here: to 
what extent does the budget process allow governments to undertake strategic 
thinking and implement chosen strategies, especially the possibilities for 
strategic decision-making/action by governments over policy issues of concern 
to them? Are budget processes aligned with the government’s strategic directions 
and leadership style?
There is an empirical question as to how far strategic considerations can be 
addressed through the budget process, and this varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. Across the OECD (especially in the parliamentary democracies) 
we can detect various ways in which political actors (ministers and especially 
prime ministers) have sought to enhance their involvement in budget decision-
making, usually to increase their influence beyond merely ratifying decisions 
taken elsewhere. Cabinets and senior financial ministers are more involved 
in determining the initial framing decisions concerning budget aggregates 
and underlying assumptions (for example, the prudential budgeting used by 
Canada, Sweden’s expenditure envelopes, or Australia’s medium-term strategy 
with budget aggregates and forward estimates). Some nations have enhanced 
the power of ministers to determine new policy initiatives on specific spending 
cabinet committees (for example, Canada’s twin cabinet policy committees for 
economics and social policy). Governments have also driven major cutting 
exercises or deep review into base spending areas or targeted areas for cutbacks 
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(Australia in the mid-1980s, then in 1996–97 and then after the election of the 
Rudd government in 2007–08; Canada in 1995–96 with the ‘program review’ 
exercise).1
Although results-related in format, the Australian ‘outcomes framework’ has 
significant problems that have hardly been addressed since its introduction in 
1999. The main exception was the opposition Labor Party’s ‘Operation Sunlight’ 
document (Tanner 2006), which provided a critical review. But most of its 
recommendations were not implemented. Cynics would argue that allocation 
to ‘outcomes’ is a disguise and that in reality it is a glorified framework for 
base budgeting at the agency level. Budgetary systems that protect the base 
budget of agencies (‘base-plus’ budgeting) are relatively impervious to major 
changes in strategic direction from the centre. Moreover, the emphasis on 
outcomes has arguably distracted attention away from analysing the ongoing 
activities of government. It may be possible for some decentralised strategic 
realignment to be exercised within agencies or departments providing they have 
the discretion, scope and capacity to move resources without unduly restrictive 
rules operating from the centre or having to curtail/downsize essential services. 
Without large surpluses, base budgeting (including standing appropriations 
and non-discretionary spending) is likely to account for up to 95 per cent of 
available resources in the budget round, especially if jurisdictions have large 
intergovernmental responsibilities and recurrent spending commitments (for 
example, sub-national jurisdictions).
Related to the budgetary process, and feeding in at critical moments, is the 
increasing use of politically articulated ‘top-down’ strategic priorities, which are 
essentially forms of policy rationing. In Australia, a small group of very senior 
ministers participate in an annual two-day retreat (the ‘senior ministers’ review’) 
in late November to determine key government priorities (usually three to four 
key priorities) for the upcoming budgetary formulation round (commencing 
December to March). The Prime Minister then writes out to all Cabinet and other 
ministers informing them of the priorities to be used in framing the forthcoming 
budget. Other policy issues not on the senior ministers’ list have less chance of 
winning ERC approval in the process. 
Prime ministers have further enhanced their discretion over the budget process 
by imposing greater personal determination over spending initiatives (which 
can be used either for strategic or expedient purposes). Prime ministerial 
preferences, formulated perhaps with input from advisers in their private office 
or department, can predetermine agendas or set key priorities without input 
from Cabinet colleagues, or be decisive in determining final spending items (and 
1 See Appendix 1 at the end of this chapter discussing what a more strategic budget process would look like 
and what kind of decisions it might contain.
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the timing of them). The Commonwealth’s $10 billion Murray-Darling Basin 
water initiative, announced in January 2007, was a case in point (see the critique 
by the then Treasury Secretary, Ken Henry 2007). The personal preferences of 
Prime Minister John Howard were increasingly imposed throughout his long 
tenure prior to and through the senior ministers’ review. This process is backed 
by charter letters and annual performance letters from the Prime Minister to 
ministers and departmental heads that provide explicit details on government 
expectations of the portfolio, policy priorities and strategic issues.
But these windows for strategic interventions by senior politicians do not 
achieve much if the politicians themselves do not choose to be strategic or 
avail themselves of the opportunity. The Australian Cabinet has progressively 
downsized the amount of business going to Cabinet (reducing the detailed 
workload), ostensibly to allow Cabinet to focus on the important issues to 
the government as a whole. Some Cabinet meetings have been given over to 
‘strategic Cabinet days’ at which a senior minister will brief Cabinet on a selected 
policy topic (usually without accompanying briefing documents or associated 
paperwork, and with PowerPoint presentations the preferred mode of address) 
and no routine matters are presented. In standard Cabinet meetings a proportion 
of time can also be set aside for strategic discussions. These developments are 
meant to provide Cabinet with ample opportunities to debate issues without 
officials and without mountains of paperwork to digest. 
However, while some of these events have been regarded as valuable sessions, 
others have degenerated into pep-talks, rallying speeches, discussions of 
political tactics or to mulling over the most recent opinion poll results. Hence, 
simply allowing ministers more time to consider strategic issues as part of the 
processes of collective responsibility does not mean that they will think or behave 
strategically. There are many criticisms of government remaining reactive and 
preferring expedient or short-term adjustments in policy settings.
A former head of the South Australian Cabinet office, Adam Graycar, recently 
argued that strategic initiatives were often not addressed through the budget 
process but instead dealt with on the side by ‘passing the hat around’. He found 
that 
colleagues in line agencies are so very tightly constrained financially 
that they cannot see beyond their core business and agency boundaries. 
They have very little financial flexibility, and Treasury bureaucrats in 
our jurisdiction, like their counterparts in other jurisdictions, have 
acculturated into knowing the price of everything and the value 
of nothing … The budget process is a mightily inefficient process of 
being barely accountable for funds previously allocated, or fighting 
ferociously for crumbs with which to fund new programs or respond to 
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cost pressures. If a new proposal involves contributions from, or benefits 
to multiple agencies, then we have a process not unlike passing the hat 
around for funds (Graycar 2007, p. 13; see also Graycar and McCann 
2012).
Second, outcomes and objectives are only loosely related to the resource 
appropriation process or performance reporting process. Outcomes are 
expressed at a high level of abstraction, often as vague composite expressions. 
Some are inspirational ‘feel-good’ phrases under which almost anything 
can fall or be counted. Some provide a grand edifice under which relatively 
mundane activities are found (for example, the Department of Finance’s 
‘Efficient Functioning of Parliament’ which provides drivers for the car fleet 
and the checking of parliamentary receipts and entitlements). This problem 
has been identified by the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) and some 
parliamentary committees on a number of occasions but little has been done 
to rectify the concerns (see Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public 
Administration 2007). The ANAO has warned agencies to express their outcomes 
with ‘sufficient specificity’ to ensure that they are meaningful. Yet departments 
continue to produce many woolly or platitudinous statements of intent in their 
portfolio budget statements:
• Efficient Functioning Parliament (Department of Finance and Administration);
• Strong and Resilient Communities (Department of Families, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs);
• Families and Children have Choices and Opportunities (Department of 
Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs);
• Higher Productivity, Higher Pay Workplaces — previously Higher 
Productivity, Higher Wages (Department of Employment and Workplace 
Relations);
• Assisting Regions to Manage their own Futures (Department of Transport 
and Regional Services); and
• Public Understanding in Australia and Overseas of Australia’s Foreign and 
Trade Policy and a Positive Image of Australia (Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade).
Many of these are clearly omnibus outcomes in that contributions to the outcome 
could come from many sources, agencies, policies, events and circumstances. 
Many agencies across government may make contributions to such intentions 
(for example, climate change, productivity, or a sustainable economy). It is a 
myth that all outcomes are conveniently located in one agency (or even one 
division of one agency) even if other agencies may assist in the delivery of 
particular outputs (for example, Centrelink assisting with the Department of 
Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs’ family payments). Across 
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the Commonwealth, one division of a department will nominally have sole 
responsibility for one outcome — which could be highly systemic or generic 
in character, when in reality the agency only makes a small contribution to the 
desired outcome. This insistence on outcomes each located within one agency is a 
budget rule of convenience for the central agencies not a reflection of the world 
of public policy.
There have been criticisms of the degree to which outcomes are changed or 
subjected to revision — with approximately 20 per cent of agency outcomes 
experiencing some changes over the past few years. But as the ANAO (2006) 
has pointed out, while some change may be justified, changes to outcome 
statements erode the capacity of external scrutineers to follow budget activity 
and performance over time. At present, agencies are required to provide 
explanations of the changed formulation from year to year and translation maps 
to allow comparative scrutiny in portfolio budget statements, but the changes are 
rarely (if ever) challenged or even discussed by Parliament. The only significant 
challenge to outcome descriptions in recent years, though ultimately impotent, 
has come through the Combet v Commonwealth High Court challenge, which 
examined the validity of certain advertising expenditure under the ‘higher 
pay, higher productivity’ outcome for the Department of Employment and 
Workplace Relations. By a margin of five to two, the court found that outcomes 
were a legal form of appropriation under which diverse items of spending could 
be made; in essence, the court backed executive privilege in this instance (and 
argued it was not the role of the courts to decide what was government policy 
and it was better for parliament to decide such matters). But it could take a 
different view in the future and force subsequent governments to specify their 
spending more precisely (as the two dissenting judges implied).
In performance management and reporting, secretaries, executives and program 
managers have direct incentives to deliver on budget or within budget — 
even under-budget, but certainly not over-budget — rather than seeking to 
maximise outcomes. At the state level, the enormous problems with child 
safety that were historically swept under the carpet indicates a history of low 
resource priority, and that managers were more interested in managing within 
their resource constraints than addressing the policy problem. There are also 
criticisms that many areas of public policy breed increased dependencies — 
and that the bureaucracy and delivery agencies are often complicit in this — 
rather than lessening dependencies (for example, middle-class welfare, rental 
or wage supplementation schemes). This is especially pronounced in the social, 
community and health sectors, the childcare industry, and of certain client 
types — such as families, farmers, and the disabled.
It is also dubious whether the outcomes framework really applies to central 
agencies that either have coordination functions or process functions that do 
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not easily fit a results-based framework. Arguably, the imposition of a one-size-
fits-all ‘outcome framework’ that may suit sectoral or client-based agencies does 
not apply as well to central agencies (Australian Public Service Commission, 
Attorney-General’s Department, Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury, Finance) 
and most of the foreign affairs and national security organisations — or any other 
entities without tangible outputs (and some agencies do report that they have 
no outputs or only have loose output groups). Their activities are principally 
internal advice, policy analysis and review, and corporate governance. As one 
Treasury official said, most of the activity under the outcome statement ‘sound 
macro-economic environment’ involved Treasury preventing silly schemes and 
crackpot ideas from being advanced or accepted, especially from ministers — 
sometimes even their own minister — and from various sectional interests (see 
Wanna 2011). The outcome ‘sound macroeconomic environment’ in reality 
consists of Treasury providing policy advice, analysis and forecasting to the 
government. It was also hard to demonstrate effectiveness in performance terms, 
especially if Treasury had prevented bad policy advice going through.
Taking these criticisms together, there is an accepted mythical or fictional 
dimension to the ‘outcomes framework’. Most of the budget is not allocated 
by outcomes, even though it can be presented as if it were. Most funding and 
allocative decisions are not based on the priority of the outcome to government, 
but on the organisational units that have been swept under that particular 
outcome label for presentational purposes. By some estimates, less than 7 per 
cent of the budget is formalised according to notions of outcomes — the rest by 
standing appropriations and departmental items (the old running costs system). 
After years in operation, many agencies do not appear to have structured their 
organisations around the outcomes framework, but instead prefer to structure 
their operations according to activities, business groups or organisational 
entities. There are questions of how far these generic indicators of government 
priorities are integrated into the real operations of government agencies (see 
ANAO 2006). As the Labor Party argued in ‘Operation Sunlight’ while it was in 
opposition, many outcomes and the documents relating to them are ‘virtually 
meaningless’ and ‘open slather for political pork-barrelling’ (Tanner 2006).
As Allen Schick (2007) said on a visit to Australia, ‘why does Australia persist 
with a budgetary system that no one believes is working?’ In his own inimical 
way he was highlighting the apparent contrast between the formal rules and 
the practical reality. Another senior public servant not from a budget agency 
claimed that one of the present-day major challenges for government was 
‘how to make the outcomes and outputs framework work — especially when 
there were claims it would turn the world around, and it hasn’t’. The next big 
budgetary debate in Australia should address the issue of whether to enhance 
the outcomes–outputs framework or to replace it with an alternative system.
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Elsewhere in the budget processes, some key institutions, such as the ERC, may 
now have outlived their principal usefulness. This high-level budget review 
committee can trace its antecedents back to 1975, but has been accused by senior 
officials across government of distorting policy-making and impeding good 
decision-making. It can often discourage agencies from making submissions for 
fear of losing resources under the operations of the offsets requirements — having 
offsets confiscated as cuts but not gaining acceptance for the new proposal. 
Agencies have learnt to bypass ERC or to game the system by massaging the 
types and levels of funds for which they apply (one or two big items or ‘majors’ 
or lots of ‘minors’). Defence and national security proposals now bypass ERC 
entirely and go through their own budgetary evaluation process (the national 
security committee of Cabinet) which is not linked to the ERC process but has 
its own aggregate limits imposed by Cabinet. ERC was once the lynchpin of 
collective decision-making premised on assessing all policy comparatively at one 
point in time in the budget cycle. Other agencies have now resorted to using 
other political tactics to secure resources outside the formal budgetary process 
(strong ministers, exceptional cases, infrastructure needs, regional priorities, 
etc.) where they stand greater chances of success and can circumvent the normal 
budgetary rules.
With Labor again coming back into government after winning the 24 November 
2007 election, they had the opportunity to fundamentally review the budget 
framework and the internal budgetary processes. ‘Operation Sunlight’ had 
promised a range of reforms (to disclosure and reporting, tightening the 
outcomes framework, etc.) and the new Finance Minister, Lindsay Tanner 
(2008), committed the government to a phased-in series of reform initiatives (16 
in total), and invited the former Australian Democrat Senator Andrew Murray 
to conduct a forensic review of budgetary accountabilities (Murray 2008). But 
no sooner had these intentions been announced than the global financial crisis 
hit Australia and the government’s enthusiasm for reform evaporated.
Dead ends, dry gullies and unintended 
consequences
As mentioned earlier, budget reformers and central budget agencies often paint 
a glorious triumphal picture of the reform journey. However, on a day-to-day 
basis, reform ideas often occurred spontaneously in different parts of the system. 
System changes could occur unexpectedly or as an unintended by-product of 
some other change. Assessments of what can be attempted or achieved has often 
meant that second- or third-best alternatives were explored and trialled. Some 
changes appear now to have been almost random experiments. Looking back, 
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there have been many procedures and budget rules adopted as leaps of faith or 
with great hopes, but which have been quietly disposed and denied when they 
are no longer found appropriate. I will mention a few of these below.
Portfolio budgets emerged in the 1980s as a result of aiming to implement 
program budgeting. Program budgeting was never adopted (although some 
new measures on the margins may have received direct program allocations). 
Instead, Australia chose to budget for portfolios, as Pat Barrett (1988) has 
argued, and within that envelope of funds the various ministers and agencies 
could have various program structures and move funds between them over time 
(allowing fungibility). The myth of introducing program budgeting was partly 
maintained as the Department of Finance consolidated running costs into one-
line appropriations — but not on a program by program basis — hence agencies 
had no program budget per se, but consolidated running costs they could apply 
across whatever program, business lines or corporate structures they chose. 
For around a decade Finance pretended it could distinguish between ‘program 
costs’ and ‘running costs’ and keep the two separate, but prior to the accruals 
framework these two labels tended to overlap or be substitutes for each other. 
Some agencies creatively gamed the new rules. The ABC, for instance, argued 
that because it made TV ‘programs’ all its costs were therefore program costs 
— and so not subject to the efficiency dividend — it claimed not to have any 
‘running costs’.
Although Australia did not deliberately plan to install portfolio budgeting, it 
worked at the political and administrative level. Yet once accrual budgeting 
was adopted in 1999–2000, the government (perhaps unintentionally) sacrificed 
portfolio budgets in favour of agency-based budgets, which has reduced 
flexibility and increased silo thinking. A clear unintended consequence of 
accruals was the compartmentalisation of agencies as single budget agencies, 
in essence dealing with the central budget agency directly. The techniques or 
ideology behind accruals meant that entities had to be directly responsible 
for the control and management of their resources; hence the way financial 
resources were identified and recorded by accountants at an agency level 
shaped the distribution of resources. This process of compartmentalisation was 
underscored by the 1997 FMA and CAC Acts, which held the head of agency 
or CEO to account as the accountable officer for financial resources. A further 
unintended consequence was that, under accruals, agencies were effectively 
given non-lapsing appropriations which, if not spent within the approved year, 
could be spent in the future for the purpose identified in the appropriation — 
leaving some to question the constitutional legitimacy of this practice.
In 2000–01, the government committed itself with much fanfare to pricing 
reviews as a way of improving the efficiency of cost structures in government 
(see Kelly and Wanna 2004). Despite the problem of identifying prices when so 
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much of what the government did had no market price or was not subjected 
to market disciplines, the government persevered with this innovation. Pilot 
studies of agencies were undertaken before more widespread pricing reviews 
were attempted, but the results were disappointing. There were two main 
findings that appeared: there was much arguing about what constituted ‘price’ 
or what methodologies were appropriate to calculate this figure; and it was not 
clear that much had been achieved in terms of useful information. The only 
possible exception being that the only price comparisons which could be 
made with any rigour were for common services and activities such as human 
resources, finance, and parliamentary services. Pricing reviews were quietly 
dropped as both guardian and spending departments realised their limitations 
or futility.
In 1996–97 the Howard government formally embraced the purchaser–provider 
model for service delivery and outsourced provision based on tight contracts 
(National Commission of Audit 1996). It viewed this as a way to contain costs, 
allow devolved forms of delivery (sometimes using different or competing 
delivery modes), and being able to hold providers to account for results. There 
was also some discussion of offloading responsibilities, and perhaps even some 
component of accountability (although the Auditor-General consistently argued 
that accountabilities could not be ‘outsourced’). After the major debacle with the 
compulsory outsourcing of IT in the late 1990s — when two Cabinet decisions 
contradicted each other, one to go ahead and the other to delay — the Howard 
government downplayed its enthusiasm for adopting the purchaser–provider 
split as a panacea for all government services. Instead, the Commonwealth spoke 
of funder–provider relations and grant-based assistance schemes where the aim 
was not to ‘purchase’ a service entirely using contracts, but contribute to desired 
outcomes in the community (for example, support of childcare centres, family 
support programs, etc.). The Commonwealth does not accept sole responsible 
for the final activity but makes funding contributions or subsidies available to 
those providing the service. Some of these funder–provider schemes operated 
through the states (for example, programs for health and housing, the disabled 
and homeless), and states for their part have largely refrained from participating 
in these programs as contractual providers. In the community sector, many of 
these non-government ‘providers’ are not-for-profit organisations that deliver 
a range of existing services, not necessarily only those that receive federal 
contributions. Faced with such difficulties, the Commonwealth generally 
abandoned the purchaser–provider model except in the area of employment 
services where the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations has 
attempted to make the model work through private-for-profit providers and 
corporate arms of voluntary organisations.
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Vouchers were also mooted as a way to empower clients and citizens and re-
route funding through the end-users rather than the organisational deliverers. 
Health and education were proposed as the major sectors where such ‘buyers-
choice’ schemes could be trialled. A former education minister, David Kemp, 
tried in vain to shift educational funding to the recipients rather than to 
institutional providers. But after a decade virtually no voucher schemes have 
been introduced — although some quasi-schemes involving limited portability 
have been used (for example, postgraduate scholarships for graduates that go 
where the student elects rather than being allocated to a particular university, 
or childcare subsidies or rebates paid to the parent rather than the centre). 
Again, discussion of voucher-driven funding models has largely abated.
Evaluation has long been the holy grail of the managerialists, many of whom 
were anxious to show value for money and establish systematic methods of 
improving policy design and undertaking policy learning. Various schemes 
have been implemented, none of which has been continued after an initial 
experimental phase. We have seen a succession of evaluation exercises since 
the 1970s: joint management reviews, program reviews, appropriateness 
reviews ordered by Cabinet, compulsory schedules of three- and five-year 
evaluation reviews, lapsing program reviews, and more recently strategic or 
cluster reviews. All imposed large investments of resources (especially time), 
not necessarily to much effect. Many of the evaluation schemes relied on the 
reviewing agency doing the review or being centrally involved in it, which 
then undermined the credibility of the findings. Other reviews were used 
tactically to try to justify more resources for a program in subsequent budget 
rounds. Each form of evaluation, with the exception of the Auditor-General’s 
efficiency or performance audits (which do not quite fulfil the same function), 
was terminated, usually within a short period of being announced. Lapsing 
reviews, for instance, were discontinued when the volume of work for agencies 
after about three years was so great they could not justify the effort involved. 
Program lapsing reviews were replaced by cluster reviews of related services 
as programs came up for renewal. It will be interesting to see whether they 
fare better than their predecessors. The sorry history of repeated attempts to 
introduce workable and effective evaluation processes has moved many senior 
officials to question why policy evaluation has never got off the ground in 
Australia.
Other dead ends and dry gullies have included: 
• the experiment with agency banking undertaken in 1999, but reversed later 
so that the Department of Finance could practice better cash management;
• the capital use charge initially set at 11–12 per cent (on a base of 6 per cent 
plus risk margin), with agencies funded for capital at the outset of the budget 
year but then charged for their capital usage at the end of the year (allowing 
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them to keep any ‘savings’), recommended by accountants — the measure 
did not prove any assistance in the management of assets and tended to 
remain an accounting exercise;
• the experiment with devolving the construction of expenditure estimates to 
line agencies has been gradually reined in by Finance following a succession 
of missed accuracy targets (revenue estimates have been even more off target) 
— agencies still input the raw data but Finance now has the final say on what 
the estimates will be;
• devolved procurement was meant to enable agencies to arrange and control 
the costs of their own procurement, but the policy was recentralised under 
new guidelines issued in 2005.
The travails of budgetary reporting: Distorting 
the glass darkly
Budget documentation is ostensibly produced for accountability and scrutiny 
purposes, but arguably has now been overshadowed by marketing and 
presentational considerations. Governments are judged on their budgets by 
many diverse audiences, so the baroqueness of budget presentation is now 
assured. Governments have long used budgets to gild the lily, disguise realities, 
and convey favourable impressions. 
Despite the Charter of Budget Honesty (which required more integrated reporting 
but which still has many problems: see Wanna 2006), budget documentation 
is now more confusing, and in certain respects less informative and non-
transparent. Allan Barton (2006) once calculated that up to nine different 
measures of budget balance or outcome can be found in budget documentation, 
and treasurers tend to hop backwards and forwards to their preferred sets of 
figures. So, from year to year we have seen various treasurers talking about the 
fiscal balance, the underlying cash balance, the headline balance and the size of 
the surplus to GDP. The most wanton disregard for accuracy and disclosure came 
with the Coalition government’s deliberate non-counting of the GST revenues 
in the Commonwealth accounts (instigated by Treasurer Peter Costello), despite 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and Auditor-General both arguing 
these revenues should be included. By not including the GST all manner of 
falsehoods were perpetrated, especially when calculating comparative spending 
patterns, such as the magnitude of Commonwealth revenues to GDP, the size of 
the Commonwealth government in OECD material, comparative expenditures 
across governments, and internal proportions of spending which are distorted 
because a large chunk of transfers to the states are not included. This tax was 
not counted largely because the former Treasurer had earlier promised to cut 
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Commonwealth outlays from the levels reached under Keating (from 27 per 
cent to 23 per cent); discounting one-sixth of the budget was his way of giving 
the illusion the Commonwealth had shrunk since 1996 (see Wanna et al. 2000, 
p. 258). It also avoided any impression that the Commonwealth tax per capita had 
increased during the life of the Coalition’s tenure in government. The exclusion 
of the GST was made solely at the insistence of the former Treasurer while the 
incoming Rudd government announced its intention to reverse this stance and 
recalculate expenses from 2000, which it promptly did. Such sophistry over the 
GST did not prevent the previous government occasionally threatening to put 
‘conditions on GST transfers’ if states do not comply with some federal wish 
or dictate. So, in spite of the sentiments expressed in the Charter of Budget 
Honesty, the government could well be open to charges of giving deliberate 
misinformation or partial reporting.
In relation specifically to the reports required by the charter, the legislation was 
introduced with good intentions but was corrupted by political circumstance 
and occasionally sidelined. The government made political mileage about its 
commitment to look at long-term demographic impacts to the budget. Yet 
in 2001–02 as the intergenerational report was due, the government became 
bogged down in the detail and had to pull material together at short notice (the 
statement seemed to have been overlooked). Treasury produced the first report 
without involving other research units across government such as the ABS. The 
second report was produced in-house, led by a Treasury team. Circumstances 
have also seen various financial reports politicised, such as when Peter Costello 
released a separate Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO) report, 
which he claimed was ‘more accurate’ the day before his department released 
the real one, and then refused to discuss the departmental report. The process 
of costing election commitments is at present hopelessly compromised meaning 
the provisions of the Act — which could be beneficial to parties in the lead up 
to the election — are largely made ineffective (for example, evaded, delayed or 
used simply in costing ‘saving’ measures). The release of the 2007 MYEFO in 
October 2007 was slightly early, suiting the government’s election timing — and 
half the report was a detailed exposition of the Howard government’s intended 
tax cuts for the period up to 2010 — and subverting the intent of the report, 
which was to be a mid-year progress report on actual movements since the last 
budget. Such examples indicate governments are motivated to use these reports 
expediently as a convenient vehicle for their own political purposes.
The preference for reporting against a selected results-based format has come 
at the cost of detailed input information and detailed activity information. 
Whereas many large private corporations collect detailed information on the 
bases of both results and input costs, and report on key changes continuously, 
governments have now scaled back their presentation of input data, relying 
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on annual accrual financial statements to tell the financial story. Despite 
parliamentary committees recommending greater program information to 
go with other budgetary documentation (for example, in portfolio budget 
statements) the government has steadfastly refused to provide this information, 
claiming it would only add levels of confusion to the available documentation. 
Finance already collects much of this input and program information, but the 
Howard government chose not to release it. Labor committed itself to producing 
greater input transparency and program performance data on coming to office, 
but it remains to be seen whether it would honour such commitments.
The usefulness of budget information to readers, inside and outside of Parliament, 
is also open to debate. Understanding of accrual financial information requires 
a basic technical accounting knowledge, which does not come naturally to 
politicians and lay commentators. For example, the implications of asset sales on 
net worth and future earning capacity get barely any attention compared with 
the consequences of increased receipts for surplus cash available to be used.
There is still a huge asymmetry in the annual budget presentation. Governments 
almost exclusively give prominence to new initiatives and priorities announced 
through their budgetary parameters, providing little new information on 
ongoing measures and commitments other than forward estimates. Some agencies 
in their annual reports do provide informative details and highlight innovations 
in their base budget activities — but often 12–15 months after the event. The 
attention given to special appropriations, which lock-in over 80 per cent of 
total Commonwealth expenditure each budget, is almost insignificant compared 
with the detailed information on departmental outputs, which comprise around 
15 per cent of annual expenses.
There are some other small, simple issues that have reduced transparency for no 
apparent reason. The government now chooses not to produce historical graphs 
of functional outlays/expenses — as it did prior to 1999 — which showed 
comparative spending data in a sectoral area over time. Such 10–15 year graphs 
allowed readers to observe what patterns were unfolding, where blow-outs 
were occurring, where tightening or deprioritisation had been made, and which 
functions were declining in importance. For a while, no functional data was 
presented at all, but after some parliamentary feedback an annual table has been 
included in the budget, but only with that year’s functional expenses shown 
(but at a high level of functionality).
For a couple of years in the 1980s, the government also courageously produced 
‘offset savings’ graphs, showing the offsets ‘captured’, the recycling of money, 
and how much offsets contributed to new policy proposals. They then terminated 
this experiment. In 1996 the Howard government produced a report ‘Meeting 
Our Commitments’, which listed the magnitude of the various savings measures 
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across government, and where the savings were made, but the government 
never repeated this exercise. Readers have to search through individual agency 
portfolio additional estimates statements for records of savings. But even 
this information is often unsatisfying, as it frequently records book transfers 
associated with reductions in estimates rather than true savings.
Performance claims by agencies are not usually audited or subject to independent 
scrutiny (although some could be taken up in performance audits). Many 
outcomes cannot be closely tied to performance indictors or even to definable 
outputs. Yet governments do not externally report performance against programs 
that would give Parliament a good indication of actual performance in agencies. 
In terms of reporting, the outcomes framework assumes the Commonwealth does 
things and delivers directly, when in fact it often does not. Agencies process 
benefits and other transfers according to conditions set by Parliament, provide 
grants and co-fund activities performed by others, or make contributions to 
services (health, housing, childcare, environmental management, family income 
maintenance, etc.). The effectiveness and efficiency of government spending 
in these activities is virtually impossible to measure in a meaningful way and 
cannot easily be attributed to the Commonwealth. Line agencies are often 
aware of this problem, but the issue has not fully crystalised at the centre of 
government.
In budgetary reporting we have frequently changed the formal requirements 
and added the emphasis on reporting impact intentions (perhaps for the better), 
but we have a long way to go to find an appropriate balance of disclosure and 
provide meaningful information.
Some key propositions and observations from 
Australia’s trajectory of reform
Looking back on the trajectory of reform over the past 30–40 years, the following 
propositions are apparent.
First, governments seem quickly to run out of steam in undertaking budgetary 
reform. Three to five years seems to be the norm for reform — in the government’s 
first and perhaps second terms especially. They can criticise their predecessors 
and inherited systems, they have their own new agendas and priorities, and 
they have enthusiasm as a new government to make changes. They then tire of 
the reform commitment, are satisfied with their handiwork, and will not allow 
or contemplate further changes. Two good examples will suffice: the Hawke 
government (1983–91) introduced most of its budget reform between 1984 and 
1987, after which it held the system in place with some gradual adaptations; 
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the Howard government (1996–2007) introduced its accrual-based outcomes/
outputs framework in 1999 and then largely left the framework unchanged since 
implementing it. This suggests budget reform itself has a life cycle: conception, 
development, implementation and consolidation followed by stagnation. 
Second, contrary to the allure of ‘strategic budgeting’, budgets tend to drive 
policy (not vice-versa), or, put alternatively, form and process drives strategy. The 
enshrinement of agency-level base budgeting within the outcomes framework 
further limits the potentiality of budgets to be strategic. If we want to achieve 
greater strategic direction, we may need to change the way we budget first. 
There are other models from which we can draw; we may need to strengthen and 
redesign the ‘challenge function’, where existing programs are systematically 
challenged in regard to their continued relevance and effectiveness; we may 
need to reconsider ways to achieve greater levels of reallocation (including with 
transfers and entitlements); or we may need to readdress the incentive structures 
and dependencies between governments and citizens.
Third, at the same time as we have reformed budgeting — especially on the 
expenditure side, focusing more and more on the smaller discretionary 
component — so the budget itself has become less important to the economy 
(and, arguably, to governments and the policy process). Much of the budget 
works on auto-pilot (consumer price adjustments to programs, bracket-creep 
with income tax, depreciation schedules, pension and benefit adjustments, etc.). 
We have structured budget processes to remove the scope for discretion. Surplus 
funds have been moved into special accounts and quarantined funds (such as 
the Future Fund, Education Fund and Infrastructure Fund) where discretion 
is limited. The budget is heavily geared towards transfer payments and citizen 
entitlements governed by standing appropriations. Governments themselves 
often recognise this — that is why so much of political presentation on budget 
day is take up with tax cuts, distractions, proposed future funds or foundations. 
Fourth, while much of the Australian budget reform trajectory aimed to 
consolidate a formerly fragmented set of processes, the system has begun to 
re-fragment. We set out to prevent cabinets making decisions without costings, 
without Treasury analysis, and without being able to make assessments of 
comparative worth of projects and programs. Hence, we consolidated budgetary 
processes, designed specially tailored Cabinet processes, and argued for annual 
consolidation and prevention of out-of-budget spending wherever possible. 
We sought control and we largely achieved it. Then budgets began to be 
more about ‘facilitation’ and we relaxed the tightness in process — much of it 
deliberately. This occasionally comes back to haunt us (for example, the 2007 
water announcement of $10 billion, which was not costed or authorised by 
Cabinet). We have gone through a roller coaster from fragmentation, to control 
and consolidation, to re-fragmentation. Relaxed controls appear to have suited 
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the political style of the day especially in a post-9/11 security context. But the 
fragmentation of decision-making comes at a price to the detriment of good 
governance and strategic leadership.
Fifth, relationships between budgets and performance are difficult and 
problematic. It is hard to combine or integrate these without avoiding unwanted 
consequences, perverse or distorting incentives, gaming or capture. While 
governments constantly talk of relating and integrating performance to budget 
allocations, they have found it difficult to do in practice. Maybe we should keep 
these two functions separate and discrete while concentrating on finding better 
ways to have dialogue between them. We have a long way to go here. 
Sixth, we need to appreciate that budget processes not only provide possibilities 
and scope for governments to do things, but also impose restraints on what 
governments can do and how they do it. There will always be a tension between 
these competing forces — the desire for efficiency and effectiveness versus 
integrity and accountability. These are not the same things, and there is little 
evidence that they are conflating under new public management or outsourced 
forms of delivery.
Seventh and finally, although governments talk about the benefits of whole-
of-government approaches and meeting priorities together, ministers are still 
risk averse about interdepartmental collaboration. Budgets allocate to silos, and 
accrual budgeting has unintentionally made the situation worse, not better. We 
need to find ways to resource whole-of-government initiatives that give these 
items the high priority that governments claim.
Appendix 1: What would a ‘strategic budget’ 
look like, and who can play the strategic role?
If budgets serve as routine planning instruments, to what extent are they capable 
of being strategic or of enhancing strategic decision-making? This question 
raises the age-old public finance issue of effective collective choice between 
competing alternatives — guns or butter, war or peace, productivity versus 
lifestyle choices. It also raises the issue of how far resources can be reallocated, 
and whether inherited allocations remain strategic or need to be changed. 
In more recent times, this conundrum has been depicted as the search for the 
holy grail of ‘strategic budgeting’ — theoretically conceived notions of strategic 
decisions leading budgetary allocations, and policy leading financial decisions.
What, then, might a strategic budget look like? How are the terms ‘budgeting’ 
and ‘strategic decision-making’ linked, or how can they be linked? What would 
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be the perceived benefits of a strategic budget process? The term ‘strategy’ is 
much over-used, and has many different meanings and interpretations. For 
politicians, ‘strategy’ often translates into ‘popular’, ‘successful’, ‘winning 
options’. Ministers may only have broad and amorphous notions of strategic 
directions (ideas, priorities, immediate goals) that need to be integrated 
with operational concerns. For administrators, words such as ‘consistency’, 
‘direction’ and ‘integration’ often come to the fore. In most cases, bureaucrats 
become concerned with strategic direction, meaning that ‘strategy’ is often 
a bureaucratic discourse — part of preparing themselves to be responsive to 
political/government priorities. 
Officials generally consider a strategic budget — or a strategic-driven budget 
process — as a blueprint or coherent overall plan, making sense of resource 
determinations and providing unambiguous direction. To many, it would ideally 
include the following characteristics:
• clear directions and articulation of objectives and priorities;
• policy decisions drive the finances and allocative efficiencies;
• the focus is on the budget in total not on the margins;
• governments look to longer-term time frames and anticipatory planning in 
relation to future expected demands;
• more reliable information on results and outcomes achieved;
• indications of relative success are acknowledged and maintained; and
• the processes of budget-setting align with the government’s strategy. 
This is not the system of budgeting we see today in Australia, although elements 
can be detected in the present practices.
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6. Constrained Parliamentarism: 
Australia and New Zealand 
compared1 
Harshan Kumarasingham and John Power
Introduction
It has been an eternal quest to limit the powers of the executive. In the ‘new 
Westminsters’2 of the Commonwealth, the Montesquieuan model of separation 
of powers was theoretically influential and yet practically avoided, as in the 
UK. Aside from the US and Westminster models, Bruce Ackerman has argued 
of a third model of democratic governance in the wake of the Second World 
War: constrained parliamentarism. This model sits between the presidentialist 
American form of Montesquieu and the parliamentary sovereignty that affords 
the British executive a near elective dictatorship. Constrained parliamentarism 
‘rejects the US separation between executive and legislature and grants broad 
powers to the governmental coalition that gains parliamentary support. It 
rejects Westminster by insulating sensitive functions from political control’ 
(Ackerman 2007). This framework of Ackerman’s has mainly been confined to 
public law scholars.3 Applying this model to the field of comparative politics, 
Power has examined this both theoretically and through the example of 
Australia (Power 2010, 2012), which placed the earlier writings of Ackerman 
(2000) at its centre. Recently, we have also used this approach on New Zealand 
(Kumarasingham and Power 2013). In the penultimate section of this chapter, 
we briefly consider the reasons why we — unlike virtually all other students of 
comparative governance — have found Ackerman so central. This consideration 
may open some new perspectives on comparative studies of regimes. According 
to Ackerman, there are ‘three legitimating ideals’ informing his approach to 
constrained parliamentarism:
The first ideal is democracy. In one way or another, separation [of 
branches of governance] may serve (or hinder) the project of popular self-
government. The second ideal is professional competence. Democratic laws 
1 The New Zealand sections of this chapter are drawn from our article, Kumarasingham and Power 2013.
2 This term was used by Kumarasingham 2010a and 2013 to describe states that had taken the Westminster 
system and adapted it from Britain.
3 A recent examination found that all but four of 69 references to the Ackerman essay were in law journals.
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remain purely symbolic unless courts and bureaucracies can implement 
them in a relatively impartial way. The third ideal is the protection and 
enhancement of fundamental rights (Ackerman 2000, p. 640)
Ackerman then goes on to consider a number of institutional specifics that 
he contended best furthered these legitimating ideals; eight were already in 
existence in some regimes around the world.
In seeking to employ this framework in the development of a theory of fiducial 
governance, Power has adapted and modified it. In particular, he has shaped 
a different approach to strategic constitutional reform issues. In this chapter, 
we step back to consider an important question in the comparative study of 
governance: the assessment of the regimes of Australia and New Zealand in the 
context of the original Ackerman framework. For our project, it is important to 
ask which of these regimes conforms more closely to the ideals of constrained 
parliamentarism?
Australia and New Zealand compared
Australia and New Zealand, in creating their own states, evoked Britain and 
transplanted the system they knew best: the Westminster System (Patapan, 
Wanna and Weller 2005). This legacy was critical for executive power. The 
legacy of Royal Prerogatives travelled to the Antipodes also for the use of the 
local executive. Power became just as centralised as Westminster with few 
institutional restraints and the focus clearly on the executive. Dissipation of 
power was neither sought nor encouraged.
Royal tradition helps to explain other characteristics. It is hierarchical; 
participants look to the leadership for guidance and assume a degree of 
authority: not quite the Stuart version of divine right, but sometimes a 
level of obeisance that comes close. Prime ministers can appoint; prime 
ministers can fire. Power is centralised; it may have moved from the 
monarch to the prime minister or cabinet, but power-sharing comes hard 
even within the traditions of collective government (Rhodes, Wanna and 
Weller 2009, p. 49).
This bequest meant that in new Westminsters such as Australia and New Zealand, 
there was a ‘legacy of vague accountabilities and fertile ground for Executive 
dominance’ (Kumarasingham 2013). Australasian adaptions also meant both 
states are distinct not only from Britain, but from each other. However, New 
Zealand and Australia have enough resemblances at the executive level of the ‘first 
among equals’ variety perennially to draw attention to the substantial powers 
of the centre operating in a well-established parliamentary environment. In the 
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Westminster tradition, conventions surround these executives with flexibility 
and opacity, which promotes expectations and evasions of how power should 
and should not be used. It is in this context that we compare and assess these 
two Australasian countries. 
With the the six features shared by the two regimes shown first, the eight 
enacted institutional specifics identified by Ackerman are:
• parliamentary democracy; 
• professional public service; 
• independent judiciary; 
• securing human rights; 
• integrity of major institutions; 
• serial referenda;
• federal structure; and
• strong upper house. 
On any mechanistic assessment, Australia would clearly conform more closely 
to the constrained parliamentarism institutional specifics, for it has a federal 
system, and most of its jurisdictions possess bicameral legislatures. However 
— and the raising of this question challenges one of the key premises of the 
Ackerman approach — does this mean that the legitimating ideals are therefore 
more fully realised in Australia than in New Zealand? Whatever our answer to 
this first question, we go on at the end of this chapter to consider the use of the 
modified Ackerman framework for the comparative study of governance regimes. 
We do this by comparing it with the very different framework proposed by 
the Canadian scholar Alan Siaroff, in his impressive work, Comparing Political 
Regimes (2009).
In approaching these questions, we shall naturally build on the work already 
done on Australia. In particular, we shall rely on Power’s use of the recent 
work of Sawer et al., Australia: The state of democracy (2009), for on most of 
the Ackerman specifics they provide instructive assessments of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the Australian regime. In what follows, we shall provide 
summaries of the treatment of each of the eight institutional specifics in the 
Power monograph. As we proceed down the list, we shall make some comparisons 
with the New Zealand experience on each institutional specific.
Parliamentary democracy
Reviewing the comprehensive listings by Sawer et al. of the 27 strengths and 32 
weaknesses of the Australian system, Power has focused on the ways in which 
long-established interests have continued to be still largely unchallenged. He 
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attributed this dominance primarily to the heavy constraints imposed by the 
nation’s constitution. In contrast, governing elites in New Zealand have been 
less heavily constrained in adapting to changing times. Thus there has been, 
in recent years, much stronger representation of women in Parliament in New 
Zealand than in Australia (Siaroff 2009, p. 165), and indigenous minorities have 
also enjoyed stronger representation. One important benchmark for estimating 
the strength of the legislature is the relative strength of its committee systems 
(Halligan, Miller and Power 2007). While in recent years there has been a 
considerable strengthening of the influence of committees in the Australian 
Parliament, the influence of their New Zealand counterparts remains stronger.
New Zealand’s adoption of the mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral 
system in time for the 1996 general election changed the nature of its democracy. 
The two-party system and with it the majoritarian manner of politics, which had 
been the mainstay of much of modern New Zealand politics, was replaced by a 
proportional system that emphasised representation and multiparty coalition. 
MMP ushered in new conventions of democracy (Palmer and Palmer 2004). Not 
only did new parties come into the Parliament, but also more women, Maori, 
ethnic groups and political viewpoints. After decades of one party cabinets, 
the governing elites had to contend with making coalition agreements beyond 
their party and often without pre-election agreements. However, the executive 
itself in ‘its day-to-day functioning has changed relatively little’, nor has 
MMP altered the principal fact that in New Zealand ‘executive power is [still] 
concentrated in a Cabinet that is founded, in general, upon convention, not law’ 
(Boston and Bullock 2009). Indeed, the Key Cabinets from 2008 to the present 
have been like the cabinets of first past the post (FPP) days in having only one 
party represented, since the support party ministers sit outside Cabinet. The 
multi-party governing arrangements that have characterised the post-FPP era, 
whether labelled or typified as coalitions or minority governments with outside 
support, has not altered the formal powers of the executive and MMP has not 
provided any new institutional constraints upon it. The New Zealand regime 
adopted the German MMP electoral system without importing the other aspects 
of German polity, which provide ‘veto players’ or constraints on the executive 
and institutions, such as its Constitutional Court, federal system, European 
Union, written constitution, and the Bundestag’s power of ‘constructive’ votes 
of no-confidence (Helms 2000). New Zealand’s institutional closet remains bare 
compared to the German constitutional structure whose electoral system it 
chose to emulate.
Professional public service
In attempting to explain the steady politicisation of Australian public services in 
recent decades, Power attributed considerable importance to the disappearance 
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of senior collegial bodies (such as public service boards). Without these 
traditionally important constraints, the offices of public service commissioners 
have been marginalised in modern managerialist times.
The public service reforms of the mid-1980s in New Zealand were arguably 
the most radical in the Commonwealth (Prebble 2010). Some of those reforms 
were the separation of the government’s trading interests from its non-
commercial activities (establishing state-owned enterprises, in sectors from 
rail to telecommunications, required to return dividends to the Crown), the 
restructuring of departments to a smaller, more market-orientated design where 
roles such as policy and operations were split, the introduction of output 
budgeting, and the reallocation of responsibility of employment decisions from 
a central public service commission to the heads of departments (now called 
chief executives). The chief executives themselves were now placed on short-
term contracts and employed by the statutory State Services Commissioner, but 
were free to employ their own staff. These structural reforms have not been 
without controversy, with many public servants losing their jobs due to the 
restructuring and privatisation. However, most commentators contend that 
the public service is now ‘more efficient and performance orientated’. Like 
Australia, the public service has been forced to surrender its monopoly of 
providing advice to ministers with use of consultants and advisors increasing 
by creating ‘contestability in the market for policy advice’ (Shaw 2006). These 
developments have caused one seasoned commentator to ask whether the public 
service is still capable of looking after the longer-term public interest (James 
2009). Indeed, with the campaign to reduce public expenditure in the public 
services, there is a rumour that even the institution designed to represent and 
guard the interest of professional public service, the State Services Commission, 
could itself face abolition as some of its functions have already been transferred 
elsewhere (Dominion Post, 31 May 2011). 
Independent judiciary
In the words of a former Chief Justice of the High Court (of Australia), the Court 
has ‘an uneasy and ill-defined relationship with the other arms of government’ 
(Mason in Patapan 2000, p. viii). The principal reason for this unsatisfactory 
state of affairs has been the court’s clear recognition in recent years of the 
political dimension of much of its work. By discarding the apolitical mask, the 
Court has, of course, laid itself open to the claims of the underprivileged, as 
was most recently illustrated in the November 2010 decision (Plaintiffs M61 
and M69 of 2010 v Commonwealth of Australia), which drove a large hole in the 
Commonwealth’s border protection arrangements. (It is difficult to believe that 
the New Zealand judiciary would be so assertive vis-à-vis its political executive). 
The discarding of one orthodoxy has, however, not yet been followed by a 
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coherent statement of the nature and boundaries of the form of politics with 
which the judiciary is now grappling. In the absence of such an understanding, 
we find that some attorneys-general are now refusing to play the traditional 
roles of defenders of the judiciary when they face political attack.
New Zealand’s judiciary also has a difficult relationship with the executive. In 
2003, the government ended appeals to the London-based Privy Council without 
a referendum and established the Supreme Court as the highest appellate court. 
The government has openly quarrelled with the Supreme Court, especially over 
questions about Indigenous land rights and prison policy. In recent years the 
Supreme Court has consistently been told to ‘stick to the bench’. New Zealand 
attorneys-general and other related ministers have openly criticised the judiciary 
in Parliament and the press. This was especially apparent with the controversy 
surrounding the Seabed and Foreshore Act 2004 (Stockley 2006). As Chief Justice 
Dame Sian Elias recently commented, ‘In New Zealand the independence of the 
judiciary from other sources of state power is fragile.’ Unlike the UK, Canada 
and Australia, administrative autonomy is not held by the judges, but by the 
executive through the Ministry of Justice (Elias 2011).
Securing human rights
In Australia, as elsewhere in many regimes in the British Commonwealth 
(including the UK and New Zealand), discourse on this topic in recent years has 
been dominated by the ‘charter’ approach (for a recent important example, see 
Australian Human Rights Commission 2009). In regimes adopting this approach 
(which in Australia have included Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory), 
the ultimate formal sovereignty of the Parliament is not questioned. However, the 
judiciary is empowered to refer back to the Parliament and the government any 
conflicts it might perceive between statutorily recognised human rights, on the 
one hand, and measures in proposed legislation, on the other. In such cases, it is 
then up to the Parliament to determine what to do. One defect in all the current 
charter arrangements has been noted by Power (2010, pp. 39–40). Although 
they are all supposed to stimulate greater dialogue between the branches of 
government, there has been a lack of a suitable collegial body through which 
such dialogue could be conducted. The councils of state proposed by Power 
would supply such a suitable institutional site (Power 2010, pp. 52 ff.). 
For New Zealand, the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi holds a central symbolic and 
political place in the human rights of the nation. This treaty between Maori 
and the Crown was initially viewed by a nineteenth-century Chief Justice as 
a ‘simple nullity’ and it is still denied general effect by a single statute and 
does not have any overriding effect. However, it has moral force and is given 
specific legal effect in particular pieces of legislation. The Treaty is also used 
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by the Waitangi Tribunal in its recommendations on claims against the Crown 
and to aid the interpretation of statutes in the courts. Former President of 
the Court of Appeal Lord Cooke of Thorndon ruled in 1993 that ‘the Treaty 
created an enduring relationship of a fiduciary nature akin to partnership. 
Each party [Maori and Crown] accepting a positive duty to act in good faith, 
fairly, reasonably, and honourably towards each other’. Cooke referred to it as 
‘simply the most important document in New Zealand’s history’, a far cry from 
the opinions of his predecessors on the New Zealand bench. Though it is not 
entrenched, it is a strong influence and the ‘Cabinet Manual’ requires Cabinet 
papers to identify any implications of proposed policies in terms of the Treaty 
and executive proposals for legislation must demonstrate their consistency with 
Treaty principles (Palmer and Palmer 2004, pp. 336–348). 
Along with the Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand has placed high importance on 
human rights since it helped draft the UN Declaration on Human Rights in 1948. 
The human rights commissioners are appointed by the Governor-General on the 
advice of the Minister of Justice and report to the Prime Minister over New 
Zealand’s compliance with international human rights legislation. The Human 
Rights Commission also monitors and makes inquiries into infringements of 
human rights and often makes public statements on such issues. New Zealand 
has always believed it has led the world in human rights, with its status as the 
first country to legislate for women to vote, the introduction of old age pensions 
in the 1890s, and, as a recent report made by New Zealand to the United Nations 
on Human Rights states, ‘The idea that everyone deserves an equal opportunity 
in life — “a fair go” — is an important part of New Zealand’s national identity 
and approach to human rights on the international stage’ (New Zealand National 
Universal Periodic Review 2010).
Integrity of major institutions 
The starting point for any discussion under this heading must be the important 
National Integrity Systems Assessment report, which has called for each Australian 
jurisdiction to create a ‘non-partisan’ governance review council to coordinate 
the activities of the several bodies now concerned with issues of institutional 
integrity. It has also stressed the need for these councils to gain ‘institutional 
champions’ (Griffith University Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law and 
Transparency International 2005, p. 61; see also Head et al. 2008), and it is hard to 
see how political leaders could not be prominent among these champions.
The obvious place to start a search for such champions is the list of institutions 
provided by the report’s mapping exercise. Here we encounter a most surprising 
omission, for there is no acknowledgement of the integrity role that is being 
played, or could be played, by the head of state. Both former Governor-General 
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Paul Hasluck, who introduced important innovations in this area, and former 
Victorian Governor Richard McGarvie, who emerged a few years ago as the 
latest champion of the Hasluck approach (McGarvie 1999), are ignored.
New Zealand’s 1982 Official Information Act has been successful in promoting 
transparency and availability of information from the bureaucracy. Indeed, New 
Zealand has the enviable title of being the least corrupt country in the world 
(Transparency International 2013) and its public service has high standards 
of political neutrality in the Westminster tradition. However, institutions that 
administer the country are often weak against the powers of the executive. New 
Zealand’s compact and centralised institutions are dominated by the executive. 
The head of state, House of Representatives, judiciary and other limited state 
institutions are either unable or unwilling to provide strong scrutiny of the 
executive. This has been shown throughout New Zealand history. 
This occasionally elicits concern, with examples such as the Environment Act 
passed in May 2010, which sacked elected Environment Canterbury councillors 
and replaced them with government-appointed ones and delayed new elections 
until at least 2013 (The Press, 30 March 2010), or the September 2010 Canterbury 
Earthquake Response and Recovery Act which in the wake of earthquakes in 
the region gave the executive massive power to intervene by Order-in-Council, 
which cannot be challenged by the courts (New Zealand Law Society 2010). 
However, as part of the 2008 Confidence and Supply Agreement between the 
Maori and National parties, these actors have recently begun moves to establish 
a framework for the ‘Consideration of Constitutional Issues’ to examine New 
Zealand’s constitutional arrangements, especially concerning the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand 2010). How much 
this makes any progress for constitutional analysis or reform remains to be seen 
as the 2004–05 all party Constitutional Arrangements Committee had a similar 
brief, but achieved little. 
Referenda
The Australian Constitution has proven extremely difficult to change, with 
only eight proposals (of 44) being approved in referenda during more than a 
century. It is now more than a decade since any referendum was put to the 
people. Australia is thus far away from Ackerman’s preferred state — where 
the citizenry would regularly be accorded the opportunity to vote on major 
issues. Few commentators have considered the possibility that it has been the 
party system that has been responsible for many of the negative votes. While 
it has been widely recognised that bipartisan agreement has been a necessary 
prerequisite for success, few have pondered the implications of the observation 
of former Prime Minister John Howard that often even the securing of such 
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agreement might be counterproductive, in that the citizenry might have well-
founded suspicions that anything that the major parties agreed on might well 
serve their shared interests rather than the public interest. Clearly, any reforms 
that improved the fiducial standing of the party system could improve the chances 
of referendum success, as would regular referendum experience for the citizenry.
Constitutional change in New Zealand is easier than overseas and has far fewer 
hurdles to surmount than Australia. However, this has not meant that referenda 
have been carriers of change to the New Zealand regime. Indeed, with the very 
notable exception of MMP, all the major constitutional changes to New Zealand’s 
regime over the past 60 years have been delivered by the governing elite to the 
people without referenda. Referenda have been sporadic in New Zealand. Part of 
the reason for this is that unlike Australia, for example, there is no requirement 
to hold referenda on particular issues. Since 1993, New Zealanders have been 
able to initiate their own referenda and there have been almost 40 such citizen-
initiated petitions. However, a successful petition needs the signatures of 10 per 
cent of the electorate, and only three petitions have satisfied this requirement 
and come to vote. In conjunction with the November 2011 general election, 
the New Zealand electorate was asked in a referendum whether to retain MMP. 
Almost 58 per cent of the voters favoured the retention of MMP. As stipulated 
by the Electoral Referendum Act (2010), the Electoral Commission held its 
own independent review of MMP. However, this review’s findings, presented 
in October 2012, predictably did not advocate major institutional reforms, 
but instead provided suggestions for technical changes within the existing 
institutional framework (New Zealand Electoral Commission 2012). 
Federal structure 
The most recent review of the condition of Australian federalism (Fenna 
2009, p. 155) concluded that there was little compelling reason to support the 
continuation of the system, for there ‘has been the apparent absence of any 
sociological basis for divided jurisdiction in this country’. It could be, however, 
that there are other reasons — such as improvement in the quality of governance 
through a regime of serial referenda — that could still be persuasive. The best 
of the students of modern Australian federalism, Brian Galligan, has attempted 
to show how strong popular involvement has imparted republican legitimacy 
to the system.
Galligan searchingly uncovered and criticised a number of the premises that had 
long dominated thinking about the Australian constitutional system. His great 
accomplishment is to demonstrate that all the various proponents of responsible 
government have paid insufficient attention to the considerable constraints 
that have been placed on all our governments and their constituent branches 
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by our federal constitutional framework. These constraints are, in Galligan’s 
view (1995, p. 14), appropriate and legitimate, because federation entailed a 
‘transformative act of the Australian people’. In this respect, he is aligning 
himself with one of the two traditions that have dominated Australia’s ‘dual 
constitutional culture’: the federal (which Galligan favours), and parliamentary 
responsible government (Galligan 1995, p. 50). However, the blocking of full 
parliamentary responsible government carries considerable costs. As Sawer et 
al. (2009, p. 295) have recently observed: ‘The system creates subnational “veto 
points” that can obstruct policy which a national government has been elected 
to enact and hence frustrates “the will of the people”.’
This leads us to a problem: whether the contemporary citizenry will be satisfied 
that it has participated sufficiently in the shaping of the Australian constitutional 
framework for it to be accorded full democratic legitimacy. Unlike Galligan, who 
has been quite content to contend that the necessary constitutional legitimation 
was achieved in Australia in the one founding moment more than a century ago, 
Ackerman (2007, p. 1800) explicitly considers the implications of long lapses 
in time: ‘It is one thing for South Africans or Germans to follow a constitution 
handed down a decade, or a half-century, ago; quite another for Americans to 
cling to an antique text that fails to mark any of the nation’s recent achievements.’
The issues raised by Galligan and others on the Australian state are interesting 
when compared with New Zealand. Martin (2001) has convincingly demonstrated 
that the federal movement enjoyed much stronger support from colonial political 
leaders in Australia than in New Zealand. New Zealand is unitary, unicameral, 
and continues with an unwritten constitution (Levine 2004). Because of the 
absence of the above, New Zealand lacks any sub-national ‘veto points’ that 
can frustrate ‘the will of the people’. Again, unlike Australia, there are limited 
avenues for the ‘will of the people’ to be expressed other than at triennial 
national elections. New Zealand’s parliamentary responsible government is not 
responsible in a deliberative democracy way, as there are few forums other than 
the executive dominated single house chamber for this to occur, and minimal 
conventions on consultation on policy and constitutional matters. Two recent 
events in local government demonstrate the centralising and unitary favouring 
nature of the New Zealand regime. From November 2010, Auckland became a 
‘super city’ with the elimination of the regional council and the dis-establishment 
of seven city and district councils to make one powerful unitary ‘super council’ 
— the largest in Australasia (Royal Commission on Auckland Governance 2009). 
Perhaps this could make Auckland a sub-national veto point, but if so this will 
be at central government behest. The propensity for central interference was 
also seen in May 2010 when the elected Environment Canterbury councillors 
were sacked using legislation passed under urgency. The council members were 
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replaced by government-appointed ones and new elections were delayed until 
at least 2013, after disputes continued over Canterbury’s water management 
(The Press, 30 March 2010).
Strong upper house 
Bicameralism does not sit easily with Westminster regimes, but is nonetheless 
common in them. As the Abbe Sieyes observed long ago, if the governing party 
controls the upper house, much of what that house does is superfluous. If, on 
the other hand, the government of the day does not control the upper house, 
much of what it does will be obstructive (Uhr 2008, p. 13).4 Upper houses retain 
their attractiveness, however, for the more consensually-minded democrats, 
for in most jurisdictions they have shown greater readiness than their lower 
house colleagues to become involved in policy development through committee 
activity (Halligan et al. 2007). In modern democratic times, the balance of power 
has shifted towards lower houses in most bicameral regimes. In the Australian 
states, for example, most upper houses have lost much of their blocking 
powers. Contemporary theorising has also followed this trend; thus Ackerman’s 
framework of constrained parliamentarianism envisages an upper house with 
only ‘half’ powers.
Although Ackerman (2000, pp. 671 ff.) gives some consideration to federalism 
as one of the constraints in his framework, he does so in a curiously limited way. 
His discussion of federalism is devoted almost totally to the ways in which it 
can shape upper houses at the national level. In his advocacy of German-style 
‘half-house’ upper houses, he gives insufficient attention to the optimal balance 
that should be struck between the powers of an upper house, on the one hand, 
and its effectiveness, on the other. The Australian experience suggests that a 
‘half-house’ upper house might not be powerful enough to be properly effective 
and that greater powers might therefore be desirable, even though these powers 
might occasionally be misused. In addition, Ackerman’s focus on the relation 
between federalism and his preferred ‘one-and-a-half’ legislature raises a serious 
problem that he does not consider. Upper houses in federal systems are more 
likely to be in serious political conflict with their lower houses than are upper 
houses in unitary systems (Tsebelis and Money 1997, p. 212). 
There have been strong voices expressing a view contrary to that of Ackerman 
— that accountability should weigh more heavily than democracy. Consider, 
for example, some of the arguments recently advanced in the revealingly 
entitled volume Restraining Elective Dictatorship: The upper house solution. 
4 An innovation in Singapore has shown how the review function so often associated with upper houses 
might in a unicameral regime be discharged by another institution — in the case of Singapore, none other 
than a directly elected presidency: see Tan 1997.
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In the opening chapter of the volume, the editors make the important point 
that ‘an institution with its own democratic credentials constitutes a far more 
substantial accountability hurdle than any creation of ordinary statute law’ 
(Prasser et al. 2008, p. 6). They do not, however, go beyond the Parliament in 
their search for appropriate democratic mechanisms for holding the executive 
to account. Like the contributors that follow them, they do not directly address 
the problem caused by rigid party discipline. Instead, they seem to assume that 
the benefits of having an upper house that lacks a government majority will 
always outweigh the costs.
The Legislative Council of New Zealand was abolished in 1951 with alarming 
ease and was never replaced, though there have been several attempts to replace 
it. In its near 100 years of existence the non-elected Legislative Council did 
little to improve accountability or scrutiny of the executive (Jackson 1972; 
Kumarasingham 2010a). However, there have been numerous attempts and ideas 
first to reform and then to replace the Legislative Council; over 60 years on, the 
idea still has a few embers burning. The interest in bicameralism in New Zealand 
is in whether it could improve the institutional and deliberative performance of 
the state and act as a check on the executive, which still retains its hegemony 
despite MMP. Arguably many of the most controversial constitutional episodes 
since the abolition of the upper house could have been slowed at the very least 
with a renovated upper house in place. An upper house could have provided 
greater deliberation and accountability of such controversial events as the 
divisive 1951 waterfront strike and the government’s draconian response to it, 
the divisive social policies and economic autarky of Muldoon, and the radical 
privatisation under the fourth Labour government, which were often enacted 
without electoral mandate (Kumarasingham 2010a and 2010b; Aroney and 
Thomas 2012). 
Palmer and others have argued that select committees are New Zealand’s answer 
to any need of an upper house (Palmer and Palmer 2004). The 1985 reforms 
designed to strengthen their powers and extend their jurisdiction were 
introduced to toughen the legislature’s power to hold the executive accountable. 
Though MMP has changed the complexion of the committees so that more 
parties are represented, they are still simulacrums of parliamentary strength 
and therefore executive influence. Indeed, the Key government (and similar 
moves happened under Clark) has even appointed a Minister to head a select 
committee showing the limits of their democratic parliamentary ability to resist 
executive instruction let alone being able to robustly scrutinise and hold the 
executive to account. 
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Excursus? Two approaches to the comparative 
study of regimes: Ackerman and Siaroff 
compared
At first glance, the work of Siaroff (2009) appears to be closer than Ackerman 
(2000) to the central purposes of our governance project. He attends more 
closely to contemporary head of state functions. Indeed, his identification of the 
13 regimes where the head of state plays a corrective role is a valuable update 
of earlier work that he had done.5 Which brings us to the issue flagged at the 
outset: why has the Ackerman framework proven to be especially relevant to 
our concerns? In order to address this important question, we shall introduce 
a comparison of Ackerman with a more ‘mainstream’ student of comparative 
governance – Siaroff (2009). In his impressive work, Comparing Political Regimes 
(which, like all other mainstream works, ignores Ackerman), Siaroff suggests an 
original way of comparing New Zealand and Australia:
Table 1: Electoral System Centralism versus Localism





Source: Adapted from Siaroff 2009, Figure 8.1.
While this table strikingly suggests strong differences between the two regimes, 
we remain unsure of its heuristic standing. What, if anything, is the significance 
of Australia sharing a cell with Canada, Colombia, Comoros, India, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia, Palau, and the United States? What is the 
significance of New Zealand sharing a cell with Andorra, Estonia, Finland, 
Lesotho, Mauritius, Samoa, and San Marino?
5 On his reading of this earlier work — Siaroff 2003 — Power had nominated only six such ‘corrective’ 
regimes where the heads of state played roles similar to that had been developed in Australia by Governor-
General Hasluck (1979). The fuller list now supplied by Siaroff provides ample opportunities for the 
investigation of the ways in which heads of state around the world have managed the ‘dual mandate’ problem 
that has so vexed many Australian republicans: Power 2008. All 13 of the regimes identified are ‘semi-
presidential’ — Elgie 2004; Elgie and Moestrup 2007, 2008 — i.e. they have a directly elected head of state 
confronting a head of government enjoying the confidence of the legislature: Bulgaria*, Croatia, Ireland*, 
Lithuania*, Macedonia*, Mongolia, Poland*, Portugal, Romania*, Taiwan, Timor–Leste, Turkey (whose head 
of state will first be directly elected only in 2014), and the Ukraine. (NB: those marked with * are those earlier 
selected by Power).
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Of rather more interest in the current context is Siaroff’s understanding of 
‘supermajoritarianism’, for it represents a rather mechanical expression of 
Ackerman’s constraints. We can most conveniently see this if we list the seven 
variables that Siaroff uses to construct his index of supermajoritarianism:
• existence of sub-national governments of some power;
• bicameralism in the national legislature;
• judicial review of legislation;
• office of head of state with some power;
• referenda;
• consociational democracy; and
• difficulty of amending the constitution.
This brief comparison indicates a conclusion that at first glance does not seem 
all that striking: the approaches of differing students of comparative governance 
are heavily shaped by their purposes. Siaroff’s work is aimed at deepening our 
understanding of the key variables that underpin differing levels of performance 
of modern regimes. Ackerman, on the other hand, is more tightly focused on 
the openings for institutional reform offered by differing regimes. It is for 
this reason that we have found the Ackerman framework more useful for our 
project, for we are ultimately concerned with constitutional reform. While this 
concluding observation about differing purposes leading to different approaches 
and choices might seem commonplace enough, it is one that is seldom explicitly 
advanced in writings on comparative governance. It is time that it was.
Conclusion
This chapter strongly suggests that the concept of constraint is more nuanced 
and complex than we had thought when we began composing it. Conventionally, 
‘constraint’ is typically used as a virtual synonym with ‘restraint’. In order 
to correct this unduly negative conception, Power, following Ackerman, has 
contended that many constraints are better conceptualised as limits that support 
as they restrain. In our explorations, however, we have come to a somewhat 
different conclusion, for the nature of constraints varies considerably from 
one context to another. In general, constraints on executive power have been 
heavier and more rigid in Australia than in New Zealand, and are so experienced 
by members of political executives. Nothing constrains a political executive 
more heavily than the embedding of other political interests in long-established 
institutional structures (for example, those of a federal system).
In a unitary system such as New Zealand’s, the constraints may be less heavy, but 
nonetheless substantial, if only because they have been more freely chosen. Since 
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the Second World War, New Zealand has probably provided more instructive 
reform lessons that any other nation. From the abolition of the upper house of 
Parliament by a conservative government in the 1950s, through the most radical 
restructuring of the public service by a Labour government in the 1980s, to the 
sweeping overhaul of its electoral system in the 1990s, New Zealand displayed 
an unquenchable thirst for reform. Unlike the Westminster regime from which 
it derived, it lacked a set of established constraints on executive power that had 
evolved over many centuries. Unlike the other ‘dominions’, it came to lack many 
of the other institutional constraints — federalism, bicameralism, and a written 
constitution — that had helped them compensate for the absence of many of 
these historical constraints. These changes bore heavily on the constraints 
operating on the national political executive. In some ways, these new patterns 
of constraint were more demanding of the political executive than were those 
operating on its counterpart across the Tasman.
This suggests that the main value of the framework of constrained 
parliamentarism is not that of facilitating comparisons between regimes, but 
rather that of providing some benchmarks for the systematic tracing of the 
overall constraining pattern in each regime. Australia and New Zealand need 
such benchmarks to meaningfully test the health of their democracy.
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7. Is Implementation Only About 
Policy Execution?: Advice for public 
sector leaders from the literature
Evert Lindquist and John Wanna
Introduction
We were asked to undertake a review of the literature on policy implementation, 
delivering policy reform, and organisation change and to explore the implications 
for public sector leaders charged with implementing public policy in fluid, 
often turbulent, environments. The goal was to inform a short, accessible guide 
for public sector leaders (State Services Authority 2011). The research questions 
animating that review (with some adaptation) were as follows:
• How is the operating environment of the public sector distinctive with 
respect to the challenges of implementation?
• How should public sector leaders anticipate the need for policy reform and 
understand implications for their agencies, which may or may not have been 
involved in the design and implementation of the reforms? 
• How do public sector agency leaders work with governments and other 
public organisations to anchor reform? What leadership strategies and 
organisational capabilities are needed? 
• What are key success factors associated with successful implementation and 
how do public sector agency leaders know when reform has stuck? What are 
the indicators and metrics for assessing performance for implementation? 
• Why do reforms and implementation become derailed or lose momentum?
The volume and breadth of the policy implementation, policy reform and 
organisational change literature make it impossible, given our space constraints, 
to systematically review all of the contributions and provide detailed account 
of debates and insights. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a more 
detailed and accessible account of the literature on policy implementation, 
delivering policy reform, and organisation change, as well as to develop an 
integrating framework. It also seeks to identify concepts and theoretical 
frameworks approaches that will be useful to public sector executives seeking 
to anticipate, implement and anchor government commitments in ever-changing 
environments, including shifting and emerging new government priorities, and 
to mobilise their organisations to maintain focus and be agile. 
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There are several themes we would like to foreshadow. First, strategies and advice 
on anchoring policy implementation should directly acknowledge the conditions 
of generalised overload of the governance systems, the shifting attention spans of 
governments, the rapidly evolving environment of public agencies, the multiple 
demands on agencies, and the inherent complexity of most policy problems. All 
of these factors point to the need for anticipatory, focused and strategic agency 
leadership. Second, effective implementation for any agency — regardless of the 
nature of the reform initiative or how central the agency was in its design and 
implementation — requires clarity of mandate and reasonable expectations, sufficient 
capability for carrying out responsibilities, and recognition that implementation 
is an administrative and political challenge requiring ongoing engagement with 
ministers, stakeholders, and other public agencies, often associated with other levels 
of government. Third, a huge tension inherent in delivering policy reform is the 
need for public sector leaders to strike the right balance between implementing (or 
imposing) a given strategic reform versus leaving scope for learning and adjustment 
in the face of unknown and/or changing conditions for implementing organisations. 
The literature on policy implementation: An 
overview
The literature on policy implementation, which emerged during the 1970s and 
gained a great deal of recognition because of Pressman and Wildavsky’s seminal 
Implementation: How great expectations in washington are dashed in Oakland, or 
why it’s amazing that federal programs work at all (1973). However, Pressman 
and Wildavsky’s contribution, though a landmark, was part of burgeoning 
scholarly interest across several countries about why policy plans failed to meet 
their stated objectives. Moreover, this work was only one stream of writing on 
policy development, policy and program evaluation, knowledge and research 
utilisation, policy termination, etc. It was part of the policy movement that 
included establishing policy schools at universities and policy analysis and 
research units in government. The policy implementation literature was seen as 
exploring one phase of the larger policy cycle, which has always considered the 
implications of one phase for others and transcended artificial boundaries (for 
example, Hogwood and Gunn 1984; Bridgman and Davis 2000; Pal 1997). 
The literature on policy implementation is vast; there have been a succession 
of books (for example, Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Bardach 1977; Van 
Horn 1979; Nakamura and Smallwood 1980; Williams 1980; Williams et al. 
1982; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983; Goggin et al. 1990; Hill and Hupe 2009), 
collections and special issues (for example, Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981; 
Williams 1982; Ingram and Mann 1980; Palumbo and Calista 1990; Schofield and 
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Sausman 2004; Honig 2006a), and hundreds of articles and chapters following 
the explosion of literature during the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, many of the 
ideas reflect and build on broader insights permeating the policy-making and 
public management literature. An extensive set of references is provided at the 
end of this chapter (for more, see Hill and Hupe 2009; Goggin et al. 1990). 
To begin with, however, a few preliminary observations are in order. First, 
since the early 1970s contributors have grappled with how to deal with ‘wicked 
problems’ even though that nomenclature only recently came into common use 
(the term emerged with Rittel and Webber 1973). Second, the implementation 
literature has always had a practical orientation (that is, providing advice to 
political and administrative leaders alike), even though it can be theoretically 
and empirically informed in sophisticated ways — that said, its focus has been 
on chronicling how implementation worked and whether policy and program 
goals were achieved and, if not, explaining why not. Much of the literature is 
more evaluative than managerially inclined. Overviews of the trajectory of the 
literature can be found in numerous sources (Hill and Hupe 2009; Winter 2003; 
May 2003; O’Toole 2003; Meyers and Vorsanger 2003) and in almost every article. 
Finally, over the decades there has been considerable navel-gazing about the 
state of the literature on policy implementation (for example, Hjern 1982; Hill 
1997; Lester et al. 1987; Lester and Goggin 1998; Winter 1999; deLeon 1999a, 
1999b; Schneider 1999; Lester 2000; Kettunen 2000; Meier 1999; Potoski 2001; 
Goggin et al. 1990; O’Toole 1986, 2000, 2004; Barrett 2004; Scofield 2001, 2004; 
etc.). One claim surfacing in the late 1990s was that the literature had lost 
momentum, but Saetren (2005) and this chapter shows quite the opposite; there 
is more writing on aspects of implementation in a greater variety of journals, 
with diverse themes taken up in different ways, under different labels, and often 
in distinct substantive fields (for example, education, health, etc.). 
The early trajectory of the policy 
implementation literature
The earliest contributions to the literature opened up the field by pointing to 
the gap between policy goals and results (for example, Pressman and Wildavsky 
1973). In particular, there was considerable interest in how policies and programs 
legislated at the national or federal level of government might not have achieved 
the hoped-for results on the ground, and how they could take shape in very 
different ways in different sub-national and local jurisdictions. Interestingly, even 
though the terminology of ‘wicked problems’ and ‘service-delivery networks’ 
were not invoked at the time, a review of the literature quickly shows that most 
of the writing of the 1970s and 1980s were indeed about national government 
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programs seeking to address tough social and other challenges, and often sought 
to do so in collaboration with state-level governments and non-profit and other 
providers. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, of course, scholars and practitioners 
alike developed an interest in the notion of policy and service-delivery networks, 
and this language permeates modern implementation studies and discourse. 
All accounts found in the implementation literature acknowledge that early 
contributions rapidly divided into two broad streams and orientations:
• Top-down perspectives and analysis seeking to explain why policy did not 
have its intended effects in terms of outcomes or exploring better ways to 
implement policy as designed. Hill and Hupe (2009) suggest that the exemplars 
of the top-down approaches include Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Van 
Meter and Van Horn (1975), Bardach (1977), Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981), 
and Hogwood and Gunn (1984). In this stream of literature, policy outcomes 
that differed from those intended were seen as failures, distortions, evidence 
of lack of willingness of staff in field operations, legislative interference, 
other levels of governments, and third-party providers to comply with 
central policy edicts. In addition to seeking to identify the causes of 
divergence from intended policy, such writing was dedicated to finding 
better ways for central authorities to anticipate implementation challenges 
and the behaviours of delivering agents, to better coordinate implementation 
activities within and across governments, and to identify better tools and 
instruments for achieving policy goals and objectives. This writing, usually 
examining US programs (but not always), often explored implementation 
issues for the national government in the context of federalism, working 
with state and local governments and non-profit and for-profit organisations 
to deliver programs. 
• Bottom-up perspectives on implementation seeking to explain why outcomes 
diverged from policy intentions by studying the behaviour of actors in the 
implementation chain: field staff and in other government and delivery 
organisations (either dysfunction or better-than-designed approaches). 
Seminal studies explored the reactions of implicated organisations and staff 
(Van Meter and Van Horn 1975), the reactions of overloaded street-level 
bureaucrats (Weatherly and Lipsky 1977; Lipsky 1980), the behaviour of 
individuals, groups, and organisations reacting in organisational and political 
ways to central plans (Hjern 1982; Ingram 1977), the under-specification and 
often poorly communicated policies and subsequent interpretation by staff 
and others (Yanow 1993), and the natural effects of ambiguity, diverging 
interests, bargaining and negotiation (Matland 1995; Barrett 2004). 
These emphases and divisions in the literature persist to this day, notwithstanding 
efforts to integrate the two perspectives. Many practitioners and scholars continue to 
seek to find better ways to execute or measure the impact of policy as originally defined 
7 . Is Implementation Only About Policy Execution?
213
in legislation, while others are more interested in the dynamics of implementation, 
exploring issues from the vantage point of implementation agents such as regional 
field offices, frontline staff, non-government delivery organisations, and clients. 
Interestingly, at an early point these analytic streams were heavily informed by 
organisation theory (for example, Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Elmore 1979; 
Berman 1978; Barrett and Fudge 1981; Montjoy and O’Toole 1979; O’Toole and 
Montjoy 1984) and this continues to this day (for example, Honig 2006a, 2006b). 
This takes the load off this chapter to review the literature on organisational 
theory, behaviour, change, and development, because many insights have 
long been factored into implementation analysis, albeit in varying ways. Their 
insights remain salient for policy practitioners and agency heads to this day. 
Integrative implementation frameworks:  
Top-down/bottom-up
While the top-down and bottom-up perspectives remain distinct traditions 
and themes in the policy implementation literature, there were early efforts 
to develop comprehensive and integrative theories and frameworks. These 
contributions recognised that the top-down and bottom-up perspectives each 
identified important variables and issues. Some of these contributions include 
the following: 
• Backwards-mapping: Elmore’s (1979) seminal contribution focused on why and 
how policy designers should engage in backwards-mapping when undertaking 
top-down design to anticipate frontline dynamics and behaviours. He suggests 
that it is important to maximise discretion for managers closer to where policy 
is delivered. This perspective goes beyond the ‘chain-of-steps’ approach of 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) or the guerrilla tactics implied by Bardach’s 
Implementation Game (1977). Elmore sees policy as partially emergent, and 
implementation likely requiring bargaining and negotiation, and asks whether 
policies as conceived anticipate the behaviour of frontline staff.
• Contingency and implementation: Berman (1978, 1980) suggests that policy 
implementation strategies differ depending on the scope of change, degree 
of technical certainty, degree of consensus, amount of coordination required, 
and the stability of environment. For the purposes of analysis, he set out two 
very different implementation strategies — programmed versus adaptive 
— with the former better specified and more about compliance in tightly 
coupled systems, and the latter less defined, more emergent in loosely 
coupled systems, and shaped relatively more further into the process and 
from the bottom-up. Neither is innately superior; their efficacy depends on 
the circumstances. 
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• Ambiguity and conflict: Like Berman (1978), Matland (1995) sought to 
reconcile top-down and bottom-up perspectives with a contingency 
approach by suggesting that different implementation styles are effective for 
different contexts. His much-cited typology identified four distinct styles 
and contexts: administrative, for low ambiguity and conflict environments; 
political, for high conflict and low ambiguity situations; experimental, for 
low conflict and high ambiguity contexts; and symbolic implementation 
when ambiguity and conflict are high. 
• Embracing complexity: Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) drew on Sabatier 
(1986) to develop a sophisticated integrative framework, embracing all of the 
top-down and bottom-up factors identified in the literature. It included all 
as variables that might influence and condition the implementation process 
(see Diagrams 1 (p. 215) and 2 (p. 216)). They note that implementation can 
be evaluated from many different vantage points: the centre, periphery and 
target groups (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983, p. 11). However, their work 
ultimately used enacted legislation as a point of departure and sought to 
explain why policies do not succeed and the circumstances under which 
they can be better specified to achieve desired goals. 
• Interdependence and task requirements: O’Toole and Montjoy (1984) 
drew on organisation theory to analyse different potential patterns in 
‘interorganisational policy implementation’. Informed by the seminal work 
of Thompson (1967), this approach elegantly considers the different kinds of 
interdependence among organisations flowing from the nature of the policy, 
the distribution of authorities, and task requirements. It is congruent with 
bottom-up approaches focusing on implementing entities, and the need to 
collaborate across agencies (Bardach 1997) and with frontline officials and 
service delivery entities. 
• Exchange and bargaining: Stoker (1989) offers an ‘implementation regime’ 
framework designed to embrace top-down features and concerns (central 
authority seeking compliance, despite the challenge of complexity and 
securing intended objectives in federal systems) with bottom-up (competing 
values, diffuse authority, and likely bargaining and conflict resolution among 
the middle and frontline organisations, and clients). Policy implementation is 
cast as an exchange process where value can be added by different actors, and 
does not presume that all politics is completed in design phase. Moreover, the 
process deals with unanticipated or insufficiently acknowledged matters, and 
sees implementation as a bargaining game and local participants as problem-
solvers. The framework anticipates a dynamic and evolutionary approach 
from initiation to routinisation to reformulation. Ultimately, Stoker sought to 
show how broader governance regimes as rules and norms condition these 
dynamics and produce accommodation, and broaden our notions of how 
cooperating can be secured and what constitutes ‘performance’. 
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• Information and incentives: Goggin et al. (1990) set out a dynamic 
model of implementation which they call a ‘communications’ model of 
intergovernmental policy implementation. This taps not only into cybernetic 
models, but also multi-level institutions, and includes variables pertaining 
to inducements, constraints, resources, federal and state ecological capacity, 
feedback from actors to policy authorities, and outcomes. Ultimately, 
though, this approach is about ascertaining the effectiveness of different 
policies across sectors and jurisdictions, and is less about developing a better 
strategic or managerial approach. The framework is intended to inform more 
systematic social science research on implementation, whereas Mazmanian 
and Sabatier (1983) sought to speak to scholarly and practitioner audiences. 
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Source: Adapted from Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983.
These efforts to integrate and acknowledge that designing effective policy and 
implementation strategies requires understanding the nature of a policy, its 
broader political history and environment, its complexity, and the organisational 
and broader environment. There is no one best way to implement. Successful 
implementation strategies are contingent, and will differ across policies, 
domains, and jurisdictions. As Berman (1978), Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981), 
and Matland (1995) suggest, these strategies and observed behaviours might 
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vary with respect to the level of analysis and over time. Importantly, an 
implication of Stoker (1989) is that a policy may be underspecified, whether by 
design or not, for the implementation challenges at hand. 
Another form of integration, similar to Goggin et al. (1990), can be found in a 
wide range of systematic efforts under the labels of ‘evaluations’, ‘trials and 
pilots’ and ‘quasi-experiments’ which, in different ways, seek to measure and 
account for variation in the performance and efficacy of policies. These empirical 
and data-rich (big-N) studies also started to emerge and gather steam as part of 
the evaluation stream in the policy analysis movement in the 1960s and 1970s. 
We do not have the space here to review such studies, but a review of Lynn 
et al. (2001), Ingraham and Lynn (2004), and the Journal of Policy Analysis 
and Management over the last 10 years will quickly provide a sense of this 
perspective. In order to account for differing performance, investigators specify 
indicators similar to many of the factors and variables considered important to 
implementation researchers, including resources, actors, constraints, incentives, 
time, etc. However, the ultimate focus differs; the emphasis in these studies is 
on accounting for and explaining performance, whereas implementation studies 
have typically sought to understand strategies and capacities. Indeed, often 
pilots and trials were put in place to avoid full ‘testing’ by rolling out a large-
scale, national policy intervention. 
Recent developments in the policy 
implementation literature
The implementation literature has continued to grow and branch out during 
the 1990s and early 2000s (Saetren 2005). The best single source for an overview 
of the scholarly literature is the second edition of Hill’s and Hupe’s (2009) 
comprehensive monograph, which is targeted for researchers rather than 
practitioners. Here we will briefly describe the ways in which the literature has 
deepened, some of which has involved levering insights from related streams of 
literature:
• Increasing use of more sophisticated concepts and methodologies for better 
recognising and analysing the broader organisational networks that emerge or 
are encountered as governments seek to deliver policy and services: There is 
better appreciation of different kinds of networks, network dynamics, the 
reality of multiple goals and interests, the extent to which governments 
might directly or indirectly shape networks, and how they might work in 
more productive and collaborative approaches (O’Toole et al. 1997; Klijn 
and Teisman 1997). Other contributions have shed light on the work of 
intermediary organisations, not directly in the chain of government hierarchy, 
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but supporting policy authorities, line bureaucracies, and delivery agents 
(for example, Honig 2004a). 
• Greater use of principal-agent, public choice, and game-theory perspectives 
to sharpen insights, testable propositions, and empirical studies on policy 
implementation: This reflects broader analytic trends in the social sciences, 
public administration, and political science. It might be thought that such 
frameworks would tend to focus primarily on the issues having to do 
with compliance, coordination, and performance (or many of the themes 
associated with top-down issues), but game theory has also been used to 
model more dynamic features and behaviour in networked contexts, driven 
by incentives, rules, the availability of information, monitoring capability, 
etc. (for example, Klijn and Teisman 1997; Goggin et al. 1990).
• Increased interest in the merits and implications of choosing a mix of policy 
instruments in order to navigate networks and challenging implementation 
environments: Scholars have recognised that implementation often involves 
working with networks, requiring better appreciation of indirect and direct 
strategies working at the organisational and network levels, in potentially 
more collaborative environments (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof 1997; 
Howlett 1991, 2005). This in turn requires new forms of leadership, skill 
and knowledge in government and public administration organisations. 
Howlett (2005) drew attention to policy and implementation styles, referring 
to the repertoires and cultures of dominant coalitions, including government 
agencies and other key interests, in particular policy sectors. Such styles 
should be understood if they are to be navigated, altered or overcome. 
• Increased awareness of whole-of-government, cross-government, horizontal, 
and multi-level governance environments of implementation: Like the 
increased awareness of instrument-mix and networked environments, this 
work suggests broader perspectives on how to approach policy design and 
implementation strategies, including coordination and mutual adjustment 
strategies across departments and agencies, and levels of government to 
better achieve desired outcomes (Management Advisory Committee 2004; 
Howlett 2005). 
• Fostering inter-organisational collaboration: This has long been an important 
theme in the implementation literature (for example, Van Meter and Van 
Horn 1975; O’Toole and Montjoy 1984; O’Toole 2003). More recently, it has 
been explored with respect to the extent of trust and goal congruence as pre-
conditions (Lundin 2007a, 2007b). This work recognises that, in networked 
contexts, cooperative and adaptive strategies will be required to address 
tensions arising from competing values and interests (Cline 2000). At a more 
micro-level, there has been increasing acknowledgement of the importance 
of getting agencies to work together (Bardach 1997), emerging from early 
analysis of implementation games (Bardach 1977). Bardach’s recent work 
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is called ‘craftsmanship theory’, dedicated to exploring the conditions for 
bottom-up and lateral collaboration and leadership across agencies, even 
after top-down announcements. 
• Anticipation and collaboration as a strategy for adapting to multi-level, 
dynamic implementation environments: Complexity and ‘wicked problems’ 
are inherent features of many implementation challenges (otherwise it would 
be relatively straight-forward to proceed with a top-down, programmed 
strategy), along with ambiguity and value-conflict. Mazmanian and Sabatier 
(1983) tackled this head on, providing scenarios for leaders to consider 
when designing strategies (see next section for more detail). Exworthy and 
Powell (2004) tapped into agenda-setting models to point out that, adopting 
and implementing policies in the congested state are not only a matter of 
waiting for the right windows opening across a central government, but also 
eventually at the local level across delivery agencies, which must collaborate 
with each other. This presumes that a reasonably good chain of relationships, 
resources, and incentives extend from the centre of government to regional 
operations of departments working at the local level. 
• Examining how implementing agents get informed, interpret and build skill 
for the policies they are to implement: Hill (2003) reviews how street-level 
bureaucrats access ‘implementation resources’ (ideas, skills, practices, 
rationale, etc.), contractors, academics, entrepreneurs, foundations, trade 
journals, and professional associations to interpret policy intentions, 
ascertain appropriate organisation behaviours, and identify new theories 
and skills to guide practice. Honig (2004a, 2004b) analyses how intermediary 
organisations — which she refers to as the ‘new middle management’ but 
which stands outside the implementation chain — can serve both policy 
authorities and implementing agents provide such resources, including 
policy-specific and system knowledge. Schofield (2004) refers to the 
challenge of managers interpreting and operationalising policy as ‘learned 
implementation’ (see Diagrams 1 (p. 215) and 2 (p. 216)), which can increase 
motivation and commitment. Spillaine et al. (2002) and Yanow (1993) 
analyse this as a sense-making and meaning-making activity by individuals, 
groups, and organisations. Kelman (2005) shows how administrative leaders 
can identify and unleash ‘reform coalitions’ from within organisations to 
implement new policy regimes. 
• Closer examination of various organisational capabilities to guide 
implementation at the centre of government: This writing reviews efforts to 
build capabilities for oversight such as tracking systems, project management, 
cabinet implementation units, problem-solving teams, and gateway reviews 
for major projects (Lindquist 2006; Barber 2007; Marsh and Fawcett 2010). 
Honig (2003, 2006b) considers how central administration offices facilitate 
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implementation of educational policy reforms. These can be seen as more 
modern efforts to shape and fix implementation games (Bardach 1977). 
• If implementation can be viewed as part of the democratic governance process, 
it is legitimate that various interests work hard to reshape policy to meet the 
needs of groups and communities: Congruent with the adaptation perspective, 
this possibility was recognised as high-conflict implementation situations 
by writers such as Matland (1995). DeLeon and deLeon (2002) suggest that 
a ‘consensual theory of implementation’ should be developed and, as we 
discuss below, Patashnik (2008) sees implementation as the next and sustained 
round of political and policy debate. To some extent, their approach seeks to 
explicitly recognise and bring politicians back into implementation analysis.
These newer concepts and perspectives have not turned the implementation 
literature on its head, but sharpen the analysis of many of the themes, issues 
and strategies it has long broached. As we see later, many have relevance for the 
kind of advice that would be relevant for public sector agency leaders. 
Recent literature on delivering sustainable 
policy reform
There has been growing interest in the topic of delivering policy reform that is 
durable; many of the themes in this literature overlap heavily with the traditional 
implementation literature, but it is more explicitly political in that it seeks to 
understand how reforms get anchored and this usually involves political mobilisation 
and strategies. Barber (2007) and Lindquist (2006) have explored these themes with 
respect to creating bureaucratic capacities at the centre of government to monitor 
the progress of government priorities, to fix problems as they arise, and to drive 
change. Here the focus is more on making good on government priorities. 
The writing that has gained most attention and animated a recent ANZSOG 
conference comes from the work of Erik Patashnik (2003; 2008). While Patashnik 
relies heavily on the implementation literature, he considers broadly how 
implementation works at the political level as opposed to the organisational or 
managerial levels. His work presumes, as does that of deLeon and deLeon (2002) 
and Matland (1995), that policy implementation often proceeds in contested and 
conflict-ridden domains, and that concerted political mobilisation is essential 
for ensuring policy durability and success. It picks up themes found early on 
in the implementation literature (Bardach 1977) that the implementation phase 
essentially provides another opportunity to undermine, re-make or elaborate 
an approved policy. Seen this way, implementation is just another forum for 
policy contestation. By means of comparing several different cases, Patashnik 
considers how political and administrative leaders blocked efforts by groups 
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opposed to new policy regimes and prevent political erosion of those policies, 
how they established and mobilised new coalitions of interests in support of the 
new policy frameworks, and made accommodations to galvanise those interests. 
An important contribution of this work is that it points to the time horizons 
required for policy implementation, noting that administrative strategies and 
tactics cannot likely proceed and succeed without significant political support. 
Interestingly, Patashnik’s analysis has an important precursor in the implementation 
literature: Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) identified implementation scenarios 
that took into account distinct political and economic contexts, and explicitly 
acknowledge the time horizons involved when attempting to secure change. It is 
a more dynamic and strategic way to understand Matland’s (1995) analysis (see 
Diagram 3, next page). In short, Patashnik (2008) provides some case studies to 
complement these early insights. Crosby (1996) provides similar perspectives on 
what it takes to anchor structural-adjustment regimes in developing countries, 
which involves not only mobilising organisational capabilities and political 
support, but also leadership, new perspectives, skills and time. 
There has also emerged work on ‘policy execution’ in the consulting world 
(Eggers and O’Leary 2009), invoking terminology from the early days of the 
literature (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975). This work definitely elicits more 
attention than policy implementation and is a direct response to the notion 
that government and public sector organisations often find it difficult to (but 
must) follow-through on the commitments they have made, and must find 
contemporary ways to do so. Indeed, the Eggers and the Barber contributions 
represent a huge strand of for-profit and consulting expertise seeking to bring 
private-sector techniques and perspectives into the government sector. This 
work does not contribute much from a conceptual or empirical perspective, and 
the terminology belies the notion that the challenges are, in fact, quite complex, 
and require the mobilisation of resources, multiple partners, networks, and 
learning — themes long in the scholarly and applied literature. 
However, Lindquist and Wanna (2011) point to limitations of the ‘delivering 
policy reform’ and ‘policy execution’ perspectives. These perspectives seek to 
maintain the integrity of original policy designs and consider the ongoing political 
and administrative effort required to anchor policy over many years in complex 
institutional environments, the politics for political and administrative leaders of 
fighting or neutralising interests seeking to undermine the policy reforms, and 
explore balancing the need to modify reforms so they work better and anchoring 
the reforms with fidelity to original intentions. Similar to the ‘compliance’ 
perspective found in the early implementation literature, the original policy goals 
are taken as given, and implementation seeks to deliver and execute them, with 
implication that they are a government priority and require central monitoring 
and oversight, and thus are infused with a ‘performance’ orientation. 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Diagram 3: How policy outputs and target-group compliance conform 
with statutory objectives over time: Four scenarios 
Source: Adapted from Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983.
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These perspectives, however, presume that the logic and theory behind the 
policy reforms is correct, and that the necessary organisational capabilities are 
ready, and that the environment remains congruent for its implementation. 
If these conditions are not met, the policy will have to be adjusted and even 
reformulated, placing us squarely back into the realm of the adaptive and 
learning perspectives on implementation. The key tension here concerns the 
extent to which policy reforms can be modified without losing their integrity 
and momentum. Indeed, one could envision a tipping point where policies have 
been anchored, but can be modified in a positive manner without returning to 
the previous regimes considered to be unproductive or unfair. 
Policy implementation: The organisational 
dimension
There is a huge literature on organisations and organisational change, most 
of which focuses on corporate sector and for-profit organisations, where the 
aim is to increase profitability, meet market and customer needs, etc. Most of 
this literature, unlike what we have reviewed above, is not focused on public 
organisations and the complex and fluid environments in which they work 
(although it does consider the challenge of working in evolving and increasingly 
networked environments). Conversely, the literature has been heavily informed 
by organisation theory and change perspectives. 
Our purpose here is to identify some key areas to consider how agency leaders of 
public organisations might anticipate and work towards anchoring policy reforms 
introduced by governments. We make a distinction between the external-strategic 
dimension, which is more complicated due to public governance dynamics and 
constraints, and the internal-strategic dimension, which takes leaders somewhat 
more squarely into the traditional parameters of the organisational change and 
development literature. Key themes to consider are as follows:
• Executives must anticipate and prepare organisations for change: This requires 
scanning and analysing policy and organisational environments, forging 
new alliances, adopting new technologies, preparing executive colleagues 
for new responsibilities that might come their way, recruiting at the apex 
and in critical areas elsewhere in the organisation with these considerations 
in mind, and communicating with staff and stakeholders (for example, 
Selznick 1957).
• Executives must assess how organisational culture fits with implementation 
tasks: Leaders should have a nuanced sense of the nature and source of the 
culture(s) in their organisation, and which parts may most resist versus be 
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capable of taking on new tasks and responsibilities (Wilson 1989). They must 
ascertain whether new capabilities or units are required for new roles and 
responsibilities (for example, cope with crisis, adopt new technology, work 
with clients or partners in a fundamentally different way, deliver higher 
probity/accountability, etc.). 
• Executives must identify new values, meaning, and narratives: The arrival of 
a new policy often requires that executives understand them as potentially 
bringing in new values, meanings and priorities, which implies consciously 
and proactively striking new balances among existing and new values, and 
developing new language and frames — the process of sense-making — not 
only for communicating the nature of the new challenges but also linking 
them to previous understandings and meanings (Barnard 1938; Selznick 
1957). Moreover, this needs to be considered not only for the executive’s 
organisation but also the larger network of organisations involved in the 
implementation.
• New tasks require different expertise and relationships: New policies usually 
require different or new task structures and ways of doing work, new 
and different mixes of professional expertise, and imply different task 
environments in the sense of different organisations to link with inside and 
outside the organisation (Thompson 1967; Wilson 1989). Agency leaders 
need to have a fine-grained sense of how specific task environments will 
shift for implicated units in their organisations, how this will affect more 
general balances struck across the organisation, and the extent to which 
this will affect the organisation’s sense of mission and culture, whether new 
understandings and frames need to be developed. 
• New tasks could imply structural change and new repertoires: Taking on new 
tasks goes beyond thinking about new leadership and capabilities in a public 
organisation. It may also have structural and process implications. As new 
units are established around new tasks and to instil new values, frames, 
and culture, structural change may be required in the larger organisation in 
order to ensure coordination inside and outside the organisation, despite the 
upheaval and human and other costs of proceeding, and work and decision-
making may have to proceed in different ways. This needs to be anticipated, 
monitored, and changed if required. 
• Embedding change is hard work: The challenge of anchoring or embedding 
change with respect to incentives, work practices, cultures, and monitoring 
is an enduring theme in the organisational change literature (Kotter 1990, 
1996), and is no less important for policy implementation. Agency leaders 
must carefully consider the internal incentives for staff to work in new 
ways and potentially with different partners. Again, this points to assessing 
the extent to which there is a need for professional development, new 
recruitment mixes for leaders and core staff alike, and whether monitoring 
7 . Is Implementation Only About Policy Execution?
225
and performance systems are aligned with the new and/or expanded 
objectives of the organisation. 
• Internal change is as important as external change: Typically, agency heads 
are more focused on external challenges and contingencies, leaving managers 
and frontline staff to work through implementing strategies. However, 
the greater the change flowing from policy implementation (breadth and 
amount of departure from current practice), the more demand there will 
be for significant organisational change, requiring that leaders have greater 
strategic engagement with staff and encouraging creative thinking on their 
part, and, of course, the stakes for dealing with the external environment 
will be raised considerably. This suggests that leaders need to balance how 
they allocate their time and strategic effort, since both dimensions are critical 
for success.
• Leading organisations in networks: Much of the traditional organisational 
change literature has focused on how leaders can change the values, 
capabilities and focus of staff. However, in recent years this has been greatly 
complicated by many organisations having to work in very different ways 
as a result of new technology, new economic realities, and new expectations 
of clients and external environments. Increasingly, leaders and their 
organisations must learn how to work in partnerships, and collaborative 
and networked arrangements as a matter of course, and sometimes under 
stress and in fluid environments. This requires finding leaders with the 
right expertise who are comfortable with working in more collaborative 
ways. 
• Banking on change: Leaders seeking to implement policies and programs 
must anticipate continual change, arising from not only the evolution 
of ongoing initiatives but also the arrival of other priorities, such as 
additional policies to implement, the adoption of new technologies and 
reporting systems, and the inevitable calls for restraint. The key challenge 
here is how to maintain engagement, motivation, and strategic focus in 
the organisation to bed down policy initiatives in the midst of competing 
priorities and potential turmoil.
There are vast streams of literature on the topics enumerated above, and we 
cannot do justice to the evolution of thinking in those areas. What is important 
about the themes and topics identified above is that they bring an organisational 
dimension to the policy implementation challenges which are the focus of this 
paper, and which need to be brought to bear on the strategic considerations for 
agency heads as they prepare themselves and their organisations for moving 
forward. 
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Pulling it all together: Implications for public 
sector leaders
This section distils implications from the literature in order to answer the 
research questions identified in the introduction of this chapter. We have 
supplemented them with some other questions we think are pertinent to the 
goals underpinning the literature review.
How is the public sector operating environment unique? 
Both the policy implementation and the policy reform literature study the 
challenge of converting adopted public policy and government intentions into 
workable, sustainable programs and achieving intended results. Like the new 
public management reforms of the late-1980s and 1990s, the policy execution 
and organisational change literature often seeks to draw lessons from the 
private sector, but are often simplistic because the public sector environment 
is more complex and challenging. Figure 1 (opposite) provides a long list of 
the distinctive features of government responsibilities and associated challenges 
when attempting to implement new policies. 
This list shows that implementing policy in a public sector environment promises 
to be challenging, and the literature has always understood it as such. We believe 
that there is little that the public sector can learn from the private sector in this 
regard. Yes, it would be wonderful to have clear goals, strong and enduring 
political support, well-aligned stakeholder and service-delivery networks, fully 
capable lead agencies and partners willing to collaborate, and reasonably stable 
environments, including funding; but it is difficult to imagine counting on this 
in a public-sector context. Moreover, new governance challenges have emerged; 
more fluid political and funding environments, and more attentive media and 
critics. However, good leaders should be aware of these challenges and, in light 
of the considerable writing and experience with implementation, presumably 
be better prepared about how to plan and strategise in the face of them. 
How should public sector agency leaders anticipate 
and prepare for reform? 
This question is interesting because most observers presume that executive 
leaders of departments and agencies were informed of policy reforms and 
involved in their design. But these can be heroic assumptions for two reasons: a 
secretary or chief executive may not have been in the policy design and approval 
loop, and not privy to all of the considerations and balances that informed the 
decisions; and a secretary or chief executive may be new to the position or the
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• Governments are typically the custodians (or agents of last resort) of many difficult or 
wicked problems (homelessness, poverty, crime, health, etc .) .
• Policy interventions to these problems often involve working with multiple and often 
reluctant partners, including different levels of governments and organisations in 
different sectors . Often these ‘partners’ actively resisted the adopted policy and/or 
have other priorities .
• In addition to the general challenge of overload, the attention of political leadership 
will likely shift due to crisis and other pressing challenges, so securing the government 
and ministerial engagement for seeing a newly adopted public policy through may be 
difficult.
• State governments are often recipients of Commonwealth policy initiatives (and may 
have shaped them through negotiations of some sort) and may have different visions, 
priorities and preferred approaches to implementing policy .
• State governments and agencies will be the enacting authorities for policies, seeking 
to deliver policies and programs with one or more department or agency and their 
regional operations, and often with local governments, non-profit/community groups, 
and contractors .
• The accountability environment for implementing public sector agencies is unforgiving, 
with the 24-hour news cycle and the scrutiny of opposition parties and a variety of 
audit and monitoring agencies, which ensures that delays, oversights, and mistakes 
can quickly become front-page news and comprise the reputation of governments .
• Despite announced plans of the Commonwealth and state governments, the availability 
of resources or even political agreements cannot always be counted upon due to 
factors and considerations beyond the policy to be implemented, suggesting that 
agency leaders should be prepared for different scenarios and to adapt .
• Beyond the matters of resourcing and political agreements, the structure of incentives 
and the oversight regime confronting all actors in the delivery chain, including state 
governments, is critical to ensuring take-up and degree of success .
• The amount of technical and cultural shift inherent in new policy regimes, the lead 
times for implementation, the number and capabilities of key stakeholders, the 
nature and quality of reform coalitions, and the readiness and centrality of a lead or 
supporting agencies vary considerably across policy initiatives creating distinct policy 
and administrative challenges .
• The extent of political interest of governments in anchoring a reform beyond adoption, 
the willingness and capabilities of reform opponents to resist, and the skill and 
adroitness of agency heads in working with political leaders and other stakeholders to 
further implementation .
Figure 1: Policy and implementation challenges for government
appointment may have been announced as part of the policy reform or in the 
wake of it. In either case, the agency head needs to quickly learn of the rationale, 
expectations, and nuances behind the decision, including the extent to which 
other levels of government and potential service providers were informed and 
perhaps had expectations about their roles, resourcing, flexibility, etc. 
Public sector leaders, particularly those new to their responsibilities, need to 
fully understand the origins of the policy, including the needs, pressures, and 
the politics that led to its enactment. Moreover, they also need to appreciate 
the range of actors implied in the upstream of policy development and the 
downstream of implementation, their interests, capabilities, and ability to block
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and further the policy as originally designed. They need to understand the role of 
their agency in the firmament of actors involved with implementing the policy, as well 
as its sources of power, influence, and leverage. Much depends, of course, whether an 
agency was a policy-taker or policymaker in the upstream of the policy development, 
and whether it will be an implementation lead or contributor in the downstream. 
The literature on organisations and change has long suggested that leaders — 
whether of private or public organisations — should be scanning environments 
for threats and opportunities, and preparing their organisations for change. 
This implies developing anticipatory repertoires such as strategic planning and 
environmental scanning, and open-minded and alert leadership. In a public 
sector context, this would also include regular communication with political 
leaders and agency-head colleagues, awareness of what comparator sectors 
and agencies have been experiencing in other jurisdictions, and monitoring 
stakeholder, client and citizen needs and satisfaction. 
Why do reforms become derailed or lose momentum? 
Implementing significant reforms can take several years, and sometimes even 
decades, for all the foundational elements to put in place, secured, and made 
sustainable. Two critical questions, however, are: is the reform yet another 
in a long line of reforms on an overloaded agenda, or if it is a top priority 
of a government performance-monitoring from the centre?; and, can political 
attention be sustained at the implementation phase, increasing momentum and 
the room for manoeuvre for agency leaders as they seek to implement a policy 
reform? In some cases, reform proposals are driven by politicians (ministers) 
while in others reforms are often sponsored by agency leaders and or other 
significant stakeholders (for example, tariff reform). 
These questions are important because as has long been apparent from 
the literature, there is no shortage of factors which could undermine the 
implementation of a policy. Figure 2 (opposite) provides a long list of the 
factors working to undermine implementation of policy reforms. Despite this 
depressingly long list of negative dynamics and possibilities, many policies and 
substantial programs and reforms do get enacted, flowing from good leadership 
and no small amount of foresight, creativity, and good fortune (Patashnik 2008; 
Lindquist, Vincent and Wanna 2011). We turn to these factors next. 
How do public sector agency leaders make reform stick?
If a policy is well-designed and properly resourced, and the environment 
congruent with expectations inherent in the design, then it is possible for a 
programmed solution to be implemented and made to stick — otherwise there 
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• Unclear or inconsistent policy designs, including poor choice of instruments .
• Under-specification of a new policy variously in order to secure approval, because 
not enough was known about how things work, or it was understood there will be 
‘learning-by-doing’ .
• Insufficient recognition of the inherent complexity not only of the problem seeking 
to be remedied but also of the solution arrived at as a ‘public policy’ (i .e . making the 
policy work is more complex than imagined at the design phase) .
• Value conflicts and interest conflicts, impossibility of securing consensus, agreement 
on means and ends, and how to evaluate outcomes .
• Insufficient anticipation of implementation challenges, including the motivations and 
power of intermediary organisations and street-level bureaucrats, and the incentives 
and resources required to engage, mobilise and influence them as well as the policy’s 
target groups .
• Insufficient political and administrative leadership assigned for implementing the 
policy reform . Unrealistic expectations built into the theory informing the policy, the 
outcomes that could be reasonably achieved with the instruments and resources at 
hand, and — to the extent that the policy adoption involved ‘emulation’ — the extent 
to which similar cultural conditions exist .
• Shrewd political and other interests actively seeking to undermine adopted policies .
Insufficient mobilisation of reform champions among beneficiaries as well as 
insufficient awareness or strategies for dealing with interests benefitting from the 
previous policy regime .
• Whether intentionally or not, public and other organisations in the implementation 
chain which either inadvertently or systematically bend (and sometimes re-formulate) 
the adopted policy into repertoires consistent with prior programs, organisational 
capabilities, and values .
• Agency leaders have insufficient repertoires for collaboration and for anchoring change 
(new work patterns, incentives, value balances, frames, etc .) .
• Inability to identify new external partners and/or work in new ways in order to achieve 
the objectives inherent in the policy reforms .
• Insufficient monitoring or delayed feedback on the activities of agents in the delivery 
and oversight chain to inform timely adjustment and learning .
• Growing awareness that a reform may be unworkable, along with insufficient ability or 
interest to make needed adjustments in the policy framework and/or implementation 
arrangements .
• Growing attention of the media and political opponents about implementation gaps, 
whether the policy was proceeding as originally planned or in a more emergent 
manner .
• Insufficient recruitment and evolution in relevant professional repertoires, skills and 
perceptions over time, and insufficient awareness of the rationale and requirements of 
the new policy .
• Insufficient repertoires for monitoring and assessing progress, sharing that information 
with partners, political leaders, and others in favour of the new policy regime .
• Lead implementing agencies are given other government priorities or crises to manage, 
government interest in securing reform dissipates, and turnover in top executive 
leadership .
• The sponsoring environment continually shifts (including new government priorities, 
budget and other constraints), complemented by insufficiently anticipatory, adaptive, 
and creative leadership, which, in turn, leads to strategic and operational overload .
Figure 2: Factors working to undermine implementation of policy reforms
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will be many adjustments along the way. Even Patashnik’s (2003) ‘policy reform’ 
stream of thinking sees that successful implementation requires ongoing political 
attention, administrative adaptation, and likely modest re-shaping of the 
original policy. It has to be acknowledged that sometimes policies as enacted, for 
a variety of reasons, need to be significantly changed or even dropped. Rather 
than enumerate a list opposite the points identified in Figure 2, we instead make 
some broad points. 
First, the literature indicates that policy gets shaped and reshaped at all 
phases of the policy cycle. Accordingly, implementation can be seen not just 
as a matter of finding strategies to enact a policy, but also an opportunity 
to refine or improve what otherwise could have been a broad or imperfect 
policy through more detailed planning, design, and learning from different 
approaches to implementation across a system or region. Implementation can 
be seen as an opportunity for policy adjustment or policy elaboration, even if 
others see this as program design and implementation. It requires recognising 
the extent of ambiguity in the policy as announced (and what needs to be 
further specified, negotiated or learned about), the extent of political conflict, 
and what operational skills and cultures must shift inside and outside pertinent 
public agencies. 
In short, it is only in certain circumstances that agency leadership can 
simply be about securing approvals and authorities. It is far more likely 
that implementation leadership will be about operationalising, elaborating 
and specifying broader policy goals, securing necessary resources for 
implementation, assembling the right capabilities and educating implementers 
down the line and in the field, as well as collaborating, negotiating, and 
forming the productive administrative coalitions with other agencies, levels of 
government, and non-government partners, including non-profit, community 
and for-profit entities. Indeed, the great tension emerging from the literature 
is the need for leaders to be goal-oriented but contingent, knowing when 
to drive forward and execute, and when to compromise, adapt, and perhaps 
achieve goals in ways different than originally imagined. With these broader 
considerations in mind, Figure 3 (opposite) identifies more specific lessons for 
keeping reforms on track and anchored. 
A crucial insight from the literature is that policy implementation is not simply 
a strategic management and administration activity, it also involves political 
management — good leaders shrewdly engage stakeholders, build and support 
coalitions in support of reforms, and engage political masters at the right time. 
It is about continuously maintaining, galvanising and mobilising support for 
reforms inside and outside agencies. 
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• Negotiate and work with political leaders to elicit ongoing support for implementing 
initiatives .
• Keep ministers informed of progress and identify how they might make strategic 
contributions as required, even if not a top government or ministerial priority .
• Map the full range of implicated interests, networks and coalitions at play .
• Find ways to strengthen entities that will benefit from and support reform 
implementation .
• Forge strong working relationships with agencies across levels of government to build 
and strengthen a reform coalition, and institute regular opportunities for reporting and 
strategising .
• Develop realistic time frames for anchoring reforms (two years or a decade) to manage 
internal and external expectations, and focus energies on foundational elements of 
reforms .
• Understand current incentives/disincentives and develop a new incentive structure 
appropriate to the implemented policy .
• Steadily recruit the right leaders and technical expertise in the agency and the broader 
implementing network .
• Ensure sufficient implementation resources to support administrative and delivery staff.
• If required, institute sufficient structural change at appropriate junctures, but otherwise 
rely on good communications, temporary task force and coordination structures .
• Develop a strategic approach to communications: ensure two-way channels with 
staff, external coalitions, delivery partners, and sponsors in government; encourage 
feedback and monitoring; and institute repertoires for informing the broader public 
about progress .
• Develop robust, focused and relevant reporting systems that recognise the emergent 
and evolutionary quality of most implementation initiatives .
• Institute staff engagement and client satisfaction feedback capabilities and repertoires, 
and ensure timely collection of data .
• Design reporting systems to inform future evaluations and assessments of the 
performance of implemented policies, whether planned or emergent .
Figure 3: Keeping policy implementation on track: Repertoires for agency 
leaders
How do public sector agency leaders know when 
implementation has succeeded?
Implementation is often a moveable feast, with plans and objectives evolving in 
response to political and other external circumstances, as well as from learning 
and change. Furthermore, gauging whether a policy reform has achieved 
intended outcomes and new thresholds of performance is different from 
assessing whether a reform-as-enacted stuck, for better or worse. With these 
caveats, several indicators inferred from the literature are displayed in Figure 4. 
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• Information and feedback is regularly obtained from key stakeholders and beneficiaries 
of the new policy, and the emerging regime reflects stakeholder input on making it 
more workable . 
• Ability to demonstrate progress even if the causal link between the policy as 
implemented and the outcomes are unclear or contested, as well as respect for 
meeting project management targets, understanding the limits of policy approach, and 
what accounts for differences .
• Trust and shared expectations were built with collaborating departments, agencies, 
delivery agents, and intermediary organisations .
• Expectations about what could be accomplished with the implemented policy and 
available resources were met, even if issues have been identified, and political leaders 
and the public are aware what the reforms have achieved . 
• Key stakeholders who opposed the reforms see key objectives and some of their 
concerns are met, and that other stakeholders, agencies, and delivery agents have 
coalesced around the reform .
• The right agency leaders and managers were put in place to institutionalise the reforms 
as programs, and the next generation of leaders selected and recruited based on the 
new model .
• Changes are embedded into repertoires; new recruits know little about what was 
previously done — it is no longer relevant or a festering matter .
• The reforms are not only insulated from legislative unpacking and relatively immune to 
end-runs through other policies and regulatory decisions .
• Success is recognised internally and sought-after by other jurisdictions .
• The leaders who guided change among the agencies in the implementation network 
move on to take up new challenges and opportunities .
• New thresholds of performance are met (for example, speed, consistency, tailoring, 
fewer backlogs), but ministers, executives and stakeholders take up issues within the 
new policy framework .
Figure 4: How might agency leaders know policy implementation has 
succeeded?
That said, aside from a ‘performance’ perspective (timelines met and outcomes 
achieved, usually under a programmed implementation scenario), the literature 
does not have definitive views on what might constitute success when 
implementation becomes increasingly emergent, negotiated, and adaptive. 
Moreover, these notions of success may vary across initiatives and the extent to 
which there are real gaps in anticipated and touted performance with respect to 
costs, outputs and outcomes. 
Other lessons from the policy implementation and 
reform literature
There is no need to repeat the many lessons from the implementation literature 
for agency heads to consider. Successful executive leadership during any kind 
of policy implementation will be about differing degrees of responsibility for 
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achieving success, balancing competing demands in an evolving environment, 
and preparing a dynamic reality and different scenarios. With this in mind, we 
want to step back and consider two significant lessons. 
First, when attempting to understand implementation (and develop a strategic 
posture), much depends on one’s vantage point. The literature does a good, if not 
bewildering job considering the different actors involved in implementation: 
politician, executive, middle manager, frontline delivery staff, recipients 
(citizens, communities, etc.), or observer (scholar, evaluator, etc.). Not only 
are these equally legitimate and material perspectives, those designing and 
implementing policy should seriously consider the other levels of analysis in 
order to better design policy, anticipate how to coordinate implementation, and 
work with inevitable frontline dynamics of other actors. 
A second implication is that, when making assessments and drawing lessons 
for designing better policy and for strategic leadership, much depends on 
the specific policy domain (transportation systems, energy, disability, water 
distribution, etc.) and the governance context (country, state, local/community, 
network). This greatly affects the distribution of power, how decisions get made, 
where capabilities are distributed, and the specific roles for different public 
organisations as well as the strategic challenges confronting agency heads. An 
important implication is that agency leaders would do well to put themselves in 
the strategic shoes of other leaders, when making assessments and attempting 
to develop strategic decisions to guide implementation. 
Conclusion: An integrative, strategic 
framework for leaders
There is no shortage of frameworks in the policy implementation literature, but 
most were developed for analytic purposes rather than for informing strategic 
leadership. That said, the implications of the literature for strategic leadership 
are numerous. Indeed, it identifies so many variables, factors, and perspectives 
on implementation that it would be easy to develop a lengthy checklist of all 
the things that should be aligned and done in order for a policy implementation 
to be successful (see, for example, the checklists in Bridgman and Davis 2000, 
chapters 10 and 13). 
We caution against relying on the checklist approach. Such checklists do not 
anticipate the different kinds of policies that need to be implemented, the 
different contexts in which policies get implemented, nor the extent to which 
evolving environments can directly and indirectly pose new and anticipated 
challenges. Though the literature does an excellent job in identifying the great 
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range of actors which might be implicated in an implementation (ministers, 
executives, middle managers, frontline bureaucrats, intermediary organisations, 
counterparts in other governments, contractors, community groups, interest 
groups, etc.), there is little focus on the challenges of specific public organisational 
leaders (other than those actually driving the change) and their executive teams, 
how they might support ministers and governments, nor how strategic priorities 
might vary across these agency leadership teams depending on the role they 
play in particular implementation firmaments. 
Rather than develop another checklist, it is better to develop a framework that 
is more strategic and assists agency heads to survey contexts, identify emerging 
policy and implementation initiatives, and assess the preparedness of their 
agencies and networks to further impending change. It must acknowledge the 
extent to which circumstances and challenges can vary across enacted policies. 
Much of what makes for good policy implementation and organisational change 
is well-known, but varies considerably in lesson-drawing for public sector 
leaders with respect to:
• specific situational contexts — crisis-driven, central government priority 
driving a mandate, a central invention or policy developed closely with 
implementing agencies, etc.;
• scale of policy interventions — broader interventions imply more agencies, 
external partners, and possibly levels of government, etc. — which implies 
different roles for different agencies and different combinations of partners 
and other organisations to contend with;
• fluidity of political and policy environment — new and changing priorities, 
crises — which requires thinking in scenario-based and multiple-level 
(political and administrative) terms;
• centrality of an executive’s organisation to implementing and realising the 
interventions — acting as a partner to many other organisations during 
implementation is very different from acting as a lead implementation agency; 
• extent of alignment of an agency’s core capabilities for the implementation 
tasks at hand, and the extent to which new capabilities, repertoires, and 
relationships have to be built in order to implement and embed a new policy 
and delivery regime; 
• extent of policy coherence and an implementation plan understood by different 
stakeholders, which is different from a policy that is flawed in terms of logic 
or not well thought out, or deliberately underspecified, and which requires 
more flexibility, learning, and emergence in implementation; 
• extent to which implementation partners know and have worked with each 
other, the amount of trust, and the extent to which implementation resources 
independent of specific agencies might be available to tap into; and
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• extent to which the time frames envisioned for successfully implementing and 
anchoring new policies are understood — three months, two years, a decade? 
These variables, when combined, produce considerably different strategic fields 
in which executives might attempt to move forward with an implementation 
checklist. 
A strategic implementation framework should focus on key strategic moments 
for agency heads, encouraging them and their executive teams to ask the 
right questions. Although Berman (1980, 1978) suggested three phases — 
mobilisation, implementation, and institutionalisation — given that agency 
heads need to learn about the genesis of new policies, and that they will need 
adjustment reconsideration at some point, the following five phases might 
be worth considering: (1) understanding a policy’s genesis; (2) planning and 
mobilising for implementation; (3) implementation as strategy and management; 
(4) institutionalisation (embedding); and (5) appraising policy regimes. What 
would make a framework organised around these phases interesting and 
productive is that the strategic context for every implementation is unique 
and usually evolving. Such a framework should contain questions probing 
the understanding of agency heads about whether the policy as originally 
conceived is working, whether new capabilities and relationships need to be 
developed, whether new strategies and tactics are required in light of evolving 
environments or learning about the real incentives and behaviours of delivery 
agents and target groups, and what strategies are required to deal with interests 
seeking to undermine the new policy regime. 
All of this should be generally distilled into a visual organising framework that 
identifies all of the key variables and considerations broached in the literature 
review, organised around the phases identified above. Distinct questions and 
pointers could be dealt with under each phase, as well as how particular 
themes (for example, handling the politics of interests, changing environments, 
motivating staff and agents, working with partners, monitoring and 
performance, etc.) might evolve across the phases. Each phase would contain its 
own scoping SWOT-type questions (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats) and call on executives to adopt a different strategic focus in the service 
of the broader implementation. 
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8. National Competition Policy and 
Cooperative Federalism
Jeffrey Harwood and John Phillimore
Introduction
The National Competition Policy (NCP) is widely regarded as one of Australia’s 
most successful examples of cooperative federalism. Through the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG), the Commonwealth, states and territories 
agreed in 1995 to implement a set of microeconomic reforms focused on removing 
impediments to equal competition between public and private businesses and 
creating competitive pricing and regulatory mechanisms for utility services and 
road transport. In return for the successful implementation of the reform package, 
the Commonwealth transferred payments to the states and territories. The NCP 
was subsequently commended as an economic success by the Productivity 
Commission (2005). However, whether it should be regarded as a successful 
example of cooperative federalism is a matter deserving further consideration.
For some, the NCP comprised soundly based policy goals and realised worthwhile 
microeconomic reforms that states and territories would not otherwise have 
achieved (see, for example, Banks 2005; Productivity Commission 2005; Sims 
1999; Thomas 1996). However, there are some critical views that the nature and 
implementation of the NCP favoured the Commonwealth, threatened community 
service obligations, did not take into sufficient account regional needs and failed 
to achieve the environmental benefits envisaged to flow on from more efficient 
markets, especially in the case of rural water schemes (see, for example, Butler 
1996; Boswell 1996; Carver 1996; Fenna 2007; Hollander 2006; Hollander and 
Curran 2001). 
This chapter evaluates the NCP as an example of cooperative federalism. After 
providing an account of the way the NCP came into being, was implemented 
and evolved, we consider the competing interpretations. In assessing those 
propositions, we draw upon discussions with six senior policy officers from 
various agencies in four states who were responsible for its implementation, 
and from the National Competition Council (NCC). A close reading of NCP 
documents further enlightens our evaluation. Our conclusion is that while in 
many respects a good example of Australian governments working together, 
the NCP was ultimately too coercive in its application to constitute an entirely 
successful example of cooperative federalism. 
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The National Competition Policy
The decision by COAG (COAG 1995a, 1995b) to implement the NCP was the 
culmination of an economic reform process that began with the floating of the 
Australian dollar in 1983. This was followed by further deregulation of financial 
markets and a series of sectoral plans designed to promote industrial development 
and locally manufactured exports. Tariffs were subsequently lowered in the 
motor vehicle, textile, clothing and footwear, and telecommunications sectors. 
While these reforms were intended to make the private sector more competitive, 
less attention was being paid to the public sector. Following the release of the 
National Competition Policy Review Report (Hilmer et al. 1993), however, 
attention shifted to the structural reform of government utilities, regulatory and 
pricing frameworks, and the extent to which government legislation supported 
or undermined competition. The solution, it was argued, was the application of 
market-based policy instruments to the public sector.
As Painter (1998, pp. 81–89) has explained in detail, the resulting NCP was 
forged through both conflict and cooperation. The then Prime Minister, Paul 
Keating, was anxious to implement Hilmer’s proposed reforms and was prepared 
to impose these upon the states. On the other hand, the states were arguably 
in their strongest position vis-à-vis the Commonwealth. The NCP called for 
the reform of government business enterprises, notably the network utilities; 
however, these were state government instrumentalities and the Commonwealth 
needed the states’ cooperation for such reforms to proceed. Although the High 
Court had not stopped the Commonwealth from encroaching upon the states’ 
traditional policy jurisdictions, it had been reluctant to intervene in support 
of the Commonwealth in matters affecting the institutional governance of the 
states. The states were in an unusually strong position. 
The states, though, were prepared to cooperate with the Commonwealth. 
Importantly, from the states’ perspective, the NCP would not directly expand 
Commonwealth powers. Moreover, most states had Liberal-led governments 
at the time that had already initiated microeconomic reforms within their 
jurisdictions (Painter 1998, p. 82).1 In this respect, there was policy convergence 
between state and Commonwealth central agencies — what Painter (1998, 
p. 83) referred to as the ‘central agency club’ — in which the focus was on 
achieving certain economic outcomes, rather than following federal principles. 
The outcome was a compromise, with the Commonwealth agreeing to the states 
being responsible for implementing the NCP in return for payments upon 
1 For most of the negotiations over the NCP in 1994–1995, only the Commonwealth, Queensland and the 
Australian Capital Territory had Labor governments. However, just before the intergovernmental agreements 
were signed at the April 1995 COAG meeting, a Liberal government took office in the Australian Capital 
Territory (February) and the Labor Party won government in New South Wales (March). 
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meeting particular policy milestones (Painter 1988, pp. 88–89). Furthermore, 
membership of the two institutions created to administer the NCP — the NCC 
and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) — would 
require the majority approval of the states and territories. By accepting the 
need for national uniformity under the NCP and the use of template legislation 
to achieve this objective, the states relinquished their legislative sovereignty. 
Hence, at the fifth COAG meeting, held in Canberra on 11 April 1995, the 
respective parties signed the three intergovernmental agreements that provided 
the foundation of the NCP.
The institutional components
The NCP comprised three intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) and an Act of 
the Commonwealth Parliament. First, by signing the Competition Principles 
Agreement 1995 (NCC 1998), the respective governments agreed to: 
• implement the concept of ‘competitive neutrality’, such that private and 
government businesses could compete equally; 
• establish mechanisms that prevented government business enterprises from 
exploiting their monopolies; 
• the structural reform of public monopolies; 
• rationalise the regulatory and pricing frameworks of water, gas and 
electricity utilities, along with the road transport sector;
• establish a national access regime designed to facilitate sharing of ‘essential 
infrastructure’ among competing businesses; and
• amend laws that hinder competition, except in cases found to be in the 
public interest.
The second IGA was the Conduct Code Agreement 1995 (NCC 1998), which 
required the amendment and use of the Trade Practices Act 1974 to prevent 
anti-competitive behaviour by government and unincorporated businesses. 
Third, the Agreement to Implement the National Competition Policy and Related 
Reforms (Implementation Agreement) 1995 (NCC 1998) specified an arrangement 
whereby the Commonwealth would compensate the states and territories some 
of the costs of implementing the NCP. The Commonwealth agreed to maintain 
the per capita financial assistance grants to the states and territories and provide 
competition payments upon satisfactory progress in implementing NCP reforms. 
This was intended to reflect the fact that, although the benefits of greater 
competition flow on to the community in general, the direct fiscal benefits tend to 
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flow to the Commonwealth in the form of increased taxation revenue. In addition, 
the states would lose dividend income from their public utilities (which could be 
substantial and which, moreover, could be tapped at will). It was estimated that 
the competition payments would cost the Commonwealth $4.2 billion (in 1994–95 
prices) over the nine years of the policy (COAG 1995b, 1995c). 
The final component of the NCP was the Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1995), which established the NCC under the Trade 
Practices Act 1974. Part IIA of the Trade Practices Act established the NCC 
with a Council President and maximum of four councillors serving terms of no 
more than five years. (Initially, the councillors were jointly appointed by the 
Commonwealth, states and territories for a period of three years, and supported 
by a secretariat of 12 officials, some of whom were on secondment from sub-
national jurisdictions). As such, the NCC was a Commonwealth statutory body, 
whose role was to advise the Commonwealth, states and territories on (rather than 
implement) the NCP. The NCC was also responsible for assessing individual state 
and territory governments’ progress in implementing the reforms, ascertaining 
whether they had made sufficient progress to receive their compensation 
payments, recommending to the Commonwealth Treasurer whether the respective 
governments should receive their competition payments and making available to 
the public information about the details and progress of the NCP. 
The Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 also established the ACCC under the 
Trade Practices Act 1974. Part II of the Trade Practices Act 1974 made provision 
for a Commission Chairperson and any number of other commission members to 
have terms of up to five years. As in the case of the NCC, a majority of states and 
territories had to agree with appointments for them to be confirmed. The ACCC 
was made responsible for administering the Trade Practices Act 1974, informing 
businesses and consumers about their obligations and rights under the Act, and 
acting as an oversight body to identify cases of price fixing and market sharing 
and report these to the relevant authorities. 
Implementation
National access regime
In accordance with the NCP, a national access regime was established, along 
with various industry specific access regimes. The ACCC was made responsible 
for administering the regime. Some of the industry regimes — for example, 
rail networks, ports and electricity distribution networks — came under the 
jurisdiction of state and territory legislation and were administered by the 
relevant state and territory oversight authorities.
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Competitive neutrality
All states and territories implemented competitive neutrality principles to 
ensure that government and private businesses could compete on equal terms. 
Guidelines were published to inform the respective parties of their obligations 
and complaints handling offices were established. Independent oversight 
bodies were also established to monitor and regulate the prices set by monopoly 
providers. For example, the Economic Regulation Authority was established by 
the government of Western Australia in January 2004 to monitor that state’s 
electricity, gas and water sectors, ensure that the respective access and pricing 
regimes are consistent with the relevant pieces of legislation, to promote and 
monitor the use of customer charters, and to carry out inquiries when required 
by the state government (ERA 2009).
Application of the Trade Practices Act 1974
In 1996, the Competition Code (Part XIA) was added to the Trade Practices Act 
1974. This allowed the states and territories to incorporate a version of Part 4 of 
the Act, the Competition Code, to cover their jurisdictions. Consequently, state 
and territory governments, unincorporated bodies and government business 
enterprises were no longer exempt from engaging in anti-competitive practices 
(unless given permission to do so by the ACCC on grounds of public interest). 
The states and territories agreed to this and they passed the necessary legislation 
by July 1996 (Productivity Commission 2005, p. 13). 
Legislative reforms
It was originally estimated that the review and reform of legislation deemed 
anti-competitive would be finished by 2000 in accordance with clause 5 of the 
Competition Principles Agreement. COAG subsequently extended the time of 
review to 30 June 2002. An additional 12 months was later granted by the NCC 
(2003, 4.1), but with the cautionary note:
Review and/or reform activity that is incomplete or not consistent with 
NCP principles at June 2003 will be considered to not comply with NCP 
obligations. Where noncompliance is significant … the Council is likely 
to make adverse recommendations on payments. 
Table 1 sets out the annual payments made to the states and territories and the 
penalties imposed by the Commonwealth.
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Although an occasionally contentious component of the NCP, the legislative 
review and reform requirement was generally met. In 2001, the NCC decided 
to differentiate between priority and non-priority legislation. The former were 
seen to have a much greater impact upon competition so that their review 
and reform would provide the most benefit to the wider community. Thus, 
in assessing whether the progress of the individual states and territories was 
sufficient to recommend to the Treasurer that they receive their competition 
payments, completion of the priority legislation reviews was pivotal.
The NCC (2005, 9.6) subsequently recommended that the states and territories 
be penalised and they responded accordingly by finishing most of the reviews 
by 2005 (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Completion rates of legislative reform (1995–2005)
Federal jurisdictions
Percentage of legislative reform completed 
(1995–2005)
Priority Non-priority Total
Australian Capital Territory 82 98 93
Commonwealth 64 89 78
New South Wales 88 94 91
Northern Territory 82 90 85
Queensland 85 92 87
South Australia 69 94 83
Tasmania 84 96 91
Victoria 84 91 88
Western Australia 55 77 68
Source: NCC 2005.
While the access regimes, competitive neutrality, the Trade Practices Act 
1974, and the legislative reviews were implemented to improve competition in 
general, they were also applied more specifically to key infrastructure: water, 
gas, electricity and road transport. 
Water
The so-called ‘water reforms’ agreed to as part of the NCP were intended to 
address the widely-held view that Australia’s water industry was unsustainable 
and inefficient. It was agreed by COAG (1994a, 1994b) that overuse of urban and 
rural supplies and the environmental degradation of water supplies necessitated 
a package of reforms to address these issues. The package included institutional, 
pricing, investment, allocation, and trading reforms. The institutional reforms 
entailed corporatising water utilities by 1998, separating responsibility for 
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resource management, standards, compliance and provision of services, and 
the establishment of integrated resource management mechanisms. It was also 
agreed to implement pricing reforms that comprised consumption-based pricing 
mechanisms, withdraw cross-subsidies where possible, and make transparent 
the subsidies that remain. Investment reforms were implemented to ensure 
that further infrastructure developments were environmentally acceptable and 
economically viable. Finally, it was agreed that water should be allocated on the 
basis of effect upon the environment, that land title and water rights should 
be detached, that entitlement be based upon ‘ownership, volume, reliability, 
transferability and, if appropriate, quality’, and trading in allocations and 
entitlements be introduced by 1998. 
By the end of 2004, the states and territories had made substantial progress 
on the implementation of these reforms. Water utilities had been corporatised 
or, in the case of South Australia, contracted out to the private sector, and the 
service provision and regulatory divisions had been separated (Productivity 
Commission 2005, p. 27). Furthermore, all participants had passed legislation 
to separate land title from water entitlements, and established requirements for 
environmental assessments. The NCC (2003, p. xiv) attributed delays in reforms 
to the conflicting interests of the various stakeholders, and to the difficulty in 
reconciling ‘the diversity of administrative and legislative environments across 
jurisdictions’. 
Gas 
Like the electricity industry, the gas industry was characterised by vertically 
integrated government monopolies, which strictly regulated gas suppliers 
(Productivity Commission 2005, pp. 23–24). Legislation controlled the 
distribution of gas both within and between states and territories. The states 
and territories successfully implemented the requisite reforms identified as 
essential for a competitive gas industry. These reforms included the separation 
of the transmission and distribution operations; rescinding legislation and 
regulations that prevented states and territories trading in gas; the institution of 
the National Gas Access Code to facilitate ‘third party access to gas transmission 
and distribution pipelines’; the corporatisation of government gas authorities; 
and the introduction of fully competitive retail markets.
Electricity
Prior to the NCP, the Australian electricity market was highly regulated and 
dominated by government-owned and vertically integrated utilities that were 
bounded by state borders (Productivity Commission 2005, p. 21). Consequently, 
electricity prices were unnecessarily high and oversupply was the norm. The 
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proposed solution was the creation in 1998 of a national electricity market, 
comprising all states and territories except Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory. The Productivity Commission (2005, p. 22) subsequently reported 
that most governments met their requirements. Certainly, all had established 
mechanisms to allow third party access to network infrastructure. The state-
owned utilities, whether privatised, leased or corporatised, had been broken up 
into their constituent parts — generation, distribution, regulation and retail. 
Under this policy of vertical disaggregation, most large customers could choose 
their supplier, as could most domestic users. 
However, a fully competitive national electricity market was not realised. 
The Productivity Commission (2005, p. 22) attributed this to insufficient grid 
interconnection, which meant that potential users were unable to access various 
suppliers; too few generators to stimulate competition upstream; price signals to 
residential users that were ‘inflexible’; the existence of multiple regulators (that 
is, one in each sub-national jurisdiction); and a lack of competition in electricity 
generation.
Transport
The road transport industry had long been covered by the various rules and 
regulations of each sub-national jurisdiction (Productivity Commission 2005, 
p. 25). This imposed costs on users which were, in turn, passed onto consumers. 
The primary objectives of the NCP reforms were to reconcile the costs with 
heavy vehicle charges, and replace the various state and territory regimes with 
a national regulatory framework. It was envisaged that such a framework would 
include a national heavy vehicle registration scheme, agreement between the 
jurisdictions over the transporting of dangerous products, roadworthiness, 
driving hours and the regulation of oversized vehicles, and a mechanism to 
ensure compliance with the framework. 
Apart from matters pertaining to licensing and registration, the states and 
territories had completed most of the proposed NCP transport reforms by the 
time of the 2005 assessment by the NCC (2005, 8.1). The NCC (2005, 8.2–5) noted 
that the Commonwealth had yet to pass legislation enabling a national heavy 
vehicle registration scheme, while the Australian Capital Territory was still 
deliberating over how to regulate the renewal of heavy vehicle registrations. 
Western Australia had two remaining reforms to address concerning the local 
introduction of the national drivers’ licence classifications and the adoption of 
a single, nationally valid, drivers’ licence, although the legislation for these was 
being debated in the Western Australian Parliament.
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Other reforms
Although the NCP is notable for its application to public utilities and the road 
transport industry, it was applied to many other industries in ways that were 
sometimes resisted by stakeholders and the Commonwealth, state and territory 
governments, leading to sub-national governments being penalised financially 
under the NCP (see Table 2). Elements of the agriculture industry were especially 
opposed to reforms proposed under the NCP. For example, there was considerable 
opposition to the removal of the Australian Wheat Board’s effective monopoly 
over wheat exports. Despite the NCC’s call for the Wheat Marketing Act 1989 
to be revised or revoked, the Commonwealth refused to deregulate the wheat 
export industry. Likewise, the Western Australian government was steadfast 
in its refusal to deregulate potato marketing; unlike the Commonwealth, it was 
subsequently penalised a total of $7.5m. 
The pharmacy sector was another that successfully avoided deregulation and 
evidenced the Commonwealth’s ‘flexibility’ in applying COAG agreements in 
contrast to the NCC’s ‘literal’ interpretations. The National Competition Policy 
Review of Pharmacy Regulation reported to COAG in 2000 and recommended 
that the states and territories be required to remove all restrictions on the 
number of pharmacies that could be owned by a single pharmacist, but also 
recommended that limits be placed on the number of pharmacies controlled by 
individual friendly societies within a jurisdiction. The first recommendation 
was supported by a COAG working group and accepted by COAG (NCC 2005, 
19.9–10). The working group rejected the second recommendation and COAG 
accepted its counter-proposal that individual friendly societies be free to operate 
under the same conditions of ownership as pharmacists. In 2004, however, 
with every sub-national jurisdiction yet to completely deregulate pharmacy 
ownership, the Prime Minister informed each of the states and territories that 
they would not incur penalties provided they legislated minimum limits of 
ownership as stipulated by him. Nevertheless, the NCC (2005) still noted that 
by not deregulating the pharmacy industry, each sub-national government was 
failing to meet its obligations under the Competition Principles Agreement. 
However, not all the states and territories felt the wrath of the NCC. Victoria, 
Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory did not suffer permanent 
deductions as a consequence of adverse findings by the NCC. The other 
jurisdictions were penalised for a variety of reasons. Permanent deductions 
were applied to New South Wales for failing to deregulate rice marketing, liquor 
sales marketing, and the chicken meat industry. Queensland was penalised for 
failing to deregulate liquor sales marketing and making insufficient progress on 
water reforms. Western Australia was punished for failing to deregulate retail 
trading hours, liquor sales marketing and potato marketing, and for having 
outstanding legislation review items. South Australia was also penalised for 
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having outstanding legislation review items, as well as failing to deregulate the 
chicken meat industry, liquor sales marketing, and barley marketing. Finally, the 
Northern Territory was subjected to permanent deductions for not deregulating 
liquor sales marketing.
NCP as an exemplar of cooperative federalism
The NCP is often promoted as an exemplar of collaborative federalism, an 
initiative that realised worthwhile reforms that states and territories would not 
otherwise have achieved. The Western Australia Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, for example, described the NCP as ‘one of the greatest achievements 
of cooperative federalism in recent years’ (CCIWA 2007, p. 7). Typically, such 
views are expressed because of the economic outcomes that NCP has delivered, 
the positive role of the NCC as a purportedly neutral arbiter between the 
Commonwealth and the states and territories, and the use of incentive payments 
to encourage scheduled implementation of the NCP reforms. 
Measurable economic success
First and foremost, the microeconomic reforms that the NCP brought about 
are widely seen as being in the national interest. In its report on the NCP, 
for example, the Productivity Commission (2005, p. 40) used the growth in 
multifactor productivity (MFP) — ‘the efficiency with which both labour and 
capital inputs are used in production’ — as its primary indicator of improved 
economic performance. The Productivity Commission (2005, p. 46) found that 
MFP in the telecommunications sector had evidenced an annual seven per cent 
increase from 1996–97 to 1999–2000, while MFP in the postal services sector 
had increased 3.5 per cent per annum over the period from 1992 to 2002. 
Overall, the Productivity Commission (2005, p. 35) estimated that the NCP has 
contributed a ‘permanent increase’ of at least 2.5 per cent in Australia’s GDP.
Governance
Second, officers interviewed regarded the NCC as a fair and reasonable broker 
in its negotiations with the states and territories. They attributed this to the 
relative autonomy of the NCC, the professionalism of the officers involved and 
the mechanism through which the NCC operated, notably, the procedure by 
which the NCC forwarded a draft report to the states and territories, allowed 
them the opportunity to respond and, then, negotiate a deal with the NCC. 
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Reform funding
The incentive payments are almost universally regarded as being crucial to the 
successful implementation of the NCP. By enabling them to highlight the cost 
of not pursuing reforms, central agency ministers were able to win over their 
colleagues in Cabinet meetings. Moreover, local media publicised the potential 
loss of revenue and politicians had to justify delays in implementing NCP 
reforms. In this way, everybody could ascertain whether it was worth sacrificing 
the incentive payment to maintain the policy status quo. Western Australia’s 
decision not to deregulate shopping hours, for example, could only be justified 
by the Western Australian government after holding a referendum.
Those who saw the NCP as a successful example of cooperative federalism 
emphasised the initial process and policy outcomes. For them, cooperation 
meant collaboration over policy formulation and a signed agreement. Success 
was measured in terms of achieving microeconomic reforms and improvements 
in economic productivity that could be associated with the reforms. 
NCP as less-than-ideal cooperative federalism
Despite the praise lavished on the NCP as a positive example of cooperative 
federalism, it also received its share of criticism during and after its 
implementation. Although the NCP was premised upon agreement between 
the federal partners, some within the states and territories felt that it did not 
treat equally all levels of government, that the review process of the NCC was 
not sufficiently transparent, and that the demands to comply with the NCP 
threatened state autonomy.
Inequitable treatment
Perhaps the most consistent criticism was that the NCP framework did not hold 
the Commonwealth accountable for implementing reforms the same way it did 
the states (NCC 2004, p. 39; New South Wales Government 2004, pp. 18, 20). The 
objective of the payments mechanism under the NCP was to act as an incentive 
— albeit a negative incentive — to discourage inaction by the respective sub-
levels of governments. However, the mechanism did not extend to include the 
Commonwealth, despite the fact that by the time that the NCC had completed its 
final assessment of legislative reviews, the Commonwealth had reviewed only 
78 per cent of its legislation. This meant that some officials saw the NCC as a 
‘policeman’ for the Commonwealth to cajole the states and territories into doing 
its bidding.
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Lack of transparency
The review mechanism of the NCP reinforced the belief of some states that the 
NCC and the Commonwealth were working together to impose policy upon the 
states. The Victorian government (Victoria 2004, p. 15), for example, voiced 
its frustration that the NCP did not contain a formal process after the annual 
submission by the states. Although the states and territories could see and 
comment upon the draft report, they were not shown the recommendations. 
Furthermore, there was no logical framework for NCC decisions and its 
recommendations as to whether penalties should be applied. 
The NCC (2004, p. 39) acknowledged that transparency was lacking in the 
reporting processes. It pointed out that it was not to blame: there was nothing 
requiring it to make its reviews public. It also explained that some reports 
were not released because they were unpopular with government. By making 
all reports public, governments would be compelled to follow processes and 
meet acceptable standards. Moreover, such reports needed to meet consultation 
standards that would be acceptable to stakeholders and the wider community.
State policy autonomy challenged
A more fundamental criticism of the NCP was that it was a national, rather than 
federal policy, which diminished the policy autonomy of the states and territories 
(Fenna 2007, pp. 189–190). Significant parts of the NCP, though — indeed, 
perhaps the bulk of the NCP — concerned collective goods whose boundaries in 
most respects do not exceed sub-national jurisdictions. Moreover, the inclusion 
of financial incentives undermined the idea of states and territories proceeding 
in a federal fashion, that is, in their own direction at their own speed. Thus, 
it could be said that the uniform national approach reflected a common view 
that this was the best policy approach to take, rather than any need for policy 
uniformity per se due to inter-jurisdictional inefficiencies.
The national electricity market provides an interesting example of this tension 
between national and federal policy. In this case, there were likely inter-
jurisdictional spillover benefits of having a single regulator and market, rather 
than multiple regulators and markets. Although Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory were excluded from the new federal market, they were not 
excluded from the new national policy requirements. This is not to suggest 
that the disaggregation of Western Power, for example, was an inherently sub-
optimal policy for Western Australia, rather that it was not a federal policy that 
had obvious spillovers or involvement with the other sub-national jurisdictions. 
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The Western Australian government found itself under considerable pressure to 
have the requisite legislation passed by the State Parliament, with the Treasurer 
(Hansard 2005) informing Parliament:
We have already suffered a suspension of our competition policy 
payments of more than $11 million for 2004–05, and we would be facing 
a further suspension or deduction of competition policy payments of 
more than $11 million for this financial year. If we go past the decision 
on the competition policy payments this year, we lose any chance of 
getting back the suspension that was imposed last year and we would 
most likely lose the more than $11 million at stake this year. 
The challenge that the NCP posed to the policy autonomy of the states and 
territories was further evidenced by the NCC’s assessment of how the ‘public 
benefit’ clause was applied. Subclause 1(3) of the Competition Principles 
Agreement 1995 (NCC 1998) required that certain matters of ‘public benefit’ 
be ‘taken into account’ during policy and legislative reviews. These matters 
included:
• government legislation and policies relating to ecologically sustainable 
development; 
• social welfare and equity considerations, including community service 
obligations; 
• government legislation and policies relating to matters such as occupational 
health and safety, industrial relations and access and equity;
• economic and regional development, including employment and investment 
growth; 
• the interests of consumers generally or of a class of consumers; 
• the competitiveness of Australian business; and 
• the efficient allocation of resources.
The states and territories understood the clause to mean that policies and 
legislation could be permitted to restrict competition if it was likely to 
undermine, for example, community service obligations. The NCC (1996), on 
the other hand, noted that the subclause did not state the weight that should 
be attributed to each matter, nor did it set out to explain to what extent sectoral 
interests should be prioritised over the interests of the entire community. 
Hence, the clause provided ‘an aid to assist review rather than a mechanism for 
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imposing blanket exemptions on reform’ (NCC 1996, p. 6). Ultimately, the NCC 
settled upon subclause 5(1) of the Competition Principles Agreement 1995 for 
guidance, which stated:
The guiding principle is that legislation (including acts, enactments, 
ordinances or regulations) should not restrict competition unless it can 
be demonstrated that:
(a) the benefits of the restriction to the community as a whole outweigh 
the costs; and, 
(b) the objectives of the legislation can only be achieved by restricting 
competition. 
The case of retail shopping hours in Western Australia is probably the most 
striking example of the NCC not accepting a state government’s interpretation of 
the public benefit. Partial reform of trading hours was blocked in the conservative-
controlled Legislative Council. The NCC (2002, 10.6–7) acknowledged this, 
but argued that Western Australia must still meet its NCP obligations. The 
NCC (2003, pp. xlii) subsequently recommended that the Western Australian 
government be penalised $7.52 million for not deregulating retail shopping 
hours. The Western Australian government sought to diffuse the issue by 
holding a referendum simultaneously with the 2005 state election. Following 
a resounding result from the public rejecting liberalisation (WAEC 2008), the 
Western Australian Treasurer wrote to the NCC: ‘The letter advised that the 
Council, to conclude otherwise, would have to assume that it knows more than 
the public about Western Australia’s public interest’ (NCC 2005, 14.30). In its 
2005 assessment, the NCC (2005, 14.30–31) countered: 
Clause 5 of the CPA … requires governments to remove restrictions 
on competition unless they can demonstrate that the restrictions are 
warranted — that is, that restricting competition benefits the community 
overall (being in the public interest) and that the restriction is necessary 
… Where a government introduces or retains competition restrictions, 
and this action was not reasonably drawn from the recommendations 
of a review, the Council looks for the government to provide a rigorous 
supporting case, including a demonstration of flaws in the review’s 
analysis and reasoning. The Council considers that conducting a 
referendum does not absolve a government from its NCP legislation 
review obligations. 
The NCC held firm and withheld the incentive payment.
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A conceptual consideration
Although both sides present convincing cases about the merits and shortcomings 
of the NCP as an example of cooperative federalism, it appears that their 
assessments are focused primarily upon different stages of the policy process. The 
view that the NCP constituted a successful exercise in cooperative federalism is 
based upon how the NCP was formulated through intergovernmental relations 
and constituted in intergovernmental agreements. Certainly, the states, territories 
and the Commonwealth negotiated over the inclusion of competition payments 
and the use of template legislation. Officials in the national and sub-national 
central agencies worked together to prepare the legislation and agreements. 
Finally, the respective parties willingly signed the three agreements at a COAG 
meeting. 
The view that the NCP was a less than successful example of cooperative 
federalism reflects a focus upon federal relations during its implementation. 
From this perspective, the states and territories assumed that the public interest 
clause would give them some leeway to address local political demands or to 
reflect local circumstances. Moreover, it was assumed that the process would be 
transparent and that they would be able to bargain with the Commonwealth if 
there were disputes over policy implementation. Instead, the lack of transparency 
in the deliberations over reform payments reinforced a lack of trust among the 
states and territories towards the Commonwealth.2
The works of Sawer (1977) and Painter (1998) — two leading Australian federalism 
scholars — suggest that the latter view has a stronger case. Over three decades 
ago, Sawer (1977, p. 6) proposed that cooperative federalism was evidenced 
by the following characteristics: ‘each of the parties to the arrangement has a 
reasonable degree of autonomy, can bargain about the terms of cooperation, and 
at least if driven too hard, decline to cooperate’. 
This is not to suggest that an absence of conflict between the participants is 
an essential element of cooperative federalism. On the contrary, it is unlikely 
that they will always agree. Governments will inevitably differ over values and 
interests, and will seek to position themselves favourably to achieve desired 
policy outcomes. As Painter (1998, p. 23) remarked,
2 Changes in government since April 1995 also exacerbated tensions between the Commonwealth and the 
state and territory governments over the NCP. Although a Liberal–National Coalition government was elected 
nationally in March 1996, at state level, Austalian Labor Party governments were being elected (Tasmania in 
1998, Victoria in 1999, Western Australia, the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory in 2001, 
South Australia in 2002). Following the election of the Labor government in South Australia in March 2002, 
Australia faced the unique situation of having all states and territories with Labor governments with only the 
Commonwealth having a Coalition government. Hence, there was at least a perception that the Commonwealth 
Coalition government was adjudicating on the performance of state and territory Labor governments.
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intergovernmental cooperation is tactical, and it is normally temporary 
because it coexists with competition and conflict (even within the same 
room). While voluntary, it can be induced and maintained by sanctions, 
such as the moral sanctions that develop from a ‘culture of cooperation’. 
By definition, however, if the capacity to impose sanctions is too 
unevenly distributed, we more than likely have coercion …
It is reasonable to assert that the states and territories entered into the NCP 
voluntarily. This is consistently raised by officers who view the NCP as a positive 
example of cooperative federalism — the states and territories were not compelled 
to sign. Of course, if they did not sign, then they would forfeit the opportunity 
to receive payments forthcoming to the signatories. After all, the payments were 
provided as compensation for the cost of implementing the reforms. 
It is important to note that although the NCP was based upon agreements freely 
entered into by the states and territories, the parties did not retain a ‘reasonable 
degree of autonomy’ and the ‘capacity to impose sanctions’ (or provide rewards, 
depending upon one’s perspective) was skewed in favour of the Commonwealth. 
The decision by the NCC to withhold payments to Western Australia because 
of its refusal to deregulate trading hours was notable not just because it 
challenged the autonomy of that state’s government to regulate trading hours, 
but also because it raised the point of who should define the ‘public interest’. 
Clearly, the Western Australian electorate thought that the current regulatory 
arrangement was in their ‘public interest’. The imposition of sanctions from 
Canberra following a state referendum is consistent with a coercive, rather than 
cooperative, form of federalism. 
As only the Commonwealth could impose penalties, there was an imbalance in 
power relations that was inconsistent with Painter’s notion of cooperation. As 
was explained above, the NCC acknowledged that the Commonwealth had not 
been as diligent as most of the states and territories in reviewing its legislation, 
but that it was unable to do anything about this except to make the public aware 
of this fact. Only the Commonwealth, through the NCC, could withhold the 
incentive payments on the grounds of unsatisfactory progress. This imbalance in 
power relations was further highlighted by the position of the Commonwealth 
Minister as the final judge on the matter. Certainly, the states and territories 
retained the right not to undertake every reform called for under the NCP, 
however, such a decision would draw sanctions more in keeping with coercive 
forms of federalism. 
Ultimately, cooperative federalism as a concept is not meaningful unless it is 
applied to both the formulation and implementation stages of a policy. The NCP 
was defined as a policy response to perceived inefficiencies in the Australian 
economy and was continually justified and evaluated in these terms. Many 
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policy officers, particularly from state central agencies, indicated that this was 
their prime concern — not federal relations. The implication for Australian 
federalism and cooperative federalism, in particular, was that the reform 
program took precedence over notions of cooperation between the federal 
partners; in effect, the ends justified the means. It could be argued that NCP had 
more in common with what has been termed ‘pragmatic federalism’ (Hollander 
and Patapan 2007). 
Conclusion
While it was instrumental in advancing microeconomic reform, the National 
Competition Policy was far from a perfect example of cooperative federalism. 
On the one hand, it was based upon agreements entered into voluntarily by the 
Commonwealth, states and territories. On the other hand, the Commonwealth did 
not implement reforms as diligently as the states, some reforms were expensive 
to administer, and others imposed disproportionate hardships upon some 
communities and businesses. Contrary to its remit, the National Competition 
Council endeavoured to influence policy outcomes, rather than simply monitor 
implementation of NCP obligations. An examination of the NCP from the 
theoretical perspectives offered by Sawer and Painter reveal that it did not offer 
the states sufficient policy autonomy and bargaining power to fully constitute 
cooperative federalism. Nevertheless, it is still one of our best examples of how 
the federal partners can work together to achieve mutually desired outcomes. 
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9. The Malfunctions of New Public 
Management: A case study of 
governance in Indigenous affairs1 
Ian Marsh
Indigenous policy presents in acute form a case study of challenges to present 
public administration practice. Successive governments have promised to reduce 
extreme disadvantage and to do this in conjunction with affected citizens.2 But 
failures persist. In looking for explanations, Dr Peter Shergold (2006) has not 
only arraigned governance as a threshold cause but also set a high bar for its 
practice:
I am aware that, for some fifteen years as a public administrator, too 
much of what I have done on behalf of government for the very best 
of motives has had the very worst of outcomes … In my personal 
opinion three things need to be done … We need to tailor government 
programs to the particular circumstances of discrete communities … We 
must ensure that discretionary government expenditures are negotiated 
to goals that address local needs … Community challenges are almost 
invariably holistic in their nature and require a variety of programs from 
all three tiers of government to be delivered in a coordinated whole of 
government manner.
1 This is an abridged version of a paper prepared for the Alice Springs think tank Remote Focus in 2011 
as part of a review of governance in remote Australia. The original paper, ‘The Evolution of Governance in Remote 
Australia: From centralised and top-down towards contextualised and collaborative approaches’, and the final report, 
‘Fixing the Hole in Australia’s Heartland’, are both available at www.desertknowledge.com.au.
2 For example, a recent policy statement (Australian Government 2011) states: ‘Genuine engagement with 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians is fundamental to our efforts to improve life outcomes and 
close the gap in the indigenous disadvantage … A critical step in improving outcomes for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Australians is for government agencies, service providers and contractors to engage them 
as valued stakeholders in the development, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, 
programs, services and legislation that have an impact on them.’ Also in November 2011, the Commonwealth 
released its ‘Indigenous Economic Development Strategy’ which states: ‘Government cannot act alone. 
Success depends on working in partnership with indigenous leaders communities and individuals and with 
business, industry peak bodies and non-government organizations.’ Writing in 2005, Peter Shergold, the 
former Secretary of DPMC and a primary author of the current framework, observed: ‘We need to drive 
governance programs in the direction of connectedness. Programs need to be made more flexible, responsive 
to community needs and priorities and delivered in a holistic manner … More importantly, there needs to be 
a delivery of programs in a seamless manner to local communities’ (2006).
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Such aspirations are echoed in more general terms in recent reports on broader 
public sector reform. At the federal level, such ideas figure prominently in the 
Moran Review (AGRGA 2010), and at a state level, in the Western Australian 
Economic Audit Committee Report (WAEAC 2009). 
So how equipped is the Australian public service to meet such challenges? 
This chapter suggests there is a long way to go. Moreover, the central obstacles 
to their realisation lie in structural features that are keystones of new public 
management. Specifically:
• Governance arrangements are a threshold cause of policy failure in 
Indigenous affairs. As discussed later in detail, centralised protocols and 
siloed departments undercut local responsiveness. Reframed governance will 
not, of course, by itself solve the many problems of Indigenous disadvantage. 
That can ultimately only be achieved with the active involvement of the 
affected citizens. But this essential mobilisation is negated by the present 
governance framework and cannot be remedied within it.
• The challenge in designing new policies is a structural one. Local discretions 
in service delivery and decentralised governance designs are unattainable 
within the present protocols surrounding budgeting, siloed departments, 
human resources management and accountability arrangements. All these 
protocols need ultimately to be reworked if the circle is to be squared between 
local discretion, continuous improvement, and centralised accountability. 
Britain has begun to experiment in whole-of-government budgeting (NAO 
2013). But ultimately the challenge goes deeper, perhaps ultimately to a 
framework that Charles Sabel has described as ‘experimentalist governance’ 
(for example, Sabel 2004; Sabel and Zeitlin 2011).
• The challenge in designing new policies is also a strategic one; a rethink 
from fundamentals is required (for example, Shergold 2013). This is first and 
foremost a challenge to imagination. A paradigm shift — one that challenges 
structurally embedded habits, practices, and approaches — will always be 
hard to accomplish. This is particularly hard in Australia’s policy system 
which has few if any platforms that can host appropriate conversations and 
exchanges.
At the heart of this chapter is a simple claim: there is an imperative need 
to reframe governance. This composite concept recognises the essential 
interdependence between the formal apparatus of the state and its publics. The 
parties are engaged in a dynamic exchange, the opposite of directed, deferential, 
passive or paternalistic linkage. In achieving positive and sustainable outcomes, 
engagement has a primary rather than a secondary role.3 Compounding this 
3 For a sensitive discussion of the complexity of choice in an Indigenous context, particularly the tensions 
between individualist and collectivist patterns, see Rowse 2002, 2012.
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challenge is the overlap of policy responsibilities between federal and state 
government. While present rhetoric gestures to the intergovernmental, systemic 
and contextual character of policy challenges, practice falls far short of stated 
ambitions.
Indigenous affairs display these difficulties in sharp relief. The following 
section explores the structural barriers which inhibit decentralised, whole-of-
government practice. This is followed by a review of responses elsewhere to 
analogous challenges. The conclusion evaluates the challenge of grafting such 
approaches into Australian public administration. 
What are the structural barriers to whole-of-
government?
Two official Management Advisory Committee reports (2004, 2007) noted five 
changes in organisation and processes that were deemed essential to underpin 
whole-of-government practice:
1. substantial initial cross-agency/stakeholder agreement about the broad 
purposes to be pursued; 
2. use of the outcomes budget framework to pool resources and to create 
appropriate accountability frameworks; 
3. lead-agency staff empowered with sufficient authority to manage whole-of-
government settings and to lead the engagement of local stakeholders; 
4. empowering these same managers to engage with relevant individuals and 
interests; and
5. ensure the individuals engaged in these latter roles have the appropriate 
networking, collaboration and entrepreneurial skills.
How did this unfold in Indigenous affairs?
A first step involves assessment of the multitude and variety of programs that 
have been established to drive change in local communities. The ‘Strategic 
Evaluation of Indigenous Programs’ (Department of Finance 2010) offers the 
most recent comprehensive overview. It identified no less than 232 individual 
programs which in one way or another support Indigenous Australians. This 
report reviews these programs in the context of the various broad outcomes 
that the government has established. An earlier Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO) report (2007) focused on the four primary departments: Department 
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of Education and Science (DES), Department of Employment and Workplace 
Relations (DEWR), Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs (FaCSIA), and Health and Ageing. This report identifies 94 programs, 
either mainstream or niche, that are relevant to Indigenous affairs. DES operates 
15 Indigenous-specific programs and 43 mainstream programs that have 
Indigenous applications; DEWR operates 11 Indigenous-specific programs and 
the Job Network; FaCSIA operates six Indigenous-specific and six mainstream 
programs; Health and Ageing operates five Indigenous-specific programs and 
nine mainstream programs. To add to the complexity, many of these major 
programs have sub-components.
To coordinate funding, the federal government decided to establish Indigenous 
Coordinating Centres (ICCs) at a regional or area level. In practice, coordination 
can be achieved by one of two means: by brokering linkages between 
communities and programs; or by joining individual programs into a funding 
block, which is more demanding. Meantime, to test the model, trials at selected 
sites were introduced in 2003.
In a report on these trials, Gray (2006) explored the challenge of program 
management as perceived on-the-ground, in this particular case from Wadeye. 
The trial was intended to reduce the number of individual programs that local 
communities need to manage. In fact, in the course of the trial the number of 
relevant programs increased to 90. In another example, Dillon and Westbury 
(2007, p. 66) list the five Commonwealth programs that could be tapped to fund 
natural resource management on Indigenous land: 
An important and growing policy area where in recent years scores of 
Indigenous ranger programs have emerged across northern Australia 
focused on land and resource management. Program funding in this 
area comes from a diverse array of agencies: the National Heritage Trust, 
the Indigenous Protected Areas Program, CDEP, STEP and the ABA 
… Programs vary in size from hundreds of millions (for example the 
CDEP or ARHP) to less than half a million (for example the Indigenous 
Children’s Program).
With 39 per cent of the Indigenous population under 15, education is another 
critical area. The same authors note the array of programs relevant here:
The national flagship programs include the Youth Allowance and 
Abstudy: the former is targeted at young people studying, undertaking 
training for Australian apprenticeship, looking for work, or sick; the 
latter at indigenous students. Over and above this, FaCSIA has four 
‘niche’ programs which provide youth services of various kinds with a 
total national budget of $34.6 million and a client base of approximately 
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340 000 nationally. DEST has at least ten youth related Indigenous 
specific niche programs … the data on numbers of service providers 
suggests that the availability of these programs in remote Australia is 
very patchy … It is clear that across the national government there 
are a couple of hundred different programs potentially allocable to the 
circumstances of remote citizens. Access is a different matter entirely 
(Dillon and Westbury 2007, pp. 67–68).
Finally, they note the bewildering array of programs aimed at Indigenous 
housing:
The existence of concurrent state and national responsibilities means 
that in some areas programs are duplicated by each jurisdiction. Housing 
is a classic example where states, territories and national governments 
deliver both mainstream and Indigenous housing and housing related 
programs, and even within the national government there are a number 
of separate Indigenous housing programs (CHIP/NAHS, CHIP/AACAP, 
FHBH) all delivering housing and essential services at the community 
level, along with the Australian Regional Housing Programme which 
funds the states and territories to deliver housing at the community 
level (Dillon and Westbury 2007, p. 65).
The whole-of-government architecture was designed to ensure these programs 
are accessed by the citizens that they are intended to serve. How effective have 
these arrangements proven to be?
Whole-of-government architecture
Since whole-of-government arrangements were introduced in 2002, there have 
been at least nine reviews. The first four covered the initial COAG trials and the 
rest focused on subsequent developments. Seven were official or commissioned 
evaluations and the remainder were independent academic assessments: Urbis, 
Keys and Young 2006; Morgan Disney and Associates 2006; Gray and Sanders 
2006; Gray 2006; ANAO 2007; KPMG 2007; Hunt 2007; FaHCSIA 2004; O’Flynn 
et al. 2011. All these reviews repeat points stressed in the Management Advisory 
Committee documents, namely that whole-of-government will not work without 
devolution of authority, funding, accountability and coordinated organisation. 
They also all found continuing and unresolved administrative difficulties.
As an introduction to these unresolved problems, consider the case of Mutitjulu, 
ironically the first community named in the Northern Territory Emergency 
Response (NTER). Before whole-of-government was conceived, this community 
tried, over more than a decade, to obtain for itself a new style of governance 
(Smith 2009). Its efforts foundered on immovable central structures. This 
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story starts in 1991 when the Women’s Council prepared a report highlighting 
concerns about ‘controlling and caring for children’. A series of submissions 
and discussions followed. In 2000, the community council at Mutitjulu asked 
Centrelink, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, and the then 
Department of Families and Community Services to work with it to develop a 
practical strategy to deal with welfare dependency and related family problems. 
Following a consultation, the Community Council itself proposed a Participation 
and Partnership Agreement. The departments did not respond. Why?
First, the key departments would not support an ‘All in’ community 
model of welfare reform and would not support linking Youth Allowance 
with school attendance, even though these had been specifically 
requested by community members … Second, Centrelink and FACS 
would not countenance an indigenous community working with them 
to develop and implement locally-relevant breaching rules. Neither 
would they countenance a community organisation being provided 
with a delegation under the Social Security Act in order to do so … 
Third, entrenched inter-departmental turf wars in Canberra meant that 
the departments concerned were unable to negotiate a common position 
… And finally the Australian government was unable or unwilling to 
reform the chaotic state of its departmental program funding in order 
to streamline the pooled funding and grant reporting arrangements 
that would have been required … In late June 2007, the Australian 
government announced that Mutitjulu would be the first community 
into which it activates national emergency measures. It will do so 
unilaterally (Smith 2009, p. 6).
So far as coordination is concerned, we will see little has changed.
The findings of the various evaluations affirm that whole-of-government is 
confounded at the critical regional and ICC levels. The obstacles are structural, 
not contingent. Consider the two most recent reports, an official report conducted 
by KPMG (2007) and an independent report conducted by academics from 
The Australian National University and the University of Canberra (O’Flynn 
et al. 2011). The KPMG study involved a review of internal documents as well 
as interviews with 158 Australian and state government agency staff and 35 
community organisations. The report compared the proclaimed objectives of the 
policy with the experience and observations of local staff. Despite six years’ 
experience and at least eight preceding reviews, structural obstacles to joined-
up work persisted. Here is a summary:
• Departmental silos persisted: Line agency staff presented to communities/
organisations as representative of their agency. Communities/organisations 
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reported that they did not know who to talk to. ICC staff and line agency 
staff rarely visit communities together (p. 19).
• Funding protocols prevented discussion with applicants: Many line agency 
staff were unable to provide governance and financial management assistance 
to organisations due to probity issues relating to assessment of funding 
applications (p. 21).
• ICC managers lacked authority: Managers indicated that they did not have 
authority to gather agency staff support. Line agencies confirmed that their 
staff remained their direct responsibility (p. 23).
• Funding and reporting arrangements inhibited whole-of-government 
collaboration: Line agencies have different program guidelines, funding 
rounds and delegations, and different risk assessment protocols. In some cases 
this resulted in applications undergoing up to eight different risk assessments 
(p. 29). One ICC took over 12 months to negotiate and approve an SRA which was 
worth under $50,000 in funding (p. 32). One agency may apply more rigorous risk 
assessment for applications over $100,000, while another agency’s more rigorous 
assessment only applies to applications over $150 000 (p.34).
• The problems are structural: ‘The implementation of whole-of-government 
collaboration in ICCs is an area requiring significant improvements. Many of 
the issues that impede whole-of-government are structure and have little to 
do with ICC staff and management’s willingness to collaborate’ (pp. 10, 29).
The findings of the university-based study (O’Flynn et al. 2011) echo these 
conclusions, albeit in more graphic terms. This study was based on 48 field 
interviews covering staff at ICCs, state and regional offices, and in Canberra. 
It suggests that, despite the top-down whole-of-government effort, Mutitjulu’s 
experience has not been transcended. Their conclusion is unequivocal: ‘Due to 
entrenched barriers, which permeate the broader public service, ICCs have been 
a failed experiment.’
Like KPMG, O’Flynn et al. identify structural failings in the basic organisational 
design:
• No or limited assignment of authority to the ICC managers, 
• An ad hoc approach to the representation of departments (which meant staff 
were withdrawn as cost pressures emerged); 
• An under-investment in skills; and
• Inconsistent operating systems.
They cite the comments of ICC managers, first on their delegations of authority:
I could not go out and direct another person to do something in this ICC 
… because they’re not from my agency. I could (only) ask, influence, beg 
(Executive Level, ICC: 248).
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Whole of government doesn’t work … when you’ve got all different 
agencies sitting in the one place, supposedly working together … 
they’re supposed to be all collaborating and telling each other what 
they’re doing … I’m telling you it doesn’t work and I work in an ICC 
and I’ve been there since the day it started (Executive Level, ICC: 248).
The fact that we’re co-located with [Department A] and [Department B] 
and a couple of [Department C’s] people is just window dressing. So there’s 
no whole of government activity between them … There’s no practical 
program [or] whole of government approach (APS Level, ICC: 248).
The NTER Review also picked up these criticisms but this time from the 
perspective of the clients:
There was extensive comment in communities about the lack of co-
ordination across locally based professional staff. Between the GBMs, 
Community Employment Brokers and shire service managers, there is 
not a clear point of authority or coordination (p. 86).
A second set of unresolved governance issues arose from conflicting vertical 
and horizontal tensions which cut across in the administration of programs. 
According to O’Flynn et al.:
The pervasiveness of a program focus and the silos that it creates were 
seen as impossible to combat even in a setting where there was physical 
co-location and strong endorsement from Ministers and Secretaries 
(2011: 249).
A third problematic element involved centralised decision-making. This 
aspiration also fell foul of more embedded administrative practices and 
requirements: 
The idea [was] for ICCs to have a pool of money that they could make 
decisions about. Well, in the great thing about being risk averse that was 
all centralised back in Canberra: … useless basically. It just went against 
the whole thing about whole of government which is about sharing, 
devolving, not controlling everything, but taking responsibility and it’s 
the same pattern. And that was a bit of its undoing, in fact because 
it was to give people the power to do the deal on the ground (Senior 
Executive Service, ICC, p. 249).
Most recently, under the 2009 National Partnership Agreements between the 
Commonwealth and the states, the same broad arrangements have been extended 
to coordinate the delivery of programs across jurisdictions. Six agreements have 
already been signed and others are foreshowed in relation to native title claims 
arrangements, remote infrastructure and healthy food. In general, the parties also 
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commit to ‘developing a co-ordinated approach’, and ‘enabling initiatives to be 
delivered in a manner appropriate to needs in particular locations’. To oversee 
the arrangements, a Coordinator-General based in Canberra was appointed in 
2009. This position was abolished in 2014.
Accountabilities as a structural barrier to local 
effectiveness 
Central accountability requirements create another barrier to on-the-ground 
effectiveness. Take health services. In the interests of enhancing local choice 
and control, the Aboriginal community controlled health services were 
established in the 1980s. Funding was later transferred to the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Commission and grants were on a yearly basis, but with an 
expectation of continuance. The Commonwealth Department of Health assumed 
responsibility in 1995 and thereafter funding increased. The pattern of funding 
has since further evolved with most services now drawing support from several 
sources: a core operating grant from the Office for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Health; state government health department grants; and by proposal 
driven niche-funding that could include broader social purposes.
Each funding source adopts its own application process, accountability 
framework and priorities. In an assessment of these arrangements, Lavoie et al. 
(2009, p. 6) note:
Analyses conducted by the Victorian Department of Health suggests 
that the reporting and compliance burden is disproportionate compared 
to that imposed on other small and medium-size funded agencies.
For example, Aboriginal agencies receiving on average $2 million were 
accountable for between 26–30 activities. Non-governmental organisations 
typically received total funding of $10 million for the same array of activities. 
This study also found that agencies can be required to produce up to 59 separate 
reports for 13 programs. This boosts transaction costs disproportionately. 
Further, in a small service, disentangling the daily time allocation of a single 
staff member between varieties of programs can be wholly artificial. Finally, a 
12-month funding cycle makes the recruitment of staff precarious.
These multiple accountabilities and the associated burden of transaction costs 
have persisted despite having figured so strongly in other evaluations. This 
suggests that the requirements derive from wider structural imperatives and 
cannot be excised without systemic change.
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Consultation and the development of social capital
As noted at the outset, every official report since 2001 has emphasised the 
imperative of working with and through local communities (for example, 
Commonwealth Grants Commission 2001; Morgan Disney and Associates 2006; 
NTER Review 2008; Department of Finance 2010; Productivity Commission 
2012). To illustrate the complexities that can arise, Edmunds (2010, p. 16) 
cites the negotiations over James Price Point, which involved Woodside and 
a proposed liquified natural gas development. Negotiations were conducted 
with the Kimberley Land Council, the organisation which had statutory 
responsibilities for consultation under the Native Title Act. The council had 
secured a consensus amongst key traditional owners. But a dissident group 
challenged these processes. Edmunds (2010, p. 16) comments:
This is a common situation and one that traditional law could once have 
dealt with. However, it fits uneasily into contemporary decision making, 
raising a crucial question about how much, and whose consent is needed 
for informed consent.
If this is one dimension of the issue, another is the quixotic (from the perspective 
of local communities) behaviour of their governmental interlocutors. Take the 
NTER, which banned sales of alcohol on Aboriginal land. According to Marian 
Brady, a specialist in alcohol use in Indigenous communities:
The (political grandstanding associated with the NTER) was a little 
strange considering that most Aboriginal land in the Territory was 
already dry. There were already 107 general restricted areas, all on 
Aboriginal land and all in non–urban areas except for one town camp 
in Alice Springs … the alcohol recommendations in the Little Children 
are Sacred report … are designed to work with and enhance the NTs 
existing legislative structure … the Intervention measures unhelpfully 
cut across them (cited in Edmunds 2010, p. 19).
Another example involved the impact of the NTER at Wadeye, an early trial site:
When a crisis erupted at the Wadeye trial site … the Commonwealth 
government resorted to a more coercive approach characteristic of 
hierarchical or contract government … It has chosen not to develop 
housing through the legitimately elected Thamururr Regional Council, 
with whom it signed the COAG trial agreement thereby by-passing and 
potentially undermining the very indigenous governance structure it 
partnered with only four years ago, and to which it remains formally 
committed in the NT bilateral agreement (Hunt 2007, p. 167).
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Smith (2009) describes the proposed governance arrangements for the West 
Arnhem Shire that were developed slowly and after protracted negotiations 
that had begun in 2004. Their purpose was to plan implementation of a new 
local government shire covering the entire region. Following protracted on-
the-ground negotiations over three years, which progressively built support 
amongst relevant groups and communities, a new governance structure had 
been settled. In 2007, the Intervention aborted these arrangements, leaving 
behind a frustrated and cynical local community. 
According to the ANAO, in 2007, 75 per cent of 257 managers surveyed responded 
positively to the statement: ‘The Indigenous Affairs Arrangements (IAAs) have 
encouraged consultation with indigenous communities at the local and regional 
levels.’ How effective were these conversations from the perspective of their 
interlocutors? The on-the-ground evidence is not positive. For example, in 
May 2010, DEEWR and FaHCSIA issued a draft Indigenous economic strategy. 
Submissions were invited and consultations held with Indigenous communities 
throughout Australia. The following are the reporter’s notes on the consultations 
held in various remote centres in November 2010. In Alice Springs, for example:
Approximately 22 (indigenous) participants attended the workshop … 
People participated in both the questions and answer session and the 
table discussions but there was widespread criticism of the relevance of 
the Indigenous Economic Development Strategy to remote areas and the 
likelihood of anything changing on the ground … There are no economic 
foundations in remote communities and this needs to be acknowledged 
… There was widespread criticism that the strategy was homogenising 
and represented an urban western model … (it) needs to respond to 
the different circumstances, opportunities, economies and drivers in 
remote regional areas...There are so many economic strategies around 
that people are blasé about ‘just another plan’ … The gap between the 
strategy and what is happening on the ground is very wide … There is a 
different sort of economy operating in remote areas. It’s not just a matter 
of transferring these into real jobs, they are real jobs but not recognised 
as such.
The report records analogous sentiments from participants in all the other 
consultations sites covering Broome, Cairns, Port Lincoln and Karratha. Here is 
one more observation from Karratha:
Real engagement means listening to indigenous people and not just 
telling them … previous feedback for policy development over the years 
has been ignored. There is no apparent correlation between what the 
Australian government proposes and what indigenous people want … 
Different communities have different needs and opportunities.
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The overall funding framework
At a material level, W. H. Stanner’s indictment of the ‘great Australian silence’ 
in relation to Indigenous Australians is reflected in the legacy of past policy 
failures:
The list would include in no particular order, the pre-existing failure of 
educational outcomes, which lead to a largely non-literate indigenous 
citizenry, extreme housing shortages for personnel required to deliver 
government funded programmes and service across remote Australia; 
poor law enforcement and less than optimal levels of intellectual capital 
within government agencies relevant to remote service delivery … 
The combined absence of social and physical infrastructure means that 
there is nothing for governments to graft mainstream services onto as 
happens elsewhere. Government appear to discount or underestimate 
the importance of a pre-existing network of social, physical governance 
and business infrastructure … (Dillon and Westbury 2007, p. 59).
One important source of equality in services for Australians is the periodic 
determinations of the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGrC). Via complex 
metrics, the CGrC attempts to equalise funding for service provision around 
Australia. But there are several problems. First, determinations are based on 
average or mainstream needs. There are no special provisions or allowances for 
remedying acute backlogs such as those that exist in remote Australia. These 
were comprehensively documented by the CGrC in its 2001 report. 
Second, while the Commission grants money on the basis of an assessment of 
needs in particular areas like housing, transport etc., there is no requirement for 
governments to spend their allocations in these areas. The states and territories 
are free to spend as they choose. Indeed, the states and territories may also use 
the existence of special Commonwealth programs as a ground for reducing their 
own allocations to Indigenous services.
There is no mechanism to check that funds are spent in line with the principles 
behind their allocation. A significant proportion of the funds allocated by both 
the CGrC and the Commonwealth to the Northern Territory are in recognition of 
the special needs of Indigenous Australians. According to a Northern Territory 
Council of Social Services analysis of the 2008 Northern Territory budget:
The spending priorities of the NT government exacerbate the differences 
in measures and senses of equality for low-income and disadvantaged 
people thereby contributing to the reduced life expectancy, poor 
health, violence and other differences that they are intended to address 
(NTCOSS 2008; see also The Australian, 24 October 2009). 
9 . The Dysfunctionality of New Public Management: 
277
Another issue concerns allocations to local government. These are determined 
on a per capita basis:
The bizarre result is that jurisdictions like the Northern Territory with 
one sixth of the Australian land mass receive less in local government 
assistance than is notionally allocated to the population of Geelong 
(Dillon and Westbury 2007, p. 188).
Whole-of-government policy development: A case 
study of CDEP 
Whole-of-government is difficult to achieve not just in on-the-ground delivery, 
but also in processes of cross-departmental policy development. Despite its 
popularity and considerable impact in remote Australia, at the same time as it is 
promulgating ambitious employment targets, the government is also curtailing 
the Community Development Employment Project (CDEP). At its peak, CDEP 
engaged some 40,000 people:
From 2005, CDEP has been systematically dismantled … Without much 
evidence, CDEP is being blamed for cost shifting by governments and 
for poor mainstream employment outcomes … as CDEP is dismantled 
people will be given the choice of mainstream work or welfare, on the 
proviso that work might require migration from home communities … 
This policy change fails to recognise Indigenous aspirations, cultures 
and life projects (Altman 2009, p. 8).
The specific situation of citizens in remote Australia has seemingly received 
short shrift. What is to be done in remote communities where there is zero 
conventional economic infrastructure? For example, to illustrate the effectiveness 
of CDEP, Altman describes the experience of the Kuninjku community in west 
Arnhem Land:
For the majority of Aboriginal people in remote communities migration 
away from ancestral lands … and from extended kin networks will 
be neither an aspiration nor a solution. This in turn suggests that key 
institutions like CDEP that are currently being dismantled will need to 
be retained (Altman 2009, p. 13).
He notes the specific contributions of CDEP to the Kuninjku economy: harvesting 
game for local consumption; producing art for sale in the national and global art 
market; and being employed in paid provision of environmental services.
A review of CDEP by the Department of Finance (2009) found that the scheme 
had very limited success in fulfilling its work readiness charter and that it was 
New Accountabilities, New Challenges
278
almost impossible to assess its community development contribution. It also 
noted these goals are likely to conflict. Altman’s (2011) detailed evidence that 
the scheme had worked positively as an enabler of remote livelihood possibilities 
in the hybrid economy played no role in the finance assessment.
The changes to the CDEP scheme in the Northern Territory also indicate the 
difficulties government faces in managing policy development on a whole-of-
government basis. The reductions in CDEP employment displaced populations 
from outstations and other settlements. But the scheme was run down without 
town camp capacities being augmented. Moreover, there was no development 
of new town-based employment opportunities and no or little opportunity for 
mainstream employment.
Beyond whole-of-government: Squaring the 
circle between central accountability and 
place-centred governance
The previous section catalogued the structural difficulties that have hampered 
realisation of whole-of-government aspirations. These include the relevance 
of local contexts; high and increasing transaction costs; a turn to micro-
management; the confounding of freedom of action on the part of local staff; 
and, above all, the incompatibility between highly centralised organisational, 
HR and funding protocols and local discretions. In this respect, Australian 
experience matches that of other jurisdictions, which have tried whole-of-
government and found it wanting. In search of remedies, a number of new or 
supplementary frameworks have been introduced to shift the locus of choice 
and decision away from highly centralised arrangements towards more localised 
contexts. This is reflected both in the ‘Total Place’ (HM Treasury and Department 
of Communities and Local Government 2010) initiatives in England and in the 
attention to place-based approaches in current OECD work. In both cases, 
the drastic cuts in public spending following the 2008 global financial crisis 
have coloured implementation (for example, Crowe 2011). Also relevant are 
‘learning-by-doing’ approaches which offer a new accountability framework to 
reconcile national concerns with local initiative and freedom of action. Finally, 
imaginative ‘place-based’ developments, covering the provision of otherwise 
threatened local services and the realisation of efficiencies through collaboration 
between authorities at the local level, are also evident in Australia. These are 
detailed in a comprehensive report on local government in outback Queensland 
(Dollery and Johnson 2007). These varied governance designs are reviewed in 
turn. A concluding section explores the consistency of these approaches with 
recent official reviews of the public sector in Australia. 
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The ‘Big Society’ in Britain
The coalition government in Britain has sought to implement more decentralised 
governance arrangements via its ‘Big Society’ agenda.4 
Decentralised governance represents a deliberate shift away from the top-
down pattern which was common to both the Thatcher‒Major and Blair‒
Brown governments. In particular, the Blair‒Brown years were marked by 
substantially increased investment in the public sector and the development 
of arrangements to enhance central control, but in conjunction with whole-of-
government delivery at the local level. Organisational arrangements to buttress 
central control and to drive service improvement included special units in the 
Cabinet office to facilitate strategy development and to drive program change. 
In addition, the performance framework was extended with a plethora of targets 
and measures. To facilitate joined-up working, joint funding agreements were 
also introduced. There is an extensive literature on all these developments (for 
example, Parker et al. 2010; Barber 2008; Marsh and Miller 2012, particularly 
chapters 3 and 4). 
The profound limitations of this experience fanned interest in more radically 
decentralised approaches. An early move occurred in 2006 when the Lyons 
review of local government proposed attention to place-based approaches. In 
subsequent years, within and beyond government, attention to alternatives 
flourished. Think tanks have been important contributors to the emerging 
agenda (for example, Demos (Wind-Cowie 2010); Institute of Public Policy 
Research 2010; Institute for Government (Adonis and Sims 2011); New 
Economics Foundation (Coote 2010)). In addition, the House of Commons 
Public Administration Committee and the Communities and Local Government 
Committee have serially reviewed aspects of the new approach.5
The government has since taken several steps to advance its decentralising 
agenda, notably the establishment of its Whole Place Community Budgets 
Programme. This sought to shift the initiative in service design from central 
to place-based authorities. It sought to join up relevant central and local 
4 Greg Clark (now a minister in the British government) wrote a book in 2003 which he describes as making 
the case that ‘if central government is everywhere, then local government is nowhere’ (Clark 2003).
5 A comprehensive list of House of Commons committee enquiries on community budgets and the ‘Big 
Society’ follows: Community Budgets (Communities Select Committee 2013); Integration across Government 
and Whole-Place Community Budgets (Public Accounts Committee 2013); Taking Forward Community Budgets 
(Communities SC 2012); Localisation Issues in welfare reform (Communities SC 2011); Mutual and Co-operative 
approaches to delivering local services (Communities SC 2012); Localism (Communities SC 2011); The Big 
Society (Public Admin Select Committee 2011); Further Report on The Big Society (Public Admin SC 20912); 
Citizens and public services (Public Admin SC 2013); Department of Communities and Local Government: 
Financial sustainability of local authorities (PAC 2013).
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departments and agencies (and, where appropriate, NGOs and the private 
sector) to create proactive services that could be responsive to specific local or 
client circumstances and needs. The promise was greater impact at less cost. 
Four English pilots have now been successfully completed. The program was 
administered by the Department of Communities and Local Government. In 
essence, this program brought together public and private sector bodies to 
develop new ways of delivering local services. It aimed to increase efficiency 
and improve service outcomes through more integrated service provision across 
multiple agencies. The project commenced in 2011 and local authorities were 
invited to apply to participate in the pilots. 
The pilots involved joint project teams from central government and the relevant 
authorities. The teams first mapped highest cost services/categories and then 
sought to devise joined-up programs. This work was supported by five technical 
advisory sub-groups, each focusing on developing a methodology for a specific 
policy area: health and adult social care; criminal justice; families with complex 
needs; the economy; and education and early years. These groups identified 
sources of information on unit costs and outcomes and promoted consistency 
in assumptions. 
The approach is described in detail in evidence to the Communities Select 
Committee (Localism HC 547, 7 June 2011), in an NAO report ( 2013) and also in 
a comprehensive report for the Local Government Association (2013). 
The following is a brief sketch of each pilot: 
West Cheshire: Total public service spends in the area in 2010–2011: £2.4 
billion. A Public Services Board was established to provide overall strategic 
and managerial direction. The project united local authorities with four central 
departments (Health, Justice, Education, and Home Office). Collaboration was 
developed around five themes: starting well (early intervention in complex 
families); working well (local economic growth, work ready individuals); living 
well (community empowerment, safer communities, affordable housing); ageing 
well (home services); and smarter services (integrated asset management, poled 
customer insight, data sharing, strategic commissioning). Estimated savings: 
£56 million over five years.
Essex: Total public service spend in the area in 2010–2011: £12.8 billion. 
This involved 15 local authorities. An Executive Board was established. 
Collaboration was developed around four themes: families with complex needs; 
economic opportunity (focused on skills and infrastructure); community safety 
(reducing reoffending and domestic abuse); and health and well-being (focused 
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on integrated commissioning). Estimated £414 million in net benefits over six 
years, comprising £127 million of cashable savings and £287 million of economic, 
social and fiscal benefits.
Greater Manchester: Total public service spend in the area in 2010–2011: £21 
billion. The project involved 10 unitary authorities represented by the Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority. There were four themes: early years (school 
readiness, links to ‘troubled families’ work stream); worklessness; reducing 
reoffending (young people, women and repeat offenders); and integrated health 
and social care (dementia and psychiatric, drugs and alcohol, end-of-life, fit-for-
work, acute conditions). £270 million of net savings over five years
West London Tri-borough: Total public service spend in the area in 2010–2011: 
£6 billion. Involved three London boroughs: Westminster, Kensington and 
Chelsea, Hammersmith and Fulham. Oversight through an established board. 
Themes included troubled and complex families; work and skills; health and 
social care; strategic coordination of infrastructure. Collaborative planning 
commenced in 2011 and involved shared library, adult social care, and children’s 
services across three boroughs. This is to be extended to integration of public 
health functions and corporate services covering ICT and facilities. Estimated 
£70 million of net savings annually
The National Audit Office (NAO) assessment (NAO 2013) supported these 
initiatives. The report also highlighted the need to develop more robust, 
standardised measurement tools as experience accumulated. As a result of 
these experiments, more robust methodologies are being developed to measure 
savings and to allocate contributions, ‘including financial incentives or funding 
arrangements that encourage partners to invest across organisational boundaries, 
particularly where reform takes longer to be financially viable’ (NAO 2013, p. 10). 
As might be expected, in a change on this scale the development of methodologies 
and protocols remains a work-in-progress — refined arrangements remain to be 
fully developed in a number of areas including: 
• standardised information and information sharing protocols; 
• a protocol concerning the sharing of savings, particularly where costs and 
benefits accrue to different agencies and/or over significantly different time 
periods; 
• how incentives for participation can be maintained and strengthened over a 
program whose pay-offs are relatively long term; and
• how accountability structures might be reframed. 
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The NAO also commented: ‘The anticipated savings from this initial exercise may 
appear modest compared with total public expenditure. However it is still early 
days … Importantly, the current exercise focused on testing a new way of working 
rather than maximising the results over the short term’ (NAO 2013, p. 24).
The program described above has involved methodologies for co-funding 
between departments and agencies, and has also shown how initial protocols 
might be developed surrounding accountability, HR assignments, and the 
sharing of returns. 
But the enduring success of this approach also requires a public service culture 
that is open to innovation. This involves prioritising, as a subject for routine 
attention, continuous improvement via service design. Here the Cameron 
government has commissioned six independent bodies to constitute what it has 
termed ‘What Works Institutes’. Their remit is exercised under the auspices of 
the Cabinet Office. Their role is to identify sectors of pressing social need and 
major public spending, where an evidence base exists but where this is either 
not synthesised authoritatively or where communication of findings is deficient. 
The aim is to aid strategic and operational development and day-to-day practice 
amongst at least three distinct groups:
• Commissioning staff: In areas where services are delivered by NGO or for-
profit contracts, the institutes will assist those who commission services in 
informing their decisions on how best to spend public money;
• Service managers: In areas of direct service provision, the institutes will 
assist public services managers in establishing how best to deliver public 
services and how to improve their service; and,
• Policy managers: In policy design, the institutes will assist departments in 
developing an informed view of what is and is not cost effective in public 
services.
The six centres cover: health and social care, education attainment, ageing 
better, local growth, crime reduction, and effective early intervention. Together 
these centres cover some £200 billion of public spending.
To ensure research outputs are utilised by government, a senior civil servant 
has been appointed as National Advisor to engage with ministers and other 
stakeholder groups. This officer is located in the Cabinet Office and reports to 
the Minister for Government Policy and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury.
9 . The Dysfunctionality of New Public Management: 
283
Place-based approaches in recent OECD work 
The extent and variety of place-based approaches in recent OECD studies 
indicate the emergent appeal of this framework. In the quest for sustainable 
economic development, jobs and the effective provision of public services, 
the establishment of context-specific capabilities are seen to be primary. They 
represent the next move in the development of public management. Place-
based approaches are suggested for a variety of contexts including economic 
development and innovation, social development, city and rural development, 
unemployment, deprived areas, and high needs contexts. This is indicated in the 
following list of recent studies (with additional studies listed in the footnote):
• Managing Accountability and Flexibility in Labour Market Policy (2011)
• Breaking out of Policy Silos: Doing more with less (2010)
• Strategies to Improve Rural Service Delivery (2010)
• Regions Matter: Economic Recovery, Innovation and Sustainable Growth (2009)
• How Regions Grow: Trends and Analysis (2009)
• Linking Regions and Central Government: Contracts for Regional Development 
(2007)
• Governing Regional Development Policy: The Use of Indicators (2009)
• Flexible Policy for More and Better Jobs (2009)
• Linking Regions and Central Government: Contracts for Regional Development 
(2007)
• The New Rural paradigm: Policies and Governance (2006)6
One proposition is common to these reports: while it is paramount to get 
institutions right at the local or regional level, there is no one-size-fits-all 
solution. According to one OECD analyst:
In many countries, the regional/central vertical governance gap is 
significant: the centre faces information gaps and the regions confront 
capacity gaps. Moreover, it makes little sense to speak of ‘centralisation’ 
or decentralisation in general – the details are always the key (Coleman 
2010). 
Historic, institutional and local characteristics should shape governance designs. 
For example, in relation to development, the emphasis is on differentiated 
6 Delivering Local Development through a Comprehensive Approach to Strategy, System and Leadership: 
Highlighting the case of Derry–Londonderry, Northern Ireland (2011); New Approaches to Rural Policy: 
Lesson for around the world (2005); The New Rural Paradigm, Policies and Governance (2006); OECD 
Territorial Reviews: France (2006); Job Rich Growth: Strategies for local employment, skills development and 
social protection (2011); OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook (2010).
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strategies and organisational designs which can detect and then exploit existing 
or potential niches or opportunities. Implicit in all of the foregoing is the key 
role of local engagement and empowerment. 
In designing place-based arrangements, the OECD has developed two 
frameworks. The first sets out systematically the seven core dimensions of a 
governance system: information, capacity, funding, policy, administration, 
objectives and accountability (see Table 1). These individual elements are 
defined as follows (Chairbit 2011):
i. An information gap is characterised by information asymmetries 
between levels of government when designing, implementing and 
delivering public policies. Sometimes the information gap results from 
strategic behaviours of public actors who may prefer not to reveal 
too clearly their strengths and weaknesses, especially if allocation of 
responsibility is associated with conditional granting. However, it is 
often the case that the very information about territorial specificities is 
not perceived by the central decision maker whilst sub national actors 
may be ignorant about capital objectives and strategies.
ii. The capacity challenge arises when there is a lack of human knowledge 
or resources available to carry out tasks, regardless of the level of 
government (even if, in general sub national governments are considered 
to be suffering more from such difficulties than central government).
iii. The fiscal gap is represented by the difference between territorial 
revenues and the required expenditures to meet local responsibilities 
and implement appropriate development strategies. In a more dynamic 
perspective, fiscal difficulties also include mismatch between budget 
practices and policy needs: in the absence of multi-annual budget 
practices for example, local authorities may face uncertainty in engaging 
in appropriate spending, and/or face a lack of flexibility in spending 
despite its appropriateness in uncertain contexts. Too strict earmarking 
of grants may also impede appropriate fungibility of resources and limit 
ability to deliver adapted policies.
iv. The policy challenge results when line ministries take a purely vertical 
be implemented at the territorial level. By contrast, local authorities 
are best to customise complementarities between policy fields and 
concretise cross-sectional approaches. Limited coordination among 
line ministries may provoke a heavy administrative burden, different 
timing and agenda in managing correlated actions etc. It can even lead 
to strong inconsistencies when objectives of sectoral policymakers are 
contradictory.
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v. The administrative gap occurs when the administrative scale for policy 
making, in terms of spending as well as strategic planning, is not in line 
with relevant functional areas. A very common case concerns municipal 
fragmentation which can lead jurisdictions to initiate ineffective public 
action by not benefitting from economies of scale. Some specific policies 
also require very specific and often naturally fixed, boundaries.
vi. The active gap refers to different rationalities from national and sub-
national policymakers which create obstacles for adopting convergent 
strategies. Common examples arise from political and departmental 
purposes. Divergences across levels of government can be used for 
‘cornering’ the debate instead of serving common purposes. A local 
mayor may prefer to serve constituents perceived aspirations instead 
of aligning decisions to national or state wide objectives which may be 
perceived as contradictory.
vii. The accountability challenge results from the difficulty to ensure 
transparency of practices across different constituencies and levels 
of government. It also concerns possible integrity challenges of 
policymakers involved in the management of public investment.
These ‘gaps’ together constitute the architecture that is essential for effective 
place designs. In the absence of appropriate arrangements in any one building 
block, the entire design of place governance is put at risk. In turn, this 
emphasises the significance of a diagnostic phase in which local conditions, 
needs and circumstances need to be clearly identified.
The second framework, ‘Bridging Coordination and Capacity Gaps’ (see Table 
2), illustrates the approaches adopted in various states to overcome coordination 
and capacity gaps. A particular state might use various combinations of these 
instruments, depending on what it seeks to achieve through decentralisation 
and what coordination and capacity gaps are relevant. The key point again is the 
variety of approaches that are evident around OECD states and the specifically 
local character of any particular design. 
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A decentralised approach is reinforced in literatures on regional innovation 
systems to which we now turn.
EU ‘learning-by-doing’, experimentalist or 
pragmatist governance
The European Union (EU) is a complex multi-level governance design for which 
it is hard to find precedents. In areas where common action has been agreed, 
the diversity of approaches and structures between member states ruled out 
top-down or one-size-fits-all designs. So how could action be coordinated? In 
answering this latter question, the EU has introduced an approach which may 
have applications to coordinated action between and within levels of government 
in Australia, specifically in the context of remote Australia. 
The EU approach replaces principal-agent designs with a ‘learning-by-doing’ 
or pragmatist one (Sabel and Zeitlin 2011). The former design continues to 
dominate public policy thinking in Australia. A central tenet of principal-
agent theory is that the principal can determine desired outcomes in advance. 
Pre-determined performance metrics allow the principal to hold the agent 
accountable for outcomes, thus obviating shirking, opportunism and other 
deceptive behaviour on the part of the agent. This has been widely applied in 
public sector settings in Australia — in a variety of human services contracts, 
for example (see Marsh and Spies-Butcher 2009). But the diversity of conditions 
across the country has required adaptation. Hence in equalising comparisons 
the centre adds in a variety of qualifying factors that it considers appropriate. 
Influenced by this thinking, elaborate contractual, co-production, outsourcing 
and reporting structures have developed in a variety of fields (for example, 
surveyed in Productivity Commission 2010).
At least three basic features of human service (and other) contexts undercut 
advance determination of outcomes by a centrally located principal:
• First, the knowledge guiding the decisions of both principals and agents is 
provisional: both are operating with corrigible information and judgements. 
Unintended consequences, ambiguity and difference abound. It is impossible 
to devise programs from first principles that survive the effort to realise 
them. In the case of the principal, this involves judgements about attainable 
outcomes and, in the case of agents, this involves judgements about the 
practices most likely to enhance performance in the pursuit of these outcomes.
• Second, providers have information that is essential to adapting performance 
outcomes for the overall system that recognise best practice: the principal is 
setting outcomes that need to reconcile efficiency and quality in a way that 
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minimises incentives for provider gamesmanship, creates incentives for 
efficiency and that does so in a way that also promotes quality services for 
clients. Any one of the outcomes is complex. Their achievement in combination 
is a daunting challenge. Only the providers have information that is relevant 
to making this latter judgement. The principal needs routine access to 
provider information in order to refine and develop her understanding of 
desired outcomes in the light of provider and client experience.
• Third, providers’ own knowledge of how to attain quality services for clients is 
varied and developing: providers’ own knowledge of how best to serve clients 
— and how best to establish organisational and governance routines that 
reinforce these outcomes — is itself corrigible and experimental. Different 
organisations will attain different outcomes and it will not be immediately 
apparent which represents the best achievement of not necessarily consistent 
purposes. Dynamic efficiency through the whole system thus requires the 
routine collection, assessment and dissemination of performance information 
amongst providers. 
An ‘experimentalist’ or pragmatist approach represents an alternative to these 
architectures, but one that promises to shift exchanges from a primarily punitive 
to a primarily learning basis (Sabel 2004; Sabel and Zeitlin 2011). This builds on 
earlier work on continuous performance improvement and ‘learning by doing’ 
— an approach to dynamic efficiency that was developed by the Toyota Motor 
Company in its management of buyer–supplier relationships (Sabel 1992). Here 
is how this might be translated to public policy settings:
General goals or designs are set provisionally by the highest level — 
parliament, a regulatory authority, or the relevant corporate executives 
… then the provisional goals are revised in the light of proposals by 
lower level units responsible for executing key aspects of the overall 
task (Sabel 2004, p. 11).
Sabel proposes to recast fundamentally the terms of the accountability 
relationship between principals and agents:
Compliance or accountability in the principal agent sense of rule 
following is There are in effect no fixed rules, or, what comes to the 
same thing, a key rule is to continuously evaluate possible changes in 
the rules. Accountability thus requires not comparison of performance to 
a goal or rule, but reason giving: actors in the new institutions are called 
upon to explain their use of the autonomy they are accorded in pursuing 
the corrigible goals [emphasis mine]. These accounts enable evaluation of 
their choices in the light of explanations provided by actors in similar 
circumstances making different ones and vice versa.
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Agents who fail to perform to best-practice levels are first given the chance 
to improve via an exchange of knowledge about their potential to improve: 
‘Repeated failure to respond, even with assistance, is, however, likely to bring 
about the dissolution of the offending unit’ (Sabel 2004, p. 14). This broad 
approach has been widely tested in a variety of human services and other public 
policy settings in the US (Sabel and Simon 2010). 
Pragmatist or experimental principles define an approach to the management of 
intergovernmental and purchaser–provider relations wholly different from the 
structure that is now dominant in federal and state jurisdictions. The alternative 
‘experimentalist’ or pragmatist approach to system design builds on a broad 
structure of intergovernmental and purchaser–provider relationship, but places 
exchange in a context that emphasises learning by both parties. 
Australian local government practice
The foregoing discussion focused on regions as the relevant spatial unit and 
involved governance models drawn from international practice. Parallel 
experiments and possibilities are also evident in Australian local government 
practice. The models that have been developed here have clear implications for 
imagining various possible forms of regional governance. These local government 
arrangements are comprehensively explored in a report of the collaborative 
practices of shires in remote Queensland (Dollery and Johnson 2007). The report 
documents the many imaginative responses of individual councils to preserve 
community amenities and to reconcile local responsiveness with efficient 
resource management and relationships with other levels of government. The 
focus of the report is the Remote Area Planning and Development Board which 
is a not-for-profit, Australian Securities and Investments Commission-listed 
company involving a collaboration of 11 councils in western Queensland. Its 
core concerns are transport, regional planning, capacity building, natural 
resource management, service development, technology and communications, 
development of sustainable industries, and investment attraction.
The report documents the many imaginative roles that are being undertaken 
by the individual councils to ensure community amenities are maintained at 
desired standards:
In the absence of any other feasible service providers, local councils must 
provide a large range of essentials services. For instance, there are not 
many councils in Australia that provide the postal services (as in Barcoo 
and Ilfracombe); offer banking facilities (Blackall, Boulia, Tambo and 
Winton); a café (as in Boulia, Isisford and Winton); undertaker services 
(Barcoo, Blackall, Boulia, Ilfracombe and Tambo); real estate agency 
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activities (Diamentina); operate general stores (Ilfracombe and Isisford); 
provide freight services (Isisford); or operate the local newspaper 
(Blackall) … In addition, each council provides extensive support to the 
humorous community and sporting organisations in their boundaries 
(Dollery and Johnson 2007, p. 104).
Other services include:
Aramac Shire either directly or indirectly provides … a bakery, Home 
and Community Care programs, and a rural transaction centre. Similarly, 
Barcaldine Shire delivers a number of state government programs 
including rural family support, 60 and Better, Home Assist Secure and 
a HACC program … BARCO Shire Council provides the Jundah Post 
Office … the Council provides a bus service and a 4WD vehicle for the 
three schools in the Shire; the Council provided land for the Windorah 
Medical Clinic; it provided land for state community housing; it has 
undertaker services and provides burial services … Barcoo Shire has 
set up a bursary system for residents undertaking tertiary, diploma or 
trade qualifications … Blackall Shire assist its residents by providing 
an ‘in-store’ Westpac Bank facility in the Council office and it acts as a 
‘developer’ baby providing an industrial estate as well as residential land 
for sale … [it] runs an extensive local economic development program … 
an airport (with 3 commercial flights a week); SBS radio transmission; 
youth development services, including employment initiatives (Dollery 
and Johnson 2007, p. 105–106).
Conclusion
The foregoing suggests the timeliness of a shift of governance towards more 
place-based spatial levels. This is the next logical step in the development of 
public sector governance. As noted at the outset, this is wholly consistent 
with the vision for public sector reform advanced in a number of recent official 
reports; for example, at the federal level, in the Moran Review (AGRGA 2010); 
and at a state level, in the Western Australian Economic Audit Committee 
Report (WAEAC 2009). This latter report specifically foreshadows the 
replacement of ‘agencies operating in silos’ with more decentralised citizen-
focused arrangements. Both these reports underline the profound challenge 
to centralised processes, cultures and organisational and budgetary protocols 
that are involved in a further iteration of public sector reform. The evidence 
reviewed in the last section suggests governance designs are available — but, as 
British experience attests, the difficulties in translating aspirations into practice 
remain formidable. No less profound obstacles can be anticipated in Australia. 
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Indeed here they are compounded by intergovernmental considerations. On 
the other hand, both fiscal and political imperatives imply dictate a shift to 
citizen focused services. The demand for more proactive services that are and 
sensitive to context will not go away. In charting a new path, a first challenge is 
to imagination — there is another way.
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10. Australian Sub-National 
Compacts with the Not-For-Profit 




In this chapter we trace the history of formal policy frameworks for cross-
sector cooperation in Australia’s states and territories. Inspired by the original 
‘English’ Compact, initiated by the Blair Labour government in 1998, the policy 
frameworks examined are intended to establish agreed rules of engagement 
between government (and its instrumentalities) and the not-for-profit (NFP) 
sector — especially those parts of the sector upon which government has 
become increasingly reliant for the delivery of public services.
Compacts represent an express acknowledgement by government of the 
contributions to social well-being made by civil society actors. They also 
embody the reciprocity implicit in the government –NFP sector relationship 
and are generally intended to act as a touchstone for agreed values, principles, 
attitudes and norms. To the extent that contemporary governments assert the 
intrinsic value of collaboration with non-state actors (O’Flynn and Wanna 2008) 
compacts offer symbolic proofs of a commitment to cross-sector partnership. 
Most compacts also seek to alleviate the impact upon NFP service providers 
of externalities associated with government procurement and contracting 
processes that have tended to focus on the exchange of public funds for 
capability (service provision). Frequently cited as constraints on the capability 
and capacity of government’s partners in the NFP sector are: high transaction 
costs; burdensome reporting; excessive prescription; failures to fund the true 
cost of service delivery; and operational uncertainty associated with short-term 
contracts (Productivity Commission 2010).
Here it must be noted that many NFP providers of contracted services reject 
the notion that they are merely contractors or agents. Rather, NFP organisations 
often see themselves as policy actors in their own right, with an implied mandate 
to represent constituencies of interest. NFP organisations are also repositories of 
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expertise, knowledge and the custodians of stakeholder trust. So, in addition to 
exchanges of financial consideration for services rendered, contracting in the 
public services space involves exchanges of authority and legitimacy (Casey 
2004).
Elson (2011, p. 137) observes that there have been few comparative analyses 
of framework agreements for cooperation at the sub-national level within the 
same country and this is certainly true of Australia, not least because the policy 
landscape is dynamic and still evolving. The analysis presented here is based 
upon extensive interviews undertaken between November 2010 and October 
2011 with public officials, sector representatives and other policy actors in 
Australia’s six states and the Australian Capital Territory. It is hoped that this 
work will make a useful contribution to both theory and praxis.
Compacts in Australia
In March 2010 the then Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, announced 
a national compact between the Commonwealth (federal) government and the 
country’s NFP sector. The Commonwealth was a latecomer in this policy space 
(Butcher 2011, 2012; Butcher et al. 2012). For over two decades successive state 
and territory governments — most of them Labor governments — have looked 
to compacts to resolve the tensions and contradictions inherent in the contract 
state. This chapter tells the lesser-known story of these policy frameworks.
Between 2001 and 2012, compacts or compact-like policy frameworks have been 
actively considered in every Australian state and territory. Some have endured, 
some have fallen by the wayside, and others have failed to fully come to fruition. 
Some have enjoyed, and continue to enjoy a measure of success. Others have 
failed to earn the full confidence of stakeholders inside and outside government. 
The cross-sector policy frameworks implemented in each jurisdiction have 
differed in their scope, institutional arrangements and operational frameworks. 
Some were developed and agreed bilaterally between government and its NFP 
sector partners; others have taken the form of unilateral policy statements. Some 
purport to be whole of sector frameworks, while others are expressly focused on 
the health and social welfare sub-sectors.
In the discussion that follows, we consider the range of factors influencing the 
adoption of compacts as well as the factors contributing to their success and 
failure. Of course, it is not possible to examine each of the cases in detail in a 
chapter of this length. Nevertheless, the appendix at the end of the chapter 
provides a contextual snapshot of each state and territory. 
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Leading from below
Australia is a federal state in which the constitutional division of powers confers 
primary responsibility upon states and territories for the delivery of health and 
human services, housing and education (ACT 2000b, p. 6; Casey et al. 2008c, 
p. 4). As a result, state and territory governments have a significant policy and 
financial exposure to the NFP sector. The rapid expansion of Australia’s NFP 
sector through the 1970s and 1980s was largely underwritten by increases in 
social expenditure by state and territory governments. Today, income from 
state and territory governments represents a significant share of the aggregate 
recurrent income for Australia’s community sector organisations (ACOSS 2011).1 
From the mid-1990s, state and territory governments have confronted the twin 
challenges of fiscal pressures and increasing demand for public services — 
including demands for greater choice in in relation to services and providers 
(Cook et al. 2012). In response, governments have sought — where politically 
and practically feasible — to ultilise non-state service providers in the NFP and 
for-profit sectors. 
Human services account for a significant share of outsourced service delivery 
owing in part to the labour-intensive nature of these industries and the 
presumed lower cost structures prevailing in the NFP community services 
sector (Productivity Commission 2010, p. 249). Other advantages claimed for 
NFP service providers include greater nimbleness, responsiveness, acceptability 
to consumers and capacity for innovation (McDonald 1999; McDonald and 
Marston 2002).
Just as NFP service providers have become dependent upon government grants 
and contracts for a significant share of their income, so too state and territory 
governments have become dependent upon NFP service providers for the 
delivery of public policy and programs. Notwithstanding the interdependence 
of the public and NFP sectors, this is not a relationship of equals. A number 
of formal reviews have confirmed that NFP service providers often operate 
within significant constraints imposed by government policy, including high 
transaction costs, financial uncertainty, onerous reporting requirements, micro-
management, excessive focus on inputs, and failure to fund the full cost of 
service delivery (Auditor-General 2000; PAEC 2002; QAO 2007; VAGO 2010). 
These factors help to explain why formal cross-sector policy frameworks to 
support enhanced cooperation between government and the NFP sector emerged 
1 State and territory governments also exercise regulatory functions in relation to the NFP sector. The 
regulatory environment in which NFP organisations operate has been characterised as consisting of 
‘uncoordinated regimes at the Commonwealth and state/territory levels’ in which ‘[d]isparate reporting 
and other requirements add complexity and cost, especially for organisations operating in more than one 
jurisdiction’ (Productivity Commission 2010, p. 113).
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first in state and territory jurisdictions. However, it should also be noted that 
a compact between the Commonwealth government and the NFP sector was 
never in prospect at any time during the 11 years during which the centre-right 
Liberal‒National Coalition governed nationally (Lyons 2001, 2002, 2003).
Compacts and Labor governments
As was the case federally, policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation in 
states and territories (with only one exception, to be discussed later in this 
chapter) have been initiated by Labor administrations. In part this might be 
explained by the fact that the Australian Labor Party has strong historical and 
institutional associations with parts of what might be collectively termed ‘civil 
society’ (which includes the NFP sector), in particular the labour movement 
and progressive social movements. To the extent that centre-left political parties 
share values and constituencies with significant parts of the NFP sector, they 
might also exhibit a predisposition to enter into formal partnership frameworks 
based on an assumption that they and the sector are fellow travellers of a sort.
During the period of the Howard Coalition government (1996–2007) compacts 
with the NFP sector formed an important part of the policy palette in all 
Australian states and territories. During this period an especially antagonistic 
relationship prevailed between the federal government and parts of the NFP 
sector, particularly around the government’s contracting practices and its 
intolerance of policy advocacy by the sector (Australia 2010; Productivity 
Commission 2010, pp. 309–310) — a situation that might have galvanised the 
sector to forge agreements with receptive state and territory Labor governments.
Process streams analysis
The adoption by state and territory governments of formal cross-sector policy 
frameworks exhibits features of policy transfer and/or policy convergence. Policy 
diffusion is evident where the preferred policy responses in one jurisdiction 
are systematically conditioned by prior choices made in others (Simmons et al. 
2006, p. 787). The transmission between jurisdictions of public administration 
doctrines, such as those encompassed by new public management, are often 
thought of in these terms (Hood 1991; Common 1998; Halligan 2011). Policy 
convergence, on the other hand, is marked by a tendency for policy formulations 
to grow more alike in response to emerging problems (Drezner 2001). In 
other words, governments confronting similar problems might more or less 
independently come up with similar solutions.
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That formal cross-sector policy frameworks in Australia’s states and territories 
contain substantially similar provisions and language is indicative of 
direct policy transfer (in so far as it reflects conscious and deliberate policy 
borrowing). However, cross-sector policy frameworks have emerged at different 
times and their political and practical expression differs substantially between 
jurisdictions, which is strongly suggestive of policy convergence. Explaining 
the emergence of compacts requires an analytic frame that supports a contextual 
analysis of the historical, political and institutional factors affecting the ways 
in which policy problems are framed and the roles played by policy actors in 
enabling (or impeding) the implementation of solutions (Common 2010). 
Process streams analysis offers a useful approach for framing a plausible 
explanatory narrative. In his seminal book, Agendas, Alternatives and Public 
Policies (first published in 1984), Kingdon posed the questions ‘what makes an 
idea’s time come?’ and ‘what makes people in and around government attend, 
at any given time, to some subjects and not to others?’ (Kingdon 1995, p. 1). 
Kingdon observed that in the volatile marketplace of ideas and solutions some 
ideas never gain traction, others become prominent and then fade, and some 
‘achieve lasting high agenda status’ (Kingdon 1995, p. 116).
Kingdon posits the existence of three major ‘process streams’: the problem stream 
(for example, the emergence of consensus about problems that require resolution, 
such as the unintended externalities associated with contracted service 
delivery); the policy stream (for example, communities of policy ‘specialists’ 
in which alternative solutions to problems are formulated and tested, such as 
formal cross-sector framework agreements); and the politics stream (for example, 
events or circumstances that influence political receptiveness to problems 
and solutions, including swings in public opinion, interest group pressures, 
elections, changes of government, or machinery of government changes).
Although the three streams operate largely independently, they come together 
at critical times. When they do, they can result in the opening of a ‘policy 
window’, which offers a time-limited opportunity for new policy ideas to be 
placed on the policy agenda. In Kingdon’s words: ‘A problem is recognised, a 
solution is available, the political climate makes the time right for change, and 
the constraints do not prohibit action’ (Kingdon 1995, pp. 86–88).
However, the opening of a policy window is not alone sufficient to place a 
proposal on the policy agenda. In most cases this requires the intervention 
of policy entrepreneurs who seek to couple their preferred solutions to 
existing problems. Policy entrepreneurs are people who have the connections, 
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knowledge, profile and personal qualities necessary to promote the coupling 
of their preferred solutions with existing policy problems (Kingdon 1995, pp. 
166–169, 181–182).2
Whether compacts survive the tumult of political contestation and policy 
implementation can depend on their maintaining what Kingdon refers to as 
‘high agenda prominence’ (Kingdon 1995, pp. 103, 198). This can be especially 
challenging in environments characterised by multiple policy domains and in 
which individual and collective policy actors have differing values, priorities 
and operational norms. Compacts can also be crowded off, or down the policy 
agenda as a result of political turbulence in the form of events such as a change 
in leadership (a frequent occurrence in Australian politics in recent years), the 
loss or turnover of key personnel (such as a CEO of a public sector agency or 
an influential thought leader in the NFP sector) or by other crises that serve to 
refocus and re-prioritise the attentions of policymakers and implementers.
A decline in agenda prominence can also occur when decision-makers conclude 
that once the policy has been announced their mission has been accomplished. 
Framework documents — such as compacts — that enunciate the purpose and 
means for cross-sector cooperation can be potent policy markers. However, 
the crafting of such a document is not an end in itself; it is only a beginning. 
Without an implementation strategy and follow-through the legitimacy of the 
initiative and the opportunity to have a positive impact is compromised (Almog-
Bar and Zychlinski 2012). Other threats are institutional resistance (e.g. an 
effect of path dependence and isomorphism); disconnects between institutional 
narrative and organisational behaviour (Meyer and Rowan 1991); the failure to 
fully understand or accept the purpose of the policy framework; and unrealistic 
expectations (contributing to cynicism and a loss of legitimacy).
Relevance in Australia
Kingdon’s process streams analysis offers a useful lens through which to view 
compacts and other forms of cross-sector agreement, but how might it apply in 
the Australian context?
First, in the problem stream, we have witnessed in Australia and elsewhere a 
broad consensus among policy practitioners and researchers about the range 
2 Kingdon and other like-minded theorists (such as March and Olsen 2006) draw upon neo-institutionalist 
theory in their analysis of political and policy phenomena, bringing together strands of normative 
(institutional logics), rational choice (bounded rationality), and historical (path dependency) perspectives in 
a compelling synthesis. Kendall 2003, Brock 2008, Elson 2011, and Phillips 2003 each draw upon Kingdon in 
their analyses of compacts in the UK and Canada. Compacts might also be usefully examined through other 
lenses, including policy implementation (Elson 2006) or from a functional legal/administrative perspective 
(Bullain and Toftisova 2005).
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of tensions, contradictions and externalities associated with the contract state. 
These include failures to fund the full cost of service delivery, burdensome 
reporting and compliance requirements, and the substitution of competitive 
behaviours for collegiality among NFP service providers.
Second, in the policy stream, we have observed since 1998 the emergence within 
various policy communities of energetic policy discourses concerned with cross-
cutting or joined-up policy and implementation; social capital; public value; 
co-production; boundary-spanning, network and relational governance; and so 
on. Policy entrepreneurs within these same policy communities have at various 
times promoted compacts or similar frameworks as a means to realise cross-
cutting policy aims.
Third, in the politics stream, Australia’s two major political parties have 
both embraced the central tenets of new public management. It is sometimes 
observed by political commentators that the ‘professionalisation’ of politics in 
contemporary Australia and the efforts of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and 
the Liberal Party of Australia to command the political middle ground has left 
few points of policy difference between the two major parties (Johnson 2011; 
Aitkin 2013). Clearly signalling those points of political and policy difference 
— particularly in times of political change — is an essential part of political 
marketing. For this reason alone, the idea of a formal framework document, rich 
in political symbolism, might have great appeal in light of the social democratic 
and corporatist traditions of the ALP — especially if the framework does not 
result in a significant impost on government.3
Australian cross-sector policy frameworks
The analysis presented here is based upon an extensive review of relevant 
primary documents and a more limited secondary literature. The primary 
literature is replete with policy documents, press releases, correspondence and 
reports (including parliamentary reports, reports by state audit offices and 
consultants). This literature is invaluable in reconstructing the policy histories 
of the relationship frameworks in each jurisdiction. 
Insights drawn from the literature are corroborated by in-depth interviews 
conducted with senior public officials, senior NFP sector representatives and 
other elite policy actors in each jurisdiction (with the exception of the Northern 
Territory). In order to protect the confidentiality of interviewees, none are 
identified by name or organisation.
3 Similar observations have been offered in relation to the Canadian Accord (Canada 2001) by Phillips 2003 
and Brock 2004, 2008.
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Each of Australia’s eight states and territories has explored the potential of 
formal relational frameworks between government and the community or 
voluntary sectors. Their form, content and implementation processes differ in 
each jurisdiction and sector confidence in state/territory frameworks is mixed 
— as is confidence in the effectiveness of compacts generally. It is difficult to 
neatly pigeonhole Australian state and territory policy frameworks. This is 
unsurprising given the complexity of the political and policy environments 
within which they arise, and the different perspectives and priorities brought 
to the table by the parties.
A variety of forms
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) led the way in 2001 with what the 
government and the community sector proclaimed as ‘the first Compact of its 
kind in Australia’ (ACT 2001, p. 4). This first compact, initiated by a Liberal 
territory government, was subsequently adopted by a succeeding Labor 
government and remains an important touchstone for social policy in the ACT. 
The most recent framework agreement (at the time of writing) is the 2012 
partnership agreement between the Tasmanian Department of Health and 
Human Services, the Department of Premier and Cabinet, and the community 
sector (Tasmania 2012). The Tasmanian agreement represents the culmination of 
an on-again/off-again conversation between government and the sector about a 
formal relationship framework begun in 1996 (personal communication 2011l; 
Tasmania 2012).
To date, three jurisdictions have implemented bilateral framework agreements 
between a state or territory government and groups representing broad 
coalitions of NFP organisations. These are the ACT (the ‘Social Compact’), New 
South Wales (NSW, with ‘Working Together for NSW’) and Queensland (the 
‘Queensland Compact’). Of these, only the ‘Social Compact’ continues to have 
policy relevance — helped by the fact that Labor has governed continuously in 
the Territory since 2001.4 By contrast, ‘Working Together for NSW’ had already 
declined in policy salience before the election of a Liberal‒National Coalition 
state government in 2011. The ‘Queensland Compact’ — once considered an 
exemplar framework — was displaced by the election of a Liberal‒National 
Party government in 2012.5 
Cross-sector frameworks implemented in Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania 
have been more narrowly cast as agreements between state government 
departments — predominantly in the human services and community health 
4 The next election will be held in October 2016.
5 It should be noted that neither ‘Working Together for NSW’ nor the ‘Queensland Compact’ were formally 
rescinded — as non-statutory instruments such a step is effectively moot.
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domains — and relevant NFP sub-sectors. In this, they are more explicitly 
concerned to address the legacy of problems arising in the contractual 
relationships between governments and NFP service providers. In Victoria, 
a proposal for a bilateral compact between government and the NFP sector 
was rejected in favour of domain-level partnership agreements between 
government departments and related groupings of NFP organisations. The first 
of these domain-level partnership agreements commenced in 2002 between 
the Department of Human Services and ‘health, housing and community 
service organisations’. This agreement was renewed in 2009 (in the form of a 
memorandum of understanding) and the model has since been extended to 
other policy domains such as early childhood development.
Although the language of some of these framework documents — such as the 
‘Queensland Compact’ — suggests broad application to the whole-of-government 
and the whole-of-sector, for the most part they apply to the human services 
and community services sectors.6 Although central agencies — for example, 
a premier’s or chief minister’s department — have had early involvement in 
the development of cross-sector frameworks in a number of jurisdictions (for 
example, in the ACT, New South Wales and Tasmania) in all cases the policy lead 
for these agreements resides primarily with line agencies with a policy lead in 
the human services domain.
Although all Australian jurisdictions have considered formal cross-sector policy 
frameworks, two — Western Australia (WA) and the Northern Territory (NT) 
— have followed a different path. In WA the ‘Delivering Community Services 
in Partnership Policy’ (Western Australia 2011b) is not an agreement, although 
it was co-developed by government central agencies, key line departments, 
and NFP sector representatives. The policy was endorsed by the state cabinet, 
is strongly championed by the Premier and enjoyed the strong support of 
community sector leaders. The Northern Territory commenced the development 
of a framework agreement in 2004–05, but later abandoned these efforts. There 
were signs in 2011 that the NT Labor government might revisit the idea of 
a formal cross-sector framework (Henderson 2011; NT Government 2011), 
however, any such development was forestalled by the election in 2012 of a 
majority Country Liberal Party government. 
6 This can also include community-based human services provided within a health portfolio. In Australia, 
the terms ‘community services sector’ or simply ‘community sector’ are frequently used to denote that part of 
the NFP sector providing community-based human services.
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Centre-left versus centre-right
With the exception of the ACT,7 state and territory cross-sector policy 
frameworks were initiated under centre-left Labor governments — most during 
the period in which the centre-right Liberal‒National Coalition governed 
nationally (1996–2007). 
As long-standing state and territory Labor governments faltered under the 
weight of incumbency, frameworks for cross-sector cooperation were inherited 
by nominally conservative administrations. So far, five jurisdictions have 
elected centre-right governments: Western Australia in 2008, Victoria in 2010, 
New South Wales in 2011, and Queensland and the Northern Territory in 2012. 
Labor governments were narrowly returned in Tasmania and South Australia 
(SA) in 2010, and in the Australian Capital Territory in 2012 (in coalition with 
the ACT Greens).
Superficially, centre-left governments would appear to be the natural allies of 
the NFP sector. However, it has been observed by NFP policy actors in a number 
of jurisdictions that Labor governments often expect their NFP partners to be 
compliant, grateful, and to refrain from criticism. The following comment by a 
senior NFP sector official reflects a commonly expressed sentiment:
For many peak bodies, sometimes there’s a perception that Labor 
governments are ‘friendly towards them’, but in fact, in lots of instances 
Labor governments expect peak bodies to be friendly towards them … 
Oftentimes, governments — particularly modern Labor governments — 
have often misinterpreted that the place of peaks is to support them, and 
not to apply critical analysis and provide policy guidance from a point 
of independence (personal communication 2011c).
Another observed:
I can remember people on the Left of the ALP in New South Wales 
[expressing] exactly that view, you know, ‘you should be damn grateful 
we’re in and do what we want’ — that sort of view, and I think the Left 
of the ALP still suffers from that in that ‘we’re the repository of all the 
good policy ideas’ and at the end of the day the public sector still knows 
how to do it best. Sorry, I don’t think either of those things are true 
(personal communication 2011b).
7 In April 2001, the Liberal government of the Australian Capital Territory published ‘Compact: Community 
partnership ACT Government: the first step’, which was hailed as ‘the first Compact of its kind in Australia’: 
Australian Capital Territory 2001, p. 4. Following a change of government in November 2001, the incoming 
Labor administration effectively rebranded and reissued the document as the Social Compact (2004) but 
without materially altering its contents: ACT 2000b, 2001.
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By contrast, Liberal‒National governments can be more accepting of the 
legitimacy of NFP organisations as autonomous actors, particularly those 
embodying traditional liberal values of independence (from government), self-
reliance and personal responsibility:
Oftentimes Liberal governments — I mean genuine liberal governments 
— sometimes appreciate the place of advocacy in a much clearer and 
less emotional manner and as a result are sometimes able to have much 
clearer relationships with bodies like peak bodies, because they see their 
place and they understand what it is (personal communication 2011c).
No two succeeding Liberal‒National administrations exhibit identical policy 
responses. In New South Wales and Victoria Liberal‒National governments 
continued to steer a course already set in train by previous Labor administrations: 
whereas the Victorian Coalition government continued along the constructive 
policy track established by Labor, in New South Wales an already moribund 
compact was ignored by the incoming government. Similarly, Western Australia’s 
Liberal government (first elected in 2008 and re-elected in 2012) has enlarged 
upon policy foundations built by the previous Labor government and, in so 
doing, revived a stagnant government–NFP sector relationship.
In 2011, the Western Australia government announced its ‘Delivering 
Community Services in Partnership Policy’ (2011b) together with significant 
new investments aimed at ensuring the viability and sustainability of NFP 
enterprises in particular sub-sectors (Western Australia 2011a). In contrast, the 
Queensland Liberal‒National Party (LNP) government, elected in a landslide in 
2012, focused on reducing state expenditure. The ‘Queensland Compact’ was 
set aside and its governance mechanisms discontinued. So-called ‘gag clauses’ 
were re-inserted in service provision agreements to debar organisations from 
advocating for policy change or even including links on their website to other 
sites that advocate for legislative change (Queensland Law Society 2012). The 
Queensland NFP sector responded cautiously to these changes — presumably 
to avoid antagonising a government aggressively pursuing a program of fiscal 
consolidation.
Policy windows and policy entrepreneurs
Formal policy frameworks for cross-sector cooperation have been initiated 
during times of political and structural change. From the early 1990s Australian 
governments have wrestled, collectively and individually, with the challenges 
of reforming and modernising the economy and public administration. Greater 
choice, competition and contestability in public service provision required major 
improvements in public sector efficiency, responsiveness and effectiveness. 
Australian governments at all levels increasingly arrived at the conclusion that 
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state predominance in public infrastructure, public utilities and public services 
could not be sustained. Market-testing, the separation of purchaser and provider 
functions, outsourcing, privatisation and purchase-of-service contracting were 
the new watchwords of Australian governance. 
By the late 1990s there emerged in the problem stream a broad critique of 
the limitations, contradictions and externalities associated with new public 
management (see Pusey 2008). Meanwhile, in the policy stream, policy 
alternatives centred on notions of joined-up governance and more pluralistic 
approaches to the realisation of government’s policy aims began to be promoted 
by state and non-state policy actors. Some of these proved to be skilled policy 
entrepreneurs capable of shaping policy preferences within government and the 
NFP sector.
From 1996–2007 the centre-right Liberal‒National Coalition governed nationally. 
This was a government dedicated (ostensibly) to reducing the size and reach of 
the state, in part by leveraging competitive markets. For much of this period 
the centre-left ALP governed in Australia’s states and territories. Although they 
too realised the necessity of structural reform, state and territory governments 
were also attracted to Blairite third way discourses then shaping social policy 
in the United Kingdom — discourses not unnoticed by thought leaders in the 
NFP sector, some of whom looked to compacts as a bulwark against the adverse 
impacts of contracting.
Policy windows opened at different times, under different circumstances and 
with different results in Australian states and territories. All states and territories 
have at one time or another embarked on the development of a formal cross-
sector policy framework. In a number of jurisdictions, however (NSW, WA, 
NT, Queensland) political turbulence in the form of leadership change, changes 
of government, structural change in the machinery of government and/or the 
departure of senior personnel (some of them the very policy entrepreneurs who 
caused compacts to be placed on the agenda in the first place) contributed to the 
closing of policy windows.
Policy initiation, implementation and practice
In some jurisdictions, central agencies and/or line departments have assumed 
the lead in top-down approaches to the development of cross-sector agreements, 
largely driven by a desire to resolve tensions arising in their contractual 
relationships with NFP service providers. Examples include South Australia (SA) 
and New South Wales. In others, the agreement-making process was initiated 
either by the sector itself in a bottom-up process (Queensland) or came about as 
the result of a bottom-up and top-down convergence of government and sector 
agendas (ACT, Tasmania, Victoria, WA).
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Each of the state and territory frameworks contains mutualistic elements, 
such as statements about the respective roles and contributions of the parties; 
shared principles, aims and objectives; and the standards of conduct expected 
of government and the sector. There are also notable differences between 
jurisdictions in terms of the role played by central agencies; the presence (or 
absence) of influential champions; the establishment of effective governance 
structures (including reporting and evaluation requirements); the formulation 
of action plans; the application of dedicated resources; and the degree of vertical 
and horizontal integration with related policy frameworks.
These factors can be important determinants of success. Any failure to 
institutionally embed formal framework agreements heightens the risks of 
fragmentation, inconsistency, irrelevance and cynicism — leading ultimately to 
a loss of policy salience. Even those policy frameworks that have enjoyed strong 
support within the NFP and public sectors can falter at critical moments in the 
politics stream, such as a change in leadership or a change of government. As 
observed by a key policy actor in Queensland, ‘there is no real way to future 
proof documentation that carries a previous Premier’s and Minister’s picture’ 
(personal communication 2010d).
Policy impact
The practical impact of cross-sector policy frameworks is difficult to gauge. It 
has to be borne in mind that in many respects these are aspirational frameworks. 
A compact represents an idealised relationship; the behaviours and practices set 
out in a framework document will not necessarily be mirrored on the ground — 
at least not without investing effort in a process of managed change.
Examples of effective cross-sector policy frameworks are those operating in 
Victoria and WA. These are acknowledged by policy actors in the public and 
NFP sectors as having made a positive contribution to the quality and durability 
of the relationship between government and the human services sector. Both 
states also have dedicated units focused on issues of sustainability and capacity-
building for the broader NFP sector (an Office for the Community Sector in 
Victoria, and a Community Engagement Unit in WA).
In both jurisdictions, governance structures have been established to guide 
implementation of the policy framework(s) and these exhibit a high degree of 
vertical and horizontal integration with allied policies. WA is notable in two 
respects: the government and the sector have eschewed a bilateral compact in 
favour of a comprehensive policy statement; and a centre-right government 
appears to have succeeded in negotiating a settlement with the sector where a 
centre-left government demonstrably failed.
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In Queensland, a state Labor government and the NFP sector accepted the need 
for a new settlement that would reflect their mutual dependence and underpin 
needed reforms. At its inception in 2008 the ‘Queensland Compact’ was 
regarded as an exemplar and even informed the development of the ‘National 
Compact’. Implementation was guided by an action plan (Queensland 2008) 
overseen by a Compact Governance Committee (CGovC). The CGovC, headed by 
an Independent Chair appointed directly by the Premier, reported annually on 
compact achievements (Queensland 2009, 2010). 
Following the election in 2012 of the LNP government led by Premier Campbell 
Newman, the CGovC ceased to meet and the Independent Chair was not renewed. 
The ‘Queensland Compact’ was no longer on the policy radar and the new 
government elected not to publish an external review of the compact completed 
prior to the election. The experience of the ‘Queensland Compact’ serves to 
illustrate the potential transience of cross-sector policy frameworks and the 
importance of obtaining cross-party support for the aims and aspirations they 
embody.
The contrasting circumstances of the ACT, SA and NSW are also instructive.
In the years since its launch in 2004 the ACT’s ‘Social Compact’ (ACT 2004) had 
declined in visibility and relevance. Accepting the need to revive and revitalise 
their relationship, the ACT government and the community sector undertook 
to refresh the framework and a revised ‘Social Compact’ was launched in 2012 
(ACT 2012). The ACT government, in partnership with the community sector, 
subsequently initiated a Community Sector Development Program to develop 
the skills and capabilities of the sector leaders to meet the reform pressures 
facing their organisations (personal communication 2013).
In SA, the framework agreement between the state government and the health 
and community services sector, ‘Stronger Together’ (South Australia 2009), 
was built upon foundations established by an earlier partnership agreement, 
‘Common Ground’ (South Australia 2004). Billed as a ‘reinvigorated approach 
between the partners to pool resources, resolve problems and develop new and 
creative approaches to service provision’, candid accounts of public officials 
and sector representatives suggest divergent perceptions of the framework’s 
effectiveness. Although state government officials speak highly of the framework 
(personal communication 2011q) the assessment of a key policy actor in the NFP 
sector is far less positive (personal communication 2011c).
In NSW, a first-term Labor government placed a compact on the policy agenda 
as part of its platform for the 1999 state election. However, it was not until 
2006 that the compact, ‘Working Together for NSW’ (NSW 2006), was finalised 
and launched — by which time the State Premier who had presided over its 
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development, Bob Carr, had resigned. The long gestation of the agreement, 
together with the departure of key instigators in the public and NFP sectors, 
foreshadowed a fraught implementation process. By the time of the 2011 state 
election at which Labor lost government to the centre-right Liberal‒National 
Coalition, ‘Working Together for NSW’ was widely acknowledged as a ‘dead 
letter’ — full of laudable words, but having had little discernable effect on the 
operations of government or the sector (Casey et al. 2008a; Dalton et al. 2008; 
Edgar and Lockie 2010; personal communication 2010a, 2010f, 2011b).
Australia’s most recent cross-sector policy framework, the Tasmanian ‘Partnership 
Agreement’ between the Department of Human Services and Health, the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet and the community sector (Tasmania 2012) 
represents a policy coda to a decade-long conversation about the government–
sector relationship. Relations between the NFP sector and government in the 
island state are generally cordial and constructive. Like the ACT, Tasmania is 
a small jurisdiction in terms of both population and geography, and exhibits 
considerable mobility within and between the public and NFP sectors — factors 
that act to reduce barriers to cooperation. 
At the time of writing the NT is the only jurisdiction that has not implemented a 
formal cross-sector policy framework. In 2004–05 the NT Labor government led 
by Clare Martin initiated consultations with the NFP sector about a framework 
agreement. However, the policy window closed abruptly when, in June 2007, 
the federal government announced a sudden and dramatic incursion into 
Aboriginal affairs in the NT — the Northern Territory Emergency Response 
(NTER) (Sanders 2008). The NTER was broadly interpreted as a rebuke to the 
NT Labor government and represented a significant loss of political capital for 
the Chief Minister, who resigned in November 2007 (Murdoch and Holroyd 
2007). By 2011, senior figures in the NT government appeared to be revisiting 
the possibility of a formal cross-sector policy framework (Henderson 2011; NT 
Government 2011). However, Labor’s defeat at the 2012 general election once 
again saw the policy window close.
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Table 1: Effectiveness of policy instruments
Framework documents exhibiting some 
effectiveness and durability
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government’s 
‘Industry Plan’
• Addresses practical 
structural reform 
agenda in relation 









• Achieving a 
compact not a 
priority for sector
• Formal bilateral 
agreements between 
Victorian government 
line agencies (health 
and human services 
and early education) 
and relevant parts of 
the NFP sector
• Policy lead resides with 
individual line agencies
• Complementary but 
separate cross-sector 
initiatives (Office for 
the Community Sector, 
2008) exist alongside 
agreements
• MOU model well 
regarded by sector
• Bilateral agreement 
between state government 
and the Futures Forum 
on behalf of community 
services sector
• Developed in response to 
sector mobilisation around 
the Community Services 
Sector Charter (2007)
• Focus on structural reforms 
to improve the government-
sector relationship and 
to build the capacity of 
the community services 
sector Policy lead resides 
with Department of 
Communities
• Oversight by Compact 
Governance Committee 
(CGovC)
• Independent Chair 
appointed by Premier (now 
lapsed) Reports annually on 
Action Plan approved by 
CGovC
• Compact in abeyance 
following defeat of Bligh 
Labor government in 2012 
state election
• A Statement of 
Understanding 
between government 
and the community 
sector
• Focus mainly on 
human services
• Policy lead resides 
with health and 
human services line 
agency
• Oversight by Joint 
Implementation Group
• Declining awareness 
and impact since 
2004 Social Compact 
‘refreshed’ in 2012
Source: Author’s research.
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Table 1: Effectiveness of policy instruments continued
Framework documents exhibiting minimal 
impact











• Agreement between 
community services 
and health line 
agencies and 
relevant sub-sectors
• Policy lead resides 
with line agency 
Initiated by the 
human services 
line agency as 
a mechanism to 
manage relationship 
with the sector






for social inclusion 
and volunteering
• Evidence of 
disconnects in both 
awareness and 
application . 
• Bilateral agreement 
between the state 
government and 
the Forum of Non-
Government Agencies 
(FONGA)
• Purpose was to 
strengthen working 
relationships between 
government and the 
sector




• Policy lead resides 
with human services 
line agency
• Oversight by Joint 
Reference Group
• Few attributable 
impacts
• Low levels of 
awareness and 
perceived relevance
• Policy widely regarded 
by sector and 
government agencies 
as a ‘dead letter’
• Liberal-National 
government elected in 
2011 has re-focused 
on red tape reduction 




DHHS, DPAC and the 
Community Sector 
launched by Premier 
Laura Giddings in 
October 2012
• The Departments of 
Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) and 
Premier and Cabinet 
(DPAC) represent the 
government
• Agreement is aligned 
with the National 
Compact and has 
whole-of-government 
implications . 




which will prepare 
an implementation 
plan outlining 
specific actions and 
measurable targets
• The Forum 
will prepare an 
annual report and 
commission an 
independent review 
and evaluation at the 
end of the first two 
years
• No formal instrument 
for cooperation in 
place
• An early attempt 





possibly as a 
result of leadership 
change (resignation 
of Chief Minister, 




• A ‘conversation’ 
about a ‘social 
participation 
framework’ initiated 
by Labor government 
shortly before the 
2012 election .
• Policy direction 
unclear following 
the formation of the 
Country Liberal Party 
government following 




The ‘hollowing’ of the state (Rhodes 2000, 2007; Di Francesco 2001) and the 
marketisation of social provision have deepened the mutual dependency between 
governments and the NFP sector; governments are increasingly dependent upon 
the NFP sector to deliver services, while NFP organisations are increasingly 
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dependent upon government contracts for their income.8 Dependence has also 
contributed to a blurring of the boundaries between the public and NFP 
sectors to the extent that the latter has come to resemble the ‘shadow state’ 
foreshadowed by Wolch (1990) a quarter of a century ago.
Network approaches to governance have long been argued to present advantages 
over hierarchy or market as a means of adapting, coordinating and safeguarding 
exchanges in the face of demand uncertainty and task complexity (Jones et 
al. 1997). However, the promotion of network governance as a means to 
overcome the traditional, hierarchical model of government is a relatively recent 
phenomenon (Eggers 2008, p. 23). So-called ‘third way’ policy formulations 
emphasising joined-up approaches to governance have indeed lent impetus to 
the pursuit of more collaborative forms of cross-sector engagement, especially 
in the pluralist mixed economy of social provision. Even so, the capacity for 
bureaucratic, cultural and operational rigidity in the public and NFP sectors to 
subvert the stated aims of formal cross-sector policy frameworks should not be 
underestimated.
Abiding by the spirit and letter of compacts can be problematic for both sectors. 
Not only do compacts have no legal force, they are also susceptible to haphazard 
implementation and waning commitment. Despite underpinning commitments 
partnership and collaboration, aligning operational practices with the rhetoric 
of compacts can be problematic. Compacts also raise difficult questions about 
the nature, role and composition of the NFP sector as well as questions about 
the legitimacy of representative organisations and their authority to speak on 
behalf of a broader sector. The NFP sector is, after all, a diverse, variegated and 
sometimes unruly political space.
Compacts also serve to highlight the difficulty of effecting institutional 
change. Public sector organisations sometimes exhibit a deep (and increasingly 
anachronistic) attachment to command and control notions of governance, even 
when they are patently dependent upon third parties for the implementation 
and delivery of programs and services (Shergold 2008). NFP organisations, 
on the other hand, sometimes appear to regard contractual compliance and 
reporting as both an affront to their cultural and operational autonomy and an 
unnecessary regulatory impost with no intrinsic value (Shergold 2008, p. 7).
8 The ‘hollowing out’ thesis advanced by Rhodes, Di Francesco and others describes a state that has moved 
beyond the logics of ‘command and control’ to a greater reliance on networks and ‘diplomacy’ (Rhodes 2007). 
The hollowed-out state is characterised by external dependence and internal fragmentation that both weaken 
the central organising capacity of the state and challenges the executive’s ability to ‘steer’ (Rhodes 2000, 
p. 350; Di Francesco 2001, p. 106). Characteristic of the ‘contracting state’, hollowing out raises normative 
questions about both the role of the state and the ability of the state to influence the direction and coherence 
of policy and outcomes (Di Francesco 2001, pp. 104–106).
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Curiously, there is little tangible evidence for the explicit adoption of policy 
learnings between states — even between states with Labor governments. The 
cases do suggest, however, that the rise and fall of compacts is closely associated 
with the opening — and closing — of policy windows occasioned by political 
events such as an impending, or recent elections, or changes in leadership. The 
cases also suggest that institutional neglect and complacency also contributes to 
a decline in the agenda prominence of cross-sector frameworks.
Conclusion
Do governments and the NFP sector need formal policy frameworks for cross-
sector cooperation? Clearly, key policy actors in Australia’s states and territories 
have at various times concluded that they do. It is also clear that faith in the 
potential of such frameworks to materially reshape the relationship between 
governments and the NFP sector is frequently challenged.
Compacts are intended to provide a roadmap for navigating a tricky political and 
policy terrain. In so doing, they have the potential to confront and challenge 
prevailing notions about the respective cultural and operational norms that 
shape the identity and modus operandi of the public and NFP sectors. Where 
compacts come into existence against an historical backdrop of cross-sector 
cooperation; where they demonstrate joint ownership and a commitment to 
a concrete program of meaningful actions; where they are guided by sound 
governance and exhibit vertical and horizontal policy integration, compacts can 
serve to provide a space in which governments and the NFP sector can work 
collaboratively in achieving shared aims.
It is important to not underestimate the difficulty of promoting compacts across 
the breadth and depth of the public and NFP sectors. Here it is important to 
reflect on the fact that a compact is a process not a paper: some stakeholders 
will have low expectations of a compact (which might result in low levels of 
commitment), and others will expect the compact to solve all their problems 
(thus creating the preconditions for disappointment and disengagement). 
Managing expectations is critical.
A compact is not a magic bullet. However, the continuing interest in codifying 
the terms of engagement between the public and NFP sectors suggests that, 
despite their limitations, compacts — or something like them — will continue 
to form a part of the policy toolkit.
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Postscript
This paper was originally presented at the the Association for Research on 
Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA) Annual Conference 
in Toronto, in 2011. Although every effort has been made to bring the content 
up to date, the volatile nature of Australian politics makes this task difficult 
— if not impossible. The durability of compacts rests, as often as not, on the 
fortunes of government and the dominance at any given time of particular 
policy discourses. A change of government nationally in 2013 signalled abrupt 
changes in the direction of NFP policy in the federal sphere. It is too soon to tell 
whether the change of government in Tasmania (2014) will affect the tenor of 
the government/NFP relationship, and the implications of dramatic changes of 
government in Victoria (2014) and Queensland (2015) are as yet unknown. The 
imperative to reform and modernise the relationship between human services 
‘commissioners’ and NFP providers was given added impetus by Peter Shergold, 
who was tasked to undertake a review by the Victorian government in 2013 
(Shergold 2013). However, new funding modalities (via the National Disability 
Insurance Scheme) and experimental financial instruments (social impact 
bonds) have the potential to transform the foundations of that relationship and, 
perhaps, render compacts obsolete.
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Appendix: A survey of Australian policy 
frameworks for cross-sector cooperation
Although compacts have been part of the policy mix in Australian states and 
territories for over a decade, there have been few comprehensive surveys of the 
state of play and relatively little has been published in peer reviewed journals 
(Brown and Ryan 2003; Butcher 2006, 2011; Casey and Dalton 2006; Pugh and 
Saggers 2007; Baulderstone 2008; Casey et al. 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Dalton et al. 
2008; Edgar and Lockie 2010). 
The landscape of the NFP policy space is changeable: political events can crowd 
compacts off the policy agenda; portfolio or machinery of government changes 
can result in a loss of continuity and salience; new problems and new solutions 
seize the attention of policymakers; neglect and complacency can fatally 
compromise even best-intentioned policy ideas. So it is that, almost as soon as 
one attempts to compile a definitive account of the range of policy responses in 
the states and territories, the accretion of policy change renders some part of 
the account obsolete. Nevertheless, the brief sketches presented below offer a 
useful glimpse of the situation in Australia’s states and territories as at the time 
of writing.
Vignette 1 — Australian Capital Territory: The social 
laboratory
The Australian Capital Territory has a population of approximately 367,000, the 
majority of which live in Canberra, the national capital. Self-government was 
granted to the ACT in 1988 and the ACT’s Legislative Assembly exercises the 
normal functions of a state legislature as well as local government functions. 
The Assembly’s 17 members are elected using a Hare-Clark proportional 
representative electoral system and, from the time of its first election in 1989, 
minority governments have been the norm in the ACT, apart from 2004–08 when 
Labor (which previously headed a minority government elected in 2001) formed 
the Territory’s first majority government. Following elections in 2008 and 2012 
Labor has governed in coalition with the ACT Greens.
The ACT has been described as a ‘social laboratory’ — often in association with 
Labor governments (Fischer 1984). The ACT led the way with Australia’s first 
compact in 2001 (ACT 2001), just months before the launch of the Canadian 
Accord. This was not a Labor initiative, however. Rather, the first ACT compact 
commenced under a minority Liberal government led by Chief Minister Gary 
Humphries (2000–01). 
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In 2000, Humphries succeeded the previous Chief Minister Kate Carnell (1995–
2000), following the latter’s resignation in the face of a threatened no-confidence 
motion after a series of high-profile public scandals (Singleton 2001). That the 
Liberal government chose to pursue a compact was possibly motivated by a 
desire to ease long-standing tensions with the community sector ahead of the 
2001 election (personal communication 2011a).
The 2001 compact continued to guide government policy after the election of 
a Labor minority government in 2001. It was republished in a revised edition 
in 2003 and was eventually replaced in 2004 with a rebadged and rebranded 
version of the previous government’s compact. The new ‘Social Compact’ (ACT 
2004) contained few material changes to the core provisions of the original. 
This is perhaps unsurprising given that in framing its pre-election budget, 
the previous Liberal government emphasised social spending in an attempt to 
outflank the centre-left Labor Party (Singleton 2001, pp. 587–588).
The impetus for the original compacts (Liberal and Labor) came from the Chief 
Minister’s Department. Both the ‘Social Compact’ and an associated community 
sector funding policy were co-designed by public sector officials and 
government’s community sector partners (personal communication 2011h, 2011i). 
However, a ‘Functional Expenditure Review’ undertaken in 2006 saw the policy 
lead transfer to the Department of Disability, Housing and Community Services 
which, by virtue of its share of contract and grants funding, was seen to have 
greater ‘direct ownership of contracting policy’ (personal communication 2011i).
Initially the ‘Social Compact’ stimulated interest in the NFP policy space and was 
seen to make a difference (personal communication 2011i). Although the sector 
acknowledged the compact’s good intentions, it also expressed concern about a 
range of perceived problems with its operation (ACTCOSS 2008). Personnel changes, 
administrative reorganisations, and emerging processes also took a toll and the 
influence and visibility of the compact waned (personal communication 2011i). 
In 2011 a Joint Community-Government Reference Group (established in 2004 
to oversight the ‘Social Compact’ and the community sector funding policy) 
undertook a review of the ‘Social Compact’. One official observed that as a small 
jurisdiction in which ministers and senior executives are quite accessible, ‘we’re 
well-placed to get it right and to connect and communicate effectively with our 
community partners’ (personal communication 2011h). 
A refreshed ‘Social Compact’ was launched in June 2012 (ACT 2012). The ‘Social 
Compact’ is intended to complement the Canberra Plan, the ‘Canberra Social 
Plan’ and policy governing community engagement. Officials acknowledge 
the ongoing challenge of maintaining the relevance of policy frameworks, 
particularly as the principles and behaviours they engender become woven into 
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practice (personal communication 2011h). One official looks forward to the day 
when policy frameworks mandating respect, equity and acceptance of diversity 
are regarded as anachronistic because these attitudes and behaviours have 
become ingrained (personal communication 2011i).
Vignette 2 — South Australia: ‘Stronger Together’, or 
the weakest link? 
South Australia’s key relationship framework document, ‘Stronger Together’ 
(2009) forms one part of a suite of policy documents and institutional 
arrangements that, in the words of a key policy actor from the NFP sector: 
‘probably don’t hang together as neatly and as easily as we would necessarily like 
them to’ (personal communication 2011c). Although portrayed in some quarters 
as an example of a well-functioning framework agreement (Baulderstone 2006), 
the South Australian example is also offered as a cautionary tale of a framework 
agreement hampered by weak institutional arrangements and a low level of 
executive commitment (ACOSS 2008).
‘Stronger Together’ and its predecessor document, ‘Common Ground’ (South 
Australia, 2004), were initiatives of the former SA Departments of Families and 
Communities, and Health. Although the NFP sector participated in drafting 
both agreements, the sector harboured ‘a level of cynicism about the capacity of 
the agreement to change the nature of the relationship in a really fundamental 
way’ (personal communication 2011c). Interviews with elite policy actors 
in the NFP sector, line agencies of government and central agencies reveal 
important ‘disconnects’ in the way the parties think about the effectiveness 
of the framework document and the overall health of the relationship between 
government and the sector.
There is a view, widely shared in the sector, that framework documents such as 
‘Stronger Together’ serve symbolic as opposed to practical purposes: ‘over the 
years government has wanted some instruments that can be paraded in a public 
context’ (personal communication 2011c). One key NFP policy actor admitted 
being ‘very sceptical and cynical about any real intention on the part of the 
government to behave in a manner that would be consistent with the “Stronger 
Together” agreement’ (personal communication 2011c). Barriers in gaining access 
to the responsible Minister coupled with a bureaucracy with little latitude to 
negotiate the parameters of public policy, serves to diminish ‘Stronger Together’ as a 
mechanism for promoting robust policy discussion (personal communication 2011c).
Conversely, officials in the SA government line agency primarily responsible for the 
administration of the agreement consider that, on the whole, peak organisations are 
‘very happy’ with ‘Stronger Together’: ‘there’s a great sense of ownership around 
New Accountabilities, New Challenges
320
it … it gets referred to regularly within the Peaks Forum as a guide … it holds a 
certain amount of power’ (personal communication 2011j). One official suggested 
that there was a ‘healthy tension’ in the cross-sector relationship, pointing out that 
attempts by public sector agencies to partner effectively with peak organisations are 
sometimes made difficult by matters beyond their direct control (such as resourcing) 
while peak organisations sometimes ‘respectfully decline’ to work with line agencies 
‘because they’re mad with the government’ (personal communication 2011j).
The relationship between government and the sector in South Australia has 
been observed to vary ‘from sub-sector to sub-sector, and from personality to 
personality’ (personal communication 2011c) and was described by one senior 
central agency official as ‘patchy’. The same official conceded that ‘some agencies 
and individuals within agencies are doing very well and in other circumstances 
that’s not the case’, adding: ‘It would be unfair to say there’s a poor relationship 
across the board — it would [be] wrong to say that — nor could you say there 
are no issues at all’ (personal communication 2011k). It is noteworthy that 
strong cross-sector relationships appear to exist in policy domains not covered 
by ‘Stronger Together’, such as the arts (personal communication 2011p).
South Australian central agencies exercise no oversight of cross-sector 
relationship frameworks. Although line agency officials suggested that some 
level of central agency coordination might be welcome, the suggestion was 
dismissed by one central agency official who observed, ‘those days are gone’ 
(personal communication 2011k).
In smaller jurisdictions, such as South Australia, relationships between 
individuals often exert greater influence on the shape of the cross-sector 
discourse than official processes or institutional frameworks — both within and 
across domain boundaries, and between sector representatives and particular 
officials and/or ministers. This observation is echoed in other small jurisdictions 
such as the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania.
Vignette 3 — Victoria: ‘Horses for courses’
Reform to ‘rationalise’ the public sector reached its apotheosis in Victoria under 
the Liberal‒National Coalition government led by Premier Jeff Kennett (1992‒99) 
who ‘eagerly embraced the neoliberal agenda of the economic policy think-tanks’ 
(Economou 2006, p. 370). In 1992, the Coalition defeated a third-term Labor 
government mired in political crises. Asset sales, spending cuts, administrative 
consolidation and outsourcing formed the core of the new government’s strategy, 
leading to Victoria being dubbed ‘the contract state’ (Alford and O'Neill 1994). 
In the process, the Victorian NFP sector, which has a long history of community 
engagement, was marginalised as a policy partner (personal communication 
2011f, 2011n; Webster and Atkins 2011). The effect was a sector that was less 
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collegial, faced greater uncertainty, and reported higher transaction costs and 
overheads flowing from the new contracting regime (personal communication 
2011n). Even so, contracting did leverage service change and fresh thinking 
(personal communication 2011n).
The 1999 state election saw the Labor Party form a minority government. 
Premier Steve Bracks described his government as ‘financially conservative and 
socially progressive’ (Costar and Hayward 2005, p. 111). Labor made substantial 
investments in health, education and regional development, and ‘did much to 
restore civility to public life after the divisiveness and sheer self-indulgence 
of Kennett’s reign’ (Dyrenfurth and Bongiorno 2011). The Bracks’ government 
emphasised inclusivity (Hayward 2006) and advocated a partnership approach 
to human services delivery (PAEC 2002). Labor went on to win elections with 
working majorities in 2002 and 2006. A 2002 report found several problems 
associated with the complexity of service agreements for community, welfare and 
health services and pointed to work then occurring in overseas and Australian 
jurisdictions around the issue of formal partnership frameworks (PAEC 2002). 
The Victorian community sector first advocated a compact as early as 2000 and 
most recently in 2006 (VCOSS 2006). Calls for a compact gained little traction, but 
the Premier’s department offered strong support for achieving a better alignment 
between the Department of Human Services processes and the way community 
organisations work (personal communication 2011n). This led in 2002 to a 
partnership agreement between the Department of Human Services, the Victorian 
Council of Social Service, and the Victorian Health Care Association. The Partnership 
Agreement has been renewed periodically. Now in the form of a memorandum of 
understanding, the framework celebrates a strong, positive relationship based 
on trust, respect and collaboration and understanding (DHS 2009). However, its 
primary focus is streamlining funding arrangements and improving consistency 
(personal communication 2011f). Although parts of the sector have ‘grumbled’ from 
time to time, positive results have generated broad confidence in the DHS’s — and 
the government’s — commitment to the process (personal communication 2011f).
A compact is no longer a priority for the Victorian NFP sector, whose interests 
run more to practical matters such as pricing, funding and contracting 
arrangements, red tape reduction, data collection and workforce issues 
(personal communication 2011f). Reviews of NFP regulation (Victoria 2007a) 
and performance (Victoria 2007b) contributed to the establishment in 2008 of 
an Office for the Community Sector, initially within the Department of Planning 
and Community Development (now in the Department of Human Services). The 
Office for the Community Sector works with agencies and the sector to reduce 
compliance burdens, cut red tape, and strengthen sector capacity (personal 
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communication 2011n). It has no role with respect to partnership agreements. 
The Bracks government also instituted a fixed price index mechanism that has 
worked ‘remarkably well’ over the last decade (personal communication 2011n).
The Victorian model of sector-specific frameworks begun under Labor continued 
under the Liberal‒National Coalition government (personal communication 
2011n); a trend confirmed in 2010 with a separate partnership agreement in the 
early childhood development domain (Victoria 2010). The Coalition government, 
elected with a slim majority in 2010, sought to distance itself from the Kennett 
legacy (personal communication 2011f). Furthermore, the Black Saturday bushfires 
of 2009 and the floods of 2011 highlighted the constraints under which community 
services operate and strengthened the government’s resolve to ‘do everything they 
can to make it easier for those organisations to deliver’ (personal communication 
2011n). The Andrews Labor government, elected in 2014, has undertaken to work 
in partnership with the sector, possibly building upon the Community Sector 
Reform Council established by the Napthine Coalition government.
Vignette 4 — Western Australia: Taking the road less 
travelled
The relationship between government and the NFP sector in Western Australia 
has been evolving over a long time. In 2004, the WA Labor government initiated 
an ‘Industry Plan’ for the non-government human services sector with three 
broad objectives: improving the relationship between government and the 
sector; ensuring the viability and sustainability of non-government human 
services; and building sector capacity (Western Australia 2004). The plan was 
complemented by a policy statement on funding and purchasing community 
services (Department of Premier and Cabinet 2002), and an indexation policy 
for non-government human services (Department of Premier and Cabinet 2004). 
Both measures were strongly influenced by an earlier WA Auditor-General 
report that found significant shortcomings with the contracting regime used to 
procure services from NFP service providers (Auditor-General 2000).
Once considered a possible precursor to a compact, the ‘Industry Plan’ faltered 
owing to a lack of central agency leadership (personal communication 2011o), 
inconsistent implementation (personal communication 2011o), and a failure 
to enforce the application of policy guidance by line agencies (personal 
communication 2011o, 2011g). As one central agency official commented: 
There had been great policies launched in the past but then implementation 
had failed. Line agencies had gone back to ‘bad behaviours’. We’ve had 
standard templates and approaches but everyone had butchered them 
along the way (personal communication 2011o).
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In 2008, the newly elected Liberal‒National government established the 
Economic Audit Committee to conduct a wide-ranging audit of the efficiency 
and effectiveness of state government functions, including how government 
partners with the NFP sector to deliver community services (EAC 2009). 
Wishing to respond to the opportunities presented by an economic boom 
created by the State’s mining industry, the new government initiated a change 
agenda built around a narrative of delivering better outcomes for Western 
Australians (personal communication 2011o). This provided a ‘platform for 
engagement’ between government and the sector (personal communication 
2011g). A ‘Partnership Forum’, comprised of public and NFP sector leaders 
and chaired by the former Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, Dr 
Peter Shergold, was established in mid-2010 to address issues relating to social 
innovation; the resolution of long-standing problems with contracting; and 
historic failures to fund the full cost of services delivered by the NFP sector 
(personal communication 2011o).
The ‘Delivering Community Services in Partnership Policy’, launched in July 
2011, is the centrepiece of a suite of administrative and financial measures aimed 
at rebuilding government’s relationship with the sector and placing the sector 
on a more sustainable footing (Western Australia 2011b). Although it is not 
a bilateral agreement, the policy was extensively co-produced by government 
officials and sector leaders. As one close observer remarked: ‘WACOSS [Western 
Australian Council of Social Service] has been almost joined at the hip with 
[the Department of] Premier and Cabinet throughout this process and I think 
that has raised some concerns actually, as regards its potential to been seen as 
supping with the devil’ (personal communication 2011o). 
There is a broad consensus amongst sector representatives and public sector 
officials that Shergold played a critical role by building trust and understanding 
amongst the participants in the process. Even more important has been the 
hands-on role played by Premier Barnett, which has given added impetus 
and authority to the change agenda: ‘To have a First Minister that is driving 
this across government is quite important … eighteen months in and he’s still 
engaged in [the] process’ (personal communication 2011o). 
In its 2011–12 budget the state government committed $604 million over 
four years to help redress the gap between the level of funding provided in 
state contracts and the actual cost of service delivery and an additional $400 
million for new services. One senior official suggested that there was genuine 
surprise in some quarters at the size of the spend: ‘Only through actions can 
you demonstrate genuine listening and partnership’ (personal communication 
2011o). An ongoing challenge will be to sustain the momentum of change and 
the capacity of the sector to remain engaged in the policy and implementation 
process (personal communication 2011g). 
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Vignette 5 — Tasmania: The long conversation
The 2012 Tasmanian ‘Partnership Agreement’ between the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the Department of Premier and Cabinet, and 
the community sector represented the culmination of an on-again/off-again 
conversation about a formal relationship framework begun in 1996 (personal 
communication 2011l; Tasmania 2012). According to one official, the fact that 
the cross-sector relationship is mediated by a line agency is ‘entirely problematic 
because it reduces the sector relationship essentially to a service delivery role’, 
thereby reinforcing the emphasis on contracting and procurement (personal 
communication 2011m).
The extent of outsourced service provision in Tasmania has increased over time. 
With a population of 512,000 and a total land area of 68,401 square kilometres, 
Tasmania exhibits strong formal and informal connections both within the NFP 
sector and between the sector and government. The community sector is closely 
knit and there is a ‘strong relationship’ between the sector and government, 
based on ‘a process of strong consultation in the way [government] forms its 
policies and the way it does its business’ (personal communication 2011d). 
Tasmania’s small size also serves to accentuate differences in the size and market-
share of NFP service providers, ranging from those with a part-time executive 
officer supported by volunteers through to large employing organisations — a 
prime example being Anglicare, which delivers services ‘across absolutely every 
conceivable part of the community sector’ (personal communication 2011d).
Personal relationships between state and non-state policy actors are also 
important: ‘We hold a lot of store in the development of personal relationships’, 
says one sector informant (personal communication 2011d). ‘Everybody does 
know everybody’, said a senior official (personal communication 2011l). A 
downside is that cross-sector relationships are so often ‘person dependent’: 
‘a champion or a leader … moves on and then things go splat’ (personal 
communication 2011e). Tasmanian ministers are highly accessible to the sector, 
and the Hare-Clark electoral system makes political compromise virtually 
unavoidable (Labor governed in Tasmania with the support of the Tasmanian 
Greens, two of whom were ministers in the government). 
Partnership is an important theme in the State’s political ecology: over recent 
years the Tasmanian government has entered into a number of partnership 
agreements with local councils and institutions such as the University of 
Tasmania. Social inclusion, social enterprise and place-based approaches have 
figured strongly as organising perspectives in Tasmanian social policy (personal 
communication 2011m). It can also be said that Tasmanian approaches reflect to 
some degree a diffusion of policy and praxis from the mainland, most noticeably 
from Victoria (personal communication 2011l, 2011m, 2011e).
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At one time promoted within government as an indicator of success in forging 
effective cross-sector relationships (OCS 2009), by 2009 cross-sector discussions 
‘ran out of steam’ (personal communication 2011l) — largely owing to personnel 
and structural changes in the Department of Health and Human Services 
(personal communication 2011d, 2011m). 
In 2010, Peter Shergold was enlisted to help restart the conversation around 
a framework agreement (personal communication 2011l). Although initiated 
by the government, one official observed: ‘I don’t think the sector needed to 
be dragged kicking and screaming’ (personal communication 2011m). The 
agreement ‘very quickly became a joint enterprise’, and, despite ‘the normal 
suspicions that you would expect from the sector’, key policy actors have 
reported high levels of good-will (personal communication 2011m).
A sector leader commented that ‘there is a lot of hope resting on a partnership 
agreement’, despite lingering cynicism within the sector (personal communication 
2011e). The sector appears to accept the practical necessity for the policy 
lead to reside with the DHHS, nevertheless it is hoped that avenues will be 
found to eventually extend the footprint of the agreement to policy domains 
beyond traditional community services (personal communication 2011e). In the 
meantime, practical issues of workforce recruitment, retention and replacement 
are of primary concern (personal communication 2011l). 
Vignette 6 — New South Wales: A long road to 
nowhere in particular
In New South Wales, the conversation leading to a formal policy framework 
around the government–sector relationship commenced in the mid-1990s 
(personal communication 2011b). As Australia’s largest state, government 
agencies’ operational and financial exposure to the NFP sector is enormous and 
has grown steadily as third party contracting grew in importance as a staple 
service delivery strategy.
The desire for a formalised relationship was driven by policies favouring greater 
competition in the procurement of public services (personal communication 
2010a, 2011b). A difficult relationship between the sector and a State Coalition 
government (1988–95) was succeeded by an equally problematic relationship 
with a national Coalition government (1996–2007). The idea of a compact was 
largely ‘sector driven’, and a former Director of the New South Wales Council of 
Social Service, Gary Moore, played an early leading role (personal communication 
2010f, a). Alarmed at the ‘unfettered market change’ that defined the mid-to-
late-1990s, the sector (and Moore in particular) looked to the proposed ‘English 
Compact’ for inspiration (personal communication 2011b). 
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A window of opportunity for change opened in NSW with the election of a 
Labor government in 1995. The new Labor Premier, Bob Carr, was receptive to 
the sector’s proposal for a formal relationship framework, although there is a 
lingering view in the sector that Carr was less interested in fundamental change 
than he was in political branding in the lead-up to the 1999 state election (Casey 
et al. 2008a; Edgar and Lockie 2010; personal communication 2010a, 2011b). 
Negotiations on a compact commenced in 2001 and were conducted on behalf 
of the sector by the Forum of Non-Government Agencies — a coalition of peak 
and service provider organisations — and on behalf of government by the NSW 
Premier’s Department. 
It is noteworthy that the compact was being actively developed during a 
turbulent period of significant change in the modus operandi of the public and 
NFP sectors (personal communication 2010a). To some extent, the parties looked 
to the compact to resolve problems it was not designed to address. For example, 
the bureaucracy looked to the compact to drive rationalisation within the 
sector, while the sector looked to the compact to resolve competitive pressures 
and tensions amongst provider organisations (personal communication 2010a). 
The compact was sometimes used in an adversarial way to confront and criticise 
government. One official remarked that parts of the sector see government 
agencies ‘as the big bag of money in the room’ while failing to reflect on their 
own obligations under the compact (personal communication 2010c).
‘Working Together for New South Wales’ was launched in 2006 by Premier 
Carr just months before he resigned from politics. It came to be regarded by 
the sector as narrowly instrumental and overly focused on funding agreements 
(personal communication 2010a). Although originally intended to apply across 
government, the bureaucracy concluded this was not feasible owing to cultural, 
operational and institutional differences between human services sub-sectors 
(personal communication 2010f). Weak institutional design, machinery-of-
government changes, turnover of personnel, inconsistent representation and the 
loss of corporate memory all helped to undermine the legitimacy and relevance 
of the compact (personal communication 2010a).
Although there is no clear consensus on this point, it is possible that successive 
leadership changes in NSW contributed to the progressive marginalisation of 
‘Working Together’. The long gestation of the compact (1999–2006), coupled 
with personnel changes, also contributed to a loss of interest once it became 
policy (personal communication 2011b). With Carr’s departure, suggested 
one observer, ‘you almost immediately saw the Compact being put in the 
bottom drawer’ (personal communication 2010a). ‘Working Together’ was 
virtually a ‘dead letter’ by the time of the Coalition victory at the 2011 state 
general election. The state government has not revisited the idea of a formal 
relationship framework although called upon to do so by the sector (NCOSS 
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2011). Government continues to liaise with the sector on new policy initiatives 
such as ‘social benefit bonds’ (Treasury (NSW) 2012). For its part, the Forum of 
Non-Government Agencies has elected to emulate its Queensland counterpart 
by largely appropriating the Community Services Charter developed by the 
Futures Forum (FONGA 2011).
Vignette 7 — Queensland: So near and yet so far
In Queensland, a decade of state Labor government went by without any 
significant moves by either government or the NFP sector towards a formal 
relationship framework. An early top-down policy overture in this direction, 
‘Engaging Queensland’ (Department of Families 2003), focused primarily on 
supporting volunteering as opposed to engaging the non-government sector in 
issues of policy or funding generally.
In August 2007, the Futures Forum, a coalition of peak and service provider 
organisations, launched a Queensland Community Services Sector Charter, the 
purpose of which was to ‘to define and communicate to other sectors of society 
(Government, business and community) what the community services sector is, 
and to raise awareness of its vital role and invaluable contribution to society’ 
(Futures Forum 2007). The Futures Forum was a response both to tensions in the 
government-sector relationship and those inherent in a diverse and fragmented 
sector (personal communication 2010b). 
In September 2007, the charismatic and populist Premier, Peter Beattie, 
retired in favour of his deputy, Anna Bligh. The charter and leadership change 
coincided with a report by the Queensland Auditor General that found an 
excessive focus on compliance in state agencies’ management of funding to non-
government organisations (QAO 2007) and an internal review of the Department 
of Communities. The latter resulted in the publication of the ‘Framework for 
Investment in Human Services’ (Queensland 2007) — ‘the absolute precursor to 
the Queensland Compact’ (personal communication 2010e). 
These events provided the impetus for action on government–NFP sector 
relations. Through the Framework, five major human services agencies, together 
with the Treasury, sought to establish clear and agreed funding processes. Said 
one official, this was about ‘government getting its house in order’ (personal 
communication 2010e). The charter added weight to efforts to address observed 
problems with the relationship, and the Futures Forum became the key 
interlocutor with government. A Joint Working Group was formed to oversee 
consultations about a compact and an associated ‘action plan’ — the rationale 
being that a compact without an action plan is ‘happy words and not a whole 
lot else’ (personal communication 2010e).
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The 2008 ‘Queensland Compact’ became a touchstone for the ‘National Compact’. 
A Compact Governance Committee (CGovC) was created (with a membership 
drawn from government and the sector) to which the Premier, whose personal 
political support was critical (personal communication, 2010b, 2010d, 2010e), 
appointed an ‘Independent Chair’. The CGovC provided a ‘safe and reliable 
forum for discussion’ in which ‘hard conversations’ could occur and consensus 
reached about reform priorities (personal communication 2010d).
Although the Queensland Compact was extolled in some quarters as ‘best 
practice’ (personal communication 2010d), scepticism persisted amongst service 
providers who believed it constrained their capacity to maximise their interests. 
The dominant view, however, was one of cautious optimism: ‘We knew, as it 
progressed, it was going to be a less than perfect vehicle but we felt, hey, it’s going 
to be better than anything we’ve got, and there’s no basis for these conversations 
at the moment, so why don’t we have a go?’ (personal communication 2010b). 
The CGovC saw its role as moving a range of issues from being ‘intractable’ to 
‘just plain hard’ (personal communication 2010d). The action plan developed 
to further the compact focused on concrete measures, process reforms and 
culture change. The CGovC, with secretariat support from the Department of 
Communities, gave the action plan a strong regional focus and reported annually 
against achievements. 
A landslide defeat of the incumbent Labor government in the 2012 general 
election threw the compact into abeyance. The new government chose not to 
release an independent review of the compact, the CGovC was suspended and 
its independent chair was not reappointed. The Liberal‒National Party (LNP) 
government focused on expenditure reductions and reimposed gag clauses 
in service procurement contracts. In 2015, the Queensland Council of Social 
Service (QCOSS) welcomed the formation of a minority Labor government as an 
‘opportunity to put the co-design and place-based solutions into action – with 
government, the community sector, community and the private sector working 
together to get the best possible outcomes for all Queenslanders’.
Vignette 8 — Northern Territory: A relationship 
framework stillborn
The Northern Territory does not, at present, have a formal policy framework 
for cross-sector cooperation. In 2005, the former Labor government led by Chief 
Minister Clare Martin (2001–07) engaged the firm RPR Consulting9 to assist 
with the development of a partnership framework between the NT government 
9 RPR Consulting was one of two consulting firms engaged by the ACT Government to assist in the 
development of the Territory’s first compact in 2001 (ACT 2000a).
10. Australian Sub-National Compacts with the Not-For-Profit Sector
329
and the community sector. The consultant’s final report, ‘New Foundations’, 
recommended the adoption of a ‘Common Cause Charter’ as a framework for 
future relationships between the government and community sectors. It also 
recommended the formation of a joint taskforce to steer the implementation of 
the proposed charter as well as the creation of a number of ‘peak councils’ (DCM 
2004). By 2008, however, and despite initial good intentions, the taskforce had 
ceased to operate, leading to cynicism within the community sector (Casey et al. 
2008c, p. 17; NTCOSS 2008).
Leadership change was a possible factor in the apparent abandonment of the 
process for developing a formal framework document in the NT. The then Chief 
Minister Clare Martin was the first female and the first Labor Chief Minister in 
the NT. Labor under Martin held a one-seat majority after the 2001 election and 
increased its majority in a landslide win at the 2005 election. The win might have 
provided added impetus for Martin’s push for a new settlement with the sector. 
In June 2007, the federal government led by John Howard, relying upon 
constitutional powers to override NT government jurisdiction in Aboriginal 
communities, announced the Northern Territory Emergency Response in 
response to the alarming prevalence of child sexual abuse in Aboriginal 
communities. The NT government’s cooperation in the federal government’s 
NTER was highly contentious. This was a show of political resolve on the part 
of the federal government in an election year. Although there was strident 
criticism of the NTER from a number of quarters, the federal government was on 
safe political ground: there was no political skin to be lost protecting Aboriginal 
children or in overriding a Labor government portrayed as failing to act on their 
behalf. Martin was surprised and seemingly unsettled by the move. The NT 
government was obliged to acquiesce and Martin’s and Labor’s credibility with 
the community sector was undermined. 
Martin resigned suddenly in November 2007, citing the NTER as a factor (she 
was subsequently appointed as the Chair of the Australian Council of Social 
Service). At the 2008 NT election, Labor was returned with a one-seat majority 
under Martin’s successor, Paul Henderson. The defection of a Labor MLA to the 
Country Liberal Party in 2009 led to a minority Labor government dependent 
upon the support of one independent MLA. Labor lost the 2012 general election, 
in part owing to a swing against it in Indigenous communities that comprise 
around 30 per cent of the NT population of 233,000. 
It is likely that the NTER helped to push ‘Common Cause’ off the policy agenda. 
By 2011 there were signs of a possible reopening of the policy window, possibly 
influenced by the example of the National Compact. The former Chief Minister 
affirmed that ‘building stronger relationships and creating opportunities to 
improve systems and support for non-government organisations’ and ‘reducing 
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red tape’ would be a priority of his government (Henderson 2011). In the area of 
child and family services, the NT Labor government called for ‘[t]he development 
of new partnerships with the non-government sector’ (NT Government 2011). 
In mid-2012, Labor initiated a ‘conversation’ with Territorians about a ‘social 
participation framework’ that would clarify the respective roles of ‘individuals, 
community groups, businesses, government agencies and non-government 
organisations’ (DCM 2012). 
Hot button social issues such as child protection, compulsory income 
management, substance abuse, domestic violence and youth justice dominate 
in the Territory. These issues disproportionately affect Indigenous communities, 
and policy responses must therefore take into account vast distances, small 
populations and geographically dispersed communities with complex needs. 
Political ructions in the territory have also offered distractions, such as when 
Chief Minister Terry Mills was controversially replaced as leader after only 
seven months in office while on an overseas trip and an abortive leadership coup 
was launched against his successor, Adam Giles, in 2015.
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11. Championing Change in a Highly 
Contested Policy Area: The literacy 
reforms of David Kemp, 1996–2001
Wendy Jarvie and Trish Mercer
When John Howard won a landslide victory over Paul Keating in March 1996, 
his junior Minister for Schools, Vocational Education and Training was David 
Kemp.1 Portrayed by the media as a dry Liberal with conservative economic and 
social views, Kemp was a well-known political figure. His hands-on experience 
as a senior adviser in Malcolm Fraser’s prime ministerial office in the late 1970s 
had been complemented by his time as a politics professor at Monash University, 
where he published a study of Australian politics which combined a theoretical 
analysis with his insider knowledge of Australian politics and government 
(Kemp 1988). 
In the radical schooling reform agenda that Kemp would pursue, improved literacy 
attainment of Australian school children, particularly in their primary years, 
would represent a core element, if not the centrepiece. His approach displayed 
a singularity of purpose and a clear understanding of how to employ the push-
pull levers of the Commonwealth’s federal powers.2 The Howard government, 
notwithstanding what has been seen as a traditional Liberal commitment to 
federalism, would become a strongly central government, partly attributable 
to the increasingly antagonistic Commonwealth/state environment — by 2002, 
all state and territory governments were Labor-controlled. Howard himself 
articulated his approach in terms of an ‘aspirational nationalism’ (Anderson and 
Parkin 2010, p. 97). In Liberal eyes, Commonwealth intervention in state policy 
areas was justified if it was supporting key Liberal objectives of individual 
decision-making and free markets (Kemp 2013). Indeed, Commonwealth Liberal 
intervention in education had long been manifest in schooling policy, beginning 
with Prime Minister Menzies’ funding of science laboratories in schools in the 
1960s. 
Hollander and Patapan (2007) have labelled the defining characteristic of 
the Howard government and the preceding Hawke‒Keating governments as 
‘pragmatic federalism’, in that both tended to directly engage with pressing 
1 David Kemp was promoted the following year to the portfolio ministry of Employment, Education and 
Training. This mega portfolio (DEETYA) was later reduced to Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DETYA) 
when Employment was established as a separate ministry with Industrial Relations. 
2 While this paper will focus on Kemp’s literacy reforms, numeracy improvement was also a key goal and 
was pursued concurrently.
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problems without resort to larger theoretical concerns. While still influenced 
by ideas and values, it was the convergence of an identified problem with an 
opportunity for political engagement which served to create the window for a 
policy solution to emerge, and this tended to favour the Commonwealth over 
the states in policy outcomes (Hollander and Patapan 2007, pp. 280–281, 283–
285). Kemp undoubtedly had a deep philosophical adherence to Liberal tenets 
and in his pursuit of literacy policy reform from 1996 was fully prepared to 
adopt an interventionist approach with state education systems. In bringing 
together the streams of problem, politics and policy, his approach appears to 
have been characterised by a pragmatic ‘problem-defined and problem-driven’ 
focus (Hollander and Patapan 2007, p. 291), which we will show was illustrated 
through the following features:
• First, his identification of an urgent literacy problem and his readiness to seize 
on the opportunities in government to capitalise on recent developments in 
educational and public policies;
• Secondly, the importance he attached to marshalling a supportive evidence 
base and communicating the literacy problem to a public audience, 
notwithstanding the contested nature of this evidence;
• Thirdly, the influence of the political environment in terms of the political 
backing he received for his reform focus, particularly from Prime Minister 
Howard, and the broader alignment with Howard’s federalist ambitions and 
first- and second-term priorities;
• Fourthly, the deliberate carrot and stick tactics which he employed to secure 
the support, or at least reluctant acquiescence, of both government and non-
government education sectors to his policy solutions; and 
• Finally, the underpinning partnership between the Minister, his Chief of 
Staff and senior departmental officers which provided the administrative 
mobilisation to embed these policy solutions into a lasting reform agenda.
Kemp’s approach, together with his department’s focus on implementation, 
illustrates the importance of having both policy and administrative champions, 
particularly in such a contested policy area. In examining his literacy reforms, 
the authors have drawn on interviews with several key players: Kemp himself, 
senior Commonwealth education department bureaucrats, two state education 
department directors-general, and the researcher who was heavily involved in 
literacy assessment.3 
3 While not taking any role in the literacy reforms, the authors worked at the Senior Executive Service level 
in Kemp’s department during the early part of the period: Wendy Jarvie worked from 1997 to 1998 in Analysis 
and Evaluation Division; Trish Mercer briefly in the Schools area in 1996 before she became an Area Manager 
in Queensland. We are grateful to Bill Daniels (a former DEETYA senior officer and, from July 2001, Executive 
Director of the Independent Schools Council of Australia) who provided access to the minutes of the Board of 
Management meetings of the Council for 1996 to 2001, which provided useful insights into the perspectives 
of the Independent schools sector.
11 . Championing Change in a Highly Contested Policy Area
345
Positioning literacy as an urgent policy problem
Kemp’s literacy agenda was based on his belief that individuals had to take 
responsibility for their own success, and that the role of education policy is 
to ensure that individuals have the right skills to achieve this (ABC 1999, pp. 
3, 11). Since the early 1990s, he had been developing and articulating Liberal 
educational policy. In July 1991, speaking at the National Press Club as Shadow 
Minister for Education, he had asserted that ‘no one area of national policy is 
more important for Australia to get right than education’, and that gaining an 
internationally competitive edge in education was as important as acquiring such 
competitiveness in transport, communication or the waterfront (Kemp 1991). 
By 1996, in the Coalition’s election platform, this had crystallised into a 
commitment to work in a ‘partnership approach’ with the states on a National 
Literacy and Numeracy Strategy, including building a national database on 
literacy and numeracy standards in Australian schools (Liberals and Nationals 
Election Platform 1996, pp. 1, 3). In his early ministerial speeches, he drew 
attention to the social and economic costs of inadequate language and literacy 
skills (Kemp, Media Release: ‘A National Literacy Goal’, 21 June 1996); by the 
next year, he was hailing literacy as ‘the key equity issue in education today’ 
(Kemp, Media Release, 16 September 1997). This prioritising of literacy intrigued 
many media commentators, who began to describe him as a ‘crusader’ (Channel 
Nine 1999). Kemp himself nominated his motivation as having come from the 
feedback he had received in his early days as Minister from industry and ‘from 
those who feel that their own literacy is not what it should be’, and there was 
also the personal element of being the father of two young children (Kemp, 
Media Release, 5 September 1999; The Australian, 6 February 1999, p. 8).
In concentrating on literacy achievement, Kemp capitalised on recent 
developments in Australia and internationally. From the mid-1980s, interest 
in measuring the performance of students and of education systems through 
standardised literacy and numeracy testing had been increasing, particularly 
in countries such as the United Kingdom and United States. This standards-
based agenda had itself been influenced by the broader global trend to reform 
public sector management and to increase accountability (Watson 2011, pp. 
7–8). Within Australia, different state governments had begun to introduce 
standardised assessment testing of students in their education systems, 
notwithstanding strong opposition from the Australian Education Union (AEU)
(Peach 1998, p. 8; The Australian, 6 August 1997, p. 11). The capability now 
existed, through psychometric measurement techniques, to enable the equating 
of state tests to derive national data. To capitalise on this, in 1995 the new and 
influential Report of Government Service Provision produced for the Council 
of Australian Governments had signalled strong interest in developing such 
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nationally comparable data on student learning outcomes, although there was 
a pragmatic awareness that this would require a significant commitment from 
both Commonwealth and state governments to be implemented (Dowling 2008, 
p. 3; Steering Committee for Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision 
1995, pp. 199–201). In Kemp’s early months, a first move in this direction was 
taken when senior education officials agreed in May to recommend to their 
ministers that literacy and numeracy benchmarks should be developed to 
indicate the student outcomes expected for particular years in schooling (Peach 
1998, pp. 8–10). Kemp’s reform focus on literacy and measurement was seen 
as being ‘absolutely on the right track’ by the influential directors-general of 
education in New South Wales (Ken Boston) and Victoria (Geoff Spring) (Boston 
21 February 2013; Spring 25 March 2013).
Marshalling the evidence
As a new minister, Kemp sought to engage with key stakeholders such as the 
cross-sectoral Australian Primary Principals’ Assocation (Kemp, Media Releases, 
17 April 1996, 29 May 1996, 19 July 1996). As early as May, he had quietly 
sought the views of the peak independent schools body (National Independent 
Schools Council) as to ‘reasonable accountability requirements’ for national data 
collections on school and student performance (Board Minutes 10 May 1996). 
This approach was an early indication of his determination, well before ‘evidence-
based policy’ had acquired political currency, to collect an authoritative evidence 
base on current literacy and numeracy performance in order to galvanise public 
debate. The literacy agenda itself was hardly new: an emphasis on literacy 
policy and accompanying programs of assistance had been a recurring feature 
under the Hawke‒Keating Labor governments through the 1990s (Harrington 
and McDonald 1999). But reliable data had not been available. Initially, Kemp 
relied on the higher end of estimates in a 1993 House of Representative Standing 
Committee on Employment, Education and Training report, that between 10 
and 20 per cent of children finished school with literacy problems. He used 
this statistic in unveiling a ‘Literacy Strategy’, with five key steps, at the 
Australian College of Educators’ Conference in June 1996 and foreshadowed 
that he would be seeking state and territory support for his fifth step, a national 
goal that every child leaving primary school should be able to read, write and 
spell at an appropriate level (Harrington and McDonald 1999, p. 6; Kemp Media 
Release 21 June 1996). This was indeed agreed as a national goal on 18 July 
at Kemp’s first meeting of the Ministerial Council for Education, Employment, 
Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA). Ministers moreover agreed to support 
this goal through the development of common literacy benchmarks for Year 3 
and Year 5 students and, importantly, the associated determination of levels of 
performance to be met in reading, writing and other essential aspects of literacy 
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(MCEECDYA, 17–18 July 1996). Thus at his first Commonwealth/state meeting, 
Kemp had achieved progress towards assessing not only student outcomes but 
also potentially the performance of the education systems themselves. He had 
also signalled a recurring political tactic of outing his agenda before discussion 
with his ministerial colleagues.
The cornerstone of Kemp’s evidence base would be the first comprehensive 
literacy survey of Australian primary school children in 16 years — in April, 
he pledged support for this survey, commissioned as part of the Keating Labor 
government’s ‘Working Nation’ reforms (Kemp, Media Release, 17 April 1996; 
Comber et al. 1998, pp. 18, 25). Conducted in August 1996 by the Australian 
Council for Educational Research (ACER) with support from the schooling 
systems, the unions and professional associations, the National School English 
Literacy Survey (hereafter the National Literacy Survey) involved nearly 7,500 
children and an additional 800 Indigenous sample, at a cost to the Commonwealth 
of $2.6 million. This survey would establish reliable, national baseline data on 
the literary performance of children in Years 3 and 5 of schooling which would 
support the development of the national benchmarks agreed by MCEETYA in 
their July meeting (MCNSELS 1997, pp. 5, 250–252, 309).
Kemp, however, was not content to wait on the survey’s results. In October 1996, 
in a major policy statement delivered at the Centre for Independent Studies, he 
drew on an ACER comparative analysis constructed from youth longitudinal 
surveys which indicated that, in 1995, 30 per cent of 14-year-old students did 
not have adequate basic literacy skills, as against 28 per cent in 1975. Describing 
this relatively small increase as ‘alarming’, he attributed these results to a ‘cult 
of secrecy’ which limited the ability of schools to improve student academic 
performance and challenged his state counterparts to publish their schools’ 
academic results. Not surprisingly, Kemp’s claims attracted considerable media 
interest and, concurrently, academic and union opposition to what they saw as 
his support for the introduction of school rankings and flawed analysis (Kemp, 
Media Release, 22 October 1996; The Australian, 22 October 1996, p. 1, 23 October 
1996, p. 15, 24 October 1996, p. 10; Martin 1997, p. 9). Politically, however, this 
challenge could not be ignored, demonstrated by New South Wales premier 
Bob Carr’s announcement that, given these ‘very, very disturbing’ figures, his 
state would consider widening a pilot project to test Year 7 literacy in 1997 (The 
Australian, 23 October 1996, p. 3).
On the eve of the next MCEETYA meeting on 14 March 1997, the Minister 
announced that he would be asking state education ministers to endorse a 
national literacy test for Year 3 students and that he would consider withholding 
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schools funding if literacy levels failed to improve.4 Notwithstanding hostile 
media reactions from several state ministers and the Liberal Premier of Western 
Australia, MCEETYA nevertheless agreed to the Commonwealth’s proposal for a 
National Literacy and Numeracy Plan, including literacy and numeracy tests for 
both Year 3 and Year 5 students from 1998 — duly reported in The Australian 
as ‘a historic agreement’ between Commonwealth and state (with support also 
from the Catholic and independent school sectors). The states would continue to 
conduct their own tests with national benchmark data derived from their results. 
This was the first of a series of key MCEETYA meetings where Kemp arranged 
for either a ministerial-only session, or preceding dinner so that ministers 
could negotiate directly on this sensitive issue; having secured their agreement 
to a testing regime, he then retreated from his threat to tie federal funding to 
literacy improvement (The Australian, 12 March 1997, p. 3, 15 March 1997, 
p. 1; Dowling 2008, p. 4; MCEEDYA, 14 March 1997).5 In contrast to such tough 
negotiations, Kemp’s strategy with the non-government schools sector was more 
conciliatory, with separate discussions conducted by both the Minister and his 
key bureaucrats with Independent schools’ representatives. The implications of 
national testing was a sensitive issue for the sector and in May 1997 they were 
only prepared to provide a holding response to Kemp’s request for their support 
(National Independent Schools Council Board Minutes, 8 November 1996, 21 
March 1997, 23 May 1997). 
Publicising the evidence
As 1997 progressed, the political tensions in the schools sector continued to rise, 
highlighted at a forum on literacy in July to which Kemp invited 28 academic 
leaders. One of the documents for the day, entitled Australian Literacies and 
prepared by academic experts, directly challenged Kemp’s position by stating 
unequivocally that there was ‘no general literacy crisis in Australia’ (Lo Bianco 
and Freebody 1997, p. xvi). Literacy had become a highly contested policy 
area and Kemp was viewed by many in the education community as having 
manufactured a literacy crisis and attached at least some of the blame to literacy 
teaching (Gill 1998; Martin 1997, pp. 8–10; Comber et al. 1998, pp. 18, 19). Early 
in 1998, an article by four prominent academics was published which closely 
analysed Kemp’s public statements and compared the Howard education agenda 
with that of the former Labor government. The authors were dismissive of the 
4 Kemp had supported his announcement by releasing yet another piece of ACER research, based on a 
five-year study of the education and career paths of 2,000 Australian teenagers, which demonstrated the 
disadvantage that young people without adequate literacy and numeracy faced in the education, training and 
labour market: Kemp, Media Release, 11 March 1997.
5 This ministerial-only meeting was reported in The Australian and both Dr Evan Arthur (then head of the 
Literacy and Special Programs Branch in DEETYA) and Dr Kemp have recalled that this was a deliberate tactic, 
as were the preceding ministerial dinners, to secure agreement to the Commonwealth’s agenda: Arthur 2012; 
Kemp 2012.
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various postwar ‘literacy crises’ that they saw as indicative of governments 
facing major social, economic and cultural change and discerned a deeper, 
more political motivation in Kemp’s agenda: ‘the current literacy crisis has 
been deployed to undermine community confidence in public schooling, and 
at the same time deflect attention and responsibility from material problems of 
poverty and youth unemployment’ (Comber et al. 1998, pp. 19–27).6 Although 
others were not so forceful in their criticisms of Kemp’s literacy preoccupation, 
the views of Comber et al. on the negative aspects of testing were shared by 
many colleagues.7
This academic reaction had been stimulated at least in part by a media debate 
which played out in September 1997 following the simultaneous release by the 
Commonwealth of two reports on the results of the National Literacy Survey. 
The first, ‘Mapping Literacy Achievement’, was prepared by the Survey’s 
Management Committee which included education system representatives, 
the unions and ACER. It was welcomed by the education community as a 
comprehensive map of literacy performance (MCNSELS 1997, pp. x, 3–4; Gill 
1998, pp. 13–14). The main message was that the majority of students were 
achieving well, although there was a significant spread of achievement. Central 
to its approach was a comparison of student survey performance in relation 
to an indicative range of student achievement in which might lie the new 
draft MCEETYA benchmarking standards released in June and developed 
by a Benchmarking Task Force chaired by the Director-General of Education 
Queensland, Frank Peach. The conclusion in this report was that only six and 
four per cent of Year 3 students were performing below this draft benchmark 
range in writing and reading respectively, rising to 15 and 21 per cent for 
Year 5 students. According to the Commonwealth representative (Evan Arthur), 
however, the Management Committee had earlier commissioned ACER to develop 
a more precise mapping of the draft benchmarks against the survey’s results, 
but had subsequently chosen to employ an indicative range in presenting these 
results (Arther 2011).8 
6 This article was published in a book edited by Alan Reid, which focused on what was described as 
the contemporary debate about the survival of the public education system. Comber et al. 1998, p. 31, for 
example argued that ‘literacy’ was functioning as a metaphor for ‘schooling’ and specifically public schooling: 
Reid 1998, pp. xi, xiii.
7 In April 1997, 50 Victorian literacy experts (from peak bodies and universities) sent a letter to Kemp, 
arguing that the expenditure on national literacy testing would be better spent on teacher training and 
professional renewal: The Australian, 23 April 1997, p. 39. For other examples of opposition to testing, see 
The Australian, 20 July 1999, p. 6; 3 April 2000, p. 15; Professor Alan Luke and Dr Brian Comber quoted on 
ABC 1999, pp. 7, 8.
8 While the methodology employed was technically complex, the choice of an indicative range in presenting 
the results would appear to have overstated achievement, when ACER’s methodological analysis (reported 
in Appendix 3) is examined more closely. The report compares achievement under the existing English 
curriculum profiles to the range expected in the draft benchmark standards. ACER reported that not all the 
students within the particular profile (Level 2 for both writing and reading in the case of Year 3 students) 
which contained the draft writing and reading benchmarks would have met the appropriate benchmark — 
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Such methodological reliance on an indicative range, not surprisingly, was 
anathema to Dr Kemp, who was determined to present a clear line (i.e. an exact 
score) in the survey results as to who was above or below the draft benchmarks; 
his recollection is that he was ‘shocked’ that ‘nowhere was there any analysis 
that could tell the community how many students had sufficient literacy to 
allow them to continue education’ (Kemp 2012). Geoff Masters has recalled that 
Kemp was very clear that the survey report would not be released until ACER 
had analysed the results in terms of what was an acceptable level of literacy 
performance. To this end, Masters and Margaret Forster of ACER developed 
what they described as ‘clear performance standards in reading and writing’ 
by utilising the draft benchmark standards to calculate a minimum score that 
would constitute a satisfactory performance for the student’s age or year group. 
Under this approach, published as ‘Literacy Standards in Australia’, very 
different results were reported: 28 per cent of Year 3 and 33 per cent of Year 
5 students did not meet the identified performance standards for writing; and 
27 per cent of Year 3 and 29 per cent of Year 5 students did not meet the standards 
for reading. Girls met the standard more often than boys, but only a very low 
percentage of Indigenous students met them.9
These differing presentations of the survey’s results would have been sufficient 
to ensure strong media interest and robust debate at the next MCEETYA 
meeting. However, Kemp’s decision to air the findings on Channel Nine’s 
60 Minutes current affairs program on 14 September 1997, some two days after 
he had provided ‘Literacy Standards in Australia’ to his ministerial colleagues, 
created what the AEU called ‘Literacy Hysteria Week’ and was later described 
as ‘sensational [media] coverage’, both electronic and print (Martin 1997, p. 8; 
The Australian, 6 February 1999, p. 8). The media focused on Kemp’s portrayal 
of ‘a serious literacy problem’, with nearly one-third of primary children 
unable to read or write at an adequate standard, requiring urgent ‘national co-
operative effort’ (Kemp, Media Release, 15 September 1997). Nearly two years 
later, the acrimonious response this had produced, particularly from state 
education ministers, was manifest on the ABC’s Four Corners program (titled 
‘War of Words’) with critics such as Phil Gude (the Victorian Liberal Education 
Minister) standing by his accusation at the time that Dr Kemp was ‘deliberately 
and mischievously manipulating data to portray literacy at a perilous level’ (ABC 
1999, p. 7; Comber et al. 1998, pp. 3, 19). Peach, the bureaucrat heading the 
for example, at least some of the 42 per cent of Year 3 students assessed at English Profile Level 2 would not 
have met the Year 3 draft reading benchmark range as this was located towards the upper end of this Level 2: 
MCNSELS 1997, pp. iv, vi, Appendix 3, 314–329.
9 ACER, for whom this was a very sensitive exercise in terms of reputational regard, were careful to 
report that it was the Minister who had asked for an exact score, in the belief that how schoolchildren 
were performing in relation to such a performance standard ‘would be useful information for the Australian 
community’: Masters and Forster 1997, pp. 10–12, 15, 19, 22; Kemp, Media Release, 15 September 1997; 
Masters 2012.
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Benchmarking Taskforce, had noted pointedly in May 1998 at an educational 
conference that ‘Literacy Standards in Australia’ had ‘caused considerable 
national concern by its use of what some argued were arbitrary and highly 
judgemental decisions’ in attempting to align the survey’s reading and writing 
results against the draft reading and writing benchmarks for Years 3 and 5 
(Peach 1998, p. 13). Yet notwithstanding these strong criticisms, the statistics 
in ‘Literacy Standards in Australia’ would be cited not only by the media and 
other commentators but also in significant reports such as the Productivity 
Commission’s Report on Government Services (The Australian, 22 September 
1997, p. 1; SCRRCSSP 1998, p. 42; Argy 1998, pp. 120–121; Alloway and Gilbert 
1998, pp. 249, 252).10 
In an attempt to regain the initiative, state and territory ministers met without 
Kemp on 22 September and issued their own ten-point plan to advance 
previously agreed recommendations in the National Literacy and Numeracy 
Plan. Kemp, however, rejected out of hand the states’ request for an additional 
$513 milllion in federal funding over the next four years (Peach, 1998, p. 13; 
The Australian, 22 September 1997, p. 1). By November, when Arthur briefed 
independent schools’ representatives, there appears to have been bureaucratic 
agreement on key assessment details but there remained ‘State ministerial 
concern about the public presentation of data’ (National Independent Schools 
Council Board Minutes, 14 November 1997). The draft literacy benchmarks for 
children in Year 3 and Year 5 were finally approved by all education ministers in 
the following year and, significantly, included a line drawn across the range to 
represent satisfactory performance (MCEECDYA, 23 April 1998; Arthur 2011).
While Kemp earned the ire of many state education ministers and bureaucrats as 
well as academics for his political use of literacy data, it is nonetheless apparent 
that he devoted considerable resources and energy to accumulating an evidence 
base on literacy. Those who worked closely with him have remarked on this 
determination. Professor Masters has recalled how Kemp, with his social science 
training, ‘was focused on evidence, he valued research and he wanted to use 
it’ (Masters 2012). Indeed, John Roskom, his Chief of Staff from 1996 to 1998, 
described his boss as having a deep belief ‘that his opponents, if provided with 
sufficient evidence, could be won over’.11 Moreover, he was well able to analyse 
and interpret the highly technical detail associated with testing and benchmark 
10 Kemp does not appear to have directly rebutted any of the criticisms of how he employed the survey data, 
but Frank Devine (a supportive journalist presumably briefed by Kemp’s office) reported in late September 
that the analysis by ACER in regard to the survey results and the draft benchmarks had been done at the 
request of the management committee for the survey (the ‘Harrington Committee’) but had then been buried 
in the Appendix to ‘Mapping Literacy Achievement’: The Australian, 25 September 1997, p. 13. 
11 Roskom made these comments when Kemp was retiring from federal politics in 2004: The Age, 17 July 
2004. In a similar vein, Steve Sedgwick (the DEETYA and then DETYA Secretary at this time) has recalled how 
Dr Kemp would look to build the case publicly and then seek to make common cause with his state ministerial 
colleagues: Sedgwick 2012.
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development — an asset he exploited in ministerial council meetings (Arthur 
2012; Sedgwick 2012). It is an open question as to whether Kemp would have 
focused so strongly on evidence if it had not fitted his purpose. Certainly, by 
publicly releasing the separate report he had commissioned on the National 
Literacy Survey’s results on a populist TV show, Kemp the politician fully 
intended to create controversy and a public debate which would promote 
his agenda of locking state ministers into support for a national testing and 
benchmark regime and presenting this as a Commonwealth driven initiative.
Getting the Commonwealth politics right
Kemp’s preoccupation with evidence was not shared by his Prime Minister. 
Paul Kelly has depicted the Howard Cabinet as more often than not seeing ‘the 
academy as unfavorably disposed towards its objectives’ with Howard employing 
research and advice ‘to realize his aims’.12 In terms of the overarching directions 
of schooling policy, however, the Minister and Prime Minister were very closely 
aligned. The Howard government was more centralist than its predecessors and 
Kemp, while genuflecting to the primary responsibility for schooling held by the 
states, had defined a formative role for the Commonwealth. He saw this as based 
on the ‘strong national interest in the educational outcomes of Australia’s schools’, 
manifested not only in the Commonwealth’s significant funding contribution, but 
also through the indirect cost of ‘school failure’ borne through unemployment 
benefits and social programs (Kemp, Media Release, 21 April 1997). 
In education, the broader political agenda favouring privatisation, competition 
and choice was manifested in the Howard government’s user choice approach to 
funding of vocational education, and the introduction of performance-driven 
funding of higher education research.13 In schools education it was evident in 
the removal of restrictions on the establishment of new private schools, emphasis 
on quality and performance standards and expansion of non-government school 
funding.14 Howard articulated this focus in 2007 when he contended that quality 
in schooling ‘demands choice, diversity, specialisation, transparency and 
competition.’ Support for testing of students’ knowledge and more transparency 
to empower parents were examples he cited of his ‘traditional views’ which he 
contrasted with the ‘postmodernist values’ of educational theorists and some 
Labor governments (The Australian, 16 May 2007, p. 14). 
12 Kelly, as Editor-at-Large of The Australian, is a respected commentator on public policy. This was an 
address to the Institute of Public Administration’s Council: Kelly 2006, p. 15. 
13 See, for example, the White Paper on higher education research funding: Kemp 1999.
14 The non-government school funding policies of the Howard government are well described by Wilkinson 
et al. 2007, pp. 151–180 and Paul Kelly, The Australian, 16 May 2007, p. 14.
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In 1999, the political significance of the literacy reforms was articulated 
publicly when The Australian labelled this as ‘a Howard battlers’ issue because 
the Howard battlers were missing out on literacy.15 Given the extent to which 
the schooling reform priorities pursued by Kemp dovetailed with the Coalition’s 
broader political agenda, it is unsurprising that Kemp was frequently reported 
as having the strong support of his Prime Minister and that Howard regularly 
praised Kemp’s literacy reforms (see, for example, The Australian, 22 December 
1997, p. 11, 6 February 1999, p. 8; AustralianPolitics.com 2001). Certainly Kemp’s 
skill at selling the government’s policies was seen by some of his opponents as 
responsible for his promotion to the Cabinet ministry of Employment, Education 
and Training in October 1997 (Martin 1997, p. 11).
Getting state agreement 
Getting state agreement: The carrot 
Aside from such marketing abilities, Kemp was determined to exert influence 
through all the avenues available to him as a federal minister. In his Foundations 
for Australian Political Analysis, he cited persuasion, grants and physical 
coercion as some of the most important social mechanisms for political strategies 
(Kemp 1988, p. 7). As a Minister, he was successful in quarantining schools’ 
programs from the tough funding cuts in the early Costello budgets and in 
securing some additional funding commitments for literacy and numeracy 
initiatives. For example:
• The government’s first budget, in August 1996, included an additional $45 
million for a National Literacy and Numeracy Strategy;
• During 1997, there were targeted funding announcements, such as $7 million 
for literacy training for primary school teachers and $6.2 million for English 
as a second language tuition for Indigenous students; and,
• $1 million to establish an annual National Literacy Week was announced 
in March 1999, and later in the 1999 budget two significant 1998 election 
commitments were funded, with $47.1 million for literacy initiatives in 
middle schooling and $84 million for MCEETYA’s National Literacy and 
Numeracy Plan (Kemp, Media Releases, 20 August 1996, 15 September 1997, 
1 October 1997, 16 March 1999, 11 May 1999).
Such funding largesse was aimed as much at the diverse non-government 
school community as the government sector. Securing their agreement to 
15 According to the reporter Catherine Armitage, this issue was discussed regularly at cabinet’s employment 
subcommittee meetings: The Australian, 6 February 1999, p. 8.
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come on board with national assessment testing of all students involved 
sensitive negotiations and was seen in the media as largely a quid pro quo for 
the substantial funding increases available for non-government schools under 
the revised socio-economic status recurrent funding arrangements (Channel 
Nine 1999).16 However, the Commonwealth drew the line at meeting the very 
substantial costs for government and non-government systems in administering 
the new national tests, insisting that education authorities needed to reassess 
their funding priorities. Kemp was adamantly of the view that literacy and 
numeracy should be the ‘first call on the education dollar’ (The Australian, 12 
March 1997, p. 3).17 
Getting state agreement: The stick
In his study of Australian politics, Kemp had highlighted the Commonwealth’s 
greater capacity in federal conflicts to extend its authority (Kemp 1988, p. 143). 
In office he worked to expand the Commonwealth’s influence in the schooling 
sector, with education becoming a prominent example of the government’s 
willingness to employ conditionality in Commonwealth grants as a vehicle to 
achieve policy priorities (Anderson and Parkin 2010, p. 101). During 1996 and 
1997, Kemp had publicly advocated that individual schools should be required 
to publish their literacy performance results as a public accountability measure 
(The Australian, 24 October 1996, p. 10; Comber et al. 1998, p. 27: Kemp, Media 
Release, 21 April 1997). He was also willing to employ — or at least to threaten 
to employ — the Commonwealth’s financial power as a lever to compel state and 
territory governments to implement his literacy standards. Having created a 
media furore in September 1997 with his 60 Minutes appearance and the release 
of ‘Literacy Standards in Australia’ with its alarming statistics, Kemp almost 
immediately announced that the Commonwealth would impose a condition 
on future access to literacy program funding, thus enacting a threat he had 
raised earlier in the year — states and territories would be required to provide 
a detailed plan on how schools would ensure that their students were reading 
and writing adequately by the end of Year 3.18
These plans became a regular requirement for education systems to access 
Commonwealth literacy funding. By mid-1999, there was media speculation that 
Kemp was investigating how to extend this by linking individual school funding 
16 Reflecting these sensitivities, Kemp’s department reported in 1999 that all government and most non-government 
education authorities had participated in literacy benchmark exercises for Years 3 and 5: DETYA 1999.
17 Despite Kemp’s views, later in 1997 there were discussions between DETYA and an Independent Schools 
representative concerning funding support for Independent schools, but this does not appear to have 
eventuated: National Independent Schools Council Board Minutes, 26 August 1997.
18 Notwithstanding Kemp’s interest in ensuring that the literacy performance of individual schools was 
made public, the reporting agreed by MCEETYA was only at the state level (without even any differentiation 
by system): Kemp, Media Release, 16 September 1997. 
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to compliance with the literacy and numeracy benchmarks (The Australian, 19 
July 1999, p. 4; 20 July 1999, p. 6). Throughout 2000, the independent schools 
sector was monitoring the strengthened accountability requirements as a ‘major 
issue’ for their schools, with concerns at the discretionary powers reserved 
for the Minister (National Independent Schools Council Board Minutes, 26 
February, 26 May, 25 August, 6 October and 24 November 2000). Kemp may 
have been partially motivated by his exasperation at the delays in implementing 
MCEETYA’s decisions from 1996–97 to develop and report progress against 
literacy and numeracy benchmarks for Year 3 and Year 5 students. There was a 
long and tortuous process of equating the different state and territory tests to 
enable national comparability; ministers only finally reached agreement in May 
1999 that such tests needed to contain more common elements to achieve such 
comparability (The Australian, 3 May 1999, p. 17; 19 July 1999, p. 4). Finally, 
in early 2000, the first report (restricted to the Year 3 reading component) 
was released, with the results indicating that some 87 per cent of Australian 
Year 3 students had achieved the benchmark — such a striking improvement 
on the 1996 survey results that Professor Peter Freebody of Griffith University 
drily remarked that ‘the latest round of testing seems to indicate either that 
[literacy levels] improved very dramatically in a very short period of time or 
that [Kemp’s claim of a “literacy crisis”] was an overstatement’ (ABC 1999, p. 
7; The Australian, 17 March 2000, p. 15).19 An alternative interpretation could 
be that the questions in the new benchmark testing had been ‘dumbed down’, 
given that ACER’s Geoff Masters was publicly quoted as claiming that state 
educators were pressuring his experts to accept easier questions. Both Kemp 
and his state colleagues, however, were quick to deny that this was occurring 
(The Australian, 25 February 2000, p. 1).20
Later in 2000, Kemp secured an important amendment to the Schools States 
Grants legislation so that education authorities, to receive funding under the 
Commonwealth’s literacy and numeracy program, would be required to report 
against performance measures and targets for literacy and numeracy. National 
reporting of state performance was now a legislated Commonwealth requirement 
— seen as an example of the Howard government’s engagement in ‘regulatory’ 
federalism, under which funding access was conditional on state compliance 
with central policy demands (Vromen et al. 2009, p. 309). Some state ministers 
contended that Kemp had threatened them with the withdrawal of funds from 
low performing schools. Both the former directors-general that we interviewed 
recalled that the ministerial-only meetings were ‘bunfights’: Geoff Spring 
19 Kemp himself had predicted in 1999 that the result would be in the low-to-mid-80s. 
20 In January 2005, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that a dyslexic Year 3 student, who was in the 
bottom 17 per cent in the NSW Basic Skills test and was said to be two years behind his peers, nevertheless 
met the literacy benchmark for Year 3. In our interview in 2012, Kemp indicated that he now has doubts as to 
whether the process employed at the time to establish equivalences across the various state tests was highly 
accurate and effective: AUSPELD 2005, p. 3; Kemp 2012.
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indicated that Kemp used his negotiating strengths ‘to imply that funds were at 
risk if they didn’t co-operate’ (Spring 2013; Boston 2013). Nevertheless, Kemp 
was adamant when interviewed by the ABC in August 1999 that he had never 
threatened to withdraw funding and that his interest was in identifying schools 
so that they could be helped by the relevant state system.21 
While state ministers resented his tactics, Kemp was often publicly regarded as 
having brought a sustained spotlight onto an important issue in school literacy 
(Argy 1998, pp. 120–121; The Australian, 6 February 1999, p. 8; Channel Nine 
1999). Despite having ranged against him what the ABC Four Corners program 
described as a ‘formidable array’ of opponents from political, bureaucratic, 
academic and professional quarters, he was seen as having successfully 
corralled all of the states and territories into accepting an ongoing system of 
literacy testing and public reporting by engaging the weight of public opinion 
(ABC 1999, p. 7). During his time as Minister, virtually every MCEETYA 
meeting included resolutions on literacy and/or numeracy, as ministers worked 
through the complex issues involved in establishing national standards for the 
benchmarks and reporting framework and then progressively extending it to 
encompass both literacy and numeracy for schoolchildren in Years 3, 5 and 7 
(and later 9).22 By 2000, furthermore, the introduction of national testing had 
become a bipartisan issue, with federal Labor publicly declaring their support 
for such a regime (The Australian, 29 July 2000, p. 30).
The public service partnership: Administrative 
mobilisation
In implementing enduring policy reform, the importance of ‘administrative 
mobilisation’ is now recognised (Lindquist and Wanna 2011, p. 3). While Kemp 
may have won the political battle, the administrative task of developing the 
benchmarks and calibrating individual state and territory tests for national 
comparability was a hard slog over many years, engaging the attention of 
senior bureaucrats, their technical staff and external psychometric experts. 
Kemp’s department (DEETYA and later DETYA) was initially slow to respond 
21 This was aired on the Four Corners program in August 1999 and also in the media in the previous month. 
Clearly many in the education community were concerned that the Minister did intend to use his abilities to 
withhold funding. In 1997, Kemp had stated in a media release that if any state or territory did not provide an 
adequate detailed plan, ‘the Federal Government would review how its funding could best be used to ensure 
each child’s needs were met’: ABC 1999, pp. 8–9; The Australian, 20 July 1999, p. 6; Kemp, Media Release, 16 
September 1997.
22 Although Queensland, Victoria and Tasmania were initially of a similar political leaning, Kemp appeared 
to bring his agenda unilaterally to MCEETYA meetings, with the exception of his first meeting in 1996 when 
he joined with Bob Quinn (the Queensland minister) to bring a critical package of resolutions on literacy: 
Peach 1998, pp. 9–10.
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to their Minister’s interest in literacy, given the more hands-off role that the 
Commonwealth had tended to play in schooling. But, by mid-1996, a dedicated 
literacy team had been brought together, combining strategic policy skills, 
Commonwealth/state experience and literacy expertise. 
The partnership which key departmental officers forged with Kemp and his key 
advisers was critical to the long term success of Kemp’s agenda.23 Kemp had a 
clear set of beliefs as to the respective roles of minister and public servants; 
in particular, he believed that ministers should control policy development, 
while the public service provided technical advice. In his 1988 book, Kemp 
had argued policy advice required ‘a [political] value component’ supplied by 
ministers and their staffers to complement the department’s technical advice 
(Kemp 1988, pp. 309–10). The DEETYA secretary, Steve Sedgwick, considered 
that his Minister had a very clear view on how the department could support 
his agenda, reflected in the open and robust discussions which he and the 
relevant branch head Evan Arthur were able to have with Kemp and his Chief 
of Staff Roskom, as Kemp teased out his agenda and took advantage of political 
and administrative opportunities (Sedgwick 2012; Arthur 2012).
In supporting their Minister at ministerial council meetings, DEETYA/DETYA 
were known for their tightly organised approach to the MCEETYA processes and 
the associated meetings of chief education officers. Given the complex technical 
issues involved, the development of the benchmarks and reporting arrangements 
necessitated the establishment of a separate Benchmarking Task Force in which 
DEETYA officers played a more active role than they had taken previously. 
Moreover, as Bill Daniels (then in charge of the schools branches in DETYA) has 
recalled, Commonwealth/state bureaucratic interactions during the Kemp years 
were characterised by considerable antagonism given the political environment 
(Daniels 2013). The pressure of the constant negotiations, consultations and 
problem solving required within these various official forums was captured in 
Sedgwick’s undoubtedly understated comment in the department’s 2000–01 
annual report that while the changes to a stronger accountability framework 
in schooling were usually pursued collaboratively in Commonwealth/state 
forums, this was ‘not without times of tension and difficulty’ (DETYA 2001). His 
counterpart in Queensland, Peach, had indeed sharply reminded an educators’ 
conference in May 1998 that the Commonwealth had no delivery responsibilities 
in schooling, although he assured his audience that his Benchmarking Taskforce 
believed that ‘a solution is possible and attainable [on the benchmarking 
exercise]’ (Peach 1998, pp. 8, 15).
23 When Kemp first became Minister, the Secretary of the department was Sandy Hollway, who supported 
Kemp through the early critical years of his schooling reforms but left in 1997 to become the CEO of the 
Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games.
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The priority the department attached to the literacy agenda in its work program 
was reflected in the space devoted to recording progress on the literacy and 
numeracy benchmarks and associated initiatives in its annual reports each year. 
Literacy, for instance, featured continuously in the Secretary’s report on the 
portfolio’s major developments and achievements. Utilising the capacity under 
the new Literacy Program for national projects, the department commissioned 
and published a considerable body of research on literacy issues such as early 
childhood literacy development and the literacy development of boys (DETYA 
2002, chapter 4, outcome 1; Harrington and McDonald 1999). To assist in 
communicating the Minister’s agenda, the department took the further step of 
releasing departmental papers, such as:
•  A discussion paper in October 1997 on the allocation of literacy grants 
(following Kemp’s decision to require detailed literacy plans from systems); 
and 
• In February 1998, a policy paper outlining the Commonwealth’s literacy 
and numeracy policy principles and goals, associated funding strategies and 
particular areas of literacy disadvantage (Harrington and McDonald 1999; 
Peach 1998, p. 10).
Through these diverse activities, across the first and second terms of the Howard 
government, the department at both executive and officer level had clearly 
engaged very actively with their Minister’s policy interest and had adapted to 
Kemp’s particular ministerial style, the urgency of his time horizons and the 
highly technical nature of this policy issue. The close working relationship was 
recognised not only by Kemp, who has acknowledged the role of the department 
(and especially Dr Arthur’s work) in the development of national testing as 
‘tremendously important’, but also by state officials (Kemp 2012; Boston 2013).
Pragmatic federalism in action
This examination of David Kemp’s literacy reforms has highlighted that, 
notwithstanding their roots in Liberal philosophy of individual advancement, a 
highly pragmatic approach was adopted by Kemp to drive them through. This 
pragmatic approach, in which the individual policy problem was given primacy 
over the theoretical formulation of the problem and potential remedy, has been 
discerned in the broader policy agendas of the Howard government (Hollander 
and Patapan 2007, pp. 290–291). 
Table 1 summarises the features of Kemp’s approach. His first step was to identify 
— or, as his opponents would have said, to construct — the literacy levels of 
primary school children as a significant public problem, beginning with his 
development of the opposition’s election platform and manifested very early in 
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his ministerial term by what was perceived publicly as his ‘crusade’ on literacy. 
In championing literacy standards as a major policy issue, he was assisted by 
an international and domestic environment which was increasingly supportive 
of standardised assessment and national reporting as the means of extending 
the accountability of teachers, schools and systems. Kemp brought a particular 
bent towards the acquisition of a supportive evidence base to underpin his 
agenda and to generate public debate; the planned National Literacy Survey 
of primary school children was a timely platform for this. His controversial 
decision to insist on presenting a clear line on the survey’s results through a 
specially commissioned (second) report, and then to announce the results on a 
populist national television program in September 1997, powerfully cemented 
in the public mind that Australian schools were experiencing a ‘literacy crisis’. 
In ‘t Hart’s view, ‘turning up the heat’ on your political adversaries is ‘a sine qua 
non of reformist leadership’ and Kemp would presumably have endorsed this 
position (‘t Hart 2011, p. 203).
Kemp believed that winning the public debate was crucial to achieving reform 
in a policy area with powerful interest groups. Although it alienated the 
education community, it ensured that state ministers could not hold out against 
his determination not only to establish national benchmarks for literacy and 
numeracy at critical years of schooling but to report nationally on performance 
by equating the results of their individual state tests. Unlike the health sector, 
where a deep evidence base demonstrating which interventions work has 
been carefully built up through bureaucratic and academic partnerships over 
several decades, evidence in the schools sector is a far more contested area and 
frequently challenged as politically motivated (see, for example, Vromen et al. 
2009, pp. 17, 331, 335). While Kemp undoubtedly had a deep attachment to 
discovering and communicating the evidence on literacy attainment, which he 
believed had been kept from the public domain (Kemp 2012), his methods were 
seen by many not only as polarising and divisive but also as motivated by his 
underlying political agenda. 
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Table 1: Kemp’s literacy reforms: Pragmatic federalism in action
Elements of reform 
approach How Kemp pursued these 
1 . Positioning literacy 
as an urgent policy 
problem
a. Identified literacy standards as a priority in Opposition election 
platform 
b . Capitalised on national and international initiatives in standardised 
assessment 
c . Publicly ‘crusaded’ for literacy as a core skill for individual and for 
national productivity .
2 . Marshalling and 
publicising the 
evidence 
a . Built strong (but contested) evidence base, taking advantage of 
National Literacy Survey of primary schoolchildren (the first in 16 
years) 
b . Ensured that the survey results clearly showed the proportion of 
children who were below the relevant benchmark, despite state 
objections and academic critics 
c . Used popular media to highlight ‘alarming’ results and win public 
debate .
3 . Getting the 
Commonwealth 
politics right
a . Ensured his education agenda was politically aligned with 
government’s and Prime Minister’s priorities in terms of 
competition and choice agendas 
b . Positioned and ‘sold’ literacy reforms as in the ‘national interest’
4 . Getting state 
agreement — the 
carrot
a . Used evidence and persuasion in ministerial meetings, particularly 
ministerial-only sessions 
b . Secured additional Commonwealth funding for literacy and 
numeracy 
c . Cultivated non-government sector to ensure their involvement in 
national testing .
5 . Getting state 
agreement — the 
stick
a . Imposed conditions on states for funding, e .g . detailed plans for 
literacy improvement
b . ‘Stalking horse’ — made threats to withhold or tie literacy funds 
to literacy improvement 
c . Legislated as Commonwealth funding requirement for education 
systems to report literacy and numeracy performance .
6 . The public service
partnership
a . Held strong views on the minister’s responsibility for policy 
development .
b. Had a good working relationship with department — saw officers 
as administrative champions, and was comfortable with robust 
discussions
c . The department, in turn, mobilised to prioritise literacy in its work 
program and Commonwealth/state negotiations .
Although Kemp initially operated ‘below the radar’ within the new Howard 
government in prosecuting such a determined agenda, his success in generating 
the pressure of public opinion for action on literacy also built his internal 
political capital, evidenced in his promotion to the senior ministry. Howard’s 
public recognition of Kemp’s achievements on the literacy agenda indicated the 
support Kemp acquired within the cabinet, and certainly his schooling reforms 
were seen as closely aligned with the government’s adoption of choice and 
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competition as two of its political mantras. For the Coalition, the public support 
for their schools agenda represented an electoral advantage, by eroding what 
had traditionally been seen as a core strength for Labor (Senior 2008, p. 221). 
In the federal arena, Kemp was willing to employ the range of powers available 
to him as a Commonwealth minister, in order to secure state cooperation. He 
controlled the agenda by negotiating directly with his ministerial counterparts; 
there was at that stage no ‘human capital’ agenda within the Council of 
Australian Governments to buttress, or alternatively derail, his plans. His 
ability to understand both the research and technical aspects of literacy was a 
powerful asset in arguing the case in ministerial council meetings, particularly in 
ministerial-only meetings or dinners. On certain key issues, such as the decision 
to retain state tests, he made concessions, recognising, for example, that a fully 
national test ‘was a step too far at that time’ (Kemp 2012). He brought additional 
funding and a greatly heightened profile for school literacy to the negotiating 
table, which helped to build support from the non-government school sector. 
Conversely, Kemp put as much pressure as he could bring to bear on his state 
counterparts and on non-government school systems to agree to his strategies 
on literacy improvements, such as the legislated conditionality of providing 
an annual plan to access Commonwealth literacy program funding and annual 
reporting against performance targets. Although his department had not 
initiated the work on literacy, their role as administrative champions was vital, 
particularly in terms of their involvement in the technical detail underpinning 
the development of the literacy and numeracy benchmarks and the national 
equating of state test results. This served to maintain the momentum on national 
assessment, against resistance from state bureaucrats and ministers, for whom 
testing results were high stakes and a threat to their administrative or political 
capital.24 If reforms involve ‘wars not battles’, this sustained attention to 
implementation was intrinsic to overcoming opposition to such systemic change 
(‘t Hart 2011, p. 209).
Yet despite such sustained attention from Kemp and his department over more 
than five years, literacy reform remained an unfinished agenda when he left 
the portfolio in November 2001 (to move to the environment portfolio) and the 
public spotlight moved to other schooling issues. In November 2004, following 
his retirement from politics, he was quoted in The Australian as laying the blame 
at the door of state bureaucrats and teacher unions for this failure to maintain 
the momentum to lift literacy levels, exemplified in the extended delays by the 
states in publishing nationally the results of the literacy tests (The Australian, 
18 November 2004, p. 11). It was not until 2008, under the leadership of Julia 
Gillard, Minister for Employment, Education and Workplace Relations and 
24 The high stakes involved have been highlighted by Dr Bob Lingard and a visiting UK academic in 2010: 
Lingard 2009, pp. 13, 19; Robin Alexander quoted in SEEWRC 2010, p. 41.
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Deputy Prime Minister in the new Rudd Labor government, that a fully national 
test (NAPLAN) was conducted, and this was followed by the establishment of a 
national body (the Australian Curriculum and Assessment Reporting Agency) 
and a national website, My School, which enabled comparative reporting 
on literacy and numeracy results at an individual school level. The national 
assessment regime has also catalysed other reforms — in Queensland, for 
example, the introduction of the benchmarks and national reporting impelled 
a major reconsideration of the educational disadvantage faced by its students 
in having one fewer year of compulsory schooling; Peter Beattie’s Labor 
government finally took the step of adding this additional year, at least partly to 
enable parity in national reporting.
While Howard may have lauded Kemp’s achievements in literacy reform at the time, 
he did not refer to this singular achievement in his subsequent autobiography.25 
While there has been broader acknowledgement of the profound impact (both 
positive and negative) of the introduction of national literacy and numeracy 
testing and reporting as an accountability tool through output measurement, 
Kemp’s driving role has rarely been highlighted, despite the public recognition 
during his time as minister.26 From his perspective as an educational assessment 
expert closely involved in national testing, Masters certainly regards the ‘Kemp 
years’ as ‘pivotal’ in the development of literacy and numeracy performance 
standards and reporting (Masters 2012). Arguably, the Minister (with assistance 
from his department) displayed what Lindquist and Wanna have described as 
the qualities for durable policy reform: ‘anticipation, contingency planning, 
considerable prudential judgment and strategic leadership’.27
Epilogue
In July 1999, Kemp had predicted that the introduction of testing would 
‘establish a new benchmark … against which the success of policies in future 
years is going to have to be measured’ (ABC, 1999, p. 8). Yet notwithstanding 
25 The ex-Prime Minister does not mention Kemp in his capacity as Education Minister, and the one schools 
policy of which he remains ‘intensely proud’ is the rapid expansion of independent schools charging low to 
moderate fees: Howard 2010, p. 243, 487.
26 In his 2008 article on school assessment, Steve Dowling recognised the profound impact of the 
introduction of testing in the late 1990s and acknowledged that Kemp was Education Minister at the time 
when national testing was introduced, although he did not directly describe his role in this reform. There has 
been some recent recognition that NAPLAN was built on the ‘Howard government’s initiative’: see Bamford 
2010; Dowling 2008, p. 3.
27 Educational policy-making tends to be critiqued by academic observers as ‘messy’ and ‘ad hoc’ or, 
alternatively, driven by hostile announcements without sufficient attention to implementation issues and 
risks: Lindquist and Wanna 2011, pp. 3, 11; Reid 1998, p. xi.
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Kemp’s spotlight on Australia’s literacy achievements, the nation’s performance 
as measured by the international benchmark of the OECD’s Programme for 
International Student Assessment tests, declined between 2000 and 2009.28 
The reasons for the decline are still being debated. One possibility is that the 
benchmarks created by the Commonwealth and states were set too low, producing 
little urgency for change in teaching and school management practices from 
either education bureaucracies or their ministers. It could also be that schools 
are not employing the most effective literacy strategies, or that other changes 
in the student population or school structure have offset the increased literacy 
focus. The most authoritative comment has come from a paper prepared for the 
panel conducting the Review of Funding for Schooling (the Gonski review), 
established by the Gillard Labor government. This found evidence that the 
decline in reading and mathematics was linked to the increased concentration 
of disadvantaged children in largely government schools. This change was, in 
turn, partly the result of other Kemp reforms which enabled parents to exercise 
choice in the school their children went to, the corresponding growth of the 
non-government school sector and a resulting loss of middle class children from 
the public system (Gonski et al. 2011, pp. 20–22).
If this is true, it would tend to suggest that, ironically, David Kemp’s literacy 
reforms, as important as they were, were undermined by parental choice — the 
other key plank in his schooling reform agenda.
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12. Cross-Jurisdictional Performance 
Audits: Impacts and options for the 
Australian National Audit Office 
Patricia Gerald
‘To attack the Auditor-General, is to seek to weaken the Parliament. To 
weaken the Parliament’s ability to hold the executive to account is to 
attack and weaken the centrepiece of our defences against tyranny and 
corruption. It is an attack on the people itself.’
 – Former Commonwealth Auditor-General, John Taylor (The Age, 5 
December 1996, p. 17)
Introduction
The lack of auditing of Commonwealth transfers to states and territories 
in Australia has been described as a ‘glaring gap’ in the accountability of 
Commonwealth spending (Wanna and Podger 2009). Payments to the states and 
territories amounted to $97 billion in 2011–12, representing 25.7 per cent of 
total Commonwealth expenditure, a significant source of funding for services 
provided to Australians including education, health, and Indigenous programs 
(Australian Government 2012). Some of these transfers are unconditional, but 
many are conditional, with specific Commonwealth objectives or expected 
outcomes. In 2011–12, conditional transfers amounted to $49.9 billion 
(Australian Government 2012). Although the Commonwealth Parliament 
remains accountable for the efficient and effective spending of conditional funds 
by the recipient states and territories, according to the pre-agreed terms, the 
Commonwealth Auditor-General has not reviewed these transfers.
The governing legislation of the Commonwealth Auditor-General is regularly 
reviewed by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA), a 
parliamentary committee tasked with ensuring that audit legislation remains 
current, relevant and sufficient for the Auditor-General to carry out his mandate. 
The 2009 review, ‘Inquiry into the Auditor-General Act 1997’, highlighted 
gaps in accountability, particularly in areas of spending made by ‘agents’ of 
the Commonwealth: a private sector contractor, non-governmental organisation 
(NGO), government business enterprise (GBE), or other level of government, 
such as a state, territory or local government. The review resulted in several 
amendments to the Commonwealth Auditor-General Act 1997, including the 
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addition of powers to allow the conduct of performance audits of these agents, 
referred to as ‘Commonwealth Partners’. These powers often referred to as 
‘follow-the-money’ provisions were awarded to the Auditor-General with the 
intent of addressing these gaps in accountability. 
As the Commonwealth Auditor-General begins to conduct these audits, in the 
case of state and territory governments it will involve crossing jurisdictional and 
constitutional boundaries into areas traditionally accessed only by state and territory 
auditors-general. Such access could impact a variety of stakeholders and further 
strain an already tenuous Commonwealth–state relationship. The Commonwealth 
Auditor-General is wading into politically and administratively sensitive terrain. 
This study examines the new provision allowing the Commonwealth Auditor-
General to conduct audits of states and territories, referred to in this report 
as cross-jurisdictional performance audits (CJPAs), and seeks to answer two 
central research questions:
• How will the introduction of CJPAs of states and territories by the 
Commonwealth Auditor-General likely impact key stakeholders, including 
the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO)? 
• How does this approach to inter-jurisdictional auditing compare to alternative 
approaches such as cooperative audits, both in Australia and internationally?
By identifying areas of impact, this investigation seeks to help the ANAO 
anticipate challenges to the introduction of CJPAs, promote discussion about 
alternatives, and develop options for optimal implementation.
This research is informed by a review of the literature on performance audit, 
an international scan of the mandates of other auditors-general, interviews 
with Australian auditors-general and other key individuals, and an online 
survey of national audit offices in other jurisdictions on their views on inter-
jurisdictional auditing. Based on these findings, a summary of key stakeholder 
impacts is presented, including impacts on the ANAO’s performance audit 
process, followed by a framework for comparing different approaches to inter-
jurisdictional audit and options for implementation at the ANAO.
Background and context
This section provides necessary background about the Commonwealth Auditor-
General and the events leading up to the current amendments.1 First, it provides 
an overview of the role of the Auditor-General and performance audit at the 
1 Information in this section was gathered from a variety of sources including gray literature, government 
and professional association websites, internet searches, news media, academic journals and books.
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ANAO. It then outlines the current state of Commonwealth–state relations, 
with a specific focus on federal financial transfers and why they are a concern 
in terms of auditing and accountability. This is followed by a review of the 
amendment process and outcomes. The final part identifies the Auditor-General’s 
key stakeholder relationships.
Accountability and the role of the Auditor-General
The Commonwealth Auditor-General is an independent officer of the legislature 
responsible to the federal Parliament for providing oversight of government operations 
and expenditures (see Figure 1). The Auditor-General supports accountability 
through the provision of financial, compliance and performance auditing services 
to Parliament and all federal public sector entities (ANAO 2011). Supported by the 
ANAO and broad access-to-information and premises powers under the Auditor-
General Act 1997, the Auditor-General can identify areas for investigation and 
recommend improvements in public administration and service delivery (ANAO 
2011). Despite the combined revenues and expenses of the General Government 
Sector of some $675 billion, the ANAO carries out its oversight duties with an annual 
budget of only $78m, or roughly 0.01 per cent of the total (McPhee 2011).
Figure 1: The role of the Auditor-General as an independent officer of the 
Parliament
Source: Adapted from Office of the Auditor-General of Canada 2007, p.4.
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Performance audit
Until 1979, the Auditor-General provided oversight through traditional audit 
practices known as financial or attest audits, and, in some cases, through 
compliance audits. Over the years it became increasingly clear that a financial 
account of how much was spent did not tell an adequate story for accountability 
purposes as to how well money had been spent, or whether value for money had 
been achieved. Something was needed to assess the managers and departments 
responsible for making spending and operational decisions, especially in light of 
‘perceived concerns about wasteful use of money and other resources’ (Wanna, 
Ryan and Ng 2001, pp. 206–207).
In 1979, the ANAO was given the authority to carry out ‘efficiency audits’, 
which marked the beginning of an entirely new role for the Auditor-General, 
and a major expansion in his work. It also led a fundamental change in the 
ANAO’s relationship with stakeholders (Wanna, Ryan and Ng 2001, p. 203), 
particularly with the departments and agencies they audit, known as ‘auditees’. 
No longer simply reviewing financial accounts, auditors would develop audit-
specific performance criteria and assess management performance against those 
criteria. Some areas of the public sector resisted the new practices, which were 
seen as ‘a threat to their operations, responsibilities and policy capabilities’ 
(Wanna, Ryan and Ng 2001, p. 204). By 1997, new legislation renamed efficiency 
audits as ‘performance audits’ (see Figure 2), and today they represent about 
40 per cent of the ANAO’s overall spending (ANAO 2012b). Approximately 56 
performance audits are conducted and tabled in Parliament each year.2 
The Australian federal context
As in many federal nations, the relationship between the Commonwealth and 
state governments in Australia is often strained. Since the Commonwealth has few 
exclusive powers but is involved to a high degree in shared functions, grievances 
between the jurisdictions often stem out of conflicts over the Commonwealth’s 
involvement in these areas that are constitutionally the responsibility of the 
states (see Twomey and Withers 2007). This is compounded by a vertical fiscal 
imbalance, which sees the Commonwealth centrally raising the majority of the 
tax revenue while the states, with limited revenue-raising capacity, are left with 
higher public expenditure demands that ‘greatly exceed’ their revenue-raising 
capacity (Quiggan 2005, p. 2). For example, Australian states do not have access 
to income tax revenues unlike many other federations (see Figure 3).
2 The number of performance audits undertaken can vary slightly from year to year.
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Figure 2: Standard performance audit process at the ANAO
Source: ANAO 2008, p. 5.
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Figure 3: State government access to income taxes: Selected federations, 
1965–2004 
Source: Twomey and Withers 2007, p. 39.
To address this fiscal imbalance, states and territories in Australia are given 
significant annual financial support from the Commonwealth government, 
amounting to $97 billion in 2011–12, about 25.7 per cent of the Commonwealth’s 
total expenditure (Australian Government 2012). In some cases, transfers can be 
as much as 60 per cent of a state’s total revenue (Quiggan 2005). Not surprisingly, 
such dependence has increased the Commonwealth’s power and influence 
(Fenna 2008), producing a federation more centralised than originally intended 
(Podger and Wanna 2012). Some critics refer to this dynamic as ‘opportunistic 
federalism’, whereby the Commonwealth, ‘picks and chooses State issues upon 
which to intervene for political purposes’ (Twomey and Withers 2007, p. 28), 
effectively rendering the states as service delivery agents of the Commonwealth.
In 2009, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) introduced reforms to 
address vertical fiscal imbalance-related issues including a commitment by the 
Commonwealth to provide ongoing financial support for states’ service delivery 
in three ways, including general revenue assistance, National Specific Purpose 
Payments (SPPs) and National Partnership Payments (NPPs). The latter two 
payments are considered to be conditional grants because they are attached to a 
set of Commonwealth objectives, outcomes, outputs and performance indicators. 
Although performance reporting associated with the SPPs and NPPs is managed 
by the COAG Reform Council and the COAG Standing Council on Federal 
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Financial Relations, prior to the 2011 amendments to the Auditor-General Act 
1997, these payments were not subject to the oversight of the Commonwealth 
Auditor-General, nor by state level auditors. 
Despite the financial framework reforms, federal financial transfers end up 
as services delivered by both jurisdictions. For example, responsibility for 
education services rests with the state governments, yet the Commonwealth 
makes contributions to education through its $9.7 billion National Schools 
SPP. Since SPPs are attached to national policy objectives, the Commonwealth 
government is responsible for attaining these objectives, yet the accountability 
attached to the Commonwealth portion of the funds rests with states for proper 
management and reporting to the Commonwealth as to how the funds were 
spent.
The JCPAA and the Inquiry into the Auditor-General 
Act 1997
In 2009, the Inquiry into the Auditor-General Act 1997 (the Inquiry) was 
undertaken by the JCPAA. Representing the formal link between the 
Commonwealth Auditor-General and the Australian Parliament, the JCPAA is a 
parliamentary committee that informs the Auditor-General of the Parliament’s 
audit priorities, recommends the resource levels for the ANAO (McPhee 2012), 
and regularly reviews the legislation to ensure it remains relevant in the modern 
public sector environment (ANAO 2012a). While the 2009 review was considered 
to be routine (eight years had passed since the previous one), its timing could 
not have been more opportune for the Auditor-General in light of the recent 
reforms to the federal financial relations framework. 
One area the JCPAA was interested in reviewing was the Auditor-General’s 
‘capacity to examine the financial and performance outcomes from 
Commonwealth investments in the private sector and Commonwealth grants 
made to State and local governments’ (JCPAA 2010, p. xi). 
Such access is often called ‘follow-the-money’ legislation, as it enables the 
auditors to follow the spending trail from end-to-end without being restricted 
once service delivery leaves the Commonwealth jurisdiction. References to 
‘follow-the-money’ legislation often bundle together the ability to audit transfers 
to any third party or Commonwealth partner, including states and territories, 
private companies or NGOs. However, there is a significant difference between 
auditing contractors and auditing state and territory partners, and this issue 
figures prominently later on in this report. 
In a submission to the Inquiry, the Institute of Public Administration of 
Australia made reference to the financial transfers to the states and territories, 
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showing concern that ‘the Commonwealth Auditor-General does not audit these 
programs against the agreed objectives, nor do state Auditors-General’, and that 
‘states may report back on their claimed performance but the Commonwealth 
has no real check as to their validity and reliability,’ (JCPAA 2010, p. 58). The 
Commonwealth Auditor-General confirmed the notion of the ‘gap’, explaining 
that the ANAO is ‘constrained at the moment to look at state performance or 
the performance of grantees under [the] act, so it is a central issue’ (McPhee 
2010, p. 8). An issue further compounded by the recent reforms to the federal 
financial framework, which relaxed the Commonwealth prescriptions on state 
service delivery (JCPAA 2010). 
To address the cross-jurisdictional issues in the JCPAA’s terms of reference 
for the Inquiry, the ANAO identified options in order of potential impact and 
preference:
• Full access powers to audit states and territories in receipt of transfers ‘in 
circumstances where there is a corresponding or reciprocal responsibility to 
deliver specified outcomes in accordance with agreed arrangements’. 
• The same as above, but rather than amend the Auditor-General’s legislation, 
the powers could be provided via separate legislation governing SPPs. 
• Make it mandatory that SPP legislation and agreements include access 
provisions for the Auditor-General — something already occurring on an ad 
hoc basis. 
• Explore ‘further cooperation between the Auditor-General and the state and 
territory Auditors-General’, the preferred option of other stakeholders, such 
as the Australian Council of Auditors-General and the Institute of Public 
Administration of Australia (ANAO 2009).
Further cooperation meant pursuing cooperative audits between the 
Commonwealth and state auditors-general to address issues of mutual concern, 
in this case the federal transfers. However, the cooperative audit approach did 
not receive much discussion by the JCPAA after ANAO flagged the secrecy and 
information sharing provisions in the Act, different audit office priorities, and 
the challenges with synching performance audit cycles with each other, making 
the timing of the phases difficult to align.
Resulting amendments and the new mandate
In their final report, the JCPAA recommended enhancements to the mandate 
of the Auditor-General, including the power to conduct cross-jurisdictional 
performance audits of states and territories. By December 2011, Parliament had 
endorsed several amendments to the Act, which represented ‘the most significant 
enhancement of the auditor-general’s mandate since the addition of efficiency 
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audit powers in 1979’ (INTOSAI 2012a). The new legislation allowed for the 
audit of ‘Commonwealth partners’, a term used to group together any recipient 
or contractor receiving money directly or indirectly from the Commonwealth 
for a particular purpose. This includes state and territory bodies, but, in these 
cases, an audit may only be conducted at the request of the JCPAA or the 
responsible Commonwealth minister. However, the Auditor-General can ask the 
JCPAA or the responsible minister to request such an audit (ANAO 2012a).
The Auditor-General will need to employ this new power in a way that develops 
its legitimacy. However, performance auditing is often a high-profile activity. 
It is unclear what plans exist for conducting cross-jurisdictional performance 
audits, and what reactions might emerge from the states, territories, and other 
stakeholders.
Summary of key stakeholder relationships
Although the Auditor-General and the ANAO derive credibility from their 
independence and objectivity, the development of meaningful relationships is 
also central to the execution of the mandate. Such relationships can help to 
promote the value of the Auditor-General and the ANAO to the public sector, 
which points to the need to manage expectations (Wanna, Ryan and Ng 2001). 
What follows reviews key stakeholder relationships, including potential new 
ones which might emerge with the introduction of CJPAs and possibly some 
form of cooperative auditing. 
Parliament and the JCPAA
As part of its regular operations, the ANAO ‘provides briefings to ministers, 
shadow ministers, parliamentary committees and their staff on audit reports 
tabled in the Parliament’ (Barrett 2002, p. 35) making the Auditor-General’s 
relationship with Parliament a critical activity of the audit office. Despite the 
emphasis on the significance of independence, the Auditor-General’s objectives 
can only be fully met with the ‘trust and respect of the Parliament’ (Barrett 
2002, p. 45). By extension, this notion of trust also holds true for the Auditor-
General’s relationship with the JCPAA. The JCPAA must determine the audit 
priorities of Parliament, advise the Auditor-General of those priorities, and 
review all reports tabled by the Auditor-General in each house of Parliament. 
The JCPAA oversees the operations, resources and external audit of the ANAO, 
reporting to both houses on matters relating the Auditor-General’s functions 
and powers they believe require attention.
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Auditees: Departments and agencies
A positive relationship with an auditee makes for a more efficient audit. Since 
1995, the ANAO has considered auditees to be important stakeholders (Wanna, 
Ryan and Ng 2001). Cooperation is necessary and encouraged for building 
trust, adding value, maintaining credibility, and ultimately gaining ‘genuine 
acceptance of [the ANAO’s] recommendations’ (Barrett 2002, p. 38). 
Commonwealth-level departments and agencies could have a stake in the 
new CJPA process. Prior to CJPA access, performance audits were limited by 
restrictions to the assessment of Commonwealth level entities, and in the cases 
of transfers to states and territories, the ANAO could only comment on the 
performance of those Commonwealth entities in managing state and territory 
agents, and without access to state and territory files. The case for CJPAs flows 
from the idea of an end-to-end audit that includes access to the state and 
territory agencies as well as assessing management of services funded by the 
Commonwealth. CJPAs have the potential of revealing issues at the state and 
territory level which have not been seen and which could be detrimental to the 
Commonwealth departments as well as state and territorial governments.
Executive coordinators (central agencies): Treasury, 
Finance, Prime Minister and Cabinet
Wanna, Ryan and Ng (2001) describe the relationship between the Auditor-
General and central agencies as one of ambivalence: they have a mutual interest in 
accountability, but the potential for exposure is a political risk. Risk is typically 
high because central agencies are ‘active players with their own agendas and 
powers and have a major say in determining many of the circumstances under 
which the Audit Office operates’ (Wanna, Ryan and Ng 2001, p. 247).
In the context of this report, the Commonwealth central agencies can be seen as 
having a vested interest in extending the powers of the Auditor-General in order 
to improve accountability for intergovernmental transfers, and, in particular, if 
they seek to shift the focus to the management and performance of states and 
territories. 
Professional bodies and international associations
The ANAO maintains relationships with several domestic professional 
associations, including Chartered Practising Accountants Australia and the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia, and makes contributions to 
developing accounting and auditing standards to the Australian Accounting 
Standards Board and the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (ANAO 2012a). 
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The ANAO is also a member of several international and regional institutions, 
with the primary purposes of information sharing, training and development, 
and setting of international standards. The most important among these groups 
is the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), 
represented by 170 Auditors-General around the world. The ANAO sits on the 
Global Working Group, Professional Standards Committee, Performance Audit 
Subcommittee, and Working Group on Environmental Auditing (ANAO 2012a). 
INTOSAI is a venue where offices can share ideas and promote better practices. 
The introduction of CJPAs could have an impact internationally if Australia is 
deemed an innovator in auditing of intergovernmental transfers.
Media, academics, commentators and the public
The media often plays a role in highlighting the ANAO’s work. Although the 
ANAO maintains a public website containing its reports and better practice 
guides, the extent of media coverage depends on what is said in Parliament. The 
media can play a major role in shaping public perceptions about the quality of 
the programs and services of the Commonwealth, as well as those of academics 
and other commentators. Ultimately, the Auditor-General and the ANAO aim 
to improve public administration, and it is important to maintain links with 
the media and to the public. Academics and other sector specialists can also 
assist the Auditor-General (Lonsdale 2008), especially when there is a need for 
expertise in certain issue areas that is not available in-house. 
The addition of CJPAs to the Auditor-General’s mandate could influence the 
public. As voters, they elect different representatives to the Commonwealth and 
state and territory governments, creating two chains of accountability. Changing 
how accountability works or increasing transparency of operations could impact 
the public’s perception of both levels of government and ultimately confidence 
in the political process, perceptions of the quality of public services, and even 
voting behaviour.
ANAO (internal relationships)
Internally, the Auditor-General has one stakeholder: ANAO staff. The 
Performance Audit Services Group will be the most impacted by the new 
legislation, but the entire office could also be influenced because a new set of 
program activities may affect resourcing, staff experience, planning, and timing 
of audits. The CJPA approach may affect the performance audit process at each 
of the stages.
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New stakeholder relationships post-amendments
Figure 4 depicts the external stakeholder relationships that may arise at the 
state level if the Auditor-General moves forward with CJPAs and possibly 
cooperative audits.
Figure 4: Anticipated stakeholder relationships of the Auditor-General 
during CJPAs
Source: Adapted from Wanna, Ryan and Ng 2001, p. 230.
State and territory auditors-general
All six states in Australia have Auditors-General, as do the Northern Territory and 
the Australian Capital Territory. Until recently, contact between these auditors-
general has occurred primarily at the bi-annual meetings of the Australasian Council 
of Auditors-General.3 The Commonwealth Auditor-General occasionally contacts 
auditors-general in other jurisdictions, but separate jurisdictional mandates and 
responsibility to different parliaments tends to discourage such contact. 
The introduction of CJPAs and possible cooperative audits could significantly 
affect state and territory auditors-general. There could be an increase in 
time demands from the Commonwealth Auditor-General not only through 
consultation and information sharing, but because of the potential impacts on 
3 The Australian Council of Auditors-General includes members from Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New 
Guinea.
12 . Cross-Jurisdictional Performance Audits
381
their own performance audit programs. Commonwealth CJPAs may stir state 
and territory parliamentary interest in a topic not previously identified in 
their annual audit work programs. It is possible that the new legislation for 
CJPAs might force more interest by the state and territory auditors-general into 
cooperative audits in order to keep the Commonwealth Auditor-General out of 
their turf. Again, this would serve to shift state and territory audit priorities.
State and territory parliaments and PACs
Although state and territory parliaments and public accounts committees (PACs) 
may not be directly impacted by CJPAs, indirect impact may occur depending 
on the audit topic. If a CJPA has significant outcomes at the state and territory 
level, the respective parliaments might take notice and demand action or further 
investigation by state or territory governments or their respective auditors-
general. CJPAs could also induce the state and territory auditors-general to 
pursue more cooperative audits with the Commonwealth Auditor-General, 
potentially diverting attention from previously identified state and territory 
audit priorities.
State and territory executive coordinators: Treasury, 
Finance, Premier and Cabinet
The states and territories are inextricably linked to the Commonwealth 
government, due to financial transfers. State governments have always had an 
interest in the accountability arrangements for intergovernmental transfers with 
respect to whether the Commonwealth was spending its own money efficiently 
and if it had ‘handed over the due surpluses’ (Wanna, Ryan and Ng 2001).
However, the introduction of CJPAs could change this relationship if the states 
and territories feel threatened by the new powers, particularly when audits 
leave them exposed or portrayed negatively. Mere access alone is enough to 
cause friction in light of historical mistrust between the states and territories 
and the Commonwealth, and explains the frequent references to sovereignty 
and constitutional rights when CJPAs were a prospect. Conversely, there is 
potential for positive outcomes for the states and territories from CJPAs in cases 
which might expose Commonwealth mismanagement or at best invite changes 
to the often-criticised restrictions and prescriptions placed on the transferred 
funds, which can result in perverse spending by the states and territories.
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State and territory auditees: Departments and agencies
State and territory departments and agencies will be a new stakeholder for the 
ANAO, and sentiments could be similar to those of the executive and central 
agencies when conducting CJPAs. As Commonwealth auditors approach state 
and territory departments for information, it is unclear how they will be 
received. Will state and territorial audit offices be expected to give advice to the 
departments and agencies they ordinarily audit? Will these departments and 
agencies simply see the ANAO as another audit office? Another set of issues will 
arise once issues papers are shared for review and reports released to Parliament 
and the public for consideration. At the very least this raises critical issues 
about whether and how to foster trust in such potentially difficult terrain.
Literature review
The literature review focuses on academic and professional literature relating to the 
emergence, development, process, application and impacts of performance audit, 
including its various external influences and modern day challenges. Literature 
on the emerging use of cross-jurisdictional and cooperative approaches to 
performance audit is reviewed and a conceptual framework developed to illustrate 
how CJPAs might impact the standard performance audit process at the ANAO.
Origins and growth of performance audit
As recent as 2011, literature on performance auditing has been described as 
‘underdeveloped’ (Furubo 2011), and much of what is available is often focused on 
the qualities it shares with the field of evaluation (Chelimsky 1985; Leeuw 1996; 
Pollitt and Summa 1996; Pollitt et al. 1999). While there is general acceptance 
that performance audit has drawn considerably from the field of evaluation, 
particularly in the development of its methods (Lonsdale et al. 2011), this has 
not precluded a broad discussion of performance audit as a unique practice.
Performance audit (known also as efficiency audit and value-for-money audit) 
first emerged the United States in the 1920s with the establishment of the 
General Accounting Office (later Government Accountability Office), who had 
been tasked with investigating and making recommendations to Congress on 
greater economy or efficiency in public expenditures (Budget and Accounting 
Act of 1921, Sec. 312(a), 42 Stat. 25). However, performance audit began to 
emerge more significantly in the 1970s as a distinct practice with statutory 
backing at audit offices around the world, including Canada, Australia, the 
United Kingdom, and parts of Western Europe and Scandinavia (Pollitt et al. 
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1999). From seemingly humble beginnings, contemporary performance audit 
now takes its place as a key area of the overall audit functions carried out by 
auditors-general (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Role of performance audit in broader scope of activities 
conducted by supreme audit institutions (SAIs)
Source: INTOSAI 2012b, p. 8.
Performance audit and accountability
The notion of the inadequacy of traditional forms of audit (English and Guthrie 
2000) and the subsequent emergence of performance audit, is widely recognised as 
a direct consequence of the widespread administrative reforms that swept across 
the public sector in the 1970s under ‘new public management’ (NPM) (see Aucoin 
1990; Pollitt and Summa 1995; Leeuw 1996; English and Guthrie 2000; Gendron 
et al. 2007; Funnell and Wade 2012). As the reforms placed a new emphasis on 
‘leaner government, better service delivery, and more efficient and effective 
management of government programmes’ (Funnell and Wade 2012, p. 435), the 
rules-based and process-driven routines of the past were gradually replaced with 
a more results-based accountability, focused on identifying desired outcomes, 
setting performance targets for the public service, and measuring the extent of 
achievement of those targets (Aucoin 1990; Hood 1991; Pollitt and Summa 1995).
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Barzelay (1997, p. 235) saw the take-up of performance audit by external 
audit institutions as an action rationalised by NPM, while Power (1997, p. 7) 
suggested it represented a whole new system of values, which he referred to as 
the ‘audit society’. Given their shared concern with efficiency and effectiveness 
of public spending, the strong links between NPM and performance audit are 
not that surprising, having been described by another author as a ‘mutual co-
dependency’ (English and Skaerbaek 2007, p. 239). 
The literature generally supports the notion that performance audits make a 
unique contribution to public sector accountability. For example, Pollitt (2006, 
p. 48) points to the ability of performance audit reports to ‘command political 
attention’, due in part to their mandatory review by parliamentary committees. 
Similarly, Lonsdale et al. (2011) sees performance audit reports as accountability 
mechanisms in their own right — the public availability of their reports offers 
citizens a rare window into the actual management of government operations. 
In Australia, Funnell (1996) and Funnell and Wade (2012, p. 447) have described 
performance audit as a ‘source of institutional pressure, exerted on the Executive 
on behalf of the Parliament to account for the efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy with which it manages and uses public resources’.
Performance audit in practice
The academic and grey literature identifies two chief purposes of performance 
audit (Barzelay 1997; Pollitt and Summa 1996; Lonsdale 2000, INTOSAI 2012b). 
The first is to provide oversight and scrutiny of government spending, which 
links to the accountability and transparency aspects of governance. The second, 
a more recent development, is to improve public administration, or more 
specifically, the management practices of public sector managers. 
The objectives of performance audit have been articulated in many ways, 
depending upon the supreme audit institution (SAI), its mandate, legislation, 
and resource capacity. Objectives for individual audits are usually expressed 
in one overall question or statement that the audit will address and can also 
include financial and compliance components. Auditing standards developed by 
INTOSAI (INTOSAI 2012b) set a baseline for the kinds of objectives an individual 
performance audit ought to have, including the three ‘Es’ often referred to by 
SAIs. These include an examination of one or more of the following assertions:
• Economy of activities in accordance with sound administrative principles 
and practices, and management policies. The principle of economy is about 
keeping the costs low. The resources used should be available in due time, in 
appropriate quantity and quality and at the best price.
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• Efficiency of utilisation of human, financial and other resources, including 
examination of information systems, performance measures and monitoring 
arrangements, and procedures followed by audited entities for remedying 
identified deficiencies. The principle of efficiency is about getting the most 
from available resources. It is concerned with the relationship between 
resources employed, conditions given and results achieved, in terms of 
quantity, quality and timing of outputs or outcomes.
• Effectiveness of performance in relation to the achievement of the objectives 
of the audited entity, and the actual impact of activities compared with 
the intended impact. The principle of effectiveness is about meeting the 
objectives set. It is concerned with attaining the specific aims or objectives 
set and/or achieving the intended results. Where appropriate, the impact of 
the regulatory or institutional framework on the performance of the entity 
should also be taken into account (INTOSAI 2010, p. 2; INTOSAI 2012c, p.4).
Process and methods
Despite early views of performance audit as merely a technical discipline 
(Adams 1986), there has since been consistent attention paid to the variability 
and non-standardisation of performance audit in practice (Glynn 1985; Guthrie 
1987; Hamburger 1989; Barzelay 1997; Pollitt et al. 1999). Hamburger (1989, 
p. 4) disagreed with the presumed objectivity of the technical performance audit, 
believing that, ‘far from being a neutral, technical discipline, performance audit 
is what the auditors choose to make it’. Likewise, others have highlighted that 
the application of performance audit depends upon the context and the subject 
matter (Pugh 1987; Guthrie 1989), ultimately subject to influences of social and 
organisational factors (Guthrie 1989). More recently, the literature seems to have 
accepted this variability in application as a positive feature, referring to the 
benefits of its ‘fluidity’, ‘malleability’ and ‘flexibility’ (Jacobs 1998; Guthrie 
and Parker 1999), as what makes performance audit so unique (Justesen and 
Skaerbaek 2010; Funnell 2011; Kells 2011; Lonsdale et al. 2011). This flexibility 
in application is also supported in the contemporary professional literature, 
including implementation guidelines issued by INTOSAI (2004), which stipulate 
that 
performance auditing is complex investigatory work that requires 
flexibility, imagination and high levels of analytical skills. Streamlined 
procedures, methods and standards may in fact hamper the functioning 
and the progress of performance auditing. Consequently, standards — 
as well as quality assurance systems — that are too detailed should be 
avoided (p. 29).
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Despite all the variations that may take place, there are some consistencies in 
practice. Many SAIs use the INTOSAI guidelines as their program foundation, 
followed by their individual system constraints, such as mandate and resourcing. 
The first step in a performance audit is the preliminary phase of topic selection. 
INTOSAI (2012c, p. 3) recommends that performance audit topics ‘should aim 
to maximise the expected impact from the audit while taking into account 
audit capacities’, which can be done by giving due regard to audit problem and 
or risk assessment and materiality of significance (including financial, social 
or political significance). Pollitt et al. (1999) identified five common selection 
factors: cost of the audit; the risk to public funds; coverage of the greater audit 
field; follow-up of earlier topics that had identified problems; and topics with 
high political attention. 
Once topics have been approved, they go through roughly the same three 
phases: audit planning, conducting, and reporting (See Figure 6).
Figure 6: Typical phases of the performance audit process
Source: Adapted from various performance audit manuals in Canada, Australia, and the UK.
• Audit planning: The planning phase includes development of background 
information, risk assessment, possible evidence sources, feasibility, 
significance/materiality, objective, scope, methodology, resource 
requirements (including staff numbers and skill sets), estimated cost, and 
audit timeline.
• Conducting: The conducting phase consists of the collection and examination 
of the data sources as outlined in the planning phase. The nature and extent of 
audit evidence required for the audit is driven by the topic and the objective. 
Typically there is a variety of evidence collected — including physical, 
documentary, testimonial or analytical — the relevance of which should be 
explainable and justifiable. All findings and conclusions must be supported 
by audit evidence. Data is often sought from sources and stakeholders other 
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than the auditee to provide a more complete picture. Analysis of all data 
collected also occurs in this phase.
• Reporting: The reporting phase involves the write up of the analysis conducted 
by the auditors. Each report is unique and they often vary considerably 
in scope and nature amongst SAIs. Reports include information about the 
objective of the audit, the methods, scope, criteria, data sources and findings. 
Findings make clear conclusions and if necessary include recommendations. 
All relevant viewpoints are to be considered and reported in a balanced 
fashion. Unless prohibited by their mandate, SAIs should always give the 
auditee the opportunity to comment on the audit finding, conclusions and 
recommendations — this process is often referred as the ‘clearance process’ 
(Sharma 2007; Lonsdale 2008) or as extending the principles of natural 
justice (INTOSAI 2010, p. 3–7).
Pressures and influences
The practice of performance audit does not happen in isolation. The process 
has both an influence on, and is influenced by the outside world. According to 
Lonsdale (2008) and others (Pollitt et al. 1999), these influences or pressures can 
have an effect on the actual conduct of the audit work. Pollitt and Summa (1999) 
have developed a conceptual model to represent how the basic performance 
audit process of an SAI is subject to various external influences, as well as 
to indicate how performance audit reports can make impacts on their greater 
operating environment (see Figure 7). Developments in public management 
outside of the audit environment can have impacts on how performance audits 
are organised internally. Likewise, recommendations from performance audit 
reports can result in changes in the management practices of public agencies or 
departments (Pollitt et al. 1999). Changes to any one element of this process can 
result in flow-on effects to any or all of the stakeholders involved.
Relationships
Several authors in the performance audit literature have referred to the 
conflicting demands placed on auditors by their various stakeholders. Put and 
Turksema (2011, p. 51) describe the role of an auditor as a constant ‘balancing 
act between listening to stakeholders and safeguarding their independent 
position’, while Wanna, Ryan and Ng (2001, p. 229) point to the inevitability 
that each of these stakeholders will have different expectations and perceptions 
of the auditors based upon the nature of each of these relationships. For the 
government bodies or auditees, the audit needs to be useful, and to be a learning 
experience for them. At the same time, Parliament is also considered a main 
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client of most SAIs, and therefore their focus is ‘much more on performance 
compliance and transparency, and where independent opinions are considered 
of prime importance’ (Put and Turksema 2011, p. 52).
Figure 7: Influences on the performance audit process
Source: Pollitt and Summa 1999, p. 8.
The implications of poor stakeholder relationships in Australia have been 
long documented by Funnell (1998, 2003) and others (Taylor 1996; Guthrie 
and Parker 1999; English and Guthrie 2000; Lonsdale 2008), particularly 
with respect to attempts by the executive government in Australia to limit 
the intrusions of performance audit by ‘attacking the reputations of auditors-
general and their staff’ (Funnell and Wade 2012). Funnell and Wade (2012) cite 
similar instances in other countries such as the UK and Canada, where their 
executives have attempted to undermine audit credibility through a variety of 
measures including:
limiting their resources, challenging their mandates and denigrating 
the quality of individual reports, accusing the auditors of blinkered 
naivety which leads to incomplete findings, and an alleged tendency 
to encroach on policy issues (Funnell and Wade 2012, p. 439; see also 
Sutherland 2001). 
The relationship between auditors and auditees is also well documented in 
the literature (Keen 1999; Morin 2001, 2008; Sharma 2007; Talbot and Wiggan 
2010; Funnell and Wade 2012). Keen (1999, p. 522) highlighted the amount 
of negotiation required between auditor and auditee and the inevitability of 
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their disagreement due to different belief systems and assumptions. Similarly, 
Morin (2001, p. 115) has observed the complexity of the relationship, ‘where 
perceptions of reality outweigh reality itself, where power plays occur and 
where the reactions of both parties are quite unpredictable’. More recently, 
Funnell and Wade (2012) have summarised the ‘persistent problems’ between 
auditors and auditees at the ANAO over the years, and found that much of the 
tension results from a difference of interests and perceived value. Auditors have 
an interest in the ‘survival and growth’ of performance audit and believe in its 
ability to add value to public administration, while auditees tended to view 
the practice in a negative light, and question the credibility of the practice in 
an attempt to ‘protect themselves and their agency’ (Funnell and Wade 2012, 
p. 446). Despite some evidence of auditees responding with compromise, Funnel 
and Wade (2012, p. 447) document the ‘overwhelmingly … resistant forms of 
tactical behaviour … especially those associated with the strategic responses of 
defiance and manipulation’. 
Other external relationships include those with academics, consultants and 
specialists who provide the Auditor-General with sector specific or technical 
knowledge on some audits. Many audit agencies — including the Office of the 
Auditor General of Canada and the UK National Audit Office — access experts 
with reference or expert panels (Lonsdale 2008), perceived as playing a ‘major 
part in the development of VFM [value for money] quality assurance processes’ 
(Lonsdale 2008, p. 236). Academics, for example, often assist agencies in 
developing performance audit methods as well as in clarifying the links between 
evidence and conclusions (Lonsdale 2008).
Impacts
Clearly relationships play an important role in the performance audit process, 
and many SAIs have taken efforts to improve these relationships based upon the 
belief that they will result in more positive impacts. Often this is done through 
follow-up audits, where auditors check to see whether earlier recommendations 
were followed (Pollitt et al. 1999; van der Knaap 2011), but others take measures 
on the front-end of an audit to encourage uptake of the entire process. In 
Australia for example, the ANAO commits itself to a ‘no surprises’ approach to 
performance audits:
The ANAO seeks to establish a relationship with entities and other parties 
such that there are ‘no surprises’ in the final audit report. This approach 
provides opportunities for entities and other parties to discuss the audit 
findings during the course of the audit. The benefit of this approach is 
to ensure that reports are accurate, evidence-based, balanced and fair. 
(ANAO 2012a, p. 8) 
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This approach has been further supported by a shift in focus from government 
waste and program failures — sometimes referred to as ‘gotcha’ audits — to reports 
focused on opportunities for learning and the promotion of better practices 
(Barrett 2011). Lonsdale (2000; Lonsdale et al. 2011) observed this shift in focus 
as a move towards the notion that performance audits ought to ‘add value’ to the 
greater world of public administration and management, by ‘identifying better 
ways of doing things’ (Lonsdale 2000). Part of this was accomplished by shifting 
the timing of performance audits from an almost exclusively ex post approach 
to one that included the commencement of audits during the implementation 
of programs, the idea being that early intervention would help identify better 
practices as the programs rolled out and result in better impacts. In addition, 
some SAIs now develop their audit recommendations so that lessons learned 
can have a broader application beyond the audited department, while others 
develop stand alone better practice guides, which provide generalised advice on 
range of topics affecting public sector managers.4 
Empirical studies that measure impacts have long been highlighted as a 
deficiency in the performance audit literature by several authors, including 
Wilkins (1995), Lonsdale et al. (1999), Morin (2001, 2008), and Barrett (2011). As 
one Auditor-General in Australia has observed, ‘it’s the holy grail for us that we 
all try to work out. You can see things change, and for the better, but trying to 
measure it is very difficult’. Barrett (2011) has echoed this sentiment and places 
emphasis on the achievement of identifiable outcomes for performance audit as 
a better way to measure impacts. 
4 For examples, refer to the ANAO website at www.anao.gov.au, the NAO website at www.nao.org.uk, or 
the GAO at www.gao.gov
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Figure 8: Factors that determine the impacts of performance audits
Source: Van Loocke and Put 2011, p. 202.
The most comprehensive study on impacts to date (Van Loocke and Put 2011), 
develops a framework for reflecting on the factors that influence audit impacts, 
and poises the field for further study in this area (See Figure 8). The study found 
that while performance audits do elicit positive impacts, they reaffirm Pollitt et 
al.’s (1999) earlier observation that these impacts are difficult to measure due to 
the inability to isolate cause and effect. While Pollitt et al. (1999) did outline 
several impacts including changes and improvements to public administration, 
cost-savings, and promotion of better practice, Van Loocke and Put (2011, 
pp. 202–203) identified four ways to improve upon those impacts: optimising 
the auditor‒auditee relationship; managing its reputation through ‘advocacy 
coalitions’ with research institutions and media; investing more resources into 
audit selection and planning to boost audit relevance; and improving efforts to 
disseminate results and consult with relevant stakeholders.
Critics
The practice of performance auditing is not without its critics. Authors have 
accused the practice of having various deficiencies and, in some cases, as having 
adverse effects (Sutherland 1986, 2001; Pollitt et al. 1999; Shand and Anand 
1996; Bowerman et al. 2003) or even no effect (Morin 2001). Performance audits 
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typically increase the workload of audited agencies, creating inefficiencies 
(Pollitt et al. 1999), but some authors have suggested that they can actually 
cultivate negative behaviour changes in public managers, such as making them 
more risk-averse or anti-innovative. In the early days of performance auditing, 
some critics complained that the lack of standards and ‘obscurity of methods’ 
made it difficult to trust the findings as reliable (Sutherland 1986; 2002 p. 23), 
supposedly because it is based upon a subjective and ‘utopian framework’ (Clark 
and Swain 2005, p. 460). In a recent review, Kells (2011, p. 390) summarised 
many of these criticisms raised over the years into seven main categories of 
performance audit behavior: promoting anti-innovation; being too nit-picky; 
creating an expectations gap; behaving as a lapdog; encouraging unnecessary 
systems; hunting headlines in the media; and performing a hollow ritual. From 
Kells’ (2011) perspective, each of these criticisms should be considered as a 
risk that can be managed in the design and operation of the audit institutions 
themselves, and Kells discusses several approaches to doing so. In other words, 
performance auditing is challenging work, but so long as risks are managed, the 
outcomes are ultimately good.
Current challenges to performance audit and recent 
trends
Although performance audit owes much of its existence to the cultural 
changes driven by the NPM reforms, its application has been ironically or 
paradoxically limited (Hood and Peters 2004) by many of the new forms of 
public sector management that emerged under these same conditions. The rise in 
privatisation, outsourcing and joint ventures for the delivery of public services 
are all well known to have challenged traditional accountability relationships 
in government. For auditors-general, their legislative powers of access were 
designed during a time when public services were delivered in-house by 
governments, and who have since been cut out from accessing or assessing the 
performance of government’s partners in public service delivery, including 
when those partners are the departments of state and territories governments. 
Murray (2011, p. 131) explains that the problem is that ‘third parties have been 
spending the money, but the Commonwealth has been carrying the risk’, which 
means that Parliament is unable to obtain a full picture of how public services 
are being delivered. 
This process is often referred to as an ‘erosion of mandate’ and cited as the 
reasoning behind the need for amendments to auditing legislation. The need 
to close such accountability gaps has been highlighted by auditors-general 
for many years, and has been well documented in the literature (see Funnell 
1997, 2003). In a report commissioned by the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office, 
Robertson (2009, p. 14) argued that the mandates of Auditors-General, ‘should, 
12 . Cross-Jurisdictional Performance Audits
393
de facto, be empowered to audit the use of public moneys, resources, or assets by 
any recipient or beneficiary regardless of its legal nature’, and that any ability to 
‘circumvent’ those powers ultimately undermines their purpose.
In Australia, requests to close this gap had been refused by successive 
governments (Barrett 2010), and even when access came it proceeded only 
incrementally. For example, GBEs were not audited until the most recent 
amendments in 2011. However, as Barrett (2010, p. 272) explains, ‘even with 
reasonable access to premises and records, there is limited opportunity for 
performance auditors to establish ‘value’ either in the delivery processes or in 
the outcomes being achieved’.
Cooperative performance audits 
Cooperative performance audits are an emerging concept in government auditing 
as a way to address inter-jurisdictional issues. Only limited academic and gray 
literature can be found on the subject, typically on government and professional 
association websites, or as the performance audit reports themselves. Initial 
reviews of the available documents reveal an inconsistency in cooperative audit 
terminology by various SAIs and academics, so the emphasis here is placed 
primarily on two guidance documents obtained from INTOSAI (1998, 2007). 
Several working definitions of the types of cooperative audits are drawn out, 
and are applied in a performance audit context.
A cooperative performance audit can be defined as an audit involving two 
or more audit institutions (INTOSAI 2007).5 There are three main types of 
cooperative audit including concurrent, coordinated, and joint, with each 
involving varying degrees of cooperation between the audit institutions 
involved and outlined below. 
• Concurrent audits: Also known as parallel audits, a concurrent audit can be 
defined as an audit conducted simultaneously by two or more audit agencies, 
after agreeing on a common issue to audit. Concurrent audits use separate 
audit teams from each agency and table separate reports only to their own 
legislature. The findings and recommendations contained in the reports are 
only those relevant to the agency’s own government. The independence of 
each agency involved in a concurrent audit means that each may adopt a 
different audit approach, including different criteria, scope, and methods, in 
order to accommodate the needs of each jurisdiction. The extent of ideas and 
experiences exchange often varies.
5 Some audit agencies and organisations use the term ‘collaborative’ in place of ‘cooperative’. For the 
purposes of consistency, this report will refer to ‘cooperative audits’ as the catch-all term.
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• Coordinated audits: A coordinated audit falls somewhere in between 
concurrent and joint audits, and in practice tend to have a wide variety of 
configurations. Often there is some kind of collaboration in the planning 
stages of the audit, but agencies still operate with separate audit teams. 
Other examples include a joint team with separate reports, or concurrent 
audits with joint and individual reports.
• Joint audits: A joint audit is an audit conducted by a single audit team 
composed of auditors from two or more audit agencies. A joint audit involves 
a much greater degree of involvement between the two agencies and results in 
preparing a single audit report tabled in the legislatures of each participating 
jurisdiction. In practice, joint audits are rare. 
Based on guidelines from INTOSAI (1998, 2007), these variations can be best 
illustrated on a spectrum from less to more cooperation, as presented in Figure 
9. There are various audit elements that offices can cooperate on, including 
audit planning, developing criteria and methodology, sharing information, and 
sharing audit activities (such as client interviews or report writing). As more of 
these elements are shared, the more integrated the cooperation becomes. 
Interest in cooperative auditing arose primarily out of the desire of SAIs to 
audit compliance with international environmental accords and other treaties 
and agreements that span multiple jurisdictions. For the agencies involved, 
‘cooperative audits facilitate mutual sharing and learning, capacity building, 
networking, and identification of best practices’ (INTOSAI 2007, p. ix). At the 
same time, cooperative audits may offer a more complete picture of the issue 
or program examined by including information about performance from other 
jurisdictions that would otherwise be left out of a traditional audit — sometimes 
described as an ‘end-to-end’ audit (McPhee 2012). 
Figure 9: Cooperative auditing from less to more integration
Source: Author’s research.
The opportunities of cooperative audits outlined by INTOSAI and some auditors-
general are echoed in the few academic articles that were located in the literature. 
Van Leeuwen (2004) argues that joint audits are the preferred approach because 
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they have the potential for better quality and impact than a single audit alone. 
Likewise, Mayne (2010, p. 4) believes that joint approaches make the most sense 
when auditing federal-provincial programs in Canada, because ‘this matches 
how the programs are being delivered and would be a more cost-effective way 
of auditing the joint program than having separate federal and provincial audits 
being undertaken, likely at different points in time’. 
In his writing about auditing in Australia, Nicoll (2005, p. 70) observed that the 
lack of joint audits was ‘surprising given the potential benefits to all levels of 
administration from cooperation in planning, especially in light of the limited 
resources available for performance auditing and the importance of services 
funded through these programs’.
There are also challenges associated with cooperative audits, many of which 
have been identified by auditors after taking part in cooperative audits. Mayne 
(2010, p. 4) admits that performance audit practices can vary significantly 
among audit offices, making cooperative work challenging, not to mention the 
value placed on independence by audit agencies, which is ‘tightly guarded’.
When choosing a type of cooperative audit to undertake, INTOSAI guidelines 
recommend that primary consideration should be given to the availability 
of resources and time, the competency and experience of staff, and general 
knowledge base of each agency. The approach used also might depend on the 
topic of the audit and the priorities of each jurisdiction. While concurrent audits 
only require enough consultation between audit offices to set a topic, scope, 
and possibly a rough timeline, this approach lacks integrated conclusions, 
and therefore may have less impact for legislators. In contrast, joint audits are 
comprehensive, integrated, and have the potential for significant impacts; but 
there are many practical challenges stemming from jurisdictional differences. 
Finally, coordinated approaches are the most flexible, and can be altered to 
suit the degree of integration desired by both parties. Ultimately, successful 
cooperative audits require the commitment of both jurisdictions because 
‘whatever type of audit is chosen, the parties involved must have a sincere desire 
to cooperate with one another for a common purpose’ (INTOSAI 1998, p. 19).
Cross-jurisdictional performance audits
In the most general sense, a cross-jurisdictional performance audit (CJPA) can be 
defined as an audit conducted by a single audit agency of an entity that lay 
outside the audit agency’s typical jurisdiction. This type of audit can be used 
to assess the performance of an entity in receipt of government funding where 
there is a corresponding or reciprocal responsibility to deliver specified outcomes 
in accordance with agreed arrangements, such as financial transfers, grants, or 
contracts (ANAO 2012a). This can apply to non-governmental organisations, private 
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contractors and sub-contractors, publicly owned companies, as well as national and 
sub-national governments — depending on the mandate granted to the auditor. 
The term ‘cross-jurisdictional performance audit’ was developed by the researcher 
to use in place of ‘follow-the-money’ audits in order to emphasise the jurisdictional 
element involved in this type of application of performance audit.
Though there is little explicit reference in the academic literature to CJPAs 
in the context of sub-national governments, gray literature indicates they do 
occur. Pinpointing cases of CJPAs where a national audit agency is accessing 
jurisdictions already covered by sub-national auditors-general has been 
difficult, however this process will be reported in later sections of this chapter. 
When compared to cooperative audits, CJPAs of sub-national governments 
are another way to address issues shared between levels of government. The 
main difference is that there is little, if any, formal cooperation with other audit 
agencies in undertaking audit work in a government jurisdiction outside of its 
own. However, despite any formal agreements or involvement of a second audit 
agency in the conduct of CJPAs, there is still space for consultation and sharing 
of information between the auditors-general and the audit offices, depending 
upon the willingness of the other office to cooperate. 
Examinations of preliminary ANAO documents suggest that CJPAs will involve 
at least some consultation or contact with the audit agency representing the 
audited jurisdiction. For example, in a recent presentation, the Commonwealth 
Auditor-General stated his intent to consider ‘the views of the JCPAA and other 
stakeholders, including those in state and territory jurisdictions’ (McPhee 
2012b, p. 5). He also suggested the possibility of ‘utilising the expertise of the 
state and territory Auditors-General and participation in state and territory 
Parliamentary inquiries’ (McPhee 2012b, p. 5).
Summary 
This section provided a review of the literature relating to key areas of 
performance audit theory and practice considered most relevant to this study. 
The literature on the origins, development and expansion of performance audit 
clearly illustrate how the practice developed alongside the reforms of NPM, and 
that it represented one part of a greater shift in perspective on accountability in 
the public sector. At the same time, these changes have also impacted the Auditor-
General’s ability to provide such assurance, and therefore constant review of the 
mandate and governing legislation is necessary to ensure appropriate access is 
provided.
Due to the network of relationships that an auditor-general is typically subject 
to, it is not surprising that the practice of performance audit also operates within 
a system of constraints. The primary stakeholder relationships of the Auditor-
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General can all have an influence on performance audit, and likewise they can 
themselves be influenced by a performance audit. This network of influences 
means that changes to any one part of the system are likely to have implications 
for the other parts.
New trends in performance audit, such as CJPAs or follow-the-money powers, 
as well as more cooperative approaches amongst audit offices, are on the rise 
in order to address areas identified as gaps in accountability and oversight and 
show promising potential for improving performance audit impacts and public 
administration more broadly.
Informed by the literature review, a conceptual framework is set out in Figure 
10 to help guide this study. Drawing on Pollitt et al. (1999) and Van Looke 
and Put (2011), the framework has been modified to include other potential 
relationships which may be affected with the addition of CJPAs. The framework 
depicts the relationships of influence on the performance audit process at the 
ANAO, as well as the outward influence that performance audits can have on the 
broader organisational environment. 
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Figure 10: Cross-jurisdictional performance auditing at the ANAO: Process 
and influences
Source: Adapted from Pollitt et al. 1999, and Van Loocke and Put 2011.
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Methodology
The research design for this study relied on a qualitative methodology consisting 
of three discreet approaches including a jurisdictional scan, interviews, and an 
online survey. 
The jurisdictional scan identifies other national audit agencies that have 
experience in the conduct of CJPAs or cooperative performance audits and to 
gain insight into how they are applied and how often. 
Semi-structured elite interviews were conducted with key stakeholders and 
selected experts in the field of public sector audit or involvement in the JCPAA 
Inquiry, including six current and two former auditors-general in Australia, 
the Chair of the JCPAA, the Committee Secretary of the JCPAA, and two senior 
audit office personnel (see Appendix 1). The aim of the interviews was to explore 
Australian perspectives on the new CJPA powers as well the various cooperative 
performance audit alternatives. 
An online survey of national audit agencies was conducted to solicit international 
perspectives on the advantages and disadvantages of CJPAs and cooperative 
performance audits.6 
Data collected from each of the three approaches is analysed together to arrive 
at a comprehensive and well-balanced assessment of the issues central to this 
study, and is presented later in this chapter.
International jurisdictional scan
The jurisdictional scan determines whether other national audit agencies 
were involved in CJPAs or other cooperative approaches to address inter-
jurisdictional audit issues. The goal is to identify good practices to consider. The 
literature review establishes working definitions for CJPAs and the three types 
of cooperative audits, and these definitions are used to analyse the findings from 
the jurisdictional scan.
6 More detail on interview and survey methodology, including a list of draft interview questions and online 
survey questions, can be found in the original full-length report (Gerald 2012).
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Canada: Cooperative audits with sub-national audit 
agencies
The responsibility for external public audit in Canada rests with the Office of 
the Auditor-General, while all provincial governments have their own external 
auditors general. While the Auditor-General of Canada may have some follow-
the-money powers, communications with office staff have confirmed that 
CJPAs are not conducted by the federal Office of the Auditor-General in any 
areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of provincial or municipal governments. 
Though federal audits of the territories do occur, they are not considered to 
be CJPAs because the Office of the Auditor-General is actually mandated as the 
responsible external auditor in for the territories, as they do not have their own 
auditors general.
Although no instances of joint audits were identified in Canada, 12 instances 
of concurrent audits occurred (18 including follow-up audits), either between 
the federal Office of the Auditor-General and provincial audit offices or amongst 
provincial offices. 
United States: CJPAs through a federal lens
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is the public sector auditor 
for the US federal government, while each of the states also has their own 
independent audit offices. The GAO has a clear mandate to conduct CJPAs of 
state government administration in cases of federal transfers, but they are not 
undertaken that often, and typically only in cases where there is a substantial 
federal involvement (personal communication, GAO, 28 October 2012). When 
GAO audit staff examine a federally funded program such as education or work 
training programs, ‘it is through the lens that focuses on how those goals may 
differ from federal goals and how that performance needs to be improved … 
from a federal perspective’ (personal communication, GAO, 28 October 2012). 
While the GAO may have a real interest in how states are spending federal funds, 
it is clear that their assessments are focused on how well federal departments are 
managing their state-level contractors or agents, and does not extend to include 
any assessment of state-level performance.
The GAO indicated that direct involvement of state audit offices in CJPAs is 
rare, and limited to consultation and coordination activities to ensure they are 
not duplicating audit work (personal communication, GAO, 29 October 2012). A 
representative explained that the GAO is much larger size and resource capability 
than most state audit offices, and therefore it makes more sense that CJPAs do 
not draw on the resources of the state level auditors (personal communication, 
GAO, 29 October 2012).
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Cooperative audits with the state level audit offices do occur, on occasion, 
relating to topics that are of mutual concern. The only involvement in an 
international cooperative performance audit that could be identified was an 
audit on invasive species undertaken in 2003 in partnership with the Office of 
the Auditor General in Canada.
United Kingdom: An integrated, joint audit approach 
to CJPAs
The external public auditor for the United Kingdom is the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General, an independent officer of the House of Commons supported 
by the National Audit Office (NAO). On occasion, the NAO conducts CJPAs 
of the devolved governments of Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, 
although each of these also has their own independent auditors general. Since 
funding transfers from the UK government to the devolved governments are 
not conditional, these CJPAs are not for the purposes of assessing performance 
against national objectives (since there are none), and instead are used for the 
purposes of performance comparison across the four countries of the UK (Paun 
and Hazell 2008). Typically these CJPAs involve active collaboration with the 
audit offices of the devolved governments, allowing the NAO to draw on their 
resources and expertise while at the same time providing them a role in the 
process. 
Occasionally, the NAO undertakes joint audits with the Audit Commission, the 
external public auditor for local government in England and Wales (personal 
communication, NAO, 16 October 2012).7 In these cases the two agencies come 
together to examine conditional grants provided from the UK government 
directly to local governments in England of Wales, which are attached to UK 
government outcomes.8 Similar to their CJPA approach, the NAO draws upon 
the expertise and local knowledge of the Audit Commission. 
The NAO has been involved in cooperative audits in the past, but the only 
recent one that could be identified was a concurrent audit in 2000, with the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and England (personal communication, NAO, 16 October 
2012). Apart from this example, no other international cooperative audits with 
the NAO could be located.
7 At the present time, the future of the Audit Commission in England is unclear, following a decision 
by the UK Department for Communities and Local Government to disband it. For more information please 
visit: http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/. Audit oversight for local government in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland is provided by their national audit offices respectively.
8 For example, in 2005 a joint audit was undertaken in with the Audit Commission entitled, ‘Delivery Chain 
Analysis for Bus Service in England’, where a joint audit team comprised of members from both the NAO and 
the Audit Commission worked together to produce a single joint report.
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Norway: Unrestricted access from a unitary 
perspective
The initial review of Norway revealed that it does not operate under a federal 
system of government, but rather as a multi-tiered government based on a 
unitary constitution (Boadway and Shah 2007). This means that ultimate control 
for government functions rests with the central government, and responsibilities 
can be delegated to lower levels by means of legislation. Norway’s national 
public auditor is known as the Riksrevisjonen, or the Office of the Auditor-
General of Norway, but it is not responsible for providing oversight to the local 
governments because they each have their own requirements for an external 
public audit function. Nevertheless, the Office of the Auditor-General can 
conduct CJPAs of financial transfers to local governments at their discretion 
when the funds are tied to specific national policies, and these audits do not 
have any involvement from the local audit agencies. Provisions for such audits 
are enshrined in the Office of the Auditor-General’s governing legislation, which 
provides the right to access information and carry out investigations of anyone, 
‘to whom central government tasks have been delegated or who supply goods or 
services to the state’ (Riksrevisjonen 2011, p. 16). 
Cooperative audits in Norway were identified, typically between the Office of 
the Auditor-General and other Nordic countries, and relating to environmental 
issues. However, more recently a concurrent audit with Russia relating to the 
management of fish resources was conducted in 2008.
Switzerland: CJPAs with a role for sub-national 
cooperation
The Swiss Federal Audit Office is the independent federal public auditor of 
Switzerland. The Federal Audit Office’s mandate allows for CJPAs to be conducted 
of the sovereign cantons (state governments), in areas where federal financial aid 
has been provided. The mandate also recommends that the cantonal level audit 
offices should be involved in any CJPA, but that such audits are to be led by the 
Federal Audit Office, and duties can be delegated at their discretion. The Federal 
Audit Office reports a high degree of cooperation with the canton level audit 
offices in this regard, which suggests that there might be advantages to working 
with the sub-national audit offices in the CJPA process in order to share the 
workload, access their specified knowledge base, and take advantage of their 
existing relationships with audit subjects. The Swiss case therefore provides 
a good example of how to integrate sub-national audit agencies into the CJPA 
process.
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Few cooperative audits were located for the Swiss Federal Audit Office, however 
one concurrent audit with Hungary was located from 2005 concerning tunnel 
and bridge infrastructure.
Germany: Cooperation with respect for autonomy
The federal external public audit function in Germany rests with the Federal 
Court of Audit, the Bundesrechnungshof, while each of the 16 autonomous 
Länder (state governments) also have their own independent audit agencies. 
The Bundesrechnungshof has legislated powers to conduct CJPAs of the Länder 
governments in cases where ‘they implement parts of the federal budget 
or have expenses reimbursed from the federal exchequer, if they manage 
federal funds or assets, or if they receive grants from the federal exchequer’ 
(Bundesrechnungshof 1997, p. 7). 
However, since tax revenues are shared in Germany, many programs are funded 
jointly by the federal and state governments, which result in overlaps in 
responsibility. In these cases the public auditors at each level of government 
must cooperate with one another to ‘seek harmonization on fundamental issues’ 
(Bundesrechnungshof 2012). This harmonisation is enshrined in the federal 
audit legislation, which refers specifically to joint audits and clarifies that 
‘where both the Bundesrechnungshof and a State Court of Audit are responsible 
for the audit, this should be carried out jointly’ (German Federal Budget Code, 
Part V, Sec. 93, Art. 1). 
While the joint approach is enshrined in legislation, the same legislation also 
states that ‘the Bundesrechnungshof may agree to transfer any of its audit 
functions to the State Courts of Audit’, and ‘may also agree to take over audit 
functions from the State Courts of Audit’, which provides the federal auditor 
with the maximum flexibility to address shared issues relating to jointly 
delivered programs, and adjust the workload to accommodate one another’s 
priorities.
The Bundesrechnungshof has also been involved in cooperative audits with 
other SAIs, the most recent of which was conducted with the SAIs of Belgium 
and the Netherlands on intra-community value-added tax fraud.
Austria, South Africa and India: A national approach
Reviews of Austria, South Africa and India reveal that while their political 
arrangements as federal systems had much in common with Australia, their 
public sector audit function did not. All three of these countries have only 
one national auditor-general responsible for auditing the entire public sector, 
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including national and sub-national government departments and agencies. 
Rather than having independent sub-national level auditors-general, the 
national audit-offices have regional offices across each country’s sub-national 
districts that specialise in auditing their regional and local affairs. As a result, 
CJPAs of sub-national jurisdictions in these cases are not possible in the same 
way as they are in Australia, as they do not have same complicating factors of 
sub-national sovereignty and sub-national audit jurisdictions. 
In terms of cooperative audits, Austria and South Africa have both been involved 
with cooperative performance audits with other SAIs relating to environmental 
issues. Most recently Austria has been involved with an audit on climate change 
with several other European countries (WGEA 2012). Cooperative audits 
involving India and other SAIs were unable to be located. 
Summary
The jurisdictional scan and resulting cases reveal several important findings. 
First, the conduct of CJPAs is not entirely uncommon internationally. Second, 
there is a wide variation in how sub-national audit agencies can be integrated 
into the CJPA process. Some countries, such as Norway, do not provide any 
role for sub-national auditors, while others such as Germany actually make 
cooperation between audit offices mandatory. Switzerland and the US appear to 
take a more flexible and voluntary approach to sub-national involvement, while 
retaining the control of the audit. At the extremes, Canada does not conduct any 
CJPAs of its provinces, while the UK has opted for the most integrated approach 
of joint audits with the local government Audit Commission, consisting of joint 
audit teams and a single joint report.
The occurrence of cooperative audits was also found to a varying degree 
across the jurisdictions examined. Canada is of particular note with respect to 
frequency of concurrent audits. 
Interviews
This section reviews the findings from interviews conducted with 12 key 
individuals possessing specialised knowledge about public sector audit in 
Australia.9 For a list of participants see Appendix 1. Responses have been 
summarised and any direct quotes that have been included are not attributed 
9 One interview included two participants — the Commonwealth Auditor-General and the senior ANAO 
staff member — and their responses have been considered as one, reducing the total number of interviews 
to 11.
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due to the small sample size and the high-profile roles of those interviewed. 
Responses were organised by key themes that emerged following data analysis 
and only those most relevant to the current study are reported below.
Cross-jurisdictional performance audits
The majority of participants viewed the new CJPA powers as a valuable addition 
to the Commonwealth Auditor-General’s mandate, however, a few stated that 
this was so long as these powers were not used to assess the states and territories 
themselves. Several commented that the mere possession of the new powers 
gave the Commonwealth Auditor-General more clout, suggesting that their 
looming threat will be enough to foment changes to both federal and state level 
management practices. As one participant explained, people have now been 
‘put on notice’ that the federal auditor may come to examine their practices.
Participants highlighted a variety of potential benefits that will flow from the 
conduct of CJPAs, including the ability to tell the full story about how financial 
transfers are managed, the ability to provide proper assurance to Parliament, 
and the opportunity to compare and contrast the delivery approaches of 
the states and territories. Several also suggested that the new powers would 
mark the beginning of improved relationships amongst all auditors-general 
in Australia, both through the increased consultation required for CJPAs and 
through stimulation of debate about a possible return to exploring cooperative 
audit approaches.
Most participants viewed follow-the-money powers more generally as an 
important tool for all auditors-general in Australia, describing them as a way 
to ‘catch up’ or ‘keep in step’ with changes in public management. At the same 
time, almost half of participants admitted that they felt they were unable to 
oppose the new powers because they had already advocated for the states and 
territories to have those same powers, explaining that it might be hypocritical 
not to support the changes and difficult to argue against the proposal in terms 
of good public policy and governance.
Cooperative audits
References to cooperative audit approaches, either in addition to CJPAs, or as 
an alternative to them, arose frequently in all interviews. More than half of all 
participants suggested that the Commonwealth Auditor-General should have 
both approaches at his disposal, representing another tool in the toolkit, to be 
used depending upon the context and circumstances. 
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Despite overwhelming interest in the cooperative audit approach, participants 
pointed to several barriers that remain before more work can be done in this area, 
including legislation limitations, priority conflicts, and timing of performance 
audit cycles. Legislation issues cited by more than half of the participants relate 
to limitations on information sharing between audit offices.10 A few participants 
pointed out that their audit legislation is currently under review to allow for 
more cooperation, while others suggested that there are already ways to work 
around these issues. Differing priorities and performance audit cycles were 
indicated as impediments because, as one participant explained, ‘just trying 
to get agreement, you know, in very good faith, between all the jurisdictions, 
around a suitable topic, is not easy to do.’ 
Joint audits
The joint audit approach was strongly supported by half of participants. One 
cited it as an ‘aspiration’, one as the ‘preferred approach’, while yet another 
stated that it ‘made an enormous amount of sense’ for the average citizen, who is 
not concerned with the jurisdiction of an audit so long as they find out whether 
there is value being achieved for their tax dollar. Supporters of joint audits 
identified several advantages to its integrated approach, including the ability to 
pool resources and leverage expertise using a joint audit team. 
Other participants identified barriers to joint audits, including information 
sharing restrictions, and administrative and personnel issues that could arise 
when composing an inter-jurisdictional team. Questions about which legislation 
team members would work under, which set of rules would they be held 
accountable to, and by whom they would be paid, were all identified. Others 
downplayed these concerns, explaining that many offices already support 
secondments, exchange programs and other arrangements, so administratively 
they would find solutions.
The nature of federal transfers
The most prominent area of disagreement amongst participants concerned the 
true meaning of the federal transfers, and how they are or should be perceived 
in the context of Australian federalism and the current vertical-fiscal imbalance. 
10 One participant summarised the issue as follows: ‘The ability for audit offices to share information 
is a good thing from an audit perspective, but it’s another thing for governments and parliaments to be 
comfortable with that, because you need to appreciate that on the one hand, auditors-general have got quite 
wide powers of access — for instance we have access to Cabinet information, and other information — and 
so, if you just have sort of a sharing provision … that suggests an auditor could pass on information about 
sensitive government matters to one of their colleagues … and parliaments are sort of saying we need to think 
very carefully about how any such provisions are framed.’
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On the one extreme, some participants pointed to the states and territories as 
simply agents of the Commonwealth when in receipt of the federal transfers, 
rendering them no different from any other contractor, private or otherwise. As 
one participant put it: ‘grants are grants … I don’t think there should be any 
equivocation about that’. On the other extreme, some participants pointed to the 
transfers as merely flows of revenue back to the states and territories, which had 
been collected by the Commonwealth on their behalf. As one explained: ‘it’s not 
actually a payment for buying a particular item of activity’. Participants with 
the latter view seemed to suggest that these monies were somehow different 
in that once transferred to the states and territories, they became state and 
territory money and therefore only subject to audit in the state jurisdiction. 
The remaining participants fell somewhere in the middle, admitting they did 
not fully understand how the money transformed once it changed hands or how 
the accountability mechanisms attached to the transfers would change.
Key stakeholder impacts
The majority of participants referred to the state and territory governments 
as being ‘suspicious’ of the new powers, and described them as ‘concerned’, 
‘threatened’, ‘worried’, ‘apprehensive’ or ‘uncomfortable’ about the prospect of 
their implementation. While most participants expected this initial resistance 
to CJPAs by state and territory governments, most believed that it was unlikely 
they would ever pursue a constitutional challenge over their use. Most 
participants anticipated the eventual socialisation and acceptance of the new 
process and that concern would begin to diminish as the ANAO develops its 
credibility and legitimacy through practice. Relationship management through 
consultation, education and sharing of information were cited as several 
participants as the best strategies to minimise negative impacts on the state and 
territory governments.
An overwhelming majority of participants felt that there was a role for state 
and territory auditors-general in the conduct of CJPAs, primarily through 
consultation, information exchange, and the sharing of previous experiences 
in the subject area, such as background information, previous audit reports or 
risk analysis that might have already been conducted on that particular agency. 
However, there were also a few participants who believed that any involvement 
in CJPAs would simply divert scarce resources away from state and territory 
auditors-general.
Challenges to CJPA implementation
The majority of participants identified the same key challenges to the 
implementation of CJPAs including the ANAO’s unfamiliarity with state and 
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territory systems and administration; potential relationship issues with their 
bureaucracies; and potential retaliation from state and territory governments if 
a CJPA is deemed to be too politically sensitive. One participant explained that 
‘state government activities are not their bread and butter so they will have 
difficulty efficiently doing those audits as they gain an understanding of the 
environment and operating area’.
Similarly, almost half of participants identified building and managing 
relationships with the state and territory bureaucracies as another major 
challenge to CJPAs, characterising the potential for turf wars, rivalries, 
obstruction, push-back, and interference. One participant explained that 
there will always be a ‘political issue around a national office auditing a state 
agency’ that will not easily be accepted by the states and territories without 
a concentrated communications campaign directed at their departments and 
agencies.
A few participants also identified resourcing as an issue, explaining that 
securing resources for a CJPA would be a challenge since state and territory 
level parliaments would have difficulty understanding why their resources were 
being diverted towards the conduct of an audit for the Commonwealth.
Details on the CJPA process
All participants surveyed unanimously agreed that in a CJPA, the state and 
territory auditees should be extended the same privileges of natural justice as 
those given to Commonwealth auditees, including copies of draft issues papers, 
an opportunity to respond to the issues papers, as well as the inclusion of their 
response (or a summary) in the final report. Participants spoke to these features 
as important to ensure audit quality and credibility. The majority of participants 
also indicated that CJPA reports should only be tabled in the Commonwealth 
Parliament.
More than half of the interview participants indicated that they did not feel 
it was appropriate for the Commonwealth Auditor-General to make direct 
recommendations to state and territory entities. However, they did support 
indirect recommendations so long as they are framed as recommendations to the 
responsible Commonwealth departments. This distinction, they explained, is 
because ‘the Commonwealth should be accountable for their officials discharging 
their obligations’, and that CJPAs are really meant to be about ‘looking at the 
Commonwealth administration, oversight and monitoring of the states and 
not necessarily the delivery by the states of the services’. Three participants 
said it would simply not be possible to hold a state agency to account in the 
Commonwealth and so there was no point in making a recommendation to them. 
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In contrast, a few participants stated that direct recommendations should be 
made to the state and territory agencies involved in a CJPA. One noted that, ‘if 
you see opportunities where they might make improvement, it seems to me that 
it would be a bit unusual not to’, while another suggested they do so only after 
a couple of years of putting CJPAs into practice.
Summary
Data collected through the interviews uncovered several important insights. 
While participants generally viewed the new CJPA powers as a positive addition 
to the Commonwealth Auditor-General’s mandate, some felt that CJPAs should 
not reach so far as to assess state and territory performance. The conduct of 
CJPAs is anticipated to impact state and territory stakeholders the most, but 
also the ANAO as they adjust to the addition of a new audit program. Several 
challenges to the implementation of CJPAs were highlighted, but none seemed 
insurmountable by the ANAO so long as they are proactive in their approach. 
Most participants showed a high degree of interest in pursuing cooperative 
audits, and although most admit these involve more work, time and resources, it 
was generally agreed that the benefits of these approaches are worth the effort. 
Survey
Findings from the online survey are summarised into two categories, including 
those that relate to CJPAs and those that relate to cooperative performance audits. 
The nine audit agencies that responded to the survey and key information about 
their performance audit practices are summarised in Table 1.
Cross-jurisdictional performance audits
Of the nine audit agencies who responded to the survey, all indicated that 
they have conducted CJPAs of other levels of government, except for Mexico 
and Ireland. Canada explained that they only do so in the case of their three 
territory governments because they do not have their own auditors general. 
Similarly, New Zealand indicated they are the only public sector auditor and 
therefore are responsible for auditing all public sector entities, including the 
local authorities. The Netherlands clarified that they do not have an official 
mandate to access the sub-national departments and agencies, but instead their 
involvement is voluntary. Overall, the responses suggested that involvement by 
sub-national audit agencies in the CJPA processes is typically limited, although 
two agencies did report closer involvement (the UK and Switzerland).
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Several challenges to conducting CJPAs were reported, including difficulties 
in accessing information, variations in agency capacity and expertise, more 
time consuming process, and differences in timing and scheduling. However, 
respondents also identified a range of opportunities associated with CJPAs, 
including the ability to examine the full picture of national spending, improved 
audit impacts, the ability to compare performance across multiple jurisdictions, 
and occasions to improve relationships with other audit agencies.
Cooperative performance audits
Seven participants indicated they have taken part in some form of cooperative 
performance audit, with two stating they have experience with all three (UK, 
The Netherlands), while others (Canada) were involved in only the concurrent 
variety. Only New Zealand and Mexico stated that they had not been involved 
in cooperative audits, but that they would like to in the future. 
Most participants stated that the biggest challenge to cooperative audits is 
that the process can take longer and involves a large degree of coordination 
and consultation between the agencies involved at each of the performance 
audit phases. However, despite these challenges, respondents identified many 
opportunities that arise from cooperative audits, again supporting the ability to 
see the complete picture, improve impacts of the audit, as well as the advantages 
of pooling knowledge and expertise from two audit agencies.
Summary
The key results from the online survey have been summarised into Table 1.
Table 1: Online survey summary: International CJPA and cooperative audit 
practices
CJPA of 
other level of 
government?
Involvement of audit 








No, OAGNZ is the only audit 
agency (i .e . no local gov . 
auditor)
No N/A







No, OAG is only audit office, 
none in the territories Yes Concurrent
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CJPA of 
other level of 
government?
Involvement of audit 












No Yes All three




Norway Yes No Yes Concurrent, coordinated
Mexico No N/A No N/A
Ireland No N/A Yes Coordinated
Switzerland Yes
Yes, through information 
exchange; optional 
involvement
Yes Coordinated and joint
*In August 2010, the UK government announced its intention to abolish the Audit Commission, which was the 
agency responsible for auditing local government spending. As of 24 September 2012, the NAO website reports 
that the new audit arrangements will see the NAO not auditing the performance of individual local authorities, 
but producing a number of value for money reports each year on issues affecting the sector. However, it should 
be noted that the participant responding on behalf of the UK did so relative to past practices. 
Discussion
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the impacts of the addition of CJPA 
powers to the mandate of the Commonwealth Auditor-General for Australia, 
which allows for audits to be conducted of states and territories when in receipt 
of federal transfers with attached Commonwealth objectives or outcomes. The 
assessment of impacts is conducted with a view to external stakeholders and 
internal considerations of the performance audit process at the ANAO, as well as 
consideration of cooperative approaches to performance audit as an alternative 
or additional approach to the ANAO’s overall mix of audit activities. 
This section includes a discussion of the implications of the key interview 
and survey findings in the context of the background, literature review, 
and jurisdictional scan, and is organised into three main parts: the first part 
discusses the implications of the findings relating to CJPAs and their impact 
on the various stakeholders identified throughout this study; the second part 
discusses the implications of key findings associated with cooperative audits; 
the third part summarises the overall discussion.
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Cross-jurisdictional performance audits
Overall, the interview data was consistent with the information presented in 
the background section with respect to the anticipated concerns about the 
introduction of CJPA powers. Participants tended to view the addition of CJPA 
powers as a valuable tool for the Commonwealth Auditor-General because it 
will allow him to conduct end-to-end performance audits of federal transfers to 
states and territories, and provide Parliament with the full story in their final 
report. According to the interview data, the impacts of this power will also have 
effects further afield, since the mere possession of CJPA access effectively puts 
the states and territories on notice for a possible audit from the Commonwealth 
auditor, and this might encourage state and territory agencies to tighten up 
some of their practices in advance of any announced audits, in the same way 
that this can occur with federal auditees.
The interview data has also made it clear that there are many differences in 
opinion and understanding of the nature of the federal transfers that take place 
under SPPs and NPPs and that these underlying differences may be at the root of 
the disagreements over the conduct of CJPAs. For example, several participants 
referred to the transfers as being a payment for a service, equivalent to the 
exchange that takes place with a contractor. At the same time, several other 
participants indicated that they perceived the transfers as a redistribution of tax 
revenue collected by the Commonwealth on behalf of the states and territories, 
and that these transfers are not actually a payment for a service, but instead 
merely a flow of revenue. So clearly there remains some confusion as to the 
status of the federal financial transfers and the interview data seems to support 
this notion that one’s perspective on the value of CJPAs is dependent upon what 
jurisdiction you represent. It is in this vein that it appears easier to rationalise 
the practice of CJPAs of sub-national governments in countries such as Norway, 
the Netherlands, and the UK, since they take place within unitary systems 
where sub-national governments really are more like service delivery conduits 
for national policy as opposed to the independent, autonomous units that are 
present in federations such as Australia.
Interview findings were also consistent with the literature on the issue of 
‘erosion of mandate’ of auditors-general, which refers to the loss or impairment 
of an auditor-general’s ability to assess or provide assurance of public sector 
performance in cases where services have been contracted out of the government 
sector and into either private or non-profit organisations. More than half of the 
interview participants indicated that follow-the-money powers in general were 
critical to ensuring auditors-general can continue to assess performance in these 
cases, because ultimately governments are still responsible for the provision 
of public services, despite their being outsourced. However, the conflation of 
the various types of cross-jurisdictional access into one access power — the 
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ability to audit any Commonwealth partner — also made it difficult for many 
of the auditors-general to oppose the amendments, particularly when they had 
advocated for these powers in their own mandates. The interview data shows 
that although most participants supported CJPAs or follow-the-money audits of 
third parties, including local governments, NGOs and private businesses, several 
had indicated that they were less certain about CJPAs of states and territories, 
due to the impacts this might have on their autonomy.
Finally, more than half of those interviewed felt that that while the Commonwealth 
Auditor-General should have sufficient oversight powers, external audits exist to 
provide oversight; the intent is not to scrutinise all Commonwealth government 
operations. Strong internal assurance and accountability mechanisms must 
be built in to all government operations and managed from the inside, with 
the external auditor reviewing them from time to time to assess if they are in 
need of improvement. Most interview participants suggested that the overall 
accountability framework of the Commonwealth could be best strengthened 
through the COAG forum, particularly the COAG Reform Council and the National 
Partnership Agreements. Improving the clarity and roles and responsibilities in 
these agreements could help bring about better value for money spending and 
ultimately improved state and territory outcomes. 
Impacts of CJPAs on external stakeholders
The process of performance audit was identified in the literature as being both 
influenced by, and having an influence on the various stakeholder relationships 
of the Auditor-General (Pollitt et al. 1999; Lonsdale 2008; Lonsdale et al. 2011). 
The importance of these relationships was generally supported in the interview 
data, which suggested that a change in the Auditor-General’s mandate, such 
as the addition of the CJPA power, will have flow-on effects for a variety of 
external stakeholders, particularly state and territory auditors-general, state 
and territory governments, and state and territory auditees — each of which is 
discussed below. Regular stakeholders of the Commonwealth Auditor-General 
will be impacted to a lesser extent, and are discussed all together in one final 
paragraph.
One of the most impacted stakeholder groups discussed in the interviews is 
that of the state and territory auditors-general. For the most part, impacts were 
considered to be positive, in that CJPAs could promote partnerships amongst 
auditors-general through added consultation and information sharing, placing 
the state and territory auditors-general in a supportive role particularly at the 
front end of the audit planning process. Likewise, several interview participants 
suggested that CJPAs are likely to act as a catalyst to promote a renewed interest 
in cooperative approaches to performance audit, ultimately impacting the 
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topic selection activities of all audit offices. There were also concerns about 
diverting state and territory resources to consult and provide information to 
the Commonwealth Auditor-General. Whether this would divert more priorities 
than requests from an MP or JCPAA to investigate a particular matter is an open 
question. 
A second group of impacted stakeholders are the state and territory executive 
coordinators and central agencies. Interview participants generally felt that 
the reaction of the state and territory governments to the CJPA powers was 
not positive, and that they felt threatened, worried or apprehensive about the 
prospects. Not surprisingly, the state and territory governments have perceived 
this process as an infringement on their constitutional rights as sovereign and 
autonomous political units. On the other hand, as one interview participant 
pointed out, this type of vocal reaction is actually business as usual when it 
comes to Commonwealth‒state relations, and perhaps this sentiment should not 
be interpreted as seriously as it was earlier in the process. In fact, most interview 
participants indicated that that they did not expect anything to come of the 
threats of constitutional challenges — unless, as two participants indicated, 
the topic was politically sensitive enough. Once CJPAs begin to occur, so long 
as they are not overly contentious, they will gradually begin to build their 
credibility with the states and territories, and potentially begin to add value 
through positive improvements. In the meantime, these sentiments will remain 
at the government level and could have flow-on effects to the departments and 
agencies that will eventually become the subjects of CJPAs. Interview data 
indicates that the extent of these effects can be best mitigated through direct 
consultation, education and information sharing with the state and territory 
governments.
A third stakeholder group impacted by CJPAs is the state and territory auditees. 
The introduction of CJPAs at the Commonwealth level will add another layer of 
audit to the state and territory bureaucracies, which will likely be greeted with 
similar sentiment to that of the state and territory governments as described 
in the previous paragraph. Although the impacts on this relationship were not 
discussed in detail in the interviews, it is easy to extrapolate from the literature 
on the auditor–auditee relationship to anticipate some of the impacts on this 
group. If we consider Funnell and Wade’s (2012) study on the auditor‒auditee 
relationship at the ANAO, characterised by animosity, it would be expected that 
the auditor–auditee relationship between the Commonwealth auditors and state 
auditees to be potentially worse. Several authors (Lonsdale et al. 2011; Put and 
Turksema 2011) point to the need for performance audits to be seen to add value 
to the auditees, and therefore the ANAO must make sure their product is of high 
quality in order to justify the effort. 
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The remaining stakeholders identified earlier in this chapter will also be impacted 
by the addition of CJPAs to the Commonwealth Auditor-General’s mandate, 
however the findings from the various methods in this study suggest that they 
will be to a much lesser extent than the previous three groups identified at 
the state level. At the Commonwealth level, Parliament and the JCPAA will be 
impacted positively due to the increased confidence that CJPA access will bring 
through improving their understanding of how Commonwealth funding is 
being spent under NPPs and SPPs. Commonwealth auditees might be positively 
impacted during a CJPA if the additional state and territory information helps 
to better explain their actions or the quality of information they were given by 
the states and territories. Central agencies and the executive government at the 
Commonwealth level do not appear to be majorly impacted by these changes, 
which is of little surprise considering the endorsement of the amendments by 
the executive following the JCPAA’s recommendations. The media, the public, 
academics, and professional associations will be impacted by a CJPA no more 
than by the tabling of a standard performance audit, although in the early days 
of the launch of CJPAs, the new access provisions might become newsworthy.
Internal stakeholders
As mentioned above, a change in mandate, such as the addition of CJPA powers, 
can have flow-on effects for an audit agency’s internal process of performance 
audit, similar to those conceptualised in the literature by Pollitt et al. (1999) and 
Van Loocke and Put (2011). The findings from the interviews and the survey 
are generally consistent with this notion, and when applied to the ANAO it is 
clear that the addition of cross-jurisdictional powers has the potential to impact 
a range of performance audit activities, from planning through the conducting 
and reporting phases, and additional considerations will need to be made at 
each phase in the CJPA process.
During the pre-planning phase, it is clear from the interview data that the ANAO 
ought to begin with CJPA topics that are not too politically sensitive for state 
and territory governments, in order to allow time to build up the credibility and 
legitimacy of the process. Some low-risk and positive outcome audits that have 
little implications for the state and territory level bureaucracies could be a good 
place to start. A concentrated communications and education campaign from 
the ANAO about CJPAs was also indicated as essential to reducing the resistance 
of the state and territory governments. Once the planning phase has begun, the 
audit team will need to allot additional time to collect background information 
and to learn about state specific legislation, policies, rules and regulations. 
Auditors may also want to consult with the state and territory Auditors-General 
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about their knowledge and experience about the audit topic or if they have 
previously conducted audits in this area, although some interview participants 
indicated there might be varying degrees of cooperation from auditors-general.
In the conducting phase, unfamiliarity is once again the biggest consideration 
for the audit team. They will be accessing new premises, working with new 
auditees, and learning about new systems. This may take additional time and 
auditors could be faced with resistance or less cooperative staff. On the other 
hand, if this is done well, the ANAO auditors may face less resistance and 
animosity on the part of the state territory agencies by demonstrating that they 
are across the issues and have a sound understanding of the state and territory 
level processes. Additional time considerations might be necessary during 
the development of issues papers, as all interview participants indicated the 
necessity of providing the state and territory agencies with issues papers and 
opportunity to comment. The consultation and negotiation period that follows 
might take more time, especially if findings are less than desirable.
In the reporting phase, auditors will have to consider very carefully whether 
or not they will make recommendations to the state and territory agencies. 
More than half of the interview participants felt that direct recommendations 
to states and territories should not be made, and that instead they should be 
directed at the responsible Commonwealth department or agency. On the other 
hand, some interview participants felt that if there were areas identified for 
improvement, that recommendations are a natural part of the performance audit 
process, so clearly there remains some disagreement as to the best approach to 
recommendations in CJPAs. 
Finally, the tabling of reports also needs to be considered. Although most 
interview participants felt that the reports should only be tabled in the 
Commonwealth Parliament, several others indicated they believed there should 
be some mechanism or forum for the states and territories to discuss the findings 
of the report relevant to them. It would seem that the ANAO should consider 
producing alternate forms of the report for the state and territory auditees, or 
otherwise make them available upon request.
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Overall, the conduct of a CJPA will require a variety of additional considerations 
to be taken at each step in the performance audit process, and these are 
summarised and presented in Table 2. It is anticipated that many of these 
considerations will diminish over time, as the practice of CJPAs becomes more 
frequent and better understood.
Cooperative approaches
The benefits of engaging in cooperative approaches to performance audit 
were generally supported across all methods including the literature review, 
jurisdictional scan, interviews, and online survey. Much of the professional 
literature and guidance from INTOSAI indicated that many SAIs have had 
success with cooperative approaches to environmental audit, and that the 
practice has increased substantially in recent years (WGEA 2012). The 
jurisdictional scan and survey data also indicated that the cooperative approach 
has spread beyond environmental audits and is being used by many SAIs to 
tackle a range of problems shared by multiple jurisdictions, including those 
shared between national and sub-national governments. The interview data was 
generally supportive of the benefits that a cooperative approach could offer to 
Australia and demonstrated a desire to further pursue these approaches more 
often. However, it was also clear that some hesitation remains as to the efficacy 
and practical realities that may arise in the development of such an approach.
In the most general sense, the barriers to pursuing cooperative audits in Australia 
relate primarily to priorities, resources, secrecy provisions, and timing, and are 
consistent with those and others identified in the literature and the survey. The 
latter two — secrecy provisions and timing — appear to be the easiest to resolve 
through legislation amendments and the demonstration of flexibility by audit 
agencies with respect to their timing and tabling programs (see Appendix 2 
for current information-sharing capabilities of Australian auditors-general). The 
sharing of Cabinet-in-confidence information and other sensitive information 
amongst auditors has also been identified as a real concern by parliaments, 
however others believe that internal policies can be developed to ensure that 
these items are not shared by auditors between jurisdictions in cases where they 
are not deemed necessary. Auditors already operate with high-level security 
clearances and are familiar with their responsibilities relevant to the protection 
of sensitive information, so it seems that this barrier can be overcome.
With respect to differing priorities, coming to an agreement on an audit topic 
may well face resistance due to the various demands of the parliaments in each 
participating jurisdiction. On the other hand, as independent officers of the 
Parliament, it is also an auditor-general’s responsibility to identify areas of 
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of audit, then they are within their rights to pursue such topics. In the context 
of federal transfers to states and territories, often they are supplemented by 
state and territory funds, potentially producing programs of interest to both 
the Commonwealth and State or Territory auditors-general, so surely it would 
not be difficult to identify areas of mutual interest. Resourcing these areas of 
mutual interest, however, might be difficult due to the variations in resource 
capacity, particularly with performance audit budgets, so a policy of voluntary 
participation might be optimal. For example, as a larger organisation with a 
substantial performance audit budget, the Commonwealth Auditor-General may 
have substantially more resources and flexibility at his disposal as compared to 
some state and territory audit offices that conduct only a handful of performance 
audits annually.
Despite these concerns with the difficulties associated with cooperative audits, 
the cooperative approach was still identified in the interview data as the 
preferred approach to the CJPA or ‘go-it-alone’ approach that has been adopted 
by some national audit agencies to assess the spending of national financial 
transfers to sub-national levels of government. In particular, the coordinated 
and joint audit approaches seemed able to remedy one of the most commonly 
reported difficulties of the CJPA approach — that being the unfamiliarity of 
the national audit agency with the business and processes of the sub-national 
departments and agencies. The coordinated and joint approaches also allow for 
the legitimisation of the process by providing a role for the sub-national audit 
agencies. These agencies act as experts in the sub-national government field, 
and allow for more information exchange, as well as the division of labor to 
maximise areas of expertise.
Concurrent
The specific application of the concurrent approach was identified in the literature 
(INTOSAI 1998, 2004) and survey data as being the easiest of the cooperative 
approaches to performance audit due to the minimal extent of integration 
required by participating audit agencies. Apart from topic selection and a rough 
timeline, concurrent audits allow for greater coverage of an issue area without 
much deviation from an audit agency’s typical performance audit process and 
cycle. The jurisdictional scan revealed Canada as a frequent practitioner of 
concurrent audits and a proponent of the approach as an opportunity for the 
national audit office to share their capacity with the provincial audit offices. In 
Australia, concurrent audits were identified as a good starting point for a more 
cooperative approach to be taken between audit agencies, however many of the 
interview participants identified a preference for a more integrated approach, 
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one resembling a coordinated or joint audit. Both interview and survey data 
were consistent with the literature regarding the limitations of the concurrent 
approach — that being their overall limited impact.
Joint
The data from the interviews and the survey were also consistent with the 
literature on the joint approach, suggesting the overall desirability of joint 
audits over all other approaches, but at the same time acknowledging the 
various barriers that some agencies might face in realising this approach 
— reiterating why they are quite rare in practice. In Australia, interview 
participants identified barriers such as confidentiality and secrecy provisions 
in the governing legislation of auditors-general as a barrier to joint audits, 
along with administrative concerns, such as how to integrate employees from 
two different jurisdictions under one set of rules and regulations, salary, and 
methodological approaches to performance audit. Nevertheless, these concerns 
do not appear to be insurmountable — as legislation can be amended and policies 
and regulations can be altered — particularly in light of joint audits having 
occurred elsewhere in the world (UK, Germany), pointing to opportunities for 
guidance or advice to be obtained through contact with international partners. 
Furthermore, it appears that joint audits are perceived to be the most credible 
approach to auditing federal transfers to states and territories in Australia, as 
they legitimise any recommendations arising from the audit due to the direct 
involvement of the state and territory audit offices — neutralising any cries of 
infringement on sovereignty or constitutional rights. Finally, joint audits were 
indicated in the literature and the interviews as being perceived as the most 
comprehensive approach to shared issues due to the maximised integration of 
the two jurisdictions via a single audit team, and despite their greater time 
commitments, they ultimately hold the most potential to produce a high quality 
audit with the greatest impact.
Coordinated
The coordinated approach was portrayed in the literature as a good middle path 
approach between concurrent and joint audits, one that is flexible enough to 
be adjusted to suit the desires of the participating audit agencies (INTOSAI 
1998, 2004). The survey data also seemed to support this and was indicated as a 
practice undertaken by several of the surveyed audit agencies (UK, Netherlands, 
US, Ireland, Norway, and Switzerland). Naturally, the coordinated approach will 
take more time overall, as it requires frequent consultation and coordination 
by all participating audit agencies throughout each phase of the audit, and 
consensus has to be reached on a variety of significant decisions, including 
choosing the scope, methods, timelines and reporting style. The tradeoffs, 
however, were indicated in the literature and the survey data, pointing to a 
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better quality audit product with greater impact than a concurrent audit, as 
well as much closer relations between audit offices and greater opportunities to 
collaborate and improve relationships. An overall summary of the advantages 
and disadvantages of all approaches to inter-jurisdictional performance audit are 
presented in Table 3.
Summary 
This section presented a discussion of the main findings from the literature 
review, jurisdictional scan, interviews and online survey within the broader 
Australian context. Overall, it is clear that CJPAs are viewed as a positive 
addition to the Auditor-General’s mandate, as they will finally enable the full 
story through end-to-end performance audits of Commonwealth financial 
transfers to states and territories, and will provide the Commonwealth Parliament 
with a renewed sense of confidence in the accountability process. An impacts 
assessment was also presented indicating that the majority of impacts from this 
new power will be felt at the state and territory levels as well as internally at the 
ANAO. Finally, a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the cross-
jurisdictional and cooperative approaches to performance audit was presented, 
which concluded that that the choice of audit type is ultimately contingent 
upon audit circumstances.
The discussion section also revealed additional insights into the original conceptual 
framework presented earlier, particularly with respect to the more specific 
challenges the ANAO might face as it begins to fold in this new set of powers 
to its current mandate, and how these juxtapose themselves with the alternate 
approaches (namely cooperative audits), which appear to have widespread interest. 
With these new considerations in mind, an overlay to the conceptual framework 
has been developed to outline the more detailed decisions that the ANAO must 
make when considering a CJPA moving forward (see Figure 11).
Taken together, the findings suggest that there are several challenges to the 
unilateral introduction to CJPAs, particularly in first one or two years, that 
could be ameliorated by the involvement of the state and territory auditors to 
some extent, possibly through staff exchanges or secondments, to aid the ANAO 
in building their capacity and experience at the state and territory level. The 
widely supported cooperative approaches, while popular, do continue to retain 
barriers to their use that will require time, resources and legislation amendments 
prior to their use. However, cooperative audits do appear to be an optimal 
approach to be pursued for use in the medium to long term. 
Options and recommendations for the Commonwealth Auditor-General and the 
ANAO are presented in the following section.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12 . Cross-Jurisdictional Performance Audits
425
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































New Accountabilities, New Challenges
426
 Options, recommendations and implementation
This section explores the researcher’s recommendations to the Commonwealth 
Auditor-General and the ANAO as they begin to move forward with their 
new program to conduct CJPAs of state and territories when in receipt 
of Commonwealth funds for a specific Commonwealth purpose. The 
recommendations are presented in the form of three options and have been 
carefully considered in light of the findings from this research, as well as the 
current realities of resource and legislation limitations. A summary of the option 
considerations is presented in Figure 12. The options are presented in order of 
less to more program development and integration with the state and territory 
auditors-general.
Option 1 — Unilateral: Proceed with a small CJPA program 
integrated into the annual performance audit program
Commitment to the status quo would see the ANAO proceed as close to normal as 
possible when beginning to conduct of CJPAs unilaterally, working in a handful 
of unique CJPAs to their overall performance audit program. For example, out of 
approximately 55 performance audits per year, three of these could be identified 
as having cross-jurisdictional components. This would require no additional 
resources, and no additional staff, as the new CJPAs would simply take the place 
of previously allocated standard performance audits. 
Minimal engagement with stakeholders would take place such as courtesy 
notifications to the auditors-general of the relevant jurisdictions when a CJPA 
is about to begin. Contact with premiers or chief ministers could also be made, 
while contact with state and territory level auditees would be as normal, through 
designation letters at the beginning of an audit. As shown in the literature review 
and interview findings, the advantage of a CJPA is that few if any coordination 
and consultation commitments are required with key stakeholders beyond the 
initial notifications of the audit. This frees up the ANAO to pursue audits of 
their choice and on the timelines of their choice.
Topic selection would have to be carefully considered. Topics of low sensitivity 
to the state and territory governments could be prioritised for the early years 
and, as confidence is built by the auditees over time, the program could begin 
to include higher risk audits. There is also the possibility that the pre-planning 
work could take some additional time for the audit team members to familiarise 
themselves with the state and territory jurisdiction, so the Annual Audit Work 
Plan should account for the potentially longer performance audit process. 
Overall, this is a realistic option for the ANAO to move forward, because it 
will require minimal cost and resources by the ANAO and the legislation is 
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already in place to conduct such audits. This approach also allows the ANAO to 
retain control over the audit and guide it through the audit process according 
to their own criteria, scope, methods, reporting and timelines — with no 
compromises. The disadvantages of this approach are that the risks associated 
with the ANAO auditors not attaining a sufficient understanding of the state 
and territory systems, and producing a poor audit or otherwise difficult debates 
during the issues paper and recommendation phases. Likewise, if the ANAO 
ends up with a CJPA audit request from the JCPAA or responsible minister that 
is of high political sensitivity, they may find themselves insufficiently prepared 
and facing push-back from the states, making for a difficult and lower quality 
audit if accurate information is not obtained. If a poor audit is tabled, this could 
further undermine the credibility of the ANAO and their audit reports.
Option 2 — Integrated: Development of a formal CJPA program that 
is committed to the direct involvement of the state and territory 
audit staff through staff exchange or secondments to the ANAO
The integrated approach would see the ANAO pursue an approach similar 
to Option 1, but with a more significant commitment to involving state and 
territory audit staff in the process through audit-specific secondments or direct 
staff exchange. The knowledge and expertise gained through involvement 
of the state and territory auditors will help ensure that the new CJPA audits 
are conducted smoothly. Issues of information sharing are also circumscribed 
because seconded staff will be subsumed under federal legislation, and governed 
as federal public service employees. For example, if the ANAO wants to do a 
CJPA in the area of education, then they could liaise with the state or territory 
office involve and see if there are any staff available to come to the ANAO that 
usually work in the state level education portfolio. 
To do this, the Auditor-General could begin to liaise with state and territory 
level auditors-general, and draw up a memorandum of understanding. This will 
secure in principle commitment from the state and territory audit offices as 
to their willingness to be involved when they are able. Since this study has 
shown that the majority of auditors-general in Australia believed there was a 
role for them in the ANAO’s conduct of CJPAs, securing their involvement in 
some way should not be too difficult. Where possible, the ANAO should pursue 
direct staff exchanges in order to replenish any staff members drawn on at the 
state or territory level. If this is not possible and a secondment is pursued, 
then the ANAO will need additional resources to compensate the seconded 
staff, as well as the state or territory audit agency for their loss in capacity. 
Alternately, the ANAO could fund these secondments out of already existing 
secondment budgets, relieving the need for additional resources other than state 
compensation. The ANAO should develop a compensation plan to address the 
issue of capacity loss at the state level.
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There are several advantages and disadvantages to this option. On the one 
hand, commitment to an integrated approach will allow the Auditor-General 
to capitalise on the knowledge and expertise of the state and territory auditors 
— one of the biggest challenges to implementation identified in this study — 
and minimise resistance on the part of state and territory governments through 
improved legitimacy. In cases where involvement by state or territory audit 
staff can be secured, the resulting impacts are likely to be more comprehensive, 
have more impact and be perceived as more credible — ultimately increasing 
the uptake of recommendations and improving public management practices.
Furthermore, the direct secondment of staff helps the ANAO retain control 
over the audit, and avoid all the coordination and alignment difficulties that 
are associated with more cooperative approaches. There will also be benefits 
to the state and territory level staff, who will return to their offices with 
additional insight and learning about the practices of performance audit at the 
Commonwealth level. This has the potential for flow-on effects in the future if a 
cooperative audit program is pursued at a later date. On the other hand, it might 
be difficult to secure resources from some of the smaller audit offices or those 
that have small performance audit programs and it might be difficult to justify 
the loss of two staff members to an ANAO audit that is not a state or territory 
priority, despite the learning opportunities available for the state and territory 
auditors. Financial compensation from the ANAO, however, could ameliorate 
this problem by allowing state and territory audit offices to retain additional 
staff.
Option 3 — Cooperative: Commit to the development of a formal 
cooperative audit program, to be pursued alongside the CJPA 
program
The cooperative approach would see the Auditor-General proceed in a similar 
way as presented in Option 1, but with a formal commitment to pursuing a 
program of cooperative audits. Since there still remain some legislative barriers 
to cooperative audits, the Auditor-General could pursue an amendment to the 
Auditor-General Act 1997, to allow for the ability to share information with 
other audit agencies within Australia. This would require prior consultation and 
bargaining with Parliament, followed by a request to the JCPAA. The Auditor-
General should also advocate for the state and territory audit offices to pursue 
similar changes to their legislation.
Through the Australasian Council of Auditors-General forum, the Commonwealth 
Auditor-General could lead the way on the development of a formal cooperative 
audit program that would involve the movement towards coordinated and joint 
approaches to audits that relate to the federal financial transfers. Once a list 
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of topics has been identified, joint working groups composed of performance 
auditors from participating jurisdictions could begin to meet regularly and 
discuss options moving forward.
There are various costs associated with this option and significant investment of 
time and resources required. The ANAO will need to request funding from the 
JCPAA and receive approval. In the pre-development stages, ANAO staff will 
be required to meet with state and territory staff to work out guidelines for the 
cooperative audit program that are satisfying to all parties. Once the guidelines 
are set, the focus will shift to topic selection and participation. A forward plan 
should be developed to identify topics and participating jurisdictions.
There are several advantages and disadvantages to this option. Through 
formal cooperation, it will allow better audit coverage of the service delivery, 
particularly in cases where federal money is combined with state or territory 
funding — an area where CJPAs do not have coverage as it is only capable of 
auditing the spending of federal funds. The interviews conducted in this study 
indicate significant support for the cooperative approach and a preference for 
it over the CJPA approach, in part because the cooperative approach will have 
more meaning for the states and territories, and will be of more interest to their 
parliaments. On the other hand, it is clear that cooperative audits are time-
consuming and will cost more than standard audits, and they require a high 
degree of coordination and consultation between offices.
Recommended option
Option 2 is recommended for the ANAO as it begins to move ahead with its 
CJPA program. Option 2 incorporates all the basic considerations contained in 
Option 1, with the additional links to the state and territory audit office through 
a formal secondment program, but does not go so far as requiring the significant 
time and resource investments that come with a formal cooperative audit 
program. Bringing in staff from the state and territory agencies will improve the 
knowledge base of the ANAO in the early days, and mitigate many of the risks 
associated with entering new audit terrain at the state and territory level. In 
addition, involvement of the state and territory auditors will improve uptake of 
the recommendations and improve audit legitimacy. 
While this approach appears to be the most realistic at the present time, it does 
not preclude the eventual development of a cooperative audit program, which 
has clearly garnered significant support and offers additional incentives that 
may not be captured in the secondment approach alone. The recommended 
approach should be considered the best course of action in the early days, but 
with an eye towards the future development of a cooperative audit program 
following necessary legislation amendments and budget increases.
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Figure 12: Options summary: Strengths and limitations
Source: Author’s research.
Implementation
Discussed below is a brief implementation strategy for Option 2, including key 
components to be addressed before the ANAO moves forward with CJPAs.
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The first step will be for the ANAO to begin liaising with the state and 
territory audit offices and work towards the development of a memorandum of 
understanding relating to secondments and staff exchanges for the purposes of 
CJPAs. This will help the ANAO determine which of the agencies would have 
immediate capacity and which might be more limited. It could also be used 
to clarify some of the terms and conditions of the secondments or exchanges 
including agency preferences, however individual employment contracts can 
also be used as in regular secondment and exchange situations.
The next step will be to develop a compensation plan to be used when 
secondments are used instead of direct staff exchange. This plan will outline 
how state and territory agencies would be compensated in the event that a 
secondment takes place and will include detailed financial information to allow 
the ANAO to best estimate costs when beginning to pursue a secondment.
The current secondment policy and budget should be reviewed immediately 
in order to determine how much flexibility exists within the current budget 
for additional secondments, as well as earmarking potential CJPA secondments 
for the upcoming year. A review of previous years’ annual reports reveals that 
secondments can fluctuate from year to year, which suggests there is some 
flexibility in the budget.
Once the previous planning documents are in place, the ANAO can move ahead 
with any CJPA identified by a minister, the JCPAA or by the Auditor-General 
Once approval has been secured, the ANAO should immediately approach the 
relevant state or territory audit office, to notify them and inquire about possible 
staff exchange or secondment for the audit. This should allow ample time for the 
state or territory audit office to prepare for incoming ANAO staff or otherwise 
loss of their own. Compensation can then be pursued. Once secondment or staff 
exchange is agreed upon, the ANAO can begin making preparations for the 
secondees’ arrival. Once secondees arrive, the audit team can begin to develop 
the Audit Work Plan and proceed with their performance audit as normal, but 
with the additional expertise of the state or territory audit staff. 
Following the conclusion and tabling of the performance audit, the ANAO 
should conduct an evaluation of the CJPA process using the secondment or staff 
exchange components, to determine whether it was an effective approach. The 
evaluation should include input from all stakeholders involved in the new CJPA 
process.
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Conclusion
The aim of this study was to assess the impacts of the new cross-jurisdictional 
performance audit powers of the Commonwealth Auditor-General on key 
stakeholders, including the ANAO, and to explore alternative approaches, such 
as cooperative audits. First, a review of background information outlining 
the Australian context was provided, followed by a review of the relevant 
performance audit literature. Next, a jurisdictional scan was conducted to 
explore performance audit practices of other national audit agencies, followed 
by interviews with a range of experts in the field of public audit. Finally, an 
online survey was administered to solicit international perspectives on CJPAs 
and cooperative audit approaches.
Findings from the study suggest that impacts of the new CJPA powers are 
anticipated to be widespread and not without their challenges, but will be 
concentrated at the state and territory levels, with the bulk of the effects 
felt by central agencies, auditees and auditors-general. While earlier fears of 
constitutional challenge on the part of the states appear to have diminished, 
both the credibility and reputation of the ANAO depend upon the outcomes of 
these audits. Therefore the ANAO must be diligent in its efforts to mitigate the 
risks associated with CJPAs through appropriate stakeholder management and 
by focusing on low sensitivity audits in the early days.
One of the best approaches to mitigating these risks would be to involve the state 
and territory audit staff through staff exchange or secondments, particularly in 
the first one to two years of the new CJPA program. This would help address 
the biggest concerns on the ground that relate to how well and how quickly 
ANAO staff can familiarise themselves with the state and territory operations, as 
well as how their new auditees will respond to the presence of federal auditors. 
It will also satisfy the desire of the state and territory auditors-general to be 
involved in the CJPA process, while providing overall legitimacy to the federal 
presence in state and territory jurisdictions. This approach will also be low in 
cost and does not require additional legislative amendments.
Although the evidence collected here presents a substantial case for the 
pursuance of more cooperative approaches to performance audit, particularly 
with respect to the issue of federal financial transfers, it is also clear that these 
approaches can be time and labor intensive, and still face legislative barriers 
that restrict information-sharing amongst audit offices. In order to pursue this 
approach, the ANAO will need to seek additional funding, as will the state and 
territory auditors-general, and some amendments to information sharing will 
have to be made at the state and territory level. However, in the medium to 
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long term of 5–10 years, this approach holds promise for improved working 
relationships between audit offices and levels of government more generally, 
and ultimately improved performance audit outcomes. 
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Appendix 1: List of interview participants
Biography information for interview participants has been gathered from the 
various audit office websites as well as through general internet searches.
• Ian McPhee (ANAO) — Ian McPhee was appointed as Auditor-General for 
Australia in March 2005. His previous position was as Deputy Secretary, 
Financial Management Group, Department of Finance and Administration, 
where his responsibilities included managing and providing policy advice 
to the Finance Minister on the budget and financial management framework; 
budget and financial reporting, and analysis for whole of government 
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purposes; public sector superannuation; and the Office of Evaluation of 
Audit. From 1998 to January 2003, Ian was Deputy Auditor-General at the 
ANAO, where he was responsible to the Auditor-General for the delivery of 
the performance and assurance audit programs. 
• Russell Coleman (ANAO) — Russell Coleman is a senior staff member at the 
ANAO and has worked for the office in various capacities for close to 30 
years.
• Andrew Greaves (QLD) — Andrew Greaves became the Auditor-General of 
Queensland in December 2011. Prior to this appointment, Andrew had been 
an Assistant Auditor-General at the Victorian Auditor-General’s Office since 
2006 and headed both the Financial Audit Group and the Performance Audit 
Group. Andrew has over 27 years experience in public sector external and 
internal audit, at the Commonwealth, state and local government levels. 
• Colin Murphy (WA) — Colin Murphy was appointed Auditor-General for 
Western Australia in June 2007. Colin has extensive experience in finance and 
administration in State and Commonwealth government roles. He has held 
senior positions within the state government in the Departments of Justice, 
Treasury and Finance, Land Administration, and the Building Management 
Authority. He has also worked for the Commonwealth Department of 
Finance in Perth and Washington DC, and as Business Manager for Murdoch 
University. Colin is a member of the Australian Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board. He holds a Bachelor of Commerce degree from the University 
of Western Australia. He is a Fellow, former board member and past State 
President of CPA Australia and a Fellow of Chartered Secretaries Australia 
and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia. 
• Des Pearson (VIC) — Des Pearson was appointed Auditor-General of Victoria 
in October 2006. He was previously Auditor-General of Western Australia 
from 1991 to 2006. He has been an involved member of CPA Australia, 
the Institute of Public Administration, and the Australian Institute of 
Management.
• Mike Blake (TAS) — Mike Blake was appointed Tasmanian Auditor-General 
in May 2004. Prior to accepting the position, he was Auditor-General for 
the Northern Territory and had previous worked as the Deputy Auditor-
General of Western Australia. Mike has been an active member of the Public 
Sector Accounting Standards Board from 1994 to 1999, a member of the 
Urgent Issues Group representing Auditors-General from 2003 to 2005 and 
was appointed to the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board on 1 January 
2006. Mike is a Fellow of ICA Australia and of CPA Australia.
• Frank McGuiness (NT) — Frank McGuiness was appointed as the Auditor-
General of the Northern Territory in September 2004. He previously held 
senior positions in the Northern Territory and South Australian Treasuries. 
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Originally from South Australia, Frank completed an undergraduate degree 
in economics and a Master of Financial Management degree.
• Megan Young (ACT) — Megan Young is a Senior Audit Manager at the ACT 
Auditor General’s Office.
• Rob Oakeshott, MP — Rob Oakeshott is an independent member of 
Parliament for Lyne, an electorate situated on the mid-north coast of New 
South Wales. Since joining federal Parliament in September 2008, Rob has 
invested heavily in committee work, including his current chairmanship 
of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit and the Standing 
Committee on the National Broadband Network. Rob played a figurative role 
in the amendments to the Commonwealth Auditor-General Act both as Chair 
of the JCPAA and after introducing a private member’s bill supporting the 
amendments in 2011.
• Russell Chafer, former Secretary of the JCPAA — Russell Chafer was the 
Secretary for the JCPAA during the time of the Inquiry into the Auditor-
General Act 1997, but has since moved to the Clerk’s Office at the House of 
Representatives. 
• Pat Barrett, former Commonwealth Auditor-General — Pat Barrett served a 
10-year term as Auditor-General for Australia until 2005. He is now a Senior 
Fellow at ANU Australian National Centre for Audit and Assurance Research 
and has expertise in numerous areas including public sector management, 
information technology, and financial, auditing and budgeting issues. He 
is a member of the Board of Governors of the International Federation of 
Accountants, the peak body of accountants in the world responsible for the 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board and the International 
Public Sector Accounting Standards Board. Mr. Barrett is also a prolific 
writer on the subject of auditing, accounting, and public management, and 
many of his papers have been published in either books or journals. 
• Glenn Poole, former Auditor General for Queensland — Glenn Poole served 
as Queensland’s Auditor-General from 2004 to 2011. Prior to that he was a 
senior executive in the Queensland Treasury Department for over 15 years. 
Glenn is now Executive in Residence at the Australian Centre for Philanthropy 
and Nonprofit Studies at Queensland University of Technology in Brisbane.
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Appendix 2: Comparison of legislative powers 
of Australian auditors-general




No No No No Yes(2011) No No No No


































Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
* This possibility was outlined in an interview with the Auditor-General for the Northern Territory

